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A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S
IT ’S  ONLY F IT TING that in a book that tracks influences, I acknowledge my 
own.
At Williams, Brian Martin and Kashia Pieprzak opened up my horizon of 
possibility, making me want to become a professor of French (and a person) 
like them.
At Yale, Alice Kaplan taught me to think for myself, and her gift of and 
with language continues to inspire. Thank you, from one A.  K. to another. 
Margaret Homans was an early believer in my work and her interest and 
engagement were invaluable. I’m grateful that Howard Bloch and Maurice 
Samuels have continued to support and encourage my work throughout the 
years. Agnès Bolton sustained me through more crises of faith than I can 
count. The anagram Ange(s) Bolton is a fitting one.
At Duke, the Contemporary Novel Group, the Triangle French History 
and Culture Seminar, Nancy Armstrong, Michèle Longino, Helen Solterer, and 
Kate Costello were thoughtful interlocutors indispensable to the crucial work 
of reframing the project and discovering what shape it was supposed to take. 
Anne Garréta pushed me to write freely without looking to her for approval 
or permission. Rey Chow’s quick laughter and careful listening and reading 
modeled an intellectual engagement and generosity to which I aspire. Robyn 
Wiegman showed me how important the psychic dimension of writing is, and 
how much of it is craft and labor. Karen Bell and Tiwonda Johnson-Blount’s 
warmth and kindness reminded me of the humanity that all this work is about 
and for. I’m grateful for the Provost’s Postdoctoral Fellowship for my two for-
mative years there.
Across the Atlantic, Suzette Robichon was a stalwart supporter who taught 
me much about French feminism, and Olivier Wagner guided me through 
Sarraute’s papers at the BnF, helping me get a sense of the texture of the real 
lives that were hers and her interlocutors’ and serving as an incisive reader 
and critic of her work.
I am thrilled to have landed in the Romance Languages and Literatures 
department at Harvard to finish this book. I thank Alice Jardine for helping 
me, at a crucial juncture, gain perspective on how to tell this story. Harvard 
French was so important in bringing French feminism to the United States 
and starting this conversation—I’m humbled by the opportunity to contribute.
I couldn’t have done this without my editor, Kristen Elias Rowley, and her 
unflagging support in seeing this through from its earliest iteration to what 
it’s now become. The comments of the Press’s readers, anonymous and known, 
have improved the book immensely. Many thanks to Jennifer Willging for a 
generous and meticulous reading that attended to both content and form. I 
do not have sufficient words to thank Lynne Huffer for the labor and care with 
which she read the manuscript and pushed my thought to where it needed to 
go. If the final product reflects just half her brilliance, I will be satisfied.
No acknowledgments would be complete without my family, who’ve 
always believed in me, and my friends, especially fellow academics—Raisa 
Rexer, Julie Elsky, Kristin Okoli, Kevin Holden, Marika Knowles, Joy Kim, 
Taylor Moore, Durba Mitra—for their solidarity, and in Durba’s case, for kick-
ing my introduction into shape.
Finally, in all these places listed, and every page, Hannah Frydman was 
there. During this project of reimagining the world through literature, she’s 
made this world we live in my (feminist) home, and this text we’ve lived in a 
true chantier littéraire.
Part of Chapter 3 was originally published as “The Riddle of Racial Differ-
ence in Anne Garréta’s Sphinx.” © 2018 Cornell University. This article first 
appeared in Diacritics, Volume 45, Issue 1, January 2017, pages 4–22.
Publication of this book was generously supported by subventions from 
Harvard’s FAS Tenure-Track Publication Fund and the Romance Languages 
and Literatures Department’s Potter Publication Fund.
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W H AT A B O U T T H E W O R L D  needs to be undone? This book turns to the 
French writers Nathalie Sarraute, Monique Wittig, and Anne Garréta for 
answers. For Sarraute, it’s the categorizing social forces that impose deaden-
ing contours onto our otherwise boundless subjectivities and flatten us into 
socially legible types and characters. For Wittig, it’s the straight mind, that 
purportedly universal thought that animates the dominant social order and 
sorts humanity into the various identity categories that constitute the hierar-
chy that heteropatriarchy requires and is built on. For Garréta, the response 
could be articulated positively as a call to queer the world. For all three writ-
ers, though, their works problematize and resist difference, understood as the 
concept that makes categories possible. My concern here is with those catego-
ries that produce hierarchy and oppression (e.g., sex, race, class, sexual orien-
tation, and nationality). Deployed as identity, difference has a stranglehold on 
the way we live. Its categories are the ones that govern how we navigate the 
world and know it or, at least, claim to know it. These categories are so natu-
ral to our thought and our processes of knowledge formation that they seem 
indispensable—givens. Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta, however, write novels 
that refuse to accept these categories as givens and reject the idea that differ-
ence is a necessary condition for human existence. In their writing, difference 
does not work the way it normally works in the extratextual world that both 
writer and reader live in. Unbecoming Language tells the story of this literary 
fabrication of a way of being where difference is not necessary.
This book thus tells a political story—the story of literature’s political 
potential, and of how the novel not only thinks, to use Nancy Armstrong’s 
phrase,1 but how it can act. This book is also a feminist story, as it takes as a 
starting point the premise that feminism is a theory and practice that aims for 
the end of identity-based oppression. In my view, feminism should be con-
cerned not only with sex- or gender-based oppression but also with hierarchy, 
the conceptual foundation for such oppression, which is the same founda-
tion for all other forms of oppression such as racism, classism, homophobia, 
etc. Feminism, then, as I use it, locates the origins of its political drive in a 
consciousness-awakening around gender-based oppression that radiates cen-
trifugally to expose the way all systems of oppression are imbricated such that, 
to combat one, one must combat the others.2
This book can also be thought of as a supplement to accounts of French 
literature that treat Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta, but not their interrelation-
ship—the intergenerational chain of influence where Sarraute is a central 
influence on Wittig’s writing, and Wittig is, in turn, a central influence on 
Garréta’s writing. Treating Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta together as a literary 
configuration loosens each writer’s anchoring in the groups or collectivities 
with which she is associated (the New Novel for Sarraute; the radical lesbian 
feminist movement and the Mouvement de Libération des Femmes [Women’s 
Liberation Movement], or MLF, for Wittig; and the Oulipo for Garréta), and 
articulates a strain of anti-difference feminist thought that has been largely 
forgotten in our (Anglo-American) histories of French feminism.
Anti-difference French feminism (i.e., feminism that rejects the idea 
of essential or constitutive sexual difference to argue that it is instead con-
structed) has largely been relegated to and compressed within the tumultu-
ous decades of the MLF’s action and organizing—the 1970s and 1980s. While 
histories and accounts of this strand of French feminist thought and action 
exist,3 anti-difference French feminist thought hasn’t been taken up by schol-
ars and critics as the foundation for a feminist poetics and literary practice the 
way differentialist French feminist thought has. Where literature’s intersection 
with feminism is concerned, the differentialist poetics of écriture féminine—
the writing of feminine difference through a writing of the female body—as 
articulated and theorized by Hélène Cixous, has dominated and continues to 
 1. Armstrong, How Novels Think.
 2. See hooks, Feminist Theory, which speaks powerfully to the need for feminism to con-
test more than sexism and misogyny.
 3. See Duchen, Feminism in France; Picq, Libération des femmes; Collectif, “MLF.”
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dominate our sense of feminist literary possibility.4 As a result, anti-difference 
thinkers such as Monique Wittig, Colette Guillaumin, and Christine Delphy 
have existed in the long shadows cast by their differentialist counterparts.5
This book thus also reframes not only literary histories but the history of 
French feminism and the adventure of its transatlantic life. When we think 
of French feminism, we most often think of differentialist feminism, which 
dominates Anglo-American accounts of French feminism. Accordingly, one 
of my hopes is that this book will make a persuasive case for the anti-differ-
ence poetics of Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta (whose relationship to difference 
cannot be adequately represented by the prefix anti, a point I will return to 
later), and for the anti-difference feminist thought their writing enacts, so that 
we might have a different framework for perceiving French feminism. Dif-
ferentialist and anti-difference French feminism are concomitant strands of 
thought that have both given rise to compelling and rich bodies of literature. 
The anti-difference stance that I take in this book is not meant to dismiss the 
theory and literature that have emerged out of a commitment to and engage-
ment with difference—I recognize that Cixous, Irigaray, and Kristeva’s work 
has invigorated feminist thought and writing. However, while there has been 
sustained scholarly and critical engagement with differentialist French femi-
nism, anti-difference French feminism has been largely treated as a historical 
footnote—more materialist, less literary, and less theoretically complex than 
its headier differentialist counterparts. In Unbecoming Language, I call atten-
tion to a body of thought and literary production that has been overlooked 
but that constitutes an original feminist poetics, which, alongside and in con-
tradistinction to the poetics of écriture féminine, suggests ways to refashion 
the world to make it more just.
 4. For instance, Weil, “French Feminism’s Écriture Féminine,” gives a measured and 
thoughtful account of the relationship between French feminism and writing that acknowl-
edges the plurality and heterogeneity of the modern French feminist movement and the artifi-
ciality of the Cixous-Irigaray-Kristeva grouping. Nonetheless, she binds Wittig with these other 
three writers and thinkers of difference and sees all four “creating the feminine in their own 
work [. . .] to provoke women to participate in reimagining their lives and their world” (169).
 5. Cixous, Irigaray, and Kristeva’s complex poststructuralist- and deconstructionist-
inflected work has continued to engage scholars to the present day, a success that parallels 
the larger importation of such figures as Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, and 
Jacques Lacan into the American intellectual universe as exemplars of French Theory. For more 
on the creation of French Theory, see Lotringer and Cohen, French Theory in America; Poel, 
Bertho, and Hoenselaars, Traveling Theory; Cusset, French Theory. 
There has recently been a renewal of interest in this anti-difference, materialist strand 
of French feminism, but those seeking to call attention to thinkers like Delphy and Wittig have 
reinforced and confirmed the narrative of their feminism as an overlooked one. See Disch, 
“Christine Delphy’s Constructivist Materialism”; Hemmings, Why Stories Matter.
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Readers will probably be familiar with at least one of the writers I exam-
ine: Sarraute is a canonical figure in twentieth-century French literature, 
somewhat akin to a French Virginia Woolf; Wittig enjoys a certain canonicity 
in her own right in feminist and lesbian circles; and Garréta, as a member of 
the highly publicized literary group Oulipo and a recipient of the Prix Médicis 
as well as a member of its jury, is a well-known and respected member of con-
temporary French literary circles.6 But these writers are not known together. 
By being known together, each of their corpora takes on a new, collective 
dimension that speaks not only to their own work but to the greater question 
of what literature can do. My conviction, which I hope will be shared, is that 
the answer is a firm “a lot.”
Through their experimentation with language, Sarraute, Wittig, and Gar-
réta stage a different relationship with respect to language from what we find 
in conventional realist novels. These three writers demonstrate that literature 
can hollow out difference and rework our subjectivity. The reworking of sub-
jectivity is not a given, however, and is only realized if we have a proper expe-
rience of literature. In an interview with The Paris Review, Garréta speaks to 
this need to experience literature:
Nowadays, people don’t read literature the way they should read it. They 
read it to find an example of something they have thought about earlier. Just 
an illustration, if you will. Very few people are willing to undergo the real 
experience of reading a book. It’s also possibly because so many books are 
formulaic, so it’s not an experience any longer.
When asked to articulate what she means by experience, Garréta responds by 
describing what reading the way we should accomplishes:
Well, you embark on the thing and you don’t necessarily know where you’re 
going, and as you experience the book—or it can be a movie or a piece of 
art—it reorders the circulation of your affects, of your perceptions, in a way 
which is not always easy to figure out because it’s, once again, very opaque. 
[.  .  .] But—something happens. It manipulates your desires, your percep-
tions, your affects in ways that aren’t predictable.7
 6. As the journalist Alain Salles put it, “Anne Garréta, like Pascal Quignard, is a well-
known writer.”  Salles, “Grasset retrouve son rang.” All translations in Unbecoming Language, 
unless otherwise noted, are my own.
 7. Gerard, “States of Desire.”
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Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta are able to effect this opaque reworking of our 
subjectivity, this “something,” if and when we really read them. What read-
ing them entails is an openness to being compelled, by their reworking of 
language and rejection of the formulaic, to rework our own relationships to 
language so that we might be able to experience ourselves as subjectivities 
without subjecthood. To be a subjectivity without subjecthood is to have a 
conscious experience of the world that is located specifically in our individual 
way of being in and perceiving the world—what we might call the self—with-
out that experience and location then being immediately defined and delin-
eated by subjecthood.
Subjecthood is the container in which we can be identified, interpellated, 
and taken up as a subject, be it the much maligned liberal subject who embod-
ies an irresponsible and arrogant individualism, or the psychoanalytic subject 
divided by the unconscious, or the biopolitical subject ordered and disciplined 
by various apparatuses and networks of power. Subjectivity without subject-
hood constitutes a radical reconfiguration of what it means for us, as human 
beings, to be in the world. It is neither the transcendence of being desubjec-
tivated, of being outside oneself or no longer oneself (through self-shattering 
jouissance or otherwise),8 nor is it the immanence of assujettissement, to use 
Foucault’s term for subjectivation, in which individuals are produced as sub-
jects through submission to power. Subjectivity without subjecthood is itself, 
without being mired in immanence, fixed or constrained by identity, pinned 
down by the various kinds of difference by which the social order would seek 
to immobilize it.
Literature, in the hands of Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta, is an important 
corrective to what we increasingly do to language and what it does to us. Their 
formal experiments draw attention to the way language is always a fabrication 
and always in the process of fabricating. By drawing attention to the process 
by which they create fictional worlds, alternative textual realities, they open 
up a space where we might stop being passive consumers of a language that 
determines the shape of who we are and what sort of a life we lead—a space in 
which to encounter a language that reworks us. Literature, when it rejects the 
 8. This self-shattering jouissance is associated with queer theory’s engagement with nega-
tivity and the anti-relational. See Bersani, “Is the Rectum a Grave?,” which puts the language 
of self-shattering jouissance on the conceptual map; Edelman, No Future, which takes up the 
mantle of Bersanian anti-relationality to argue for a queer embrace of embodying the death 
drive; Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, which displaces self-shattering onto the figure of the suicide 
bomber. For an interesting take on desubjectivation that sees it as an ethical, and thus rela-
tional, site, see Lynne Huffer’s engagement with Foucault in Mad for Foucault and Are the Lips 
a Grave? I take up the question of queer theory’s sustained engagement and association with 
negativity and self-shattering or self-undoing later in the introduction.
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tyranny of a self-identical, referential real and embraces the fictive, interrupts 
the flow of “reality” long enough for us to stop coinciding with the identities 
that have been assigned to us by forces beyond our control (i.e., disciplinary 
bodies such as the social order, the state, the community). It makes it possible 
for us to exist differently—freed, at least momentarily, from the determin-
ism of difference. This subjectivity without subjecthood—where one is fully in 
oneself but free, fluid, unfixed, potential—is what I call unbecoming.
We are immediately assujettis, subjected from the moment we enter into 
life,9 language, and consciousness—pushed toward a predetermined path of 
becoming who it is that we have been told we are (woman, man, straight, 
white, American, etc.). Consequently, this state of subjectivity without sub-
jecthood will always succeed the becoming-identity we all undergo. It will 
always be a negative reaction to what we’ve become. Unbecoming is thus an 
act of erosion (eroding those categories we ostensibly correspond to and are 
contained by) and of excess (becoming more than our identitarian limits 
would have us be, spilling out past the contours that used to delimit us). Sar-
raute describes this state of subjectivity without subjecthood as follows: “On 
the inside, I feel myself to be everything and nobody. When, sitting here in 
this armchair, I speak to you, I don’t know who’s in front of you. Of course, 
one can say what the social person is, we can say what our social roles are . . . 
There, already, we’re dealing with several persons, but I don’t feel myself to be 
any of them. To whom are you speaking? I does not know [je ne sait pas]. [. . .] 
We are such an immensity, so many things happen in us that, seen from the 
inside, there is no identity.”10 Unbecoming is the process by which one attains 
this non-identitarian state of plurality and possibility, and it passes through 
an encounter or relationship with language, which is precisely what Sarraute, 
Wittig, and Garréta enact in their writing.
Beyond freedom from identitarian strictures, unbecoming provides a 
way out of the epistemological impasse in which we find ourselves today. In 
contemporary thought, one of the most significant developments in the last 
decade or so has been the new materialist turn—a return to the material, 
regularly invoked as the real, which entails moving past the linguistic turn 
that dominated the intellectual landscape of the late twentieth century with its 
attention to the discursive construction of reality and insistence on the insta-
bility and multiplicity of meaning.11 In Becoming Undone, Elizabeth Grosz, a 
 9. See Stryker, “My Words to Victor Frankenstein,” 249–50, for a discussion of birth pro-
nouncements of gender such as “It’s a girl.”
 10. Benmussa and Sarraute, Entretiens avec Nathalie Sarraute, back cover, 121.
 11. Prominent new materialist thinkers include Jane Bennett, Bruno Latour, Mel Chen, and 
Elizabeth Grosz, who hail from different disciplinary backgrounds.
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thinker of new materialism, argues for feminist theory to move beyond iden-
tity politics, the subject, and the epistemological, and “turn, or perhaps return 
to questions of the real—not empirical questions regarding states of affairs 
(for these remain epistemological), but questions of the nature and forces of 
the real, the nature and forces of the world, cosmological forces as well as 
historical ones. In short, it needs to welcome again what epistemologies have 
left out: the relentless force of the real, a new metaphysics.”12 Grosz’s argument 
is based on an opposition between the epistemological and the metaphysi-
cal, the representational and the real, the conceptual and the material, where 
epistemology is always at odds with a direct experience of the real. I propose 
unbecoming as an abstention from having to choose between epistemology 
and ontology. Unbecoming, just as it reworks subjectivity, cutting subjecthood 
loose, also reworks epistemology.
Unbecoming subjectivity is experiential, open to and attentive to the 
material (in particular, the materiality of language, where this materiality is 
not simply material in its effects but in itself).13 It is cognitive, but it is not 
knowing. Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta use language to suspend the ways in 
which language consolidates and produces knowledge. Instead of language 
enabling the subject to know the world and thereby master self and world, 
language here erodes and exceeds the subject, transforming it into a con-
sciousness that cannot use language to consolidate knowledge and the identi-
ties that are the objects of such knowledge. The only thing that unbecoming 
subjectivity can be is itself—not an identity, or a subject, but a consciousness 
that experiences itself as unbounded. It can only exist in its experience, and 
it is powerless to decant that experience into discrete epistemological units 
or bodies such as knowledge and truth. The subjectivity without subjecthood 
does not know anything—it experiences its own unknowingness and, in that 
experience, is freed from compulsory knowledge, compulsory identity, a com-
pulsory way of being. Cognition without connaissance—that is the humble 
position of unbecoming subjectivity. It takes in experience and lets it go, at 
a point of equilibrium between materiality and knowledge, where neither 
the material nor the conceptual have taken up their positions of opposition 
and incompatibility. Unbecoming is thus a state of radical neutrality, neither 
purely epistemological nor purely ontological, but a state that, as it dissolves 
the boundaries of itself, refuses to be contained in either knowledge or the 
material. It is, to draw again on Sarraute’s language, “this self-evident fact—or 
 12. Grosz, Becoming Undone, 85.
 13. In Chapter 2, I discuss the materiality of language that emerges in Sarraute, Wittig, and 
Garréta’s writing and its difference from the materiality theorized by new materialisms.
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is it madness?—that each of us is an entire universe unto ourselves, that we 
feel infinite, without contours.”14
So, who are Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta, these writers of unbecoming? Their 
unbecoming poetics emerges through reading them together as forming a col-
lective project of anti-identitarian writing, where each writer’s individual cor-
pus is shaped by her own approach to and conception of difference, which is 
informed by her particular historical moment. In the next section, I will situate 
and describe each writer in chronological order, so that the reader may famil-
iarize herself with authors that she may not otherwise know and obtain a sense 
of the historical context of each writer’s literary production. Afterward, the 
remainder of the introduction will be devoted to addressing methodological 
issues.
NATHALIE SARRAUTE (1900–99)
Nathalie Sarraute (born Nathalie Tcherniak), an author whose works have 
been translated into more than thirty languages and immortalized in Gal-
limard’s prestigious Pléiade collection in 1996 while she was still alive, is one 
of the major French novelists of the twentieth century. She is considered a 
central figure of the Nouveau Roman, or New Novel, a group of experimental 
writers including Alain Robbe-Grillet, Claude Simon, and Michel Butor, who, 
in the 1950s and 1960s, became famous in some circles and notorious in oth-
ers for pursuing literary innovation through the refusal of such conventions 
as well-developed characters or plot-driven linear narratives, which they asso-
ciated with the traditional—and to them, outdated—Balzacian realist novel.
Born July 18, 1900 in Ivanovo, Russia, to a well-off, cultured, secular Jew-
ish family, Sarraute first came to France in 1902 following her parents’ divorce 
to live in Paris with her mother, Pauline Chatounowski, who wrote under the 
pen name N. Vikhrovski. She spent two months each year in either Russia or 
Switzerland with her father, Ilya Tcherniak, who was a chemist of such repute 
that the tsar issued him a special dispensation permitting him to live in Iva-
novo even though he was Jewish. Sarraute, who was already being raised by 
her parents to be bilingual in French and Russian, spent the first part of her 
education in the French system, where she learned to read and write. Sarraute 
went back and forth between Russia and France until her father became the 
 14. Sarraute, Prière d’insérer to “disent les imbéciles.”
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primary custodial parent in 1909, at which point he’d already immigrated to 
Paris because of political persecution in Russia.
An excellent student, in 1920 Sarraute obtained her licence (the French 
equivalent of a BA) at the Sorbonne in English literature. Her studies also took 
her abroad: she started, but didn’t finish, a BA in history at Oxford, and spent 
several months in Berlin studying sociology, history, and working on her Ger-
man. Sarraute returned to Paris and went to law school, where she met her 
husband and lifelong reader, Raymond Sarraute, who would prove to be enor-
mously influential in introducing her to his literary and artistic tastes. Sarraute 
practiced law until the German occupation of France in World War II made 
it impossible for Jews to do so. She left the bar but refused to wear the yellow 
star, going instead into hiding until the Allied Liberation of Paris, at which 
point she returned to Paris and, no longer a practicing lawyer, dedicated her-
self to writing, which would be her principal occupation for the rest of her life.
In 1932, Sarraute started to write what would, after years of working and 
reworking, end up being Tropismes. Her manuscript, completed in 1937, was 
rejected by numerous Parisian publishers before finally being accepted by 
Denoël in 1939, but would not be well-received until it was republished in 1957 
by the Éditions de Minuit.15 Her second work, the novel Portrait d’un inconnu 
[Portrait of a Man Unknown] (1948), hardly did better: despite a preface by 
Jean-Paul Sartre, national hero and intellectual, whom she’d met during the 
Occupation, the manuscript was rejected by Gallimard and published by Rob-
ert Marin, who bought back the novels at the cost of paper and freed Sarraute 
from her contract after the novel sold only 400 copies.
It took a long time for Sarraute to establish herself as a writer. It was only 
in the 1950s, when the New Novel movement was in the air and the subject of 
much press and media attention, that Sarraute began to enjoy more success, 
with Gallimard publishing two novels—Martereau (1953), Le Planétarium [The 
Planetarium] (1959)—and a collection of literary criticism, L’Ère du soupçon 
[The Age of Suspicion] (1956), which would come to stand alongside Alain 
Robbe-Grillet’s Pour un nouveau roman [For a New Novel] (1963) as the two 
most important theoretical works on the New Novel. In refusing to create nov-
els with traditional characters, plots, or narrative, the New Novelists refused 
identification with either the explicitly political and ideologically charged lit-
térature engagée [committed literature] that Sartre had made influential in the 
postwar years, or the depoliticized, dilettantish right-wing literature of the 
Hussards. Their writing constituted a literary example of Théophile Gautier’s 
 15. The lack of success of the Denoël edition may have had something to do with its unfor-
tunate coinciding with the beginning of World War II, in addition to the difficult and experi-
mental nature of her writing.
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call for “art for art’s sake,” and this aestheticism put them at the modernist 
front of French literature.
With the advent of the New Novel, Sarraute was finally able to establish 
herself as a writer. After the publication of Le Planétarium, she was invited 
by universities all around the world to give talks about her work and con-
temporary literature (especially the New Novel). While much of Sarraute’s 
success surely had to do with her association with the intensely mediatized 
New Novel, and no study of the New Novel omits her name, Sarraute always 
maintained a certain distance from the group, disidentifying with the label 
New Novelist. Her differences from the New Novel are manifold: Claude 
Ollier, Robert Pinget, Claude Simon, Samuel Beckett, Alain Robbe-Grillet, 
and Michel Butor were all writers with Minuit,16 while she was a writer with 
Gallimard;17 Sarraute was a generation removed from them, a good twenty 
years older; Sarraute insisted on an approach to writing that focused not on 
the objective, surface world, but on interiority and psychology, rejected by the 
other writers, especially Robbe-Grillet; and, most visibly, she was a woman, 
while they were all men.
Sarraute insists on her singularity even though (or perhaps because) critics 
and readers try to inscribe her in categories, tacking on to her such labels as 
Woman, Jew, New Novelist. It’s easy to understand this tendency to identify 
her: these identities correspond to the realities of her lived life and make her 
more legible as an individual—she was a woman, Russian, Jewish, and closely 
associated with that group of writers that became known as the New Novel. 
As a portrait of her published in the popular press magazine Télérama attests, 
“Sometimes, when the sun set too early in winter, she would let herself be 
taken over by a deep melancholy that could stem from either her Russian 
soul or her Jewish memory.”18 This statement embodies precisely the categoriz-
ing, reductive powers of language to which Sarraute was always so sensitive 
throughout her entire writing career: it tries to identify and explain her by 
packaging her person into discrete categories—Russian, Jewish, etc. But Sar-
raute always rejected identity, insisting not on the differences between indi-
viduals but on how we are all the same, each of us as alike as two drops of 
 16. While Ollier and Butor also distanced themselves from Minuit and Jérôme Lindon’s 
careful curation of his New Novelists, at the time of the iconic photo of those writers gathered 
in front of the Minuit offices, which came to be the face of the New Novel, both those writers 
were still with Minuit.
 17. This difference in publishers is significant. Minuit, which began publishing Resistance 
materials during World War II, had a political identity grounded in resistance, subversion, and 
the contemporary. It was a young press compared to Gallimard, which was well-established—a 
bastion of prestige and guardian of literary tradition.
 18. Gazier, “Nathalie Sarraute.” My emphasis.
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water.19 Sarraute thus refused to identify as a woman writer, a Russian writer, 
a Jewish writer, a New Novelist. For her, to write was to be no one. In no 
uncertain terms, she would reject the idea of writing as an expression of her 
individual identity, saying: “Who am I? What am I? Here are questions I’ve 
never asked myself while writing,” and “When I write, I am neither man nor 
woman nor dog nor cat.”20
This is not to say that she was devoid of ego: her papers, available in the 
archives at the Bibliothèque nationale de France,21 show her to be someone 
of great precision who sought to be in control of her own life and image. 
And, though writing was never easy for her,22 Sarraute did not see herself as 
a minor writer. This desire for control can be seen in Sarraute’s publication 
in 1997 of Ouvrez, her last published work, a year after Gallimard effectively 
had turned the page on her life and work by publishing her Œuvres complètes 
[Complete Works] as a Pléiade edition in 1996. For Sarraute, the idea of self-
less writing meant that writing was an act and a space that did not consolidate 
or depend on a self endowed with identity—a self forged in and through dif-
ference. Instead, writing was where selves could disappear and subjectivities, 
unencumbered by identity, show themselves to be radically equal, without dif-
ference but not the same. While Sarraute’s manuscripts will not be open to the 
public for several more decades, I would wager that whatever she was working 
on at the time of her death will prove to be yet another instance of our radical 
equality before and through language.
MONIQUE WITTIG (1935–2003)
Unlike Sarraute, whose life has been well documented and can be represented 
in a clear chronology,23 there is little that’s known publicly about Monique 
Wittig. There are no biographies, authorized or unauthorized (although Wit-
tig’s sister, Gille Wittig, self-published a short book consisting of text and pho-
tographs remembering their shared childhood).24 Wittig’s biography, then, 
 19. Finas, “Nathalie Sarraute,” 4.
 20. Sarraute, Prière d’insérer to “disent les imbéciles”; Rykiel, “Quand j’écris,” 40.
 21. Fonds Nathalie Sarraute, BnF Richelieu, Département des Manuscrits, NAF 28088.
 22. Rambures, Comment travaillent les écrivains, 152–53; Leduc, La Folie en tête, 65.
 23. The Pléiade edition of Sarraute’s complete works includes a detailed chronology of her life 
compiled in consultation with the author herself. For more on Sarraute’s life, see Bouchardeau, 
Nathalie Sarraute. Ann Jefferson, one of the editors of the Pléiade edition, is currently working 
on a biography of Sarraute.
 24. Many thanks to Suzette Robichon for giving me a copy of this work, Ma sœur sauvage 
[My Wild Sister]. This work is doubly unauthorized insofar as it does not have an ISBN assigned 
to it and thus exists outside library catalogues and official records.
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remains the property of those who actually knew and shared their lives with 
her. But we do know that Wittig was born in 1935 in Alsace, where she grew 
up in the rural town of Dannemarie. And we know that Wittig came to Paris 
to study at the Sorbonne in 1950.25 Beyond that, little information has been 
made available. What we know of Wittig emerges, then, primarily out of her 
entry into public life through her writing, her feminism, and her life as an 
academic in the US.
Wittig, as is made clear in her posthumously published work, Le Chantier 
littéraire [The Literary Worksite] (2010), which is both an ars poetica and an 
homage to Sarraute, was deeply influenced by the New Novelists and their 
rejection of literary convention. Their experiments in form inspired her own, 
and her debut novel, L’Opoponax (1964), garnered critical acclaim, winning 
her the Prix Médicis and Sarraute’s lifelong respect. When Wittig’s literary 
creation collided with her feminist activism in the MLF, however, it resulted in 
what seemed to be a marked change in her literary course, which took on an 
overtly political lesbian bent with such novels as Les Guérillères [The Guéril-
lères] (1969); Le Corps lesbien [The Lesbian Body] (1973); Brouillon pour un 
dictionnaire des amantes [Lesbian Peoples: Material for a Dictionary] (1976), 
co-authored by Sande Zeig; Virgile, non [Across the Acheron] (1985); the play 
The Constant Journey [Le Voyage sans fin] (1984), and a collection of short 
stories, Paris-la-politique (1999). What had been present as a thematic ele-
ment in L’Opoponax—the protagonist is a little girl who comes to realize and 
own her love of another girl—became the driving force and logic of Wittig’s 
subsequent works.
While Wittig is considered an important writer by academics and lit-
erary critics and her works enjoy cult status among a certain lesbian and/
or feminist subset of readers (made possible by Wittig’s works having been 
translated widely), she is probably best known for her feminism. Like many 
other members of the Mouvement de Liberátion des Femmes, Wittig had been 
involved in the revolutionary, Marxist student-worker uprisings of May ’68, 
which nearly brought down De Gaulle’s government. Revolted by the sexism 
of their male co-revolutionaries, who took for granted that women would 
serve them in a domestic and sexual capacity instead of being equal mem-
bers in the movement, Wittig, along with other disenchanted women, initiated 
 25. These are the two lines of the biographical essay, authored by the Wittig scholar Diane 
Crowder, that deal with Wittig’s early life that are published on the website maintained by the 
Monique Wittig Literary Estate (http:// www .moniquewittig .com/ bio/ bio .html), as well as in a 
more recent biographical essay authored by Sandra Daroczi (https:// modernlanguages .sas .ac 
.uk/ research -centres/ centre -study -contemporary -womens -writing/ languages/ french/ monique 
-wittig). This is also the only biographical information one can find in encyclopedias.
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what would become the MLF to fight for the liberation of the class of wom-
en.26 In 1970, along with her sister, Gille Wittig, Margaret Stephenson (who 
would later change her name to Namascar Shaktini), and Marcia Rothenburg, 
Wittig co-authored and co-published “Combat pour la libération des femmes” 
[Combat for women’s liberation] in the leftist newspaper L’Idiot International, 
which would act as a manifesto for the MLF.  In addition, Wittig was one 
of the original ten to participate in the act of putting, on the tomb of the 
unknown soldier, a wreath dedicated to the one even more unknown than 
he—his wife—for which she and her fellow protestors were arrested. This act 
would be mediatized and then mythologized as inaugurating the MLF as a 
movement with real visibility.27
Wittig left France in 1976 with her partner, Sande Zeig, a dancer and cho-
reographer, and taught in French departments at a number of American uni-
versities and colleges such as Vassar College and UC Berkeley before assuming 
a permanent position at the University of Arizona, where she would eventually 
also join their Women’s Studies program. Wittig remained in Arizona until 
her death from a heart attack in 2003. Her trajectory as an academic over-
laps considerably with her trajectory as a feminist, as many of the essays she 
published as part of The Straight Mind were first presented at academic con-
ferences and published in academic journals. For instance, Wittig’s oft-cited 
declaration that lesbians are not women was made during the 1978 meeting of 
the Modern Languages Association (MLA)28 and the essay that communicated 
this idea in written form was first published in the academic journal Feminist 
Issues.29 Because of Wittig’s life in the academic sphere, she has been taken up 
and taught as a major theorist of materialist, anti-difference feminism, and is 
known primarily for The Straight Mind (1992), which was revisited and pub-
lished in French translation as La Pensée straight in 2001. She has had a last-
ing impact on both feminist and queer studies for her unrelenting conviction 
that difference is a constructed, not natural, category, and that just as language 
created difference, it can undo it.30 And, because of Wittig’s insistence on the 
 26. See Picq, “MLF: 1970, Année Zéro.”
 27. The MLF was not a unitary group but rather a diverse coalition of smaller, constitu-
tive groups that allied together and arrived at decisions through consensus. Wittig was herself 
involved with a number of different subgroups, such as Les Gouines rouges [The Red Dykes] and 
Féministes révolutionnaires [Revolutionary Feminists].
 28. See Shaktini, On Monique Wittig, 197.
 29. Wittig, “One Is Not Born a Woman.” 
 30. Wittig has become a household name in feminist theory in large part because of Judith 
Butler’s sustained engagement with her in Gender Trouble. Whether Butler should be judged a 
good reader of Wittig or not has been the subject of debate. Anne Garréta dismissed Butler’s 
reading of Wittig as “la bouillie pour chat” (literally, “mush for cats,” and figuratively, “rubbish” 
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specificity of a lesbian politics in the feminist struggle against patriarchy, she 
has been taken up by some as a queer or proto-queer figure.
In 2007, the journal GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies published 
a special volume on Wittig entitled “Monique Wittig: At the Crossroads of 
Criticism,” which brought together essays that had originally been presented 
at a conference at Harvard University held in Wittig’s honor after her death.31 
These essays are both academic commentary and homage, an accounting for 
Wittig’s work and a remembrance of her life. They operate as a collective tes-
timony to the importance of her thought and presence. The essays display a 
remarkable diversity, ranging from the anecdotal and rigorously intimate to 
the more familiar rigor of academic analysis, from the attempt to channel Wit-
tig’s voice and style to an explicit affirmation of one’s distance and distinction 
from her (with these seemingly contradictory impulses often cohabiting the 
same essay). The special issue gives some sense of the richness of Wittig’s writ-
ing and thought, the influence and impact she’s had. It shows what it can look 
like to remember Wittig as a feminist, theorist, politically engaged activist, 
writer, or lesbian; as having an unrelenting focus on recuperating subjectivity; 
as constituting a figure of queer possibility; as unassimilable to genealogies of 
queerness. While the special issue demonstrates just how portable Wittig is, 
and the many ways she can be taken up, we should remember that in her own 
eyes, as is made clear in her writing, both published and unpublished,32 she 
was first and foremost a writer who wrote because of language, because of all 
the things language could make and unmake.
ANNE GARRÉTA (1962–)
Garréta’s literary career began with a splash. Sphinx, published in 1986 when 
Garréta was a twenty-three-year-old normalienne, as female students of 
France’s elite écoles normales are called,33 received critical acclaim for the feat 
of erasing gender from a love story written in the highly gendered French lan-
guage. Garréta was brought onto Bernard Pivot’s popular literary television 
or “baloney”) in her keynote address on Wittig and Foucault for Sciences Po’s 2013 Queer Week. 
For a written articulation of the disagreement, see Garréta, “Wittig, La Langue-Le-Politique,” 
which charges Butler with misreading Wittig.
 31. Epps and Katz, “Monique Wittig.”
 32. Wittig’s letters to Sarraute, housed in the Sarraute archives at the BnF, attest to the 
importance of literature and writing to Wittig.
 33. While the American and French education systems are very different, one could liken 
the écoles normales to the Ivy League, where membership in this elite sphere guarantees access 
to social, intellectual, and economic capital and resources not otherwise accessible.
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program, Apostrophes, and hailed as a young writer to look out for.34 Garréta 
went on to publish a philosophical pamphlet in the manner of eighteenth-
century Enlightenment texts, entitled Pour en finir avec le genre humain [To 
Do Away with Humankind] (1987) before pursuing a PhD in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century French literature at New York University. Garréta has gone 
on to pursue a dual academic career in both France and the United States, 
teaching at the Université de Rennes II and Duke University.
After Sphinx, Garréta published two more novels, Ciels liquides [Liquid 
Skies] (1990) and La Décomposition [Decomposition] (1999), before she was 
inducted (or co-opted, to use their term) into the Oulipo, or Ouvroir de Lit-
térature Potentielle [Workroom of Potential Literature],35 a highly publicized 
and public literary group composed of writers and mathematicians who pro-
duce literary texts and seek to renew literary potential through adherence to 
certain constraints.36 Since her entry into the Oulipo in 2000, her novel Pas 
un jour [Not One Day] (2001) won the Prix Médicis, and she has co-authored 
a novel, Eros mélancolique [Melancholy Eros] (2009), with the Oulipian poet 
Jacques Roubaud. Most recently, in 2017, she published a novel, Dans l’béton 
[In Concrete], a ludic and linguistically playful narrative of childhood.37
Garréta is a difficult writer to pin down. She exemplifies hybridity and a 
disregard for the consistency or coherence that we demand from or expect 
of identities. Like Sarraute, Garréta resists being defined by clear contours 
and corralled into neatly demarcated identities. She is feminist, but insists on 
her queerness.38 She is French, but also lives and works in the United States 
and is equally at ease in French and English—less bilingual and bicultural 
than translingual and transcultural, operating through a constant movement 
between these two linguistic and cultural poles. She is Oulipian, but main-
tains an ironic stance on the way literary potential is attributed to individuals 
(such as the way a commitment to literary potential doesn’t prevent a cult of 
personality from setting in). While trained as a scholar of seventeenth- and 
 34. Pivot, “Pendant la campagne électorale lisez des romans.”
 35. While ouvroir is often translated as workshop, I opt for the more literal workroom.
 36. Some famous members of the Oulipo include Raymond Queneau, its co-founder, 
Georges Perec, and Italo Calvino. One particularly famous constraint is the lipogram, or omis-
sion of a letter, as illustrated by Perec in his novel La Disparition, which is written without the 
letter E.
 37. The novel was published too recently for me to be able to include it in my discussion 
of Garréta’s corpus, but it confirms the strong influence of Wittig, as there is an incredibly 
rich intertextual engagement with L’Opoponax. It also continues Garréta’s work of suspending 
identity by maintaining, for a substantial portion of the text, the sort of non-disclosure of the 
narrator’s gender we find in Sphinx.
 38. Garréta, during a writing workshop held at the fourth annual Queer Week held at Sci-
ences Po in March 2013, said, “I’m feminist, but not at the price of forgetting I’m queer.”
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eighteenth-century literature,39 she also works with contemporary fiction and 
queer theory. Her literary and intellectual influences are eclectic, including 
Barthes, Proust, Rousseau, Rancière, Foucault, Sedgwick, and Wittig.
Where Garréta is consistent is in a commitment to indeterminacy, her 
investment in the freedom to move unhampered by categories. Garréta’s com-
bination of the contemporary—the queer, the postmodern—and of the early 
modern is logical insofar as both can be seen as coalescing around a rejection 
of division and the identification and definition (and the ensuing hierarchy) 
that follow,40 and around a demand that everything be accessible, manipu-
lable, in play. Garréta has described her affinity for early modern literature 
as follows:
I like 17th- and 18th-century literature because the disciplinary division 
between literature and philosophy, between narrativity and ideas, hasn’t yet 
happened. Because sticking literature inside the limits of a pure narrative 
plot is to sterilize it. Literature’s great strength is precisely not having a terri-
tory. Not even a vague one. It’s absolutely universal in the sense that it’s the 
putting back into play of all the world’s variety.41
Viewed in light of her investment in queer politics and her postmodern 
aesthetic sensibilities that have her combining the preciosity of early mod-
ern French with the language of video gaming,42 Garréta might not seem to 
resemble Sarraute or Wittig, but she shares with them a sense of literature’s 
possibilities. In this language of putting back into play all the diversity of the 
world—that is, experiencing the world in its differences without its being 
ordered by difference, given that hierarchy is inimical to play and the freedom 
of play—we can see a vision of literature as a space where the concept of terri-
tory no longer applies, where such boundaries and contours disappear.
Garréta, living in the twenty-first century, is wary of the language of uni-
versalism even as she evokes literature’s universality.43 Rather than get caught 
 39. Garréta, “Fins de romans, XVII(e)—XVIII(e) siècles.”
 40. Admittedly, the Enlightenment was actually a time of great division and taxonomical 
knowledge (see Foucault, The Order of Things and his discussion of the classical episteme), but 
Garréta’s predilection for the early modern is grounded in the fact that it hasn’t been taken over 
entirely by such categorization and still enjoys a certain intellectual or conceptual fluidity.
 41. Garréta, interview with Frédéric Grolleau from September 1, 1999, reproduced at http:// 
cosmogonie .free .fr/ paru2 .html.
 42. This combination of disparate elements and citations of older forms embodies Fredric 
Jameson’s conceptualization of postmodernism as characterized by pastiche. See Jameson, Post-
modernism, 17.
 43. Garréta, in conversation with me, has, half in jest, likened Wittig’s attempts to appro-
priate the universal to trying to steal a motorless vehicle when it might be better to walk to one’s 
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up in the question of whether to use the language of universality and univer-
salism to describe the literary project of a writer who has a vexed relationship 
with these deeply French notions, I want to instead place Garréta, along with 
Sarraute and Wittig, under the sign of unbecoming, which describes the state 
of subjectivity without subjecthood enacted by these writers without tying it 
to an ism (like universalism), which denotes ideology. Unbecoming is a state, 
not an ideology. It is an experience, not a position—one that is open to any 
and all readers.
CONNECTIONS
The fact that all three writers pursue unbecoming writing is not a coincidence. 
A direct chain of influence connects Sarraute to Wittig to Garréta. Wittig 
knew and was inspired by Sarraute’s work, and Garréta knows and is inspired 
by Wittig’s, which means that the poetics of unbecoming can be seen as trans-
mitted from one writer to the next, and not only transmitted, but transformed, 
according to each writer’s own historical moment and situation.
The connection between Sarraute and Wittig is the clearest, as these 
two writers knew each other well. They enjoyed a long and close friendship, 
marked by mutual support and admiration, which lasted the decades between 
Wittig’s meeting Sarraute through the publication of L’Opoponax and Sar-
raute’s death in 1999. Wittig was one of Sarraute’s most constant friends, and 
they spent each summer together at Sarraute’s country house in Chérence.44 
Wittig’s letters to Sarraute reveal a friendship that had its origins in passion, 
and her earliest letters include explicit declarations of love. What becomes 
evident, though, from reading Wittig’s side of her correspondence with Sar-
raute, is that while that initial passion was romantic, it wasn’t so much Sar-
raute as Sarraute who inspired it, but Sarraute as writer. Wittig fell in love 
with Sarraute not because of Sarraute’s physical person, but because of Sar-
raute’s language, because of the Sarraute Wittig found in Sarraute’s books. Wit-
tig’s critical works are a testament to Sarraute’s influence. Beyond Le Chantier 
littéraire, which is a sustained reflection on and engagement with Sarraute’s 
writing, The Straight Mind, in addition to its well-known essays on feminist 
destination instead. Garréta is deeply ambivalent about the question of the universal, however, 
and this remark is not a simple dismissal of Wittig’s attempts at appropriating universality. As 
Garréta clarified at a later point, for her critique to stand, the term universal would need to be 
clarified conceptually, and Garréta’s and Wittig’s different situations d’énonciation [situations of 
enunciation—essentially, speaking positions] would need to be historicized.
 44. For more on the camaraderie between Sarraute and Wittig, see the chapter on Sarraute 
in Hewitt, Autobiographical Tightropes.
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theory, includes several essays devoted to Sarraute’s writing. This juxtaposition 
speaks to how Wittig saw Sarraute’s writing and language as playing a funda-
mental role in forming her own political and aesthetic project. While Wittig’s 
initial encounter with Sarraute was one of love at first reading, her continued 
relationship with Sarraute and Sarraute’s language resulted in an unwavering, 
sophisticated reflection on literature as a joining together of the political and 
the aesthetic, as seen throughout Wittig’s œuvre.
While Garréta hasn’t published book-length works consecrated to Wit-
tig the way Wittig did for Sarraute, the impact Wittig has had on Garréta is 
undeniable. We can think of Wittig as a catalyst for Garréta’s writing. Plenty 
of other literary figures inform Garréta’s work, but it is to Wittig that Garréta 
confesses a debt. It’s Wittig that Garréta cites as a condition of possibility for 
her debut novel, Sphinx, as I discuss in Chapter 3. Garréta’s relationship to 
Wittig might not have had the intimate dimension that Sarraute and Wittig’s 
had, but it is nonetheless also characterized by a fierce investment in Wittig 
not so much as a biographical character, but as a singular vision and experi-
ence of language.
Unbecoming Language consists of four chapters. The first three chapters exam-
ine each writer’s use of language to unbecome, to combat a regime of seem-
ingly compulsory difference. The fourth chapter examines all three writers’ 
relationships to language to theorize a poetics of unbecoming—an original 
feminist poetics grounded in an experience of a language endowed with a 
body and agency. These chapters are anchored in my own close encounters 
with the novels I discuss, and thus remain largely within a world delineated by 
textual, rather than historical, boundaries. Nonetheless, the historical dimen-
sion is important, and in what follows, I attend to the way each writer’s use 
and conception of language is itself historically conditioned. Language, at the 
moment of writing and at the moment of reading, can feel like a transcendent 
experience, where the text is the fruit of a now-ness of and with language, but 
it is in fact constantly both pulling and being pulled by the waves of history.
As Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta belong to different generations, each of 
them originates from a different set of possibilities and constraints than is the 
case for the others. In considering how each of these writers lives and works 
under a particular set of historical conditions, I do not presume to account for 
the historical evolution of what it meant and means to be a woman, a subject 
which would require multiple volumes, nor, similarly, to provide a history of 
French literature in the twentieth century, which would also require a book 
unto itself. Rather, I want to consider, more modestly, some of the implica-
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tions of what it means for Sarraute’s, Wittig’s, and Garréta’s respective historic-
ity to be filtered through the categories of writer and of woman concomitantly 
(which doesn’t mean, however, considering their historical specificity through 
the filter of Woman Writer, an identification that misses the point of their 
unbecoming writing). The simple fact that each of them writes and lives in 
different moments means that their experience of both literature and differ-
ence is different for each.
Of the three, Wittig’s historical specificity could be seen as the most obvi-
ous. Her writing career coincides with the political, revolutionary energy and 
the social turmoil of the MLF. It is evident that the sorts of feminist utopias 
of lesbian lovers and warriors that Wittig stages in works like Les Guérillères, 
Le Corps lesbien, and Brouillon pour un dictionnaire des amantes are related to 
her own active engagement within the MLF—to her experience in this coali-
tion of women who created feminist spaces and identities for themselves in 
their struggle to create a world other than the one imposed on them by patri-
archy. But these novels were not simply the imagining of other worlds: they 
were attempts at creating a history and a language for women who, up till that 
moment, did not have either. Wittig writes in Les Guérillères of the need to 
create such a history and language: “You say there are no words to describe 
this time, you say it does not exist. But remember. Make an effort to remem-
ber. Or, failing that, invent.”45 This imperative to create a history, to tap into a 
memory that one didn’t even know one had, can be seen as part of the femi-
nist zeitgeist of the 1970s and 1980s, which, in addition to political struggles 
in the streets and in consciousness-raising groups, permeated the academy 
on both sides of the Atlantic. We can see this in the beginnings of women’s 
history as a discipline, as recounted in the pioneering work of feminist histo-
rians such as Michelle Perrot, Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, Joan Kelly, Nancy 
Cott, and Gerda Lerner, to name a few who, in the face of much resistance and 
scorn from the academy, gave a voice to women across the centuries whose 
lives had been relegated to silence.46
Wittig’s later works such as Virgile, non and the short stories of Paris-la-
politique mark a dramatic shift in tone from heady utopianism to bitterness. 
These works, which feature women incapable of acting in their self-interest 
or of striving toward emancipation, reflect Wittig’s own experience of both 
physical and temporal distance from a feminist movement that ultimately 
failed to end patriarchy and was torn apart by internecine conflict, seen in the 
way a strong faction such as Antoinette Fouque’s differentialist Psychanalyse 
 45. Wittig, Les Guérillères, 89.
 46. Perrot, Une histoire des femmes; Klapisch-Zuber, Culture et pouvoir des femmes; Kelly, 
Women, History & Theory; Cott, Root of Bitterness; Lerner, The Woman in American History.
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et Politique (Psychépo, or Psych et Po, for short) took over the movement and 
worked to legitimate and anchor the difference that was anathema to Wittig’s 
politics.47 And in a pre-MLF work like L’Opoponax, a bildungsroman where 
the protagonist’s coming of age coincides with a becoming-lesbian, we can see 
the germ of the optimism Wittig and other lesbian feminists must have held 
in the years leading up to the MLF, of the energy without which such a move-
ment and reclamation of marginal subjectivity would not have been possible. 
Wittig, whose life is marked by a deep political engagement, produced works 
that bear the mark of that exuberant moment in the 1970s when a whole new 
world—revolution—was just around the corner.
Wittig’s writing, just as it bears the marks of its political moment, bears 
the marks of its literary one: her pursuit of formal innovation and rejection 
of novelistic conventions such as plot and character can be seen as the fruit 
of her exposure to the work of the New Novelists who had done away with 
them and demanded that writers write differently. The two strands of Wittig’s 
feminism and her writing are tightly tied together. Without the New Novel’s—
and in particular, Sarraute’s—influence, Wittig might have written novels that 
had traditional plots and featured heroic female protagonists, a simple and 
fantastic counterpoint to the classic realist novel, or heavy-handed novels in 
the vein of littérature engagée. And without the influence of the MLF, Wittig 
might have written formally innovative texts that continued in the “difficult,” 
inaccessible vein of the New Novel by engaging in self-conscious reflection 
on genre as genre, but not as gender, producing works divorced from feminist 
political ends—art for art’s sake. Wittig could have been cleaved into two: into 
Wittig the feminist activist and into Wittig the writer. Or she could have been 
simply one or the other. She was both, however, and this was made possible 
by the convergence in her life of both the New Novel’s literary energy and the 
MLF’s political energy.
Garréta’s writing is more difficult to map onto the sorts of seismic political 
and literary movements that marked Wittig and made possible her becoming-
Wittig, in large part because Garréta is a contemporary writer, still alive, still 
writing, and so her corpus (and hence, any evaluation of her work) is provi-
sory. As Garréta explicitly articulated at a conference in France held in Wittig’s 
 47. Under Fouque’s leadership, Psychépo trademarked the name and logo of the MLF in 
1979, ending what had been a diverse and pluralistic movement. Fouque took this legal action 
to take over the MLF and ostensibly save it from the parts of itself that identified as feminist, 
as she was vocally anti-feminist, seeing feminism as an attempt to destroy sexual difference 
(see Fouque, “Femmes en mouvements”). For feminist reactions to Fouque’s actions, see Per-
rot, “MLF: ‘Antoinette Fouque’”; Fourest, “Le Féminisme pour les nuls”; Collectif, “MLF.” For a 
history and account of the MLF from Fouque’s point of view, see Fouque and Mouvement de 
libération des femmes, Génération MLF, 1968–2008.
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honor, whose proceedings were published under the title Lire Monique Wittig 
Aujourd’hui, she owes her entry into writing to Wittig:
Monique Wittig is an extremely important writer for me. In a way, she made 
possible my first novel [. . .]. I thus have a debt, which isn’t a debt, but that 
obligates me nonetheless—it isn’t that I owe Monique Wittig something but 
that she opened up a possibility for me.48
But Garréta’s voice is entirely her own, and her corpus, while it has a political 
spirit, is markedly different from Wittig’s—Garréta is no Wittig Junior.
Garréta’s writing, as we will see, is melancholic and dark—dystopian rather 
than utopian in its energies and tone. In addition, the strategy that Garréta 
employs for writing against difference and identity is not that of Wittig’s les-
bianization of her textual world in order to give lie to the false universalism 
of the white, straight male. Rather than attempt, as Wittig does, to reclaim the 
universal and recuperate the vilified, marginalized subjectivity of the lesbian,49 
rather than establish utopian spaces as a positive alternative to the damage 
difference and identity have done in creating structures of oppression in the 
world, Garréta instead occupies a negative position and destroys said world 
in her texts. She privileges destruction and desolation, as seen in Sphinx, Ciels 
liquides, La Décomposition, and even a seemingly autobiographical work like 
Pas un jour.
These departures from the Wittigian corpus might be attributed to Gar-
réta’s coming of age and into writing in the 1980s—after the fizzling out of the 
adventure of the MLF, whose aspirations were assimilated into the Socialist 
government of François Mitterand, a political mainstreaming that effectively 
domesticated feminism by taking it out of its revolutionary context—and 
to her taking up of gender and queer studies, distinctly American bodies of 
thought and work.50 With both the movements of May ’68 and the MLF hav-
 48. Garréta, “Wittig, la langue-le-politique,” 25. See Chapter 3 for a closer examination of 
Garréta’s indebtedness to Wittig.
 49. It’s important to remember that for Wittig, the lesbian doesn’t represent an identity per 
se. Instead, it’s a refusal of sociality, of identity as a source of privilege and power. It’s a fugitive 
subjectivity that’s anarchic in its rejection of traditional power structures. As Wittig puts it, the 
point isn’t to replace patriarchy with matriarchy, to simply invert who’s in power and who’s not, 
but to do away with hierarchy altogether. Wittig, The Straight Mind, 10. While one could argue 
that Wittig’s stance of militant lesbianization doesn’t in fact live up to Wittig’s aspirations for 
it, it’s important to recognize that the figure of the lesbian is conceptualized not as a stepping-
stone to a different kind of hierarchy but as a means for its destruction.
 50. Garréta’s fluency in these fields is part of her formation as a hybrid individual. In 
particular, her taking up of gender and queer studies can be seen as an Americanization of 
her intellectual landscape, as these fields, though they are indebted to French poststructuralist 
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ing drawn to a close, and with familiar forms of power still in place, assuming 
a utopian vision must have seemed impossible or naïve. Garréta’s writing thus 
imagines not the ebullient collectivities of Wittig’s novels, but stages instead 
subjectivities that are marked by their alienation and isolation, a solitude that 
cannot be escaped, that prevails against any attempts to forge a durable rela-
tion. Garréta’s melancholy could be seen as a mourning of the political pos-
sibility that used to be but is no longer.
Garréta’s corpus, however, still speaks to a sense of political possibility 
for literature. This possibility is marked by queerness, understood in broad 
strokes as an anti-identitarian, anti-normative positionality. Emerging in the 
1990s out of poststructuralist theory, queer—as taken up by queer theory—
brought deconstruction to bear on sexuality in order to denaturalize it, and 
showed how heterosexuality is in no way natural, but the product of imposed 
and assimilated norms. This critique of normativity produced both a critique 
of compulsory heterosexuality but also of the categories of gay and lesbian 
identity that had become a rallying point for non-heterosexuals oppressed by 
a straight social order: gay and lesbian were also problematic in their mobiliza-
tion, or rather, immobilization, around a homosexual norm and hetero/homo 
binary. Queer theory’s denaturalizing critique and resistance soon expanded 
beyond sexuality to target all forms of normativity. Against compulsory iden-
tity, queer theory thus proposes fluidity, mobility, and the destabilization of 
categories.
In Garréta’s work, the influence of queerness can be seen in her overturn-
ing of normativity (La Décomposition celebrates murder as a method to attain 
aesthetic perfection; Ciels liquides features an angelic character who might 
be considered queer par excellence as an immanently non-normative being 
existing outside the categories of gender as well as of the human), and in her 
embrace of a proliferation of meanings as a way of resisting the oppressive 
normativity of epistemological closure and certainty (e.g., Sphinx, a text that 
predates queer theory by some years, lends itself to a number of different pos-
sibilities—a love story between two men, two women, a man and a woman, 
or something else). But while Garréta’s work can be considered queer, it goes 
further than queer, in my view. Queer theory is by and large content to oper-
ate through destabilization of normative identity categories and practices. I 
see Garréta’s work as going beyond destabilization, as being animated by the 
ambition to destroy them altogether. The Wittigian nature of this ambition 
theorists such as Foucault and Derrida, are considered by the French to be distinctly Ameri-
can products. For more on the vexed national character of these fields and the transatlan-
tic exchange that produces them, see Berger, Le Grand théâtre du genre; Costello, “Inventing 
‘French Feminism’,” and, most recently, Perreau, Queer Theory.
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calls for Garréta to be read with Wittig, and thus, with Sarraute, which is a 
reading that should not be subsumed solely under the aegis of queer. I will 
return to and develop this point more carefully in the last section of the intro-
duction, where I will be able to paint a less reductive picture of the decidedly 
non-monolithic conceptual field of queer theory.
Finally, Sarraute’s writing is even harder to map onto the sorts of seis-
mic political and intellectual movements that mark Wittig and Garréta, partly 
because her writing remains so consistent in tone and intention even as the 
twentieth century, which served as the backdrop for the nearly seventy years 
of her writing career, was marked by constant social and political changes. 
To situate Sarraute historically in terms of what would have been the con-
text for her entry into a writing against difference, it may be helpful to place 
her within what is called, reductively, first-wave feminism, in which case we 
can then situate Wittig and Garréta within second- and third-wave feminism, 
respectively.51 First-wave feminism describes the feminist activism and theory 
from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century that was pri-
marily concerned with obtaining suffrage. Behind the struggle for suffrage 
was the greater project of legal equality, which animated the liberal feminism 
that the first wave is identified with—a feminism concerned with access to 
equal opportunities and rights such as the right to vote, to hold property, to 
work freely, and to not be considered minors under the law, as stipulated by 
the Napoleonic Code. Sarraute, in interviews, has identified her feminism as 
being outside the literary realm: “I am politically engaged as a citizen, not as 
a writer.”52 For Sarraute, feminism was more about improving concrete condi-
tions and obtaining equal rights than about concepts or theory. While Sarraute 
thus did not see her writing the way I do, as a concerted and coherent feminist 
project of writing against difference, there was no shortage of ways her life as 
a woman in the first half of the twentieth century posed constraints—con-
straints first-wave feminism was fighting to change. Of course, Wittig and 
Garréta also faced (or face, in Garréta’s case) certain limitations as a result of 
being women (or rather, of being interpellated and identified as such by the 
state and social order), but they began writing and publishing when there was 
at least a semblance of equal status under the law.
 51. The wave model of feminism has been rigorously critiqued on many fronts, and it cer-
tainly has the infelicitous consequence of overly distinguishing one moment in feminism from 
the others (e.g., there were first wave critiques of essentialism, and it isn’t as if the third wave 
of feminism hasn’t been concerned with questions of economic access and equity), but it still 
remains a useful model for thinking through feminism’s progress and evolution throughout the 
twentieth century by accounting for what struggles came to dominate a given period.
 52. Huppert, “Nathalie Sarraute,” 14.
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To understand how being a woman who wrote was necessarily different 
for Sarraute than it was for Wittig or Garréta, take the example of suffrage. 
Sarraute wrote and published Tropismes (1939) before French women received 
the right to vote in 1944.53 To write and to publish necessarily means believing 
that one’s voice deserves to be heard, and Sarraute was attempting to make 
her literary voice heard even though the French state made it clear that her 
voice as a citizen did not count. Sarraute’s legal inferiority manifested itself 
in other ways as well. For example, Sarraute was 38 years old when married 
women were granted legal majority, finally allowed to be adults under the 
law, and she was 65 years old when married women obtained the right to 
work without their husbands’ consent (which, for Sarraute, meant having her 
husband sign off on her previous publishing contracts with Gallimard). With 
this in mind, we begin to get a sense of Sarraute’s audacity in demanding 
that she be recognized not simply as a woman writer, but as a writer without 
qualification—a demand for an equality that simply did not exist in the soci-
ety Sarraute lived in for the better part of her adult life (and that still exists 
only partially).
Sarraute began to write in the 1930s, nearly two decades before Simone 
de Beauvoir would drop a theoretical bombshell by declaring that women are 
made, not born. Wittig began writing after Beauvoir’s Le Deuxième sexe [The 
Second Sex] (1949), and Garréta had access to feminist and queer theory—
both were exposed to a sustained feminist critique and theorization of differ-
ence. For Sarraute, however, difference was something that was experienced 
in life but that could be transcended in writing. In her correspondence and 
interviews, when she evokes Russian proletarians reading Balzac, or a young 
man identifying with the elderly female character of Tante Berthe in Le Plané-
tarium, she sees literature as being larger than the divisions brought about by 
class, sex, or age. In writing, she found a way of shedding her identity and the 
various forms of difference that that entailed, and this in a moment before 
thinkers gave lie to the seemingly essential nature of identity or difference in 
a way that had traction on society at large. Sarraute’s writing may not have 
been informed by a theory of difference, but it itself theorizes against dif-
ference: this is the point of departure, chronologically and conceptually, for 
Unbecoming Language.
 53. They would not be able to exercise their newly won right until the general elections 
the following year, when French women were able to cast a ballot for the first time on April 29, 
1945.
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WHICH STORY TO TELL?
In Unbecoming Language, I tell the story of these three writers and their hol-
lowing out of difference and identity differently than you might expect. In this 
story of difference, subjectivity, identity, and doing things to them through 
language, neither French theory nor queer theory appear as characters, despite 
the centrality of difference and subjectivity to the poststructuralist French 
thought of the second half of the twentieth century that was taken up in the 
States as French Theory, and despite the centrality of identity (and its subver-
sion) to queer theory. You may be wondering, why not?
Let’s begin with French Theory. Since Descartes, French thought has been 
preoccupied with the question of subjectivity, and the French Theory of the 
1960s on can be seen as attempting to account for subjectivity, be it to elimi-
nate the subject or to recuperate and revitalize it.54 To name a few key players, 
we have, for example, Althusser’s conceptualization of the subject as consti-
tuted by ideology, Derrida’s deconstruction of the subject through a rigor-
ous critique of the metaphysics of subjectivity, and Lacan’s theorization of 
the subject in structuralist, linguistic terms (“the unconscious is structured 
like a language”).55 And crucial to the French conceptualization of subjectivity 
has been difference, taken up famously in different ways by Derrida, Lacan, 
and Deleuze, such that French Theory’s interrogation of subjectivity could be 
characterized as a project of conceiving difference as a constitutive element 
of subjectivity.56 Moreover, Cixous, Kristeva, and Irigaray—the French Femi-
 54. For a treatment of why subjectivity has been so central to French philosophy, see Wil-
liams, Contemporary French Philosophy. Even what’s being called New French Philosophy or 
New French Theory (to distinguish it from the poststructuralism of the latter half of the twen-
tieth century), which might be described as having moved away from its predecessor’s linguistic 
turn to embrace a new materialist turn, is still concerned with the status and nature of human 
subjectivity, just from a more materialist as opposed to a discursive or linguistic perspective.
 55. Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus (Notes Toward an Investigation)”; 
Derrida, Of Spirit; Derrida, Of Grammatology; Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psy-
cho-Analysis, 203.
 56. Derrida came up with différance, which, in its difference from différence, and its play on 
différer (to defer), gestures toward how meaning is always deferred through an endless free-play 
of the signifiers, which is precisely the sort of free-play by which binaries can be deconstructed 
and thwarted; Lacan made sexual difference foundational to his theory of human subjectiva-
tion, where to become a subject and enter into the Symbolic order (the order of language, of 
the social) is to successfully sexually differentiate according to the Oedipal complex; Deleuze 
attempted to create a philosophy of difference wherein the relationship between difference and 
identity is inverted: no longer are two things, imbued with identity, compared and found to 
be different from each other so that difference follows from identity. Rather, difference is what 
constitutes those entities.
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nists—are themselves deeply shaped by their engagement with these and other 
philosophers.
To read Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta’s treatment of subjectivity and dif-
ference through these theorists, however, would be to displace the center of 
conceptual gravity from their writing to that of the theorists, and to outsource 
the work of theorization. All three of our writers knew, to varying degrees, 
the work being done in French Theory. Sarraute, for instance, poked fun at 
Roland Barthes’s arguments for the authority and agency of the text over that 
of the author, as theorized in his landmark essay “The Death of the Author,” 
when she joked that his notion of the non-agential scriptor, who has no autho-
rial authority over the text produced, just made her think of script-girls, or 
movie directors’ female secretaries.57 She also dismissed psychoanalysis as not 
having anything to say and as having invented an unconscious of which she 
has no knowledge.58 Wittig had a career as an academic in addition to being a 
writer, and her critical essays demonstrate her knowledge of figures central to 
the intellectual landscape of post–1960s France: thinkers as diverse as Marx, 
Lacan, Lévi-Strauss, Benveniste, Saussure. And Garréta is perfectly at home 
engaging with any thinker, possessing a dizzyingly encyclopedic knowledge of 
philosophical and theoretical production from Plato to today. Sarraute, Wit-
tig, and Garréta thus wrote concomitantly with these thinkers. They published 
novels that respond and contribute to the same urgent questions of subjectiv-
ity and difference as those being grappled with by Derrida, Deleuze, Lacan, 
et al. While surrounded by this intellectual, philosophical environment, Sar-
raute, Wittig, and Garréta’s literary explorations were not written to partici-
pate in these other conversations—they were simultaneous but independent, 
firmly in the literary sphere.
But their novels are as much the site of theorization and thought as “pure” 
theory.59 The literariness of Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta’s writing goes hand 
in hand with the conceptualization of unbecoming, of subjectivity without 
 57. See Sarraute, Œuvres complètes, 1694–95.
 58. Halicks, “Interview with Nathalie Sarraute”; Rykner, Nathalie Sarraute, 168; Benmussa 
and Sarraute, Entretiens avec Nathalie Sarraute, 44.
 59. As Timothy Bewes puts it: “The novel itself is a theorization [.  .  .] the novel cannot 
escape theoretical being; its discursive fabric is pontification, which is to say, theory.” Didier 
Eribon bluntly states, “Great writers are often great theorists. [.  .  .] Literary works are often 
richer in existential, political, and theoretical insights than works published in philosophy or 
the social sciences.” Anna Kornbluh makes the case for “the novel as critique.” Bewes, “Reading 
with the Grain,” 3; Eribon, Théories de la littérature, 5; Kornbluh, “Toward the Novel as Cri-
tique.” And the 2018 Society for Novel Studies Conference is itself entitled “Novel Theory” and 
poses the question, “How do novels theorize?” (http:// blogs .cornell .edu/ sns2018/ ). Interestingly, 
this sort of collective engagement with the theoretical capacity of the novel appears to be largely 
Anglophone, perhaps because in the French and francophone tradition, theory is itself already 
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subjecthood. In her critical essays making up The Straight Mind and Le Chan-
tier littéraire, Wittig insists on the fundamental importance of literature in 
the shaping and understanding of subjectivity, and she treats Sarraute’s fic-
tion as theory, as when she cites Sarraute’s novels in these essays, according 
them the same (or more precisely, more) intellectual status as (or than) Lacan 
or Saussure, for instance. And Garréta, as we saw earlier, admires the lack of 
“disciplinary division between literature and philosophy, between narrativity 
and ideas” that eighteenth-century literature displays. We can see her writ-
ing, along with that of Wittig and Sarraute, as working to break down that 
division and present a narrativity that constitutes ideas. In this, they are actu-
ally joined by French Theory, itself composed of thinkers who wanted to wed 
philosophy to literature in a reenactment of the Enlightenment elision of the 
boundary between them. As Alain Badiou, himself a French philosopher who 
is often identified as part of the new generation of French Theory—even if his 
birthdate situates him chronologically more closely to Derrida and Deleuze’s 
generation—has described it:
Forty years on we have, perhaps, grown accustomed to the writing of 
Deleuze, Foucault, Lacan; we have lost the sense of what an extraordinary 
rupture with earlier philosophical styles it represented. All these thinkers 
were bent upon finding a style of their own, inventing a new way of creat-
ing prose; they wanted to be writers. Reading Deleuze or Foucault, one finds 
something quite unprecedented at the level of the sentence, a link between 
thought and phrasal movement that is completely original.60
Badiou’s assertion is hardly a contentious one, and many readers of French 
Theory insist on the literary quality of these thinkers’ writing—indeed, the 
literariness of their theoretical writing is an important part of what makes 
French Theory French.
Given our capacity to see these theorists’ form as fundamental to their 
thought, it should be a simple matter to extend that same intimate linkage of 
form and thought to writers such as Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta, who cease-
lessly work and rework form. We’ve made the link between concept and form. 
I want to send it back in the other direction, and insist on the link between 
form and concept. My impression is that we more readily consent to dissolving 
the borders between theory and literature when theory is our starting point, 
our ground—when we know that a work was written with the express pur-
deeply literary and provides a much more visible convergence of the theoretical and the liter-
ary than does the novel.
 60. Badiou, The Adventure of French Philosophy, lviii.
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pose of theorizing—than we do to dissolving the borders between literature 
and theory, to attributing theoretical status or weight to a storyteller or writer, 
especially one of fiction. But if there were ever a set of writers who could be 
viewed as constituting a coherent theoretical project, it is Sarraute, Wittig, and 
Garréta. If Derrida, Deleuze, and Foucault are thought of as theorist-writers, 
I want us to think of Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta as writer-theorists, and to 
attend to their writing so that we might be able to perceive their theoretical, 
conceptual projects. To do so, they must be read on their own terms, without 
the preemptive mediation of other theorists acting as an interpretive screen.
You may very well consent to refraining from reading Sarraute, Wittig, 
and Garréta through French Theory, and allow their corpus to put forth for 
itself a strong anti-identitarian vision that seeks to undermine difference. But, 
you might think, after having allowed their corpus to argue for such anti-
identitarianism, why not then place their anti-identitarianism in conversa-
tion with what queer theory has to say on the subject, given that queer theory 
has become synonymous with anti-identitarianism?61 Why not bring unbe-
coming into conversation with the sort of self-undoing that the conversation 
around queer negativity has invited for decades now? Given Wittig’s lesbian-
ism and Garréta’s self-identification as queer, wouldn’t reading them alongside 
and with queer theory be an obvious choice? Why not bring them into the 
queer conversation so that we can take them as anti-normative writers writ-
ing against the normativity of identity? While the language of dissolving sub-
jecthood (or, as Robyn Wiegman calls it evocatively, self-decomposure)62 and 
freeing subjectivity from the determinism of identity resonates strongly with 
the project of queer negativity, I abstain from a queer hermeneutics for both 
historical and conceptual reasons.
 61. See Jagose, “Feminism’s Queer Theory,” 160; Wiegman and Wilson, “Introduction,” 3. 
Queer theory can be seen as a critique of the identitarianism subtending feminism and gay 
and lesbian studies’ attempts to cohere around the identity of woman, in the first case, and 
gay and lesbian, in the second, which led to a larger critique of identity itself, understood 
“as an artifact of the normalizing force of modern power,” which then led to queerness’s 
becoming “therefore characterizable not in terms of any positive substance but in opposi-
tional relation to normativity,” where identity is one of the most tenacious and consequential 
instances of normativity at work. Jagose, “The Trouble with Antinormativity,” 31–32. While the 
anti-normativity that undergirds the multifarious and often conflictual project of queer theory 
has branched out beyond identity to critique other forms of normativity such as liberalism 
and nationalism, which are not so easily mapped onto the traditional repertoire of identity 
categories (sex, race, sexuality) associated with identity politics, anti-normativity can be seen 
as a form of anti-identitarianism insofar as normativity works to gather collectivities around 
its various iterations, where the shared norm can then be easily stabilized and fixed so as to 
become the foundation of a shared identity.
 62. Wiegman, “Sex and Negativity,” 219.
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To read Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta through the lens of queerness 
occludes the historical and cultural specificity of their configuration. To 
assimilate them into a queer genealogy would be to lose sight of how their 
writing, historically, does not have queer theory as its intellectual backdrop. 
It predates queer theory (Garréta’s first novel, Sphinx, was published in 1986, 
several years before Teresa de Lauretis would introduce the term queer theory 
in a 1991 special issue of differences).63 As evoked earlier, they were instead 
writing against the cultural and intellectual backdrop of a specifically French 
tradition of conceiving difference—e.g., the French appropriation of psycho-
analysis, the French origins of poststructuralist thought, and a French, dif-
ferentialist vision of emancipation for women—and abstaining from it: their 
literary production constituted an independent intellectual framework. Relat-
edly, the anti-identitarianism of Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta’s works isn’t the 
anti-identitarianism of queer theory, which isn’t so much anti-identity as it 
is pro-non-normative-identity, a non-normative stance that, as Robyn Wieg-
man and Elizabeth Wilson have shown, quickly solidifies into a normative 
anti-normativity.64 Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta are not anti-normative in the 
way that anti-normative queer theory is. Instead of saying no to the ques-
tion of norms, or calling out identity and identitarian politics explicitly, they 
enact, literarily, a project of indeterminism that has anti-identitarian effects. 
They simply construct an other-place, one where identity categories crumble, 
and difference, as the foundation upon which to build identity, becomes as 
unstable as sand. I see this anti-identitarian place as informed by a quint-
essentially French universalism, originating in the Enlightenment, to which 
each writer has a different relationship.65 Reading these writers as queer would 
thus be to miss the way their corpus is itself a response to and a reworking of 
a distinctly French universalism. This isn’t to say that queer readings of these 
 63. de Lauretis, “Queer Theory.”
 64. Wiegman and Wilson, eds., Queer Theory without Antinormativity. Special issue, dif-
ferences 26.1 (2015). Lisa Duggan and Jack Halberstam, prominent figures in queer theory, 
critiqued Wiegman and Wilson’s project, rejecting their characterization of queer theory and 
viewing it as intellectually disingenuous. See Duggan, “Queer Complacency without Empire”; 
Halberstam, “Straight Eye For the Queer Theorist.”
 65. Sarraute seems invested in the possibilities of French universalism as seen in her 
descriptions of the French school system in Enfance, which show her and her classmates acced-
ing to a universal citoyenneté. Wittig and Garréta are both sensitive to the false universalism 
of Enlightenment French universalism, which elevates one type of subject (the white, straight, 
French male) as universal at the expense of all others, but they have different reactions. Wit-
tig attempts to recuperate universalism while Garréta seems averse to the idea, finding more 
political potential in the American notion of queerness than in a French universality. Despite 
Garréta’s aversion, the fact remains that she was shaped by the French idea and is a product of 
French culture, sociality, and schooling.
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writers shouldn’t be attempted, or that all readings must always historicize 
to be interesting. Far from it—one of my goals in writing Unbecoming Lan-
guage and revealing these writers’ interrelationship and shared influence is to 
encourage others to read and engage with them, to discover their own projects 
and desires for these texts. Those projects might be explicitly queer, but my 
own project here is not.
If my project distances itself from the label of queer and the concepts and 
vocabulary that come with it, it’s primarily because the sort of unbecoming I 
see in Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta’s corpus does not map onto the theoriza-
tions of self-shattering and desubjectivation put forth by queer negativity and, 
in particular, the antisocial strand of queer theory that has been so influential 
in sustaining the debates and dissensus that have characterized queer theory 
since its inception.66
While there are clear resonances between my writers’ project of unbe-
coming and that of queer theory’s antisocial strand, queer theory is not the 
tool best suited for making sense of it for two reasons. First, queer theoriza-
tions of self-decomposure tie language too tightly to subjected subjectivity, 
and take subjectivity as already normed, already formed into a subject, by 
ceding as much ground and authority as it does to psychoanalytic models 
of conceiving the two. Unlike my theorization of unbecoming as the experi-
ence of subjectivity without subjecthood, Jack Halberstam, in an essay entitled 
“Unbecoming: Queer Negativity/Radical Passivity,” grounds unbecoming in 
the psychoanalytic narrative of subjectivation through submission to the sym-
 66. For some recent, metadisciplinary accounts of queer negativity that see queer negativity 
as fundamental to the shape and trajectory of queer theory, both past and present, see Wieg-
man, “Sex and Negativity”; Ruti, The Ethics of Opting Out.
Queer negativity has become a capacious term that refers to such distinct projects 
as Leo Bersani’s call for a non-redemptive sexuality that, through shattering the self, renders 
collectivity and community impossible; Lee Edelman’s rejection of reproductive futurity—of 
investment in the future, as exemplified by the elevation of the figure of the child—and its 
call for queers to identify with the death drive, embodying and embracing the homophobic 
narratives of queers as a dangerous threat to the social order; Heather Love’s call to lean into 
loss and pain as a countermeasure to a problematic gay pride that would forget queer histories 
of exclusion; and Jack Halberstam’s proposition that failure might serve as a non-normative 
means to create alternatives to stultifying, heteronormative conceptions of success. See Bersani, 
Homos; Edelman, No Future; Love, Feeling Backward; Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure.
Queer negativity has dominated queer theory both in psychoanalytically driven ways, 
where negativity is not what destroys the social but rather what constitutes it, and in socially 
oriented ways, where negativity is constative rather than constitutive. In the latter, negativity is 
observed as it manifests itself in society (e.g., shame, suffering—these are produced by society 
but do not in themselves produce or structure society). What is pertinent here is the first kind 
of queer negativity, which has been most tightly woven around the term “antisocial thesis,” 
first introduced to a broad audience by Caserio et al., “The Antisocial Thesis in Queer Theory.”
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bolic realm, to language and its norms.67 Halberstam argues for a negative, 
queer feminist writing that foregrounds subjects who unbecome—who refuse 
to become subjects by refusing to speak and enter into a normative language. 
Here, what subjectivity remains after having foregone subjecthood is deprived 
of language, relegated to silence and passivity, which Halberstam identifies, 
correctly, as having powerful political consequences.
Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta’s unbecoming language, however, is one that 
does not ground subjectivity and the relinquishing of subjecthood in the giv-
ing up of language. Instead, they forego subjecthood through a vital experi-
ence of and relationship with language. Rather than abstain from language, 
they forge a different relationship to it. Halberstam’s unbecoming subject 
“articulates itself in terms of evacuation, refusal, passivity, unbecoming, unbe-
ing” tied to “negativity and negation.”68 The unbecoming subjectivity without 
subjecthood, by contrast, unbecomes not in order to experience non-agential 
passivity and unbeing, but in order to be more fully itself, to tap into a being 
that is richer and more vital than what the language of identity and difference 
provides. In other words, rather than relinquish language in order to accede to 
a state of subjectivity free from the subjection of subjecthood, Sarraute, Wittig, 
and Garréta bring the reader into their close encounter with a language that 
can rework our subjectivity and unchain it from the confines of subjecthood 
for as long as we are in contact with it.
Second, queer theory runs the risk of trapping Wittig and Garréta in 
identity, albeit a queer one, because of how neatly queer maps onto Wittig 
and Garréta’s sexuality. In such a reading, Wittig’s and Garréta’s queer sexual-
ity would be identified as the origin of their anti-identitarian writing, which 
would be unable to account for how Sarraute, as a heterosexual woman, is 
the origin of this collective corpus of unbecoming writing. Either Sarraute 
would be displaced as the starting point of this project, or Sarraute would be 
queered: a latent queer sexuality might be attributed to her, or other aspects 
of her biography might be pointed to in order to argue that she is queer for 
being non-normative, such as her being a Russian Jew. Her anti-identitarian-
ism would thus be explained in identitarian terms, using a language her writ-
ing decidedly works against. In avoiding reading this poetics of unbecoming 
as a queer one, then, I am also trying to keep Garréta’s and Wittig’s sexuality 
from overdetermining our reading of this collective corpus and preventing us 
from having the sort of indeterminate and freeing encounter with language 
without which we cannot unbecome.
 67. Halberstam, “Unbecoming.”
 68. Halberstam, 178.
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At this point, I’d like to turn from these broader theoretical questions to 
more granular questions of vocabulary. As you’ve undoubtedly noticed, I’ve 
deployed the language of indeterminacy, anti-identitarianism, and anti-differ-
ence somewhat interchangeably, and I’d like to take the time now to explain 
why I do so. If I use all these terms, it’s because none can represent adequately 
the nature of unbecoming. The project and poetics of unbecoming catches on 
all these terms without being fully caught by each one, and that is undoubt-
edly because the unbecoming language we find in Sarraute, Wittig, and Gar-
réta’s writing is experiential and provides us with an encounter with language 
that description cannot fully reproduce. Indeterminacy, anti-identitarianism, 
and anti-difference, together, however, can give an approximate idea of what 
unbecoming is.
I use indeterminacy to refer to a consequence of unbecoming. To be a 
subjectivity without subjecthood is to be a non-delineated subjectivity. With 
no contours, it’s impossible to determine where and what such subjectivity 
is—it remains indeterminable and indeterminate, outside the demarcating, 
delineating identity categories that constitute subjecthood. It is in their resis-
tance to these identity categories that Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta’s corpus 
is anti-identitarian. Their anti-identitarianism stands opposed to the identity 
of identity politics, to those identity categories that efficiently and invidiously 
contain and impose limits on our subjectivities, which, in the absence of social 
forces that would categorize us, feel unbounded. Finally, their corpus is anti-
difference, which is a crude rendering of a more complex relationship to dif-
ference than a single prefix can indicate.
Etymologically speaking, identity and difference are at odds with each 
other: identity is derived from the Latin idem (“same”) and denotes sameness. 
So why am I positing difference as what undergirds identity so that to be anti-
identity is to be anti-difference? The way we use “identity” today, as a way of 
identifying which social categories we identify ourselves as belonging to, such 
as sex, race, class, and sexuality, applies a differentiating logic to sameness, or 
rather, builds sameness on difference. We identify these axes of difference and 
make them the basis of a feeling of sameness or similarity with other people 
who also embody this difference. Difference is mobilized into a sameness on 
which a collective identity can be built.
The social order has primed us to consent to being sorted into these dif-
ferent categories of sameness, and does not leave us with options for opt-
ing out: any positive affirmation of non-categorical identity turns into a new 
category,69 and the only way out, as Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta demonstrate 
 69. Consider how non-binary gender has itself become yet another site of categorization, 
as the proliferation of gender categories beyond male and female demonstrates.
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in different ways, is to try to break down the material with which these cat-
egories are built—language. In other words, we’ve cut up difference to make 
categories, and have then claimed that those categories, which constitute iden-
tity, cohere through sameness. Given that these identity categories depend on 
their distinction from one other to function (a man is not a woman, black is 
not white, able-bodied is not disabled, gay is not straight), they are built on 
a reified difference. Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta are anti-difference insofar 
as their writing demonstrates a sustained resistance to the way difference is 
used to imprison and (de)limit us, diminishing our sense of possibility for our 
subjectivities. They are anti-difference in the way that anti-difference feminists 
posit difference as a constructed concept. But they are not anti-difference in 
the sense that they are saying no to difference. To say no to difference would 
be to negate their very own existences.
They accept the pervasiveness and omnipresence of difference as some-
thing foundational to the way our society is currently ordered, and yet, rather 
than simply consent or resign themselves to a difference that would impose 
itself in every corner of intersubjective relation (the moment you encounter 
another person, you start the process of figuring out and establishing your 
difference), they use their writing to hollow out difference from within. By 
doing so, they reveal how malleable difference is, how it is in fact not impen-
etrable or impervious but instead, surprisingly fragile, contingent: a simple 
pronoun can put a deep crack in it, spoiling its integrity.70 Within difference, 
while appearing for all intents and purposes as clearly visible and identifiable 
subjects, Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta write their way into subjectless ways of 
being, hollowing out a space in which to be otherwise.
This hollowing out of difference constitutes a reworking of our subjectivity 
and has relational and political implications. By forcing us to have a different 
relationship to language than we normally do—to encounter a language that 
is indeterminate, working against identity and against the reification of differ-
ence into hierarchy—the relationship that is most profoundly transformed is 
not an inter-human relationship, but the relationship we have to the language 
that provides us with a way of connecting to the world and making sense of 
it and each other. Language is non-human even if it is intimately tied to the 
human. Its difference from the human becomes clear in Sarraute, Wittig, and 
Garréta’s writing as they experience language as autonomous and material, 
possessing a body proper to it. This human-linguistic encounter replaces the 
identitarian sense of the world as it is with a non-sense that rejects categori-
zation. Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta lay the groundwork for a reworking of 
 70. As Chapters 1–3 show, the pronoun is important to all three writers’ unbecoming 
writing.
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sociality by creating the possibility for each of their readers to reenact their 
work of hollowing out difference, and, by showing us what it feels like to 
inhabit difference differently, to elude a subjecthood that is constantly rebuilt 
and reinforced day after day, interaction after interaction. Their texts create 
space within a world of difference to live without it. They hollow out differ-
ence and create pockets of unbecoming where we might be ourselves in our 
full plenitude.
How, if we experience this unbecoming, experience what such unbecom-
ing language does to our subjectivity, can it not shift the way that we live with 
each other? If we experience our own boundedness as a contingent one, able 
to be undone by seeking out and relating to the unbecoming language we find 
in Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta’s texts, and others have the same experience, 
that means that beyond reworking our own subjectivities, we might rework 
the language that we use with each other, the language of our intersubjectiv-
ity. We might engage in a sociality of disarmament. Instead of reproducing the 
language that has produced us as identitarian others and sames, we might put 
that language down and opt for a language that works to keep our difference 
from congealing into a false and divisive sameness. Hollowing out difference 
collectively to make our extratextual world more like the textual ones we find 
in this book would mean making the burden of difference easier and lighter 
to bear, and it would create space in which to imagine a world with something 
other than difference as its gravity, as the force that holds things together in 
hierarchy.
This, I realize, is an undoubtedly utopian project, as identity is not some-
thing that we can do away with all of a sudden. I agree with the position 
famously dubbed “strategic essentialism”71 by Gayatri Spivak and believe that, 
in our contemporary moment, we do not have the luxury as political actors 
of disinvesting in identity. It is precisely by embracing identity, albeit in a 
provisory manner, that we’re able to engage in the coalitional politics that 
attend to our present and concrete lived realities, and to make progress toward 
hollowing out the categories that are the site of oppression until they are no 
more. The anti-difference French feminist Christine Delphy recognizes this 
and doesn’t consider the project of abolishing an identity category such as 
gender to be incompatible with coalitional politics: “To try to abolish gender 
categories in no way contradicts the formation of gendered political commu-
nities—it would be absurd to say ‘To get somewhere, let’s act as if we’re already 
there.’”72 But to encounter the sort of unbecoming language that these writers 
 71. Spivak and Landry, The Spivak Reader, 214.
 72. Delphy, Classer, dominer, 71.
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deploy is to encounter a radical possibility, even if it is intermittent—a flash 
that momentarily lights up the sky of our lived lives.
I’d like to think that with enough readers experiencing a hollowing out of 
difference, this enterprise might coalesce, turning from a vague and nebulous 
ideal into a nebula of constant unbecoming, with and through a freed and 
freeing language. At the very least, however, this corpus serves as a reminder 
that the world of difference that we live in, and the kinds of difference that 
we necessarily take on in order to be a part of it, is as fictive (in the sense 
of fabricated) as the worlds we read. And even if it does nothing more than 
that, by making it possible for the selves we think we know ourselves to be to 
unbecome, this literature makes it possible to think or dream of what it might 
look like to travel beyond the horizons of a world marked and measured by 
difference, by constant delimitation and boundary-marking. This literature’s 
unbecoming language acts as the most becoming of all of language’s possibili-
ties, and invites us to get to know it as a way of un-knowing all the things we 
thought we knew ourselves to be.
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C H A P T E R  1
Sarraute’s Indeterminacy
A Universe without Contours
NATHALIE SARR AUTE. The name conjures up an image of an old woman’s face 
whose deeply etched wrinkles and sharp features serve as a feminine counter-
part to Samuel Beckett’s—Sarraute, after all, did not become a renowned literary 
figure until she was well into her fifties, and she did not publish a bestseller until 
she was in her eighties. The name also conjures up an iconic photograph (fig.1): 
Sarraute, legs crossed, her toes in their leather pumps angled inwards toward 
each other in a typically feminine pose, stands demurely at the edge of a group of 
mostly younger men. These men, their legs uncrossed, are the avant-garde nov-
elists who would make their fortunes under the name of the Nouveau Roman, 
or New Novel, the last literary avant-garde in France. And Sarraute’s fortune, like 
theirs, would also get caught up with the New Novel, for better or worse.
With a career that spanned most of the twentieth century, Sarraute spent 
some seventy years exploring tropisms—a term she adopted from biology 
to describe the instinctive and involuntary reactions that take place in what 
she called sous-conversation [sub-conversation], under the surface of conver-
sation—which are so small and rapid that they go unnoticed. In Sarraute’s 
words, “They are indefinable movements that move very quickly at the limits 
of our consciousness; they are the origin of our acts, our words, the feelings 
we show, the ones we believe we feel and can define.”1 This obsession with the 
 1. Sarraute, L’Ère du soupçon, in Œuvres complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1996; 2011), 1553. This 
quotation is taken from Sarraute’s preface to the French edition of L’Ère du soupçon, which was 
not included in the English translation.
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tropism would set Sarraute apart in most minds as a singular writer,2 but this 
singularity did nothing to prevent her from being assimilated into the catego-
ries that make literary history and its developments intelligible.
Sarraute is most often placed in the categories of the New Novel and of the 
woman writer, both of which distort or obscure important aspects of her work 
and end up imposing a gendered writing with which she would disidentify. I 
want to draw Sarraute out of these categories in order to prevent them from 
serving as a grille de lecture [reading grid] that limits potential readings by 
providing us with a ready-made framework within which to think about the 
writer and her work. By removing Sarraute from these categories, we can read 
her instead with Monique Wittig and Anne Garréta, the three writers constitut-
A note on the complete works of Sarraute: Gallimard, in 1996, published a Pléiade edi-
tion of her then complete works. Unwilling to have the door closed on her career at the age of 
96, she wrote and published her last novel, Ouvrez, in 1997. Gallimard, in 2011, published a new 
edition of the Pléiade that contains Ouvrez and thus truly constitutes Sarraute’s complete works, 
but they did not issue this new edition a distinct ISBN. While the pagination for Sarraute’s texts 
remains mostly the same, the section of critical materials is different as the commentary on 
Sarraute’s critical reception in the press was excised to make room for Ouvrez. I will refer to 
the 2011 edition throughout; readers interested in checking my citations will have to make sure 
they are looking in the complete complete works of Sarraute.
 2. Claude Mauriac wrote of Sarraute’s singularity, “But what neither Balzac nor the most 
modern writers knew how to depict is what Nathalie Sarraute expresses.” Mauriac, L’Allitérature, 321.
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FIGURE 1. The New Novelists. Left to right: Alain Robbe-Grillet, Claude Simon, Claude 
Mauriac, Jérôme Lindon, Robert Pinget, Samuel Beckett, Nathalie Sarraute, Claude Ollier. 
Photo: Mario Dondero.
ing a collective corpus of anti-identitarian feminist writing that opens up new 
political possibilities for literature.
OUTSIDE CATEGORIES
It’s difficult to disengage Sarraute from the New Novel, as she received much 
public attention through her identification as one of the New Novelists, 
achieving a level of success and recognition that she had not experienced for 
the first two and a half decades of her writing career, despite Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
having supported and promoted her first novel, Portrait d’un inconnu (1948), 
for which he wrote the introduction. Even those scholars who are careful 
to insist on her difference from the New Novel still use the New Novel as a 
point of reference that helps to trace a clear definition of what Sarraute is not. 
Sarraute scholars, regardless of where they stand vis-à-vis the New Novel—
whether they view it as a productive concept that helps to situate Sarraute and 
her work, or whether they view it as a distorting label that takes away from 
the singularity of her work—still feel compelled to contextualize Sarraute in 
relation to it.3 The New Novel thus serves in some sense as the principal center 
of gravity for thinking about and situating Sarraute: not to actively disidentify 
Sarraute with the New Novel is to assent to her association with it and thus to 
accept the New Novel’s avant-gardism as the primary or most relevant char-
acterization of her experimental writing; and to disidentify Sarraute with the 
New Novel is to disavow the substantial impact the New Novel had on the 
reception of her work. My purpose here is neither to add to the scholarship 
on the New Novel nor to try to identify to what extent we can or should con-
sider Sarraute to be a New Novelist. Rather, I am interested in examining the 
possibilities that open up if we read her not in relation to the New Novel, but 
completely outside of it.
Placing Sarraute within the category of the New Novel both effaces and 
emphasizes her genderedness: it assimilates her into this group of male mod-
ernist writers, insisting on the common cause shared by her and the other 
New Novelists, and it positions her, as in the photograph, as the odd woman 
out.4 In the same way that Sarraute’s disidentification with the New Novel in 
no way prevented her from being identified as a spearhead of the group, Sar-
 3. Valerie Minogue and Arnaud Rykner, both major Sarraute scholars, represent these 
two positions, with Minogue taking the New Novel as a useful way of contextualizing Sarraute’s 
quest for literary innovation, and with Rykner insisting on reading her against the New Novel. 
See Minogue, Nathalie Sarraute; Rykner, Nathalie Sarraute.
 4. Marguerite Duras had been briefly associated with the New Novel, but that association 
did not stick the way it did in the case of Sarraute, and so Duras was able to construct herself 
according to the model of the singular writer.
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raute’s consistent disidentification with the category of woman writer has in 
no way prevented her from being identified as one. The idea of the woman 
writer has been used to compare Sarraute to other writers who are women—
e.g., Marguerite Duras, Marguerite Yourcenar, Simone de Beauvoir, Maryse 
Condé, and Annie Ernaux—and has led to her autobiographical writing being 
tied to the specifically gendered stakes of writing as a woman, for instance, 
or to seeing her narratives as containing an anxiety symptomatic of being a 
woman writer working in a masculine field and transgressing social norms.5
Sarraute asserts unequivocally that her womanhood has nothing to do 
with her writing. The literary magazine La Quinzaine littéraire asked Sar-
raute and seventeen other French writers a set of three questions related to 
the larger question of whether writing can be sexed: “Is the writer at work 
aware of being specifically a man or woman? One is a man or woman and one 
writes: does this factor show up in the writing that is produced? If there is a 
difference, is it absorbed, removed, distanced, or, on the contrary, accentuated, 
utilized, exploited in writing?” Sarraute responded by saying, “I am convinced 
that there is no difference between men and women, as there is no differ-
ence between their respiratory or blood systems. [.  .  .] Consequently, I have 
never asked myself if there were qualities or faults that could be called mas-
culine or feminine. I think these distinctions are founded on prejudices, on 
pure conventions.”6 Moreover, Sarraute has explicitly rejected the notion that 
women writers are connected to each other through a shared womanhood: 
“People always compare women to each other. I was asked once at a confer-
ence what similarity there was between Marguerite Yourcenar and Marguerite 
Duras. I said that there was an enormous similarity: they were both called 
Marguerite! Otherwise there is not an iota of connection between them.”7 Sar-
raute, in both instances, shows her aversion to having something contingent, 
like one’s name or chromosomal configuration, turned into something foun-
dational—a sentiment that informs her rejection of a deterministic sexual dif-
ference. Sexual difference, like characters and plot, are pure conventions and 
as such can be undone or overridden.
Despite Sarraute’s resistance, she has continued to be identified as a 
woman writer, and in some sense, her resistance has itself sharpened the con-
tours of the feminine writerly identity from which she tried to escape. Sar-
raute’s absence, for example, from Alice Jardine and Anne Menke’s Shifting 
Scenes: Interviews on Women, Writing, and Politics in Post-68 France, is framed 
as an abstention, a refusal to be anthologized or considered a woman writer. 
 5. See Hewitt, Autobiographical Tightropes; Willging, Telling Anxiety.
 6. Sarraute, quoted in Hermann, “L’Écriture a-t-elle un sexe?,” 29.
 7. Weiss and Guppy, “Nathalie Sarraute.”
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However, by remarking on her absence from the ranks of the other women 
writers who consented to reflect on the relationship between being a woman 
and writing, attention is called to Sarraute as a woman writer in a way that 
simply omitting her wouldn’t have.8
Neither the category of the New Novel nor the woman writer are able 
to represent Sarraute adequately. On the one hand, to place Sarraute in the 
New Novel, in the tradition of the avant-garde, is to put her in a masculine 
category and bind her to a masculinist and modernist resistance to literary 
conventions and norms. On the other hand, to identify Sarraute as a woman 
writer is to put her in a feminine category that binds her to a feminine form 
of resistance to masculinist literary culture, and, more broadly, to the patri-
archy that subtends it. Both categorizations miss the larger point of Sarraute’s 
writing, which is her commitment to indeterminacy and continual resistance 
to all categorization, seen in her ceaseless attempts to dissolve the contours 
of the identities that categorize us in order to open up our subjectivities to an 
immediate experience with a language that is vivant, alive. This language that 
Sarraute pursues knows no identity as such; it’s a language that hasn’t yet been 
killed through convention, disciplined by the social order into ratifying differ-
ence as the basis of the identity categories that fix us.
This isn’t to say that Sarraute scholars haven’t attended to her aversion 
to categorization—it is impossible to read Sarraute and not be struck by her 
resistance to fixity, her commitment to blurring or destroying the lines of 
demarcation that constitute categories. Rather, her anti-categorical writing 
hasn’t been contextualized in such a way that we can see its full impact. By 
reading her outside both the masculine and feminine traditions constituted 
by the New Novel and the woman writer, it becomes possible to see the way 
Sarraute’s writing elucidates the interface between the literary and the politi-
cal.9 By suspending Sarraute from these familiar categories, we can see how 
her anti-categorical writing has an inherently political dimension because it is 
produced from within the context of a quest for aesthetic, literary innovation.
 8. Jardine and Menke, Shifting Scenes, 5.
 9. This interface has been the subject of much debate, from Plato’s polemics against poet-
ry’s corrupting powers, to Jacques Rancière’s notion of literature’s determining role in the dis-
tribution of the sensible. See Plato, The Republic, Book X, and Rancière, Le Partage du sensible 
and La Parole muette. By “distribution of the sensible,” Rancière refers to how literature frames 
what subjects belonging to a certain collectivity or social order can see or not see, feel or not 
feel, sense or not sense—how literature configures a common sensorium. The interface that I 
am concerned with is not that of what impact literature has on politics, but rather the process 
by which it has that impact, or moves from the literary sphere into the political one. That is, I 
am interested in the literary processes that lead to a distribution of the sensible, a reconfigura-
tion of how a collectivity experiences the world.
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Sarraute did not see herself as a political writer and her interest in the 
tiny movements of tropisms, in unremarked psychological phenomena, would 
seem apolitical. For those familiar with Sarraute, it’s probably surprising to 
see me assert that Sarraute’s writing is political. While this may not be the 
most obvious reading of Sarraute, it’s one that comes into focus when Sarraute 
is read alongside Wittig and Garréta. Their more obviously political writing 
serves as a backdrop that allows Sarraute’s tiny, indeterminate tropisms to be 
seen in a political light and mobilized for a project of anti-identitarian writing 
that seeks to provide us with an encounter with unbecoming language. In the 
case of all three writers, it’s precisely by pursuing the aesthetic and the liter-
ary that the political is produced, that an experience of subjectivity without 
subjecthood obtains. Let’s turn now to what this experience looks like for Sar-
raute, which she would describe in terms of neutrality.
THE NEUTRAL: A UNIVERSE WITHOUT CONTOURS
Sarraute’s commitment to indeterminacy, to undermining the fixity of differ-
ence and the proliferation of identity categories that difference produces, is 
rooted in her conviction of what she calls the neutrality of humankind. Sar-
raute’s notion of neutrality takes the being of human being as a state free of 
difference, as a being without contours. As we saw in the Introduction, it is 
for her “this self-evident fact—or is it madness?—that each of us is an entire 
universe unto ourselves, that we feel infinite, without contours.”10 She would 
elaborate on her notion of the neutral in an interview, stating that “the human 
being for me is the neutral. There’s a word for that in Russian, tcheloviek, and 
in German, Der Mensch—a human being, man or woman, regardless of age, 
regardless of sex.”11 She cites two differences that are used to categorize human 
beings into identity—age and sex—as examples of contours that for her do 
not exist in the neutral space of human existence. Later, in the same interview, 
she emphasizes that neutrality is not some balanced distribution of difference, 
where one difference is not allowed to have more purchase or influence than 
another, but the absence of difference altogether:
Talk to me about this neutral zone that is at the center of Man, taken in its 
broadest sense.
I am not thinking at all in terms of “androgyny.” I work uniquely from what 
I feel myself. I don’t place myself on the outside, I don’t seek to analyze from 
 10. Sarraute, “Prière d’insérer” to “disent les imbéciles.”
 11. Benmussa and Sarraute, Entretiens avec Nathalie Sarraute, 184.
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outside. Inside, where I am, sex doesn’t exist. I never tell myself: that was felt 
by me, or a woman, or a man. [. . .] I am so much in what I am doing that I 
don’t exist. I don’t think it’s a woman who’s writing. That thing that I work on 
is in the middle of taking place somewhere where the feminine or masculine 
sex does not intervene.12
Sarraute’s rejection of sexual difference may seem to be, at best, wishful think-
ing. As feminist theories of the social construction of gender from Beauvoir 
on have amply demonstrated, one’s self-consciousness of oneself as a woman 
or one’s active identification or disidentification as a woman does not matter. 
Being gendered is a social construction and position that is imposed from 
without regardless of whether one accepts it. Sarraute’s conviction of neu-
trality is obviously limited or ineffectual against a greater social impetus to 
impose difference, as her being caught up in the category of woman writer, 
despite her repeated insistence otherwise, shows.
However, rather than focus on the limitations of Sarraute’s claims, I want 
to focus on its possibilities. Sarraute experiences the space of writing, of her 
encounter with language, as one where the relentless imposition and reitera-
tions of difference are no longer operative. Within this literary space, dif-
ference can be and is evacuated. While this may seem useless vis-à-vis the 
larger social sphere, it opens up the possibility for readers to also encounter 
language in Sarraute’s texts as a similarly emancipatory experience, where one 
is freed, albeit momentarily, from the strictures of difference. And an experi-
ence once realized opens up the possibility and desire for a more sustained 
experience of difference-lessness. Just as the first light bulbs lasted only a few 
flickering moments but made concrete the possibility of sustained electric 
illumination, so too might these momentary experiences of identity-lessness 
make concrete the possibility of living without identity, and bring into greater 
 12. Benmussa and Sarraute, 184–85. Sarrautian neutrality is distinct from Maurice Blan-
chot’s, for whom neutrality is the state of radical nonsubjectivity as manifest in the neuter (see 
Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation). Hers is an experience of radical subjectivity, one without 
subjecthood—the “I” that is so much in what it is doing is the “I” of subjectivity; it is not the 
“I” that doesn’t exist, which is the “I” of subjecthood. Roland Barthes’s notion of neutrality 
(developed at length in Barthes, The Neutral) posits the neutral as “everything that baffles the 
paradigm” (6), where the paradigm is embodied by the binary whose oppositions are the struc-
turing and productive foundation of Western thought, and is driven by the desire to retreat 
from a hegemonic social order. It resonates with Sarraute’s eschewing of the paradigm of sexual 
difference, but, for Sarraute, the neutral is a very real and accessible state, the affirmation of a 
truth about humankind, while such affirmation, in Barthes’s view, would be a manifestation of 
arrogance, too close to dogma. For Barthes, the neutral is utopian, impossible to fully seize.
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relief the manufacturedness and unnaturalness of the regime of identity we 
all live under.13
Sarraute’s conception of neutrality is radical in its rejection of difference 
even when it has been neutralized, as seen in her rejection of androgyny, 
which is a state where neither masculinity nor femininity has the upper hand, 
rendering the sexual difference they manifest “neutral” in its effects. A neu-
tralized difference, for Sarraute, is still a difference, and for her, true neutrality 
demands the dissolution of all difference, all contours, all identity. Language—
the work she does with it, in it, on it, and the space she occupies when she 
does all those things—is the key to acceding to this neutrality: it is the media-
tion that enables her to be a universe without contours. Language is where 
one can have experience and subjectivity (Sarraute feels, she senses, and her 
texts are spaces where the reader gets to recreate those feelings and sensa-
tions herself) without the contours that make up such identities as “woman,” 
“man,” or the person behind “I.” Sarraute writes, then, to free subjectivity from 
the contours that corral it into being a subject endowed with an identity into 
which subjectivity has been decanted. She writes to unbecome, and makes this 
experience available to her readers as well.
THE POLITICAL SARRAUTE
Sarraute’s commitment to indeterminacy is political: her works enact the neu-
trality she believes is shared by all. In effect, she writes against the very foun-
dation of a social order whose continued existence depends on maintaining 
the manifold differences issuing from the originary concept of difference that 
then coalesce into identity. What would modern polity be without the iden-
titarian contours of nationality, immigration status, sexual orientation, sex, 
race, marriage and family status, age, language, economic power, disability, 
standardized test results, medical diagnoses, and all the other categories that 
 13. Here, I go further than Sarraute was willing to go, since she described the identity-less 
experience she writes of as an unsustainable one: “One couldn’t live in my books or in tro-
pisms. [. . .] One would go crazy. Social life and community would no longer be possible, nor 
action.” Benmussa and Sarraute, Entretiens avec Nathalie Sarraute, 73. Sarraute thus cordons 
off her writing from lived life, but I believe experiencing her books can transform, rather than 
destroy, social life and action. In this, I read Sarraute generously, as Gary Wilder understands 
such reading, which entails thinking with a writer “to extend the logic of their propositions far 
beyond where they may have stopped.” Wilder, Freedom Time, 13.
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inhere in biopower and its establishment of the modern nation state?14 Indeed, 
the polity divides in order to cohere.
Despite Sarraute’s relentless attack on the contours that make the modern 
nation-state possible, she is not read or received as a political writer, and her 
work is not considered for its political stakes. Wittig, however, was able to 
detect the political force of Sarraute’s work. She found something in Sarraute’s 
writing that enabled her to produce her own work, which is unanimously rec-
ognized for its political program of combating patriarchy and its heterosexual 
regime of domination. Apart from Wittig, however, Sarraute’s critics tend to 
replicate Sarraute’s self-description as a non-political writer15 and her insis-
tence that when she writes, she has no identity: “When I write, I am neither 
man nor woman nor dog nor cat.”16 Such a statement, when used to distance 
her writing project from the political, reveals the underlying assumption that 
the political necessarily derives from or involves a subject in possession of an 
identity to whom interest can be ascribed.
While Sarraute describes her writerly self as emptied out with no one 
there—no one left to be political—it is difficult not to see in her own lived 
experience a political root to Sarraute’s aversion to categories. During World 
War II, as a Jew in occupied France, Sarraute experienced firsthand the tyr-
anny of categories and the terror they can produce. The consequences of being 
placed into the category of Jew were grave: she was disbarred as a lawyer 
and, after divorcing her husband to protect him, went into hiding after being 
 14. See The History of Sexuality for Foucault’s now famous articulation of the interrelation-
ship of knowledge and power as borne out in the modern nation-state’s invention of biopower, 
which marshals scientific knowledge to control populations, or in his own words, designates 
“what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowl-
edge-power an agent of transformation of human life.” Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 143.
 15. Ann Jefferson, in her rich study of the central role of difference in Sarraute’s work, 
reiterates Sarraute’s aversion to being considered a political writer (e.g., her opposition to being 
considered a feminist writer) and tries to approach the question of Sarraute’s political quality 
obliquely: “Without seeking to retrieve Sarraute for a reading of her work in terms of race or 
gender, an understanding of the ways in which theorists of these issues are confronted with 
questions of difference can be helpful in underscoring this dimension of Sarraute’s own engage-
ment with questions of difference.” Jefferson, Nathalie Sarraute, 11. In other words, Jefferson 
wants to be able to mine the insights of explicitly political theory without having to assume the 
association with the political. By declining to read Sarraute as political against her self-char-
acterization, however, Jefferson in effect depoliticizes theories of gender and race that set out 
to theorize from an explicitly political point of departure, and neutralizes their impact. Benoît 
Auclerc is a notable exception to this critical consensus about Sarraute’s depoliticized writing, 
but he reads Sarraute in order to read Wittig. Where he’s interested in the political quality of 
Sarraute insofar as it elucidates Wittig’s work, I am interested in Sarraute’s political qualities for 
what they have to say about Sarraute as well.
 16. Rykiel, “Quand j’écris,” 40.
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denounced as the daughter of a Jew, leaving behind her husband and their 
eldest daughter.17 Sarraute, who refused to wear the yellow star, had to assume 
false identities and was nearly arrested and deported following a close call 
with a zealous baker who was going to denounce her to the authorities. She 
lived under a regime marked by a politics of difference that obsessively identi-
fied and categorized the other in order to preserve the purity and dominance 
of the Aryan same. Sarraute scholars who are attentive to the ways in which 
Sarraute’s biography can be read as informing her writing nonetheless take her 
insistence on her depoliticized writing project at face value and allow Sarraute 
her self-characterization as a depoliticized writer.18 By reading Sarraute’s work 
for the political, radically anti-identitarian force of her writing, however, we 
can see its rich interrelation with Wittig and Garréta’s work. This interrelation 
in turn makes it possible to see how their collective corpus theorizes a new 
feminist poetics of unbecoming, which, unlike the more familiar poetics of 
écriture féminine, treats language as being inimical to difference.19
Wittig’s critical intervention is to discern that what is political in Sar-
raute’s work is language itself, not simply who wields it and against whom it is 
wielded (a view that attributes agency exclusively to the locutor and accord-
ingly instrumentalizes language). As much as language is Sarraute’s medium, 
Sarraute is language’s. Wittig would consider Sarraute’s will to empty herself of 
her self to let language speak and act through her to be a fundamental element 
of Sarraute’s writing. She saw Sarraute shedding her identity to foreground 
language instead as a living and agential entity. Hence Wittig’s description 
of Sarraute’s œuvre in her posthumously published ars poetica, Le Chantier 
littéraire [The Literary Worksite] (2010), as “the first and only one of its kind 
to be written entirely from the side of language; everywhere, the referent you 
look for in life is here in the life of language.”20 Though Wittig never explicitly 
states the connection between living language and the category-shattering, 
indeterminate neutrality that Sarraute pursues, this Sarrautian experience of 
language as living is what drives Wittig to write against difference. For Sar-
raute, this living language is immanently inimical to the kind of difference that 
undergirds identity and leads to oppression—it cannot create these contours.
 17. Sarraute’s two younger daughters would eventually join her in a boarding school in 
Parmain, where she posed as a schoolteacher and her daughters posed as her nieces.
 18. See Valerie Minogue’s discussion of Sarraute’s vocabulary in her last novel, Ouvrez, 
where Minogue draws attention to the recurrence of words like blockhaus and prisonnier that 
allude to the concentrationary universe. Minogue in Sarraute, Œuvres complètes, 2118. See also 
Jefferson, Nathalie Sarraute, 10–11.
 19. See Chapter 4 for an elaboration of the poetics of unbecoming.
 20. Wittig, Le Chantier littéraire, 69–70.
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By examining first an early work, Tropismes (1939), then a mid-career 
work, Les Fruits d’or (1963), which was published at the height of the New 
Novel movement, and then a late-career work, Tu ne t’aimes pas (1989), which 
was published after the waning of the New Novel and Sarraute’s and Robbe-
Grillet’s return to more traditional, conventional narrative forms through 
their autobiographical works,21 we can see that her writing’s dissolution of 
identity categories and hollowing out of difference become stronger over the 
course of her career. The more complete or explicit sort of blurring or removal 
of identity found in her later works shows her work becoming more explic-
itly anti-identitarian as her pursuit of the tropism becomes more refined and 
developed. However, if we take seriously Sarraute’s affirmation that her entire 
corpus is a pursuit of the tropism, we should be able to find this political 
force starting in Tropismes. Let us take a look, then, at Tropismes to see what 
it is about this work that would make Wittig feel “blasted in the process” of 
reading it.22
TROPISMES: A DIFFERENT KIND OF LANGUAGE
It took Sarraute more than seven years to write Tropismes, a slim collection 
of 24 short prose pieces.23 Sarraute was decidedly a writer of perspiration, not 
inspiration—it was normal for her to rewrite passages as many as fifty times.24 
The 24 pieces comprise a kaleidoscopic variety of voices, perspectives, gen-
ders, ages, and social positions. Each section is a discrete text that stands by 
itself and shows to the reader the tropisms that Sarraute claims we all expe-
rience but are unaware of because of how subtle and imperceptible they are. 
Recalling Sarraute’s definition, tropisms are those movements that transpire 
just underneath the surface of conversation in response to another person’s 
presence. Tropismic reality is the psychological material that sticks to words 
 21. Sarraute published Enfance [Childhood] in 1983, and Robbe-Grillet published Le Miroir 
qui revient [Ghosts in the Mirror], the first of an autobiographical trilogy, Romanesques, in 1984. 
Enfance is Sarraute’s most conventionally narrative text, but it is still by no means a conven-
tional one, as she splits the narrative voice into a masculine interlocutor and a feminine inter-
locutor in dialogue with each other. In Sarraute’s work, greater narrative normativity does not 
correspond to greater identitarian normativity: she still manages to write against difference and 
identity in her more traditionally intelligible work.
 22. Wittig, The Straight Mind, 45.
 23. The first edition of Tropismes, published by Denoël in 1939, contained 19 Tropisms, 
and the 1957 Minuit edition, the one we know, contained 24—Sarraute added six new Tropisms 
between 1939 and 1941, and had one of the original Tropisms deleted. See Valerie Minogue’s 
“Notice” to Tropismes in Sarraute, Œuvres complètes, 1717–19.
 24. Sarraute, quoted in Rambures, Comment travaillent les écrivains, 153.
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in the space between language and an unarticulated or inarticulable affective 
state. It is the space where sensation and language come together. The tropism 
is neither sensation nor language in and of themselves, but their union. There 
is no tropism without language, and there is no tropism without sensation, but 
the tropism is irreducible to each.
In this interstice between sensation and language, this synapse, Sarraute 
finds the substance and source of her writing. Sarraute operates in the interval 
between sous-conversation and conversation, or, as Dominique Rabaté con-
ceives it, the interval between inside and outside: “Words are thus the indis-
pensable agents of this delicate work of shuttling between inside and outside. 
They are the privileged vectors of this fragile passage. This preceding affirma-
tion appears to me to be central in Sarraute. [.  .  .] The writer’s work would 
consist, from then on, of returning words to their original movement and let-
ting them float in this intermediary space that is their natural environment.”25 
By operating in the interval between inside and outside, Sarraute places her-
self and the reader in an indeterminate, intermediary space where words can 
move outside the rigid boundaries of identity. Here, we can come into inti-
mate contact with a subjectivity that is not and cannot be fixed, existing as it 
does in a space without contours.
Take the first tropism for instance, which sets the tone for the rest of the 
work, and is composed of a sequence of four short paragraphs. The tropism, 
and the book, opens with this sentence:
Ils semblaient sourdre de partout, éclos dans la tiédeur un peu moite de l’air, 
ils s’écoulaient doucement comme s’ils suintaient des murs, des arbres gril-
lagés, des bancs, des trottoirs sales, des squares.
[They seemed to spring up from nowhere, blossoming out in the slightly 
moist tepidity of the air, they flowed gently along as though they were seep-
ing from the walls, from the boxed trees, the benches, the dirty sidewalks, 
the public squares].26
We are placed in a situation of ignorance. We know that ils [they] are in 
an urban environment, as signaled by the walls, trees, benches, sidewalks, 
and squares. But we do not know who these ils are and the verbs Sarraute 
uses seem distinctly un-human in contrast to the human setting of the city: 
they seep or burst out from within this space, they hatch or bloom in the 
 25. Rabaté, Poétiques de la voix, 264.
 26. Sarraute, Tropismes, in Œuvres complètes, 3; Sarraute, Tropisms, 1. I will occasionally 
emend Maria Jolas’s translation. All subsequent citations will be made in-text.
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wet warmth of the air, and they flow slowly as though they are seeping out 
from the various parts of the city. The verbs seem to be describing insects, 
plants, or spores—those life forms that lack animal sentience, self-awareness, 
and expressivity. The following paragraph depicts these ils as clustering into 
“longues grappes sombres entre les façades mortes des maisons” [long, dark 
clusters between the dead house fronts] (3; 1) and “devant les devantures des 
magasins, ils formaient des noyaux plus compacts, immobiles, occasionnant 
quelques remous, comme de légers engorgements” [before the shop windows, 
they formed more compact, motionless little kernels, giving rise to occasional 
eddies, slight cloggings] (3; 1). Ils are drawn to human buildings, for unknown 
reasons, and they are described as having some sort of collective or social exis-
tence, although it is unclear whether it is a conscious formation or a purely 
instinctual one.
At this point, halfway through the tropism, we are still ignorant as to what 
sort of creature or life-form is being narrated. Sarraute shifts direction and, 
in the third paragraph, she directs us toward and defamiliarizes the familiar 
trope of children who are enthralled by toys and storefront windows carefully 
dressed to whet their appetite:
Une quiétude étrange, une sorte de satisfaction désespérée émanait d’eux. 
Ils regardaient attentivement les piles de linge de l’Exposition de Blanc, imi-
tant habilement des montagnes de neige, ou bien une poupée dont les dents 
et les yeux, à intervalles réguliers, s’allumaient, s’éteignaient, s’allumaient, 
s’éteignaient, s’allumaient, s’éteignaient, toujours à intervalles identiques, 
s’allumaient de nouveau et de nouveau s’éteignaient. (3)
[A strange quietude, a sort of desperate satisfaction emanated from them. 
They looked closely at the piles of linen in the White Sale display, clever imi-
tations of snow-covered mountains, or at a doll with teeth and eyes that, at 
regular intervals, lighted up, went out, lighted up, went out, lighted up, went 
out, each time at the same interval, lighted up again and again went out.] (1)
Our previous uncertainty as to what was being narrated dissipates as the image 
of spores, plants, and insects is replaced by one of children transfixed before a 
store window and the fantastic world it stages for their puerile imaginations. 
The repetition of s’allumaient, s’éteignaient [lighted up, went out] reproduces 
the hypnotic effect the doll’s blinking has on the children, and the language 
hypnotizes its readers as much as the action that is its referent hypnotizes the 
children. Sarraute, however, does not allow us to stay for long either in this 
state of knowing, of readerly certainty, or in the state of hypnosis.
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In the last paragraph, Sarraute upends our expectations by revealing that 
the storefront display has hypnotized not a crowd of children, but rather, the 
adults who are their caretakers:
Ils regardaient longtemps, sans bouger, ils restaient là, offerts, devant les 
vitrines, ils reportaient toujours à l’intervalle suivant le moment de s’éloigner. 
Et les petits enfants tranquilles qui leur donnaient la main, fatigués de regar-
der, distraits, patiemment, auprès d’eux, attendaient. (3)
[They looked again for a long time, without moving, they remained there, in 
offering, before the shop window, they kept postponing until the next inter-
val the moment of leaving. And the quiet little children, whose hands they 
held, weary of looking, listless, waited patiently beside them.] (1–2)
What had started to seem like a typical scene of childhood turns into some-
thing far uncannier, and the usual roles accorded to adults and to children are 
reversed.27 Sarraute ends the tropism with the image of the children who are 
waiting because they are not caught up in the fictive world that the store has 
created for their consumption. 
The tropism can be read as an allegory of reading, with the storefront dis-
play of the snow-covered mountain and the entrancing doll standing in for the 
sorts of fictive worlds created by the traditional Balzacian novel and its able 
mimetic narratives that produce what Roland Barthes has called the reality 
effect.28 Sarraute, like the small children who are waiting for their grown-ups, 
is tired of this weary realism and tries instead to create the experience of real-
ity for the reader. Her goal is not to describe reality but to make us experience 
the sensations that tropisms provoke in our mind. To prevent us from turning 
into readers hypnotized by mimesis and traditional realism, Sarraute makes 
a concerted effort to kick our feet out from under our various interpretative 
toeholds. As we move from sentence to sentence, each conclusion we draw 
comes undone. Each determination we make about who the ils are ends up 
the product of false clues that Sarraute plants in the text to lead us off course. 
Sarraute thwarts our attempts at drawing clear narrative contours and insists 
that our reading be marked by uncertainty and indeterminacy.
 27. See Freed-Thall, Spoiled Distinctions, 135–38 for a discussion of Sarraute’s creation of 
atmosphere in Tropismes and her depiction of a creepy domesticity. In her incisive analysis 
of Tropismes and a number of Sarraute’s other works, Freed-Thall looks to Bourdieu to bring 
together the sociological and the aesthetic in order to theorize a distinctly Sarrautian aesthetics 
of the douceâtre [sweetish/bland].
 28. Barthes, The Rustle of Language, 141–48.
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But if I am to take Sarraute’s conception of the tropism seriously, then I 
must relinquish this reading, which, as convinced as I am by it, is too certain, 
too sure of itself to be properly tropismic. Where Sarraute’s tropism might be 
seen most effectively at work is in the way she compels me to let go of the my 
in my reading, to try not to hold on to it, to try not to pin the tropism down, 
but rather to let the tropism produce a sensation in me. To be in an interpre-
tative mode is automatically to be outside the sensate mode. So, to be true 
to the tropismic spirit, let me cast doubt on my reading and try to dissolve 
the my by introducing other possibilities. Perhaps I’ve simply fallen into the 
very trap I’m trying to alert you to, and the ils is different in each paragraph, 
and the unity I’ve just read into the tropism a false one. In which case, Tro-
pism I, rather than staging the unraveling of our reading of a unitary scene 
between children and adults that works against the usual parent/caretaker-
child dynamic, stages our desire to create stable narratives, to fix the tropism 
rather than letting the tropism unfix us.
Tropismic language is language that moves between inside and outside, 
and we can see this dynamic at work in the metanarrative space of criticism 
and interpretation: I move constantly from being inside my reading, sure of 
it, to being outside it, regarding it with suspicion as just another instance of a 
pernicious instinct to fix language. Not only do I experience sensations while 
reading Tropism I, with the slippery language of oozing spores producing the 
sort of recoil that a word like moist also does, but I experience a sensation of 
confusion and a certain distress as I find the hermeneutical object I have cre-
ated falling through my fingers despite my attempts to hold on. To read Sar-
raute’s tropismic writing, then, is to be faced with the seemingly impossible 
imperative to maintain reading as a verb but reject it as a noun: to read without 
ever arriving at a reading. I will be the first to admit that I will fail, and what 
follows are readings that will undoubtedly fall into stability and fixity despite 
my desire to respect and convey the tropism in its movement and indetermi-
nacy. However, I hope that these readings will gesture toward the indetermi-
nacy and mobility that inspired them (which I am incapable of preserving in 
this critical mode), so that you may be able to find a way to pivot from critique 
to construction, the construction of a subjectivity unfettered by difference.
This first tropism speaks more to the unfixing of identity—the impossibil-
ity of fixing the ils—than the power of language. However, language’s power 
is still gestured toward in its ability to recreate the sensations and situations 
it describes.29 We see this in the repetition of s’allumaient, s’éteignaient; in the 
 29. For an excellent close reading of Tropism I that shows how Sarraute exploits the physi-
cality of language to recreate experience, or sensation, rather than describe it, see Minogue, 
Nathalie Sarraute, 10–11.
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long sentences of the first half reenacting the slow movements of the adults 
gravitating toward the storefront window; and in the final sentence with its 
many small, separated clauses mirroring the isolated children, who, unlike the 
adults that are clumped together in grappes [clusters], are separate from each 
other. And again, the ils in question might not be the adults at all but some 
other group. The uncertainty of the referent does not change, however, the 
emphasis in this tropism on the collective reaction to the storefront display, 
on the sensations and mental movements that lie just beneath the surface of 
their quiétude étrange [strange quietude], their satisfaction désespérée [desper-
ate satisfaction]. In subsequent tropisms, Sarraute turns more to the crucial 
role language plays in creating and provoking these sensations such that Tro-
pismes, taken in its entirety, points to the tropism as a sensation deeply inter-
twined with language.
Sarraute, in her essay “Le Langage dans l’art du roman” [“Language in 
the Art of the Novel”], articulates this interrelation by describing how tropis-
mic language is different from ordinary language: “Words lose their ordinary 
meaning. They are words that are carriers of sensation. Of this sensation and 
none other. They make it emerge, certainly, but as integrated with them. They 
make it live and it, in turn, gives life.”30 Tropismic language isn’t meant to 
signify or communicate a predetermined meaning. Rather, it is a language 
integrated with sensation, and this fusion between language and sensation 
brings both to life. Language enables the reader to experience the tropism, and 
the tropism prevents language from becoming the dead language of clichés 
and conventions. This dead language is the language of the traditional novel 
and its clear narrative—a language invested in clear referents to an intelligible 
reality, a language that keeps the reader at a certain remove. Dead or conven-
tional language is akin to a snow globe, which represents a scene that can be 
observed and turned around from multiple angles—where the flurry of snow 
falling inside the globe can be seen in its totality. Living language, or Sarraute’s 
tropismic language, strives to place the reader inside the snow globe, inside 
the movement of the snow, where a total vision and apprehension of the scene 
are sacrificed in order to enable sensation and experience in its stead.
For Sarraute, language and the sensation that constitute the tropism are 
inseparable, and this coextensivity is evoked strikingly in her second tro-
pism. As with the first tropism, Sarraute thwarts our hermeneutic impulses 
by revealing how difficult it is to suspend our judgment, and puts pressure on 
the ease with which we jump to conclusions. At first glance, Tropism II seems 
to offer more information to the reader than the first tropism did. It begins 
 30. Sarraute, Œuvres complètes, 1691.
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with a scene of ils who are torn away from their vanities in front of which 
they had been studying their own faces. A singular elle [she] is revealed as the 
reason their contemplation of their own faces is interrupted:
“C’est servi, c’est servi,” disait-elle. Elle rassemblait à table la famille, chacun 
caché dans son antre, solitaire, hargneux, épuisé. “Mais qu’ont-ils donc pour 
avoir l’air toujours vannés?” disait-elle quand elle parlait à la cuisinière.” (4)
[“Dinner is ready, dinner is ready,” she said. She rounded up the family, each 
one hiding in his lair, lonely, ill-tempered, exhausted. “What on earth is the 
matter with them, for them always to look so worn out?” she said when she 
talked to the cook.] (3)
The tropism, for all intents and purposes, seems to be opening with a famil-
iar scene of bourgeois family life: the task of getting an entire family to sit 
down for a meal, and the reluctance of the children to be loquacious around 
their parents. Elle reads as a figure of authority, the mistress of the house, the 
mother. The next paragraph seems to confirm this, as Sarraute describes elle’s 
many hours spent chatting with the cook: “préparant des potions pour eux ou 
des plats, elle parlait, critiquant les gens qui venaient à la maison, les amis” 
[preparing various medicines for them, or special dishes, she talked on and 
on, criticizing the people who came to the house, friends of theirs] (4; 3). With 
a single word, Sarraute undoes this reasonable conclusion as deftly as she did 
in the first tropism: “‘Mademoiselle a de beaux cheveux,’ disait la cuisinière, 
‘ils sont épais, ils sont beaux malgré qu’ils ne bouclent pas’” [“Mademoiselle 
has pretty hair,” said the cook, “it’s thick and pretty, even if it doesn’t curl”] (4; 
3). The mademoiselle, reserved for unmarried and young women, eliminates 
the initial narrative thread of the mother of the family gathering her children 
for dinner, and we are left instead with the more complicated and unexpected 
figure of a daughter, perhaps, or another relative, who spends most of her time 
gossiping with the cook, exchanging platitudes and passing judgment.31 Their 
conversation is banal, peppered with such clichés as “ils ne l’emporteront 
pas avec eux” [they can’t take it with them] in reference to a miserly family’s 
wealth. But it’s precisely beneath the surface of this conversation that tropis-
mic energy can be detected and felt: something attaches to these seemingly 
insignificant words and is able to penetrate the psyche.
 31. And, to add yet more uncertainty, rendering the referent of elle even more indetermi-
nate, the mademoiselle could be referring not to the elle to whom the cook is speaking, but to 
the daughter of the house, who isn’t present, in which case, the elle could be another domestic, 
like the cook, and their conversation one of gossiping about their employers.
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Sarraute interrupts this conversation in the third paragraph with the sud-
den introduction of a solitary il [he], who seems to be one of the ils from 
before, but whose exact position in the family is indeterminable. This il is the 
site of tropismic sensation; through his sensations, we too wind up caught 
inside the tropism provoked by the preceding banalities:
Et il se sentait filtrer de la cuisine la pensée humble et crasseuse, piétinante, 
piétinant toujours sur place, toujours sur place, tournant en rond, en rond, 
comme s’ils avaient le vertige mais ne pouvaient pas s’arrêter, comme s’ils 
avaient mal au cœur mais ne pouvaient pas s’arrêter, comme on se ronge les 
ongles, comme on arrache par morceaux sa peau quand on pèle, comme on 
se gratte quand on a de l’urticaire, comme on se retourne dans son lit pen-
dant l’insomnie, pour se faire plaisir et pour se faire souffrir, à s’épuiser, à en 
avoir la respiration coupée . . .
‘Mais peut-être que pour eux c’était autre chose.’ C’était ce qu’il pensait, 
écoutant, étendu sur son lit, pendant que comme une sorte de bave poisseuse 
leur pensée s’infiltrait en lui, se collait à lui, le tapissait intérieurement. (4–5)
[And he sensed percolating from the kitchen, humble, squalid, stamping 
thought, stamping in one spot, always in one spot, going round and round, 
in circles, as if they were dizzy but couldn’t stop, as if they were nauseated 
but couldn’t stop, the way we bite our nails, the way we tear off dead skin 
when we’re peeling, the way we scratch ourselves when we have hives, the 
way we toss in our beds when we can’t sleep, to give ourselves pleasure and 
make ourselves suffer, until we are exhausted, until we’ve taken our breath 
away . . .
‘But perhaps for them it was something else.’ This was what he thought, 
listening stretched out on his bed while, like some sort of sticky slobber, 
their thought infiltrated him, stuck to him, wallpapered him internally.] (4)
This sequence is extraordinarily complicated, and combines an articulation 
of the force of language with the sort of blurring of identities we saw in the 
previous tropism. On a narrative level, what is happening and being articu-
lated is the pensée humble et crasseuse [humble and squalid thought] of the 
elle and cook’s banal conversation as it takes on oppressive dimensions, over-
whelming the il who is unable to avoid hearing it and winds up infiltrated by 
this language, covered in it both within and without. But this narrative clarity 
is disrupted by Sarraute’s language, which makes it impossible to know who 
the subjects of this scene are, and what their relationship is with each other. 
The passage begins with the il, who could be a child in the family, or perhaps 
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the father, and almost immediately the subject of the sentence shifts to that 
of the cook and elle’s conversation, the feminine pensée humble et crasseuse 
described as piétinante [stamping]. The adjectival piétinante then shifts to the 
verbal present participle piétinant whose subject is then revealed to be, not the 
elles [they] that had been described so far in the tropism as being the holders 
and articulators of such thought, but an ils.32 The humble and grimy thought 
contained within the cook and elle’s conversation, the anthropomorphized 
thought whose stomping in the kitchen is heard by the il in his bedroom, is 
not limited to the cook or the elle, but belongs also to others, whose identi-
ties we do not know—a broad, general ils. These anonymous ils are seized by 
the same grimy thought that took over the cook and the elle, and the stomp-
ing initially attributed to the thought is then transferred onto these ils, who 
compulsively pronounce the same sort of banalities as had the cook and the 
elle. In the course of one sentence, the distinction between a human il and an 
abstract pensée is elided, and the feminine subject of pensée is then elided with 
a human ils who also contain the elles from the first part of the tropism and all 
these different subjects are then joined by an on [one/we/you] that interpel-
lates the reader so that our experience of biting our nails and picking at our 
skin and turning about sleeplessly in bed ends up informing the oppressive 
compulsive utterances of this ils.
This reading could be mistaken, though, as Sarraute’s use of many depen-
dent clauses that follow one after another after another makes it difficult to 
isolate or identify which discrete subjects are being blurred together. It’s just 
as possible that the ils who are stomping around in the kitchen are the com-
bination of the pensée and of the il, caught up in a relentless repetition of 
moving around together, and that the site where this takes place is no longer 
even the kitchen but some other space. It is exceptionally difficult to do this 
sort of close reading of Sarraute at the sentence level because her words and 
clauses shift and move more quickly in our reading of them than is possible to 
articulate in writing.33 But what I’m trying to show with this rather torturous 
breakdown of the sentence is that Sarraute sows confusion and uncertainty in 
her writing at the level of the individual word. To read this sentence normally 
is to be caught up in its whirlwind of movement, and Sarraute’s repetition of 
 32. In French, elles and ils both mean they but elles is reserved for an exclusively feminine 
they whereas ils could refer to a group of all men or a group of both men and women.
 33. Françoise Asso elegantly captures the difficulty of analyzing Sarraute’s work: “To read 
according to the norms of a reading that analyzes ‘naturally’ is to always return to following a 
thread, to constructing a continuity by leaning on the logic of succession, which does not apply 
to the texts of Sarraute. If a writer can represent simultaneity, if the reader can perceive it holis-
tically, the commentary then works against the natural movement of the text.” Asso, Nathalie 
Sarraute, 50–51.
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clauses and words creates a sentence that is so fast-paced that to read it, espe-
cially aloud, is both to feel disoriented and breathless.
Sarraute’s repetitions and modulations relentlessly drive the sentence for-
ward before we’ve even had time to process the clause we were in the middle 
of reading: the piétinante gives way to piétinant and the loss of that e cre-
ates an acceleration that is then continued by the repetition of toujours sur 
place, toujours sur place [always in the same spot], by the shift from toujours 
[always] to tournant [turning], which changes the tempo of the sentence, and 
by the repetition of en rond, en rond [round and round]. The sentence’s fren-
zied careening forward comes to its peak with the last series of clauses whose 
emphatic, percussive repetition of comme [as] five times take us through to 
the end of the sentence, where we end not with a bang but with a whimper, 
as it trails off into ellipses whose silence and slowing down capture our own 
respiration coupée [cut off breath] and attempts to recover our breath. Through 
reading this sentence’s fifteen clauses, we wind up sharing the experience of 
the il who experiences (or is part of) the ils who move about so frenetically 
with the humble, grimy thought of banality. This sharing is reinforced by the 
shift from ils to the more participatory on, which is a pronoun that works 
by inclusion, and interpellates the interlocutor, or in our case, the reader, by 
claiming us as part of that on.
In this passage, we doubly experience the force of language: we see language 
narrated as something that takes over the il and coats his insides and outsides, 
and we experience language as something that sweeps us up into an almost 
interminable sentence that sets us down in a state of confusion about which 
subjects were doing what verbs at which points. One of the strategies Sarraute 
has for dismantling identities is to use language to overpower and overwhelm 
the reader so that we can no longer keep anything straight or point to discrete 
identities with any sort of certainty. She adds layer of unknowing onto layer 
of unknowing. Already, we were unclear as to who was being described in the 
tropism—elle as mother then as daughter or perhaps an aunt or perhaps a live-
in governess or domestic; il as a son or perhaps a father or perhaps an uncle or 
perhaps a live-in tutor or butler—and then Sarraute goes further and makes it 
impossible to tell which of these uncertain figures are the subjects of her sen-
tence and if these subjects are even different from each other.
The tropism continues with il’s resignation to his situation and his conclu-
sion that it is impossible to get away from the clichés and recycled formulas 
that constitute most of our social interactions:
Il n’y avait rien à faire. Rien à faire. Se soustraire était impossible. Partout, 
sous des formes innombrables, ‘traîtres’ (‘c’est traître le soleil d’aujourd’hui, 
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disait la concierge, c’est traître et on risque d’attraper du mal. Ainsi mon 
pauvre mari, pourtant il aimait se soigner . . . ’), partout, sous les apparences 
de la vie elle-même, cela vous happait au passage, quand vous passiez en 
courant devant la loge de la concierge, quand vous répondiez au téléphone, 
déjeuniez en famille, invitiez des amis, adressiez la parole à qui que ce fût. 
(5)
[There was nothing to be done about it. Nothing to be done. To avoid it was 
impossible. Everywhere, in countless forms, ‘traitorous’ (‘The sun is trai-
torous today,’ the concierge said, ‘it’s traitorous and you risk catching your 
death. That was how my poor husband . . . and yet he liked to take care of 
himself .  .  .  ’) everywhere, in the guise of life itself, it caught hold of you 
as you went by, when you hurried past by the concierge’s door, when you 
answered the telephone, lunched with the family, invited your friends, spoke 
to anybody, whoever it might be.] (5)
For him, this oppressive language is as omnipresent as the air. No matter the 
interlocutor, qui que ce fût [whoever it might be]—family, friend, acquain-
tance, or stranger—it emerges, passing itself off as life itself. After conclud-
ing the impossibility of escape, il proceeds to try to come up with a strategy 
for survival in this ineluctable situation. He considers the others—those who 
propagate this language without second thought and suffer no consequences—
and how he should respond to them:
Il fallait leur répondre et les encourager avec douceur, et surtout, surtout ne 
pas leur faire sentir, ne pas leur faire sentir un seul instant qu’on se croyait 
différent. Se plier, se plier, s’effacer: ‘Oui, oui, oui, oui, c’est vrai, bien sûr,’ 
voilà ce qu’il fallait leur dire, et les regarder avec sympathie, avec tendresse, 
sans quoi un déchirement, un arrachement, quelque chose d’inattendu, de 
violent allait se produire, quelque chose qui jamais ne s’était produit et qui 
serait effrayant. (5)
[You had to answer them and encourage them gently, and above all, above 
everything, not make them feel, not make them feel a single second, that 
you think you’re different. Be submissive, be submissive, be self-effacing: 
‘Yes, yes, yes, yes, that’s true, of course that’s true,’ that’s what you should say 
to them, and look at them warmly, affectionately, otherwise a rending, an 
uprooting, something unexpected, something violent would happen, some-
thing that had never happened before, and which would be frightful.] (5)
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Il’s social world is at stake in his response to them. If he pushes back against 
their language, he risks a complete rupture that would destroy any chance of 
connection. Il justifies his decision to submit to their language by imagining 
that if he were to pose any resistance and articulate his difference, he would 
destroy them: “il les secouerait comme de vieux chiffons sales, les tordrait, les 
déchirerait, les détruirait complètement” [he would shake them like old soiled 
rags, would wring them, tear them, destroy them completely] (5; 5–6). This 
fantasy of destruction, of power, quickly cedes to a darker fantasy of being 
destroyed, which ends Tropism II:
Mais il savait aussi que c’était probablement une impression fausse. Avant qu’il 
ait le temps de se jeter sur eux—avec cet instinct sûr, cet instinct de défense, 
cette vitalité facile qui faisait leur force inquiétante, ils se retourneraient sur 
lui et, d’un coup, il ne savait comment, l’assommeraient. (5)
[But he also knew that this was probably a false impression. Before he would 
have time to leap at them—with that sure instinct, that instinct for defense, 
that easy vitality that constituted their disturbing force, they would turn on 
him and, all at once, he did not know how, they would knock him out.] (6)
Sarraute, in this tropism, stages a dramatic confrontation between a mono-
lithic ils, who are more properly represented by their language than who they 
are as individuals (their interchangeability strips them of any individual iden-
tity), and an il who is only an il by virtue of having a different experience of 
language than they. Tropism II is thus a confrontation between normative, 
dominant language and attempts to resist it.34 And while the dominant lan-
guage is narrated as completely overpowering and destroying non-normative 
language, this fantasy of obliteration is belied by the fact that the experience 
of language that we as readers are left with is from the perspective of the non-
normative, which resists obliteration even as it fears it. A non-normative space 
is thus carved or hollowed out from within this normative language.
Sarraute’s tropisms consistently stage this conflict between normative 
and non-normative languages and become apprehensible because of the gap 
between them.35 Recalling Sarraute’s description of the tropism as fused with 
 34. Over half a century before queer theory would develop its strong critique of normativ-
ity, Sarraute staged the invidiousness of normativity at the level of language.
 35. Valerie Minogue qualifies this conflict as “the war between the petrifying power of 
words and the fluidity of experience.” Minogue, Nathalie Sarraute, 1. I would nuance Minogue’s 
description and characterize the war as being between the petrifying power of normative lan-
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living language, we can define dead language as the normative language of for-
mulas and clichés seen in Tropism II—fixed and ready-made language. Living 
language, in contrast, is mobile, non-normative language. It is not the prod-
uct of molding oneself according to society’s dictates and using the language 
it has prescribed. It is not the product of making ourselves legible by placing 
ourselves in preassigned categories and reading others and making sense of 
them by fixing them in their categories. In Tropism II, we witness the banal-
ity of gossip and social niceties, but let’s not forget that the cliché often has 
grandiose ideas as its subject, and that banality is as sweeping as it is small. 
Clichés aspire to totalization, and there is an existential, ontological dimen-
sion to such hackneyed utterances as “It is what it is,” which expresses a kind 
of Stoic or Zen response to the contingency of existence, or “Takes one to 
know one,” which speaks to larger issues of subject formation, recognition, 
and intersubjectivity.
Normative language, for Sarraute, extends past the oft-repeated phrases 
that are most recognizable as clichés to also encompass single words that rep-
resent monolithic concepts we take for granted such as Amour [Love] and 
Bonheur [Happiness].36 Sarraute applies her tropismic magnifying lens to 
them in order to reveal all the psychological movements that they provoke 
but obscure. This normative language is language that produces fixed ideas in 
people’s minds, the way Love and Happiness (which get bandied about as if 
they were self-evident concepts) do. Normative language eliminates the gap 
between itself and what it represents, and claims to be entirely adequate to the 
task of conveying meaning. Françoise Asso remarks on the totalizing nature 
of the cliché, referring to it as language “that gives the illusion, all swollen 
with its own importance, of being big enough [. . .] to contain the real in its 
entirety.”37 Sartre recognized this dimension in his preface to Sarraute’s first 
novel, when he wrote about the cliché, or lieu commun, saying:
[.  .  .] this beautiful word has several meanings: undoubtedly it designates 
those worn out thoughts, but it means that those thoughts have become 
the community’s meeting place. Each one finds him or herself there, finds 
the others there. The cliché, the commonplace, belongs to everyone and it 
guage and the non-normative language that is able to accommodate and fuse with the fluidity 
of experience.
 36. Sarraute reveals the tropisms produced by Amour in L’Usage de la parole and by Bon-
heur in Enfance. See Œuvres complètes, 94 6–54; 1024–25.
 37. Asso, Nathalie Sarraute, 46.
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belongs to me; it belongs in me to everyone, and it is the presence of every-
one in me.38
The ready-made language that Sarraute diagnoses as dead language has the 
function of turning us into social beings and ordering us into relationships—
into community, into citizens and subjects. This well-worn language is total-
izing in its capacity to “say it all”; consequently, the cliché either brings an 
end to conversation so that nothing else can be said, or produces more clichés 
in response, since the only adequate response to the totality of the cliché is 
another cliché. Sarraute does neither. She responds to the cliché not with more 
clichés, but with the tropism and the living language it is a part of and that is 
a part of it.
In Tropisms I and II, Sarraute writes from an intermediary space, between 
inside and outside, in order to attempt to return words to their “natural,” or 
neutral, environment. This is the space between the inside of a subjectivity 
without contours and the outside of the well-contoured subjecthood that is 
required to be part of a community—the space between solitude and sociality. 
Tropismic language thus does not dissolve identity categories in the outside 
world because it does not get rid of sociality. The voices that populate most 
of Sarraute’s texts can be categorized according to age, gender, class, etc. Tro-
pismes and Sarraute’s subsequent works do not erase the well-defined roles 
and social structures that constitute the bourgeois world that serves as their 
setting. In Tropismes, we see how present familial and domestic structures are. 
Martereau’s principal dramatic action is centered around a real estate deal. Le 
Planétarium features conflicts that can occur during the seemingly banal task 
of decorating one’s apartment, which becomes the stage for family drama. 
Vous les entendez? narrates a father’s agony at having aesthetically insensible 
children who do not appreciate his Pre-Columbian statuette. And intergen-
erational conflict is a running theme in Sarraute’s work. But Sarraute did not 
write of bourgeois life simply because she herself was bourgeoise and was 
writing what she knew. Rather, Sarraute zeroes in on the highly structured and 
coded system of the bourgeois family, which, in its codification, has reached 
the status of cliché and idealized normativity, in order to hollow it out and 
reveal it to be nothing more than a surface, devoid of substance.39
 38. Sartre, Preface to Portrait d’un inconnu, in Sarraute, Œuvres complètes, 36. Sartre here 
imbues cliché with a potentially positive valence—it inspires collectivity and community—
whereas for Sarraute it represents precisely the sort of language that is to be avoided at all costs. 
The solitary pursuit of the tropism entails eschewing community to privilege instead relation-
ship with language.
 39. I’m grateful to Olivier Wagner, the curator of Sarraute’s papers at the BnF, for shar-
ing with me his trenchant reading of Sarraute’s corpus and observing that Sarraute targets the 
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But, to return to Rabaté’s metaphor of the shuttle, the tropism, as mobi-
lized by Sarraute, takes us from that outside world of sociality, and the dif-
ference and identity categories that it depends on, to the inside world of 
contourless subjectivity, where difference no longer has any purchase. To be 
in the indeterminate flux of tropismic language is to be in a non-identitarian 
elsewhere. Most of the time, the language we use and operate in is the dead 
language of convention and of sociality. But Sarraute sets out to give us an 
experience of the tropism, this other kind of language, which punctuates and 
perforates the otherwise smooth surface of sociality and reminds us that there 
is something else, that we can have subjectivity without subjecthood.40
In Tropismes, language becomes the most powerful force and reality pres-
ent, and it is language’s ability to shape reality that makes it so powerful. In the 
face of this language that exceeds the boundaries of sociality and various sub-
jects’ abilities to control it, identity falls away, and the categories upon which 
it depends are dissolved as we are taken from the outside world to an inside, 
tropismic, world. This is what would seize Wittig in her encounter with Sar-
raute, and what would drive Wittig’s own work. As Wittig described Sarraute 
in an interview four months before Sarraute’s death at the close of the twenti-
eth century, “She is the genius of the century. Her work is beautiful literarily, 
philosophically, and it’s also revolutionary; I don’t know of any writer who can 
compare to her. She made us discover phenomena of living language that no 
linguist was able to bring to light.”41
When Wittig calls Sarraute revolutionary, she means it in both the liter-
ary sense, in terms of writing in a new way, and the political sense, in terms 
of transforming reality. When we, as readers, join Sarraute and her tropisms 
in that intermediary, indeterminate space, we’re positioned to experience 
language’s force the way her anonymous subjectivities do and to have our 
own identities become erased, unfixed. We can unbecome, experiencing our-
selves as a universe without contours. The tropism undoes the work that the 
social order does of imposing contours onto our subjectivities and decanting 
them into neatly demarcated and hierarchized identity categories. It creates 
for readers the experience of a reality that does not depend on socially con-
structed difference, which is revolutionary indeed.42
bourgeois family to politicize it as part of a strong anti-conformism that coexisted with her 
otherwise quite bourgeois life.
 40. See Introduction for a discussion of subjectivity without subjecthood.
 41. Devarrieux, “’J’ai connu la guillotine.’”
 42. Benoît Auclerc articulates the importance of the political quality of Sarraute’s work in 
Wittig’s own work: “Hence the paradigmatic role Sarraute plays when Wittig tries to articulate 
in what way a literary work can become a war machine: the tropisms, in Sarraute’s work, insofar 
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THE RUNAWAY TROPISM
Sarraute’s belief in the living nature of tropismic language and its resistance to 
deadening normativity is not naïve, however. She makes it clear that language’s 
liberation of subjectivity from the strictures of identity and categories is not an 
easy one. Her tropisms all tend toward an overwhelming negativity, as seen in 
Tropisms I and II. Paranoia, antagonism, oppression, aggression, and violence 
permeate her work, which speaks to the hegemony of the normative social 
order and its conventional, categorizing language—to the dangers of refusing 
to conform to that order. Sarraute’s texts seem to negatively reinforce identity 
by making non-identitarian space seem terrible to occupy. To be a properly 
socialized subject would be to follow the path of least resistance and seem-
ingly greatest reward, but Sarraute’s narrative voices always opt for the harder 
path of staying with the tropism despite the alienation from the outside world 
that it entails. They always choose the life of language over the easy death of 
conformity.
We have all seen the costliness of resisting the dominant social order: 
people pay for being marginal with their very lives; political movements that 
seek to uproot oppressive regimes are met with violent repression. It’s hardly 
surprising that Sarraute’s staging of the tropism’s indeterminate space, which 
is not bolstered by the sturdy structures of a dominant social order, would be 
framed as a frightening one. It’s a risky venture to give up identity, to choose 
being a subjectivity alienated and isolated by its rejection of fixity over being 
a subject integrated into some external identity. Sarraute understands that lib-
eration is frightening.
Wittig articulates the high stakes and risky nature of liberation with a 
problematic metaphor. In “One Is Not Born a Woman,” one of the essays that 
make up The Straight Mind, Wittig’s landmark work of feminist theory and 
criticism, Wittig takes the lesbian as an exemplary figure of resistance to het-
erosexuality as a figuration of patriarchy and develops the radical idea that 
“lesbians are not women.”43 She articulates the lesbian’s role in dismantling 
this oppressive social order as being akin to that of the runaway slave, where 
the lesbian is effectively the person who flees from the difference that grounds 
heterosexuality:
Lesbian is the only concept I know of which is beyond the categories of sex 
(woman and man), because the designated subject (lesbian) is not a woman, 
as they resist all attempts at definition and leave behind all categorization, constitute the site 
of resistance to conformism, to identitarian assignments.” Auclerc, “Wittig et Sarraute,” 203.
 43. Wittig, The Straight Mind, 32.
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either economically, or politically, or ideologically. For what makes a woman 
is a specific social relation to a man, a relation that we have previously called 
servitude, a relation which implies personal and physical obligation as well 
as economic obligation [.  .  .], a relation which lesbians escape by refusing 
to become or to stay heterosexual. We are escapees from our class in the 
same way as the American runaway slaves were when escaping slavery and 
becoming free. For us this is an absolute necessity; our survival demands 
that we contribute all our strength to the destruction of the class of women 
within which men appropriate women. This can be accomplished only by 
the destruction of heterosexuality as a social system which is based on the 
oppression of women by men and which produces the doctrine of the dif-
ference between the sexes to justify this oppression.44
This metaphor is obviously problematic in the way it appropriates a racial 
identity—the American runaway slave is black—and uses it as an analogy 
for the seemingly unraced figure of the lesbian.45 In what follows, I want to 
momentarily suspend my critique of the metaphor in order to see how the fig-
ure of the runaway slave, upon which Wittig models the lesbian—the key term 
for her political project—can be seen as describing the same dynamics present 
in the tropism, so that we can shift from a problematic analogy between the 
lesbian and the runaway slave as the key to freedom from a regime of differ-
ence to a more productive one between the lesbian and the tropism.
Given that she conceptualizes the woman as slave, put into servitude by 
the men who possess women as their property, Wittig views the lesbian as a 
fugitive from the heterosexual order who exists in a state of freedom, albeit 
a precarious one. In her thought, it is only by fleeing from one’s class, be it 
the class of woman or of slave, that that class, and the social system which 
depends on it, can be destroyed, since there is no reason for the oppressors 
to put an end to the system otherwise. The metaphor of the runaway slave 
acknowledges the dangers of choosing to escape beyond categories and estab-
lish a space that exists outside the workings of the dominant social order: the 
runaway slave, if caught, had no protection in the justice system and faced 
grave retribution—amputation, whipping, branding, death.
The tropism functions in the same way as the runaway slave does. This liv-
ing language, in its insistence on indeterminacy and being outside categories, 
is a fugitive from the dead, conventional language that dominates. This latter 
language is enslaved by ideology, in service to a social order that oppresses 
 44. Wittig, 20. My emphasis.
 45. For a defense of Wittig’s metaphor, see Crowder, “From the Straight Mind to Queer 
Theory,” 494–95.
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through its formulation of difference. In the same prière d’insérer to “disent les 
imbéciles” where Sarraute affirms that each person’s subjectivity is a universe 
without contours, she discusses the tropism as developing through two oppo-
sitions. First is the opposition between feeling oneself to be without contours 
and knowing oneself to be viewed by others as bounded by contours and cat-
egories, reduced to being a character through a process of identification that 
necessarily produces “classifications, hierarchies: the ‘supremely intelligent,’ 
the ‘imbeciles.’ .  .  .” Second is the opposition between “the free, living, inde-
pendent idea” and “the idea bound to characters who produce or support it, 
this idea petrified by contempt—‘fools say’—or by religion, conformism, and 
terror.” These questions of which language and ideas to choose (Sarraute elides 
the distinction between language and thought) have weighty consequences, 
as Sarraute develops further in the prière d’insérer: “What is twisting and 
turning before our eyes raises some of the most significant and consequential 
questions of our time.” These consequences are so significant because an entire 
social order is at stake in the question of tropismic versus non-tropismic lan-
guage. The tropism emerges as a response to intersubjective interaction, and 
it is precisely when we encounter an other that the question of difference and 
identification becomes central. What the tropism questions is sociality itself.
In Entre la vie et la mort (1968), Sarraute stages the psychic life of the 
writer faced with this choice between living and dead language.46 One can 
either stay enslaved, operating within the dead language of categories and 
conventions and renouncing freedom and mobility for the sake of a costly 
stability, or one can join the fugitive, free language that is the tropism, and 
risk the various retributions that could follow. Sarraute’s tropism, as a space 
and reality that exist outside the dominant social order, is the manifestation 
of a fugitive community whose precarity in no way diminishes the force of its 
freedom. This freedom may not be immediately or easily discernible in Tro-
pismes, which represents tropisms somewhat indirectly, as embedded within 
an intelligible social world. However, in Sarraute’s later works, she gives read-
ers a more direct experience of the tropism. She moves the tropism away from 
being embedded within the outside world and instead embeds us in the tro-
pism, in a direct experience of how its stubborn, desperate indeterminacy 
resists the overwhelming determinate order that would seek to reappropriate 
it and reimpose difference. Sarraute’s tropism, like Wittig’s runaway slave, is 
the powerful sign of a possibility made real, whose tenuous existence has pro-
found political consequences.
 46. I discuss Entre la vie et la mort at length in Chapter 4.
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I thus propose to revise Wittig’s elaboration of the lesbian as a radically 
anti-identitarian figure that abolishes the sexual difference that normally 
inheres in the usual definition of lesbian as a woman who loves women. 
Rather than likening the lesbian to the runaway slave, which reinforces the 
very identitarian logic that Wittig opposes by not addressing racial difference 
(thereby tacitly maintaining it), we should liken the lesbian to runaway lan-
guage. Tropismic language is a better analogy for the lesbian in that it takes 
us out of identity, which is precisely what the lesbian is supposed to do. By 
doing so, we can read Wittig generously, taking her logic further than she did. 
Wittig’s use of the runaway slave is problematic, certainly, and demonstrates 
the limits of the critical mode of writing, which cannot enact experience and 
create textual realities in the same way that fiction can. Wittig’s literary writ-
ing is able to go further than her more theoretical essays can, to move beyond 
critique to the construction of something new in her literary worksite, which 
I discuss in the next chapter. If Wittig was able to build this worksite, it is 
because Sarraute’s seemingly humble tropisms were, in the mind of a reader 
like Wittig, explosives that would clear the ground for her to do so. Let us turn 
now to Sarraute’s later tropismic writing, which only increased in their anti-
identitarian impact from the initial Tropismes that had already stunned Wittig.
THE TROPISM AFTER TROPISMES
Tropismes, as Sarraute’s first work, was conservative in relation to the over-
all trajectory of her corpus. As Sarraute developed as a writer, her approach 
to the tropism would become more radical and experimental. Her writing, 
consequently, would become more explicitly anti-identitarian, increasingly 
destabilizing identity categories to the point of destroying them. At the begin-
ning of her career, Sarraute was still uncertain of herself as a writer, an uncer-
tainty evidenced in the modest length and format of Tropismes. The thought of 
writing novel-length tropismic works—of sustaining the tropism for so many 
pages—was out of the question: “I thought only of writing short texts like 
[Tropismes]. I couldn’t imagine it possible to write a long novel.”47
In its more conservative nature, Tropismes assumes an externalized view 
of the tropism. As readers, we’re still in a concrete setting with recognizable 
markers that help us situate ourselves. Where Sarraute’s language in Tropismes 
is still powerful and able to produce sensation, as seen in her deft deploy-
ment of clauses and her control of the rhythm and pacing of her sentences, 
 47. Weiss and Guppy, “Nathalie Sarraute.”
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it nonetheless operates in a largely descriptive mode—the tropisms are pre-
sented from outside the tropism, and the sensation we feel is an echo of the 
sensation experienced by the tropismic individual. From this vantage point, 
Sarraute used her first tropisms to map out the psychological and literary ter-
rain that she would enter with subsequent works, taking her readers with her 
inside the tropism. In order to assure a firsthand experience of the tropism on 
the part of the reader, Sarraute gradually left behind external points of refer-
ence that mediate our experience of the tropism. She describes this process of 
bringing the reader inside the tropism:
“To dispossess the reader and entice him, at all costs, into the author’s terri-
tory. [. . .] Suddenly the reader is on the inside, exactly where the author is, at 
a depth where nothing remains of the convenient landmarks with which he 
constructs the characters. He is immersed and held under the surface until 
the end, in a substance as anonymous as blood, a magma without name or 
contours.”48
We can see this trajectory toward greater interiority in the novels that fol-
low Tropismes—Portrait d’un inconnu (1948), Martereau (1953), and Le Plané-
tarium (1959)—which progressively eliminate the novelistic conventions of 
character and narrator to instead plunge the reader inside the anonymous, 
contourless, magma-like substance and experience of the tropism that is the 
substance of Sarraute’s corpus. This increased interiority does not mean an 
erasure of all traces of exteriority—the sorts of familial and social structures 
that are present in Tropismes continue to be present in these and Sarraute’s 
other novels—but in Sarraute’s later writing of the tropism, we can see a will 
toward greater immediacy, toward taking the reader more deeply into tropis-
mic interiority.
Sarraute’s fourth novel, Les Fruits d’or [The Golden Fruits] (1963), is the first 
to apply the tropism’s destabilizing power to gender, a category of difference 
that has been naturalized and essentialized through the capacity of females 
to bear offspring: in this text, gender loses its primacy as a principal mode of 
identifying people. In Les Fruits d’or, a novel about a novel entitled “Les Fruits 
d’or”49 and the different reactions it provokes, Sarraute moves away from 
plot as it is traditionally understood—plot as what happens in a story, or the 
sequence of events that make up a story—and plunges the reader into a world 
 48. Sarraute, The Age of Suspicion, 71.
 49. In scholarly discussions of Les Fruits d’or, the convention is to distinguish between Sar-
raute’s novel and the novel-in-the-novel by referring to the former in italics and the latter in 
quotation marks. I follow this convention here.
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of disembodied, anonymous voices. Very little can be said to “happen” in Les 
Fruits d’or even though the novel has a certain narrative coherence whose 
driving conflict or dramatic impetus is centered around the reception of “Les 
Fruits d’or” and its rise and fall in terms of literary glory. What could pass 
for a plot features human actors whom it is difficult to describe as characters, 
given the anonymity and fluidity of who is speaking at any given moment. 
Le Planétarium [The Planetarium] had also featured disembodied voices, but 
these had not been anonymous, since they were endowed with names and 
clearly articulated relationships fixed within the structure provided by a fam-
ily unit. Here, however, Sarraute eliminates any indication of the relationships 
that connect the various voices to each other so that there is no way of con-
firming their relationship outside the individual interactions that arise around 
the aesthetic object of the novel, “Les Fruits d’or.” Anonymity is a necessary 
step in bringing the reader into the interiority that is for Sarraute the realm of 
indeterminacy: a name is always imposed from the outside for the benefit of 
those on the outside. Even the act of self-naming necessarily places the self in 
an exteriorized relation to the self.
Les Fruits d’or begins with clearly gendered voices, male and female, that 
are discussing a visit to a male friend or acquaintance or relative who had 
circulated a postcard reproduction of a painting by Courbet to prove his aes-
thetic refinement. After this initial scene, which features a stable identificatory 
axis of gender, we are left awash in conversation, in a set of je [I], tu [you sin-
gular, informal], il [he], elle [she], nous [we], and vous [you singular formal, 
you plural] that are all responding to various works of art. This difficultly 
differentiated mass of aesthetic pronouncements culminates in an extended 
discussion of the novel “Les Fruits d’or.” Whereas in a usual conversation, each 
pronoun serves to demarcate a specific subjectivity, Sarraute does not allow 
us to use the pronoun as we normally do: as a buoy we hold on to in order to 
orient ourselves. In Les Fruits d’or, the pronoun, instead of keeping us afloat in 
the narrative, throws us into it so that we are immersed in a sea of thoughts, 
sensations, and feelings, unable to easily make out one from the others: in the 
middle of a dialogue, after the em dash that sets off an interlocutor’s speech, 
we slide without any warning from speech into their thoughts, or the thoughts 
of someone else. The writing moves from one thought to the other and back 
again so frequently that we are left wondering at any given moment who is 
saying or thinking what. The lack of differentiation is visually manifested in 
the proliferation of Sarraute’s signature ellipses, and it is never clear whether 
one set of ellipses connects the thoughts and words of a single speaker or sig-
nifies instead a leap to someone else’s.
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From the beginning of the novel, Sarraute, as she does in Tropismes, wastes 
no time in having us lose our footing. Unlike in Tropismes, she makes it impos-
sible for us to ever regain a new footing. In the following typical passages, 
Sarraute melds first-person, second-person, and third-person pronouns, and 
combines all possible points of view in just a few lines:
Épinglée au mur sur le papier gris à grosses fleurs roses au-dessus du bureau 
pour capter l’inspiration, glissée dans la rainure entre l’encadrement et la 
glace au-dessus de la cheminée, tout à coup . . . miracle . . . la même . . . Et 
leur air .  .  . cet air qu’ils ont . .  . Pudique. Fier. Ma trouvaille. Ma création. 
Mon petit trésor secret. Ne me quitte jamais. Mais tenez, à vous, vous en êtes 
digne . . . à vous je peux sans crainte: pas de profanation, aucune souillure. 
Avec vous, tenez, je partage. Un don. Mon bien le plus précieux . . .
[Tacked up on the wall, against the gray paper with the big pink flowers over 
the desk to receive inspiration, stuck in the crack between the frame and the 
mirror over the mantelpiece, all at once .  .  . miracle .  .  . the same .  .  . And 
their look . . . that look they have . . . Shy. Proud. My find. My creation. My 
little secret treasure. Never leaves me. However, here, to you, you are worthy 
of it . . . to you I can, with no fear: no profaning, no defiling. With you here, 
I’ll share. A gift. My most precious possession . . .]50
Je sens que moi aussi ça me gagne . . . titillation exquise . . . ça vient, ça me 
possède .  .  . Incantations .  .  . Extases .  .  . Allons, tous ensemble, plus fort. 
Encore. Plus fort. Plus loin. Moi maintenant je m’avance, je franchis toutes 
les bornes, je lâche tous les freins . . . Tout au bout . . . rien ne m’arrête . . . 
aucune crainte mesquine du ridicule, aucun souci glacé de pudeur. Encore. 
Jusqu’à l’extrême limite. Je m’abandonne . . . Le voilà. Il tombe en transes, le 
Dieu le possède, il se convulsionne, les yeux révulsés, l’écume aux lèvres, il 
se roule par terre, arrachant ses vêtements .  .  . Pour moi .  .  . il se frappe la 
poitrine . . . Pour moi, je ne crains pas de le dire . . . Rien au-dessus. Courbet 
est le plus grand. Shakespeare. Dernier sursaut. Il se courbe en arc de cercle: 
Shakespeare et Courbet. (525–26)
[I feel that I too am about to succumb . . . exquisite titillation . . . it’s com-
ing, it grips me .  .  . Incantations .  .  . Ecstasies .  .  . Come now, all together, 
 50. Sarraute, Les Fruits d’or, in Œuvres complètes, 523–24; Sarraute, The Golden Fruits, 11. 
All subsequent citations will be made in-text.
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stronger. Again. Stronger. Farther. Now I begin to move forward, I stride 
across all frontiers, I release all brakes . . . At the very end . . . nothing can 
hold me . . . no petty fear of ridicule, no chill concern with shyness. Again. 
To the very limit. I let myself go . . . Here he is. He falls into a trance, pos-
sessed by his god, he is in convulsions, his eyes bloodshot, foaming at the 
mouth, rolling on the ground, rending his garments . . . For me . . . he beats 
his chest . . . As for me, I’m not afraid to say it . . . Nothing greater. Courbet 
is the greatest. Shakespeare. Last twitch. He arches his body: Shakespeare 
and Courbet.] (12)
In the first passage, ils and leur air [their look] are described from an external 
point of view, but, almost immediately, Sarraute assumes an internal point of 
view, a move that leads to the first-person utterance, “Ma trouvaille. Ma créa-
tion. Mon petit trésor secret” [My find. My creation. My little secret treasure]. 
Ils has turned into je: not only does the distinction between external and 
internal not hold, but neither does that between singular and plural.51 After 
this moment of first-person enunciation, the perspective shifts again, this time 
toward the second person, so that the je, who had previously been viewed 
in the third person, is now being engaged with in the second person. The 
ambiguity between vous as singular and vous as plural places us in a state of 
indeterminacy, where the vous is not fixable—the interpellation that the sec-
ond-person vous normally entails is incompletely operative here. In the sec-
ond passage a similarly rapid shifting of perspectives also occurs. What starts 
off in the singular first person turns into the plural first person with “Allons, 
tous ensemble” [Come now, all together], and we are brusquely ejected from 
this interiorized perspective when Sarraute jumps from “Je m’abandonne . . .” 
[I let myself go . . .] to “Le voilà. Il tombe en transes” [Here he is. He falls into 
a trance], with the ellipses serving as the only form of transition. This oscilla-
tion between the external and the internal is restaged with the alternation at 
the end of the passage between moi [me] and il. Both these passages manifest 
Sarraute’s will to undo any and all stable platforms of enunciation and pro-
 51. Alternatively, the first-person statements could still be made from the perspective of 
the third-person observer, who is imagining each of the individuals who compose the collec-
tive ils to have the same internal monologue of “Ma trouvaille. . . .” Even in this scenario, dis-
tinctions are dissolved as this reading requires the third-person observer to place themselves 
wholly in the other person’s perspective, which requires giving up their own. For all intents and 
purposes, they become the other person—the end result is the same as when the first-person 
utterances are considered to be made by that first person. Regardless of which reading one 
adheres to, Sarraute makes the various subjectivities and perspectives completely permeable, 
making sustained distinctions untenable.
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duce instead a subjectivity that has no fixed base, one that cannot ossify into 
identity.
Because Sarraute combines subjectivities (and thus pronouns) with aban-
don, ils turning into je turning into vous, the distinctions between them are 
lost, and the pronoun no longer carries as much identificatory weight as 
usual—the pronoun no longer refers to an individual or a defined group of 
individuals. Since Sarraute tears down the divisions between pronouns, our 
tendency as readers to distinguish, identify, and bag and tag a novel’s sub-
jectivities as characters about whom things can be known, is thwarted.52 As 
all three perspectives of the first-, second-, and third-persons are combined 
under the sign of a single em dash, this leveling of distinctions flattens that 
sacrosanct difference between one person’s subjectivity and another’s—the dif-
ference enabling you and me to wield the I that makes us feel like we exist. 
We can already see in this mid-career novel, with its melding of subjectivities, 
the sort of erasure of sexual difference that Wittig, influenced by Sarraute, 
would go on to target more specifically with her own work. Wittig’s unortho-
dox use of the pronouns on and elles in L’Opoponax (1964) and Les Guérillères 
(1969), respectively, is preceded by Sarraute’s attack on the rigidity with which 
pronouns are segregated from each other—a rigidity that shackles an indi-
vidual to an identity—and by Sarraute’s move away from traditional dialogue 
between two fixed, clearly separate, individual voices to something resembling 
Babel, an unfixed, amorphous exchange between plural voices.
One could argue that for all of Sarraute’s dissolving of the usual boundar-
ies between pronouns and the subjectivities they represent, she still privileges 
primarily masculine pronouns in the conversations that make up Les Fruits 
d’or, or the indefinite positive on or the indefinite negative personne [nobody], 
and that this represents a masculinization or de-feminization of the text. In 
this case, the kinds of identity-bending that occur in the text take masculine 
subjectivities as the privileged vectors for anti-identitarian work, with only 
occasional instances of clear gender-bending occurring where a feminine pro-
noun, and attendant narrative voice, loses its gendered specificity. This is all 
true, and Sarraute’s justification for her use of the masculine pronoun as a way 
of creating not a masculine universe but a neutral one can sound like a con-
cession to the phallocentric social conditions in which she writes, where the 
feminine is indeed more marked, and particular, than the masculine.53 Indeed, 
 52. See Sarraute, “L’Ère du soupçon,” where she describes the reader’s (and the writer’s) 
tendency to gravitate toward this sort of well-defined character.
 53. See Minogue, “Notice” to Portrait d’un inconnu, in Sarraute, Œuvres complètes, 1741, 
and Jefferson, Nathalie Sarraute, 98, 110 for discussions of how assuming a masculine voice 
allows for greater neutrality. Elsewhere, Sarraute, in a series of interviews with Simone Benmussa, 
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Wittig’s analysis in “The Mark of Gender” of the marked quality of feminin-
ity as it is inscribed and enacted in language would at first seem to support 
Sarraute’s diagnosis of her situation as a writer who wants to create a neutral 
textual universe but cannot do so if she makes use of the marked language of 
feminine subjectivities. However, and this is where Sarraute’s concession can 
be seen most clearly, Wittig takes this marked quality as a reason to revolt 
against language and destroy gender with language from within language, 
while Sarraute opts to avoid feminine pronouns and their marked nature and 
not take part in that battle. Rather than fault Sarraute for claiming to create 
a falsely neutral textual universe, or for reproducing the familiar cooptation 
of the universal by the masculine, we should see this first step toward explor-
ing the tropism’s capacity to destabilize identity, to the extent that pronoun 
distinctions no longer hold, as precisely that—a step toward the more visibly 
radical anti-identitarianism that characterizes her late career, as exemplified 
in the novel Tu ne t’aimes pas [You Don’t Love Yourself] (1989).
Even Wittig, whose writing’s political nature is uncontested, began more 
modestly, with her debut novel, L’Opoponax (1964), striking a different tone 
in its poignant revision of the récit d’enfance [narrative of childhood] than 
that of the programmatically lesbian works that would follow: it is with Les 
Guérillères (1969), Wittig’s second novel, that we see her first explicitly politi-
cal assault on phallocentric language. While Sarraute does not go so far in Les 
Fruits d’or as to divest the masculine pronouns of their universality, as Wit-
tig would in Les Guérillères, where she strips il and ils of their longstanding 
status of representing all humanity, Sarraute still works with and against the 
pronoun in important ways and cuts loose the pronoun’s strong connection 
to a certain enunciatory position. This work has enormous implications for 
subjectivity-formation, as seen in the linguist Émile Benveniste’s assertion that 
the formation of subjectivity in language necessarily takes place through the 
creation and exercise of the pronoun.54 In light of this, we could see Sarraute’s 
inhabitation of the masculine-as-neutral voice as a refusal to have her subjec-
tivity fixed by a femininity imputed to her as her official identity—as her anti-
identitarian gesture as a writer, in keeping with her refusal to be considered 
a woman writer.
As Sarraute continued to write, following the tropism down its path toward 
greater and greater instability and indeterminacy, the sort of partial occlusion 
of gender that we see in Les Fruits d’or gives way to a complete eclipse of iden-
tity, as can be seen in her later work, Tu ne t’aimes pas. Sarraute’s progression 
describes the feminine voice as too marked to represent neutral experience. See Benmussa and 
Sarraute, Entretiens avec Nathalie Sarraute, 184–88.
 54. Benveniste, Problèmes de linguistique générale, 2:263.
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from Tropismes to Tu ne t’aimes pas is characterized by increasingly greater 
disembodiment, ambiguity, and lack—or rejection—of differentiation. Iden-
tity, or what is concretely identifiable, becomes less important while the tro-
pism—sensation, as opposed to identification—and the language it is joined 
to become more so. Tu ne t’aimes pas is an exemplary text in its creation of a 
reality where the identity to which we tether our subjectivity is placed under 
extreme pressure: the experience of subjectivity becomes predicated on giving 
up identity altogether.
As opposed to the novels that precede it, Tu ne t’aimes pas strips away all 
indications of the outside world and withholds any sort of setting or context. 
All that remains is language and dialogue that are impossible to place in rela-
tion to some external situation. Even this dialogue is severed from the outside 
world, as it is not between two or more different people and their respective 
subjectivities, but, rather, takes place within a single mind. The subjectivity of 
an individual is divided into an uncountable number of constitutive subjec-
tivities, all clamoring in response to the experience that the collective subjec-
tivity—that is, the individual’s subjectivity rendered as a collective—has of a 
declaration that some unknown person had addressed to them: “Vous ne vous 
aimez pas” [You don’t love yourself].55 All the subjectivities housed within the 
“person” targeted as the vous turn on and toward each other, eager to find out 
which voice or subjectivity in their ranks is implicated. Who, among their 
nous, is the vous? As Sarraute would describe the novel in an interview with 
Wittig:
In You Don’t Love Yourself, there was no I. There was nothing but us. Con-
sciousness was still very much lacking any I, I being nothing “but a formless 
assemblage of unknown parts.” There was nothing but multiple nous that 
represented he who did not love himself: he felt so tremendously complex 
that he did not know whom he could love in the middle of all that. What he 
sent outside, what he made appear on the outside, was one or several del-
egates who represented him.56
The self to which we attribute subjectivity turns out to no longer be the cohe-
sive identity that it would normally be taken to be in a social situation: each je 
housed within that self represents a particular way of being in and reacting to 
 55. Sarraute, Œuvres complètes, 1149. This is the opening sentence of the novel. If the nov-
el’s title opts for the singular tu (Tu ne t’aimes pas) as opposed to the vous, it’s to reinforce the 
idea that this collective vous is contained by a single person.
 56. Wittig, “Le Déambulatoire,” 7.
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the world. Each delegate represents a certain configuration of sensation and 
affect, and is a fraction of the so-called individual’s Being:
—“Vous ne vous aimez pas.” Mais comment ça? Comment est-ce possible? 
Vous ne vous aimez pas? Qui n’aime pas qui?
—Toi, bien sûr .  .  . c’était un vous de politesse, un vous qui ne s’adressait 
qu’à toi.
—À moi? Moi seul? Pas à vous tous qui êtes moi . . . et nous sommes un si 
grand nombre . . . “une personnalité complexe” . . . comme toutes les autres 
. . . Alors qui doit aimer qui dans tout ça?
—Mais ils te l’ont dit: Tu ne t’aimes pas. Toi .  .  . Toi qui t’es montré à eux, 
toi qui t’es proposé, tu as voulu être de service . . . tu t’es avancé vers eux . . . 
comme si tu n’étais pas seulement une de nos incarnations possibles, une de 
nos virtualités .  .  . tu t’es séparé de nous, tu t’es mis en avant comme notre 
unique représentant . . . tu as dit “je” . . .
—Chacun de nous le fait à chaque instant. Comment faire autrement? 
Chaque fois que l’un de nous se montre au-dehors, il se désigne par “je, ” 
par “moi” . . . comme s’il était seul, comme si vous n’existiez pas . . .
[—“You don’t love yourself.” But what does that mean? How is that possible? 
You don’t love yourself? Who doesn’t love whom?
—You, of course . . . you, the only one they were talking to.
—Me? Only me? Not all the rest of you who are me? .  .  . and there are so 
many of us . . . “a complex personality” . . . like every other . . . Who is sup-
posed to love whom, then, in all this?
—But they told you: “You don’t love yourself.” You . . . The one who showed 
yourself to them, the one who volunteered, you wanted to be the one on duty 
. . . you went up to them . . . as if you were not merely one of our possible 
personifications, one of our virtualities . . . you broke away from us, you put 
yourself forward as our sole representative . . . you said “I” . . .
—We do that all the time. What else can we do? Every time one of us shows 
himself to the outside world he designates himself as “I,” as “me” . . . as if he 
were the only one, as if you didn’t exist . . .]57
Sarraute recognizes that in our minds and the solitary space of our conscious-
ness, emotions, and perceptions, we are not our identities or the labels, cat-
egories, and functions that we are for others, that we become in order to be 
seen by them. Instead, we are full of virtualities, an endless set of possibilities. 
 57. Sarraute, Œuvres complètes, 1149; Sarraute, You Don’t Love Yourself, 1–2. All subsequent 
citations will be made in-text.
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Sarraute’s text opens onto a world of absolute interiority where, according to 
her, sex and other socially constructed differences and categories like it do 
not exist. While, early on in the novel, there’s a brief moment where reference 
is made to being a middle-aged father of Irish origins (1155; 9), which would 
seem to fix this collectivity as a masculine one, Sarraute refuses to recognize 
this insertion of gender as an imposition of difference: she refuses to let sub-
jectless subjectivity be marked by this trapping of subjecthood. As Sarraute 
writes later on in the novel:
—“Et nous .  .  . Comment savoir si le respect nous manque .  .  . Ici rien ne 
porte de nom. Personne n’exerce aucune fonction. Il n’y a ici ni père ni mère.” 
(1245)
[—“And we .  .  . How can we know whether we are lacking in respect .  .  . 
Here, nothing has a name. No one has any function. Here there is neither 
father nor mother.”] (156)
Names, functions, gendered roles—these are all fundamental to society and 
allow an individual to be recognized as part of it. In order to participate in 
the social order, an individual must allow herself to be categorized, situated, 
and ordered—she must consent to having all these identity-handles installed 
in her, or, to borrow Robyn Wiegman’s metaphor, must consent to wearing all 
these identity clothes.58
In Tu ne t’aimes pas, Sarraute strips subjectivity of these externally 
imposed trappings of identity59 in order to give the reader access to a truly 
interior interiority isolated from the social world outside—the world of dif-
ference and hierarchy. Again, Sarraute’s tropismic entry into this interiority of 
contourlessness does not entail the destruction of the exterior world of con-
tours and identities. The social world still exists: it provokes, with the state-
ment “Tu ne t’aimes pas,” the subjectivity’s anguished collective response. But 
where the subjectivity is not a clearly delineated subject, as inside the tropis-
mic magma of sensation, the difference that acts as the gravity of the exterior, 
social world—gravity insofar as difference makes the social order cohere and 
gives its various constitutive identities their weight—no longer holds. To put it 
 58. Wiegman, Object Lessons, 7.
 59. Valerie Minogue comments on this removal of identity: “Everything has undergone 
scrutiny—names, roles, assigned functions, gender and number, and even verb tenses. The text 
removes, one by one, the labels of official language, and strips of their authority those names 
and adjectives that designate age, sex, familial and social roles.” Minogue, “Notice” to Tu ne 
t’aimes pas, in Sarraute, Œuvres complètes, 1915.
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another way, difference turns subjectivity into solid subjects, and the tropism 
transforms that solid subject into a gaseous subjectivity that has no contours.
If one of the subjectivities in this collective individual subjectivity were 
still to conceive of itself along some identificatory, differentiating axis such 
as name, function, gender, or sexuality, it would not truly be in a space of 
interiority but would still be reacting to and participating in some externality. 
In this text, for a voice to be heard, it must first be completely situated in the 
interior world of this anonymous person whose mind we are in. Any desire we 
might have to read these voices as being representative of a masculine subjec-
tivity because the pronouns they occupy—je, tu, nous, on, vous—do not mark 
themselves as feminine, places an impassable distance between ourselves and 
the subjectivity that Sarraute offers up to us. Reading such identity into these 
unidentifiable voices, whose multiplicity signals a complexity that resists the 
simple unicity of identity and shows that subjectivity cannot be reduced to A, 
B, C, and D identities, is to place ourselves outside the conversation to which 
we have been invited as readers.
In order to experience what Sarraute experienced and be present with 
the voices in their space of sexless interiority where categories and distinc-
tions are not yet operative—in order to read properly—we must leave that 
will to differentiate behind. We must stop going through the text with a fine-
toothed comb, trying to find identity and difference where our host, Sarraute, 
has repeatedly told us that there is none. Granted, just because a writer says 
something is so does not make it so, and we could choose to read Sarraute 
against the grain of what she says, resisting how she, as a writer, attempts to 
control her texts’ reception. We could read Sarraute as a woman writer and 
sound her works for glimpses of écriture féminine, or try to account for the 
impact her social situation as a woman, a Russian immigrant, a Jew, etc. has 
on her writing. Such a reading would make Sarraute’s writing a simple reflec-
tion of Sarraute the subject.
I prefer to read Sarraute for what her writing can do, for its political poten-
tiality, for the ways in which it works against identity and strives for the unbe-
coming experience of subjectivity without subjecthood. One could just as 
easily read her for those moments where she fails or does not completely suc-
ceed, and look for all the ways identity and difference are still intelligible and 
operative in her textual worlds. But rather than fault Sarraute for making exag-
gerated claims about the power of her writing, I would suggest that we look 
instead to the political quality of her conception of writing as an anti-identi-
tarian space and for the ways her writing served for Wittig (and can continue 
to serve for us) as a catalyst to delve into literature for this political potential. 
I want to take Sarraute’s writing as an opportunity to combine the aesthetic 
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with the political, to see in language the material of an emancipation from the 
world as it is, and to see in fiction the possibility of realizing a different world.
Sarraute’s corpus can thus be seen as an attempt to write into existence 
an experience of neutrality in French, a language in which there is no neuter, 
no neutrality built into the grammar that structures it. She resists the differ-
ence language enacts, naturalizes, and codifies, to place us in and make of us 
a universe without contours.60 In Tu ne t’aimes pas, Sarraute delivers us this 
contourless, expansive universe, through a collective of infinite voices. To read 
contours of our own making—names, roles, functions, gender, sexuality—into 
a material whose formlessness she insists on would be to miss the radically 
new attempt at attaining the non-identity that makes her work so singular. It 
would be to make of Sarraute’s writing simply a new realism rather than the 
making of a new reality.
Regarding such a durable identity category as that of sexual difference, 
Sarraute pushes further in Tu ne t’aimes pas than with previous works such 
as Les Fruits d’or. She undertakes, at eighty-nine years of age, with greater 
boldness than before, the work of making the category of sex obsolete, to cite 
Wittig,61 or even impossible. By refusing to plot out human subjectivity onto 
preconceived axes of identity, Sarraute chooses to enact an experience that is 
outside both identity and society. Where Les Fruits d’or features voices that, 
though unidentifiable, still identifiably belong to different individuals, Tu ne 
t’aimes pas nullifies the difference between individuals by nullifying individu-
als altogether, and she stages intersubjectivity within the same subjectivity. 
Sarraute replaces the experience of an externalized social order with the cha-
otic disorder of an internal sociality that constitutes subjectivity: Sarraute’s 
writing enacts the social without all the structures of difference and identity 
that society imposes on individuals as the price for entering into that symbolic 
order, for becoming one of many. Sarraute shows the many of one, the infinite 
complexity that makes identity a futile endeavor.
 60. Even in an autobiographical work like Enfance (1983), which is the one text where we 
might expect concrete details and the recounting of particularities—it is, after all, her individual 
story, the story of her childhood—we can see the will to flatten and eliminate contours, in two 
notable ways. First, she splits the narrator into a masculine voice and a feminine one, so that 
the contour of sexual difference, of being a gendered individual, is attenuated. And second, 
she erases the contours of her Jewishness by refusing to mark herself as Jewish in the text, an 
erasure that mirrors her refusal to wear the yellow star during the Nazi occupation of France 
in World War II.
 61. Wittig, commenting on Les Guérillères, explains: “The goal [. . .] is not to feminize the 
world but to make the categories of sex obsolete in language.” Wittig, The Straight Mind, 85.
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BEGINNINGS AND PROVOCATIONS
Sarraute, with her work on the tropism, on this neutral area of human subjec-
tivity, and her ridding pronouns of concrete and differentiated referents that 
are tethered to identity, provides an important precedent for the profoundly 
political work Wittig would do in her combative texts, where pronouns are 
mobilized in the war against difference as weapons that attack gender, or sex-
ual difference, where it first begins in language. We can see Sarraute and Wit-
tig as both engaged in a struggle to undo the pernicious effects of socially 
constructed and reified identity, and as offering up alternative ways of being, 
even though they produce very distinct corpora that do not resemble each 
other stylistically. Nonetheless, their writing is driven by a shared impetus, 
and the differences in their œuvres can be conceived of in terms of scale. 
Where Sarraute condenses, Wittig expands. Sarraute’s strategy is to attack 
difference through stripping the novel down to its bare bones: language and 
dialogue. Wittig’s strategy is to create an alternative world: instead of distill-
ing the universe we know into pure interiority, she creates a new one instead. 
Wittig’s expansiveness goes so far as to create an alternative lexicon, as seen 
most clearly in her and Sande Zeig’s Brouillon pour un dictionnaire des aman-
tes, thereby creating a new language with which to rewrite history itself. Sar-
raute turns inward, away from expansion, and reduces her scope, removing 
the human, the social, and the historical altogether to leave behind just words. 
“Just words,” however, sounds misleadingly small or reductive: language for 
Sarraute, after all, is at the heart of everything—at the heart of the real in 
which we live.
That Sarraute and Wittig would have a shared purpose is due to Wittig’s 
literary debt to Sarraute, a debt that she acknowledges freely: it is Sarraute’s 
work, unique for being written “entirely on the side of language,” that inspires 
Wittig’s conviction that language shapes reality, that “language molds the real,” 
and prompts her to consider Sarraute the first to fully recognize how “lan-
guage, far from being a reflection of ‘things’ and of social reality is in some 
manner what processes it [. . .] and even what creates it.”62 But influence does 
not have to be unidirectional. It’s interesting to note that in later works like 
Tu ne t’aimes pas, we see a more complete or extreme example of Sarraute’s 
removal of social categories such as sexual difference from the human uni-
verse that she is trying to make more apprehensible through writing.
It may be mere coincidence that Tu ne t’aimes pas, with its more radical 
erasure of difference, was written after Wittig’s Les Guérillères and Le Corps 
 62. Wittig, Le Chantier littéraire, 69, 133, 140. See also Auclerc, “Le tropisme.”
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lesbien. However, I think we should consider the possibility of Wittig’s influ-
ence on Sarraute, of Wittig’s work on the real through language informing 
Sarraute’s own work, especially given the two writers’ long-standing friendship 
and their mutual support and admiration.63 If we take Sarraute’s and Wittig’s 
œuvres side by side and observe how Sarraute’s more radically anti-identitar-
ian works come after Wittig begins producing her politically charged, defi-
antly lesbian works, a narrative emerges where Sarraute radicalizes Wittig who 
in turn radicalizes Sarraute. Together, they experiment with language to find 
ways to exploit its capacity to undo difference. In this labor they would even-
tually be joined by Garréta, who also works on language to shape the real, and 
whose writing is the present-day version of an anti-identitarian vision that 
can be traced back to the 1930s and Sarraute’s first iterations of the tropism. 
This writing against difference is thus a collective endeavor, one whose con-
tinued existence sustains Sarraute’s contemporariness and situates Sarraute at 
the beginning of a radically anti-identitarian corpus.
Reading Sarraute now is a provocation to imagine and experience neutral-
ity and indeterminacy in a contemporary moment that continues—despite 
the lessons of queer theory’s anti-identitarian subversions, the constructivist 
convictions of feminist theory, critical race theory’s intersectional insights, 
and a turn in the humanities to the posthuman—to invest in the notion of dif-
ference and identity as a fundamental part of human existence. Queer theory 
wants identity, but wants it deconstructed; feminist theory continues to be 
vexed by the question of woman, or haunted, as it were, by the identity woman 
claims for itself; intersectionality, meant to undermine the monolithic qual-
ity of identity categories, has ended up producing a proliferation of localized 
identities that, for their specificity, are no less monolithic; and posthumanism, 
in attempting to work against the hubris of the humanist subject’s ontological 
privilege, is unable to get out of the binary logic of opposition that shores up 
its dependence on the notion of a human identity even as it works to decon-
struct it and reveal its blind spots. Sarraute, as we’ve seen, adopts the radical 
position of eschewing identity altogether, giving up the pleasures and privi-
leges of being a subject for the sensations of subjectivity instead. Her writing 
aspires to be one where the human no longer exists as an identifiable, catego-
rizable subject, but rather senses and lives as a boundless subjectivity that is, 
for Sarraute, the truth of who we are.
Let me end this chapter with a particularly evocative comment Sarraute 
made about her work and its reception in an interview with the French actress 
 63. See Hewitt, Autobiographical Tightropes, for the chapter on Sarraute, in which she dis-
cusses the camaraderie between Sarraute and Wittig.
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Isabelle Huppert. Sarraute refuses to have her writing identified as an example 
of écriture féminine, as somehow fundamentally shaped and informed by her 
sexual difference as a woman, by speaking about her work’s capacity to tran-
scend such categories: “When Le Planétarium came out, I was interviewed by 
a young man who said to me: ‘Ah! But Aunt Berthe is me, I just got married, 
I get up at night to look at the door handles . . .’ That pleased me!”64 Sarraute’s 
pleasure is rooted in the young man’s ability to identify with a female charac-
ter, at her writing’s ability to get him to take off his identity clothes of young 
masculinity and to strip Berthe of her identity clothes of elderly femininity, 
to dissolve both his and her identities, and the categories of age and sex that 
subtend them, and step into Berthe’s subjectivity.65 Sarraute takes pleasure in 
sharing this experience with her readers, in having us experience the kind 
of subjectivity and language that disrupts the current social order with its 
oppressive, compulsory designations of identity. She takes pleasure in having 
us experience the pleasure that comes from being in a language that allows 
such freedom and mobility, that allows us to move past identity. The most 
powerful part of exclaiming Aunt Berthe is me! is its assertion that, as Sarraute 
would put it, “we all resemble each other like two drops of water”66—that in 
our sameness, each of us is infinite, a universe without contours. This convic-
tion makes Wittig and Garréta’s writing possible, and, in the chapters that fol-
low, we’ll be able to see the ways in which both Wittig and Garréta, as writers 
of their respective moments, also work to erase the contours we think we can-
not do without, to produce a contourlessness that Sarraute has shown to be a 
space of possibility made accessible through a living language.
 64. Huppert, “Nathalie Sarraute,” 10.
 65. One might be tempted to see the young man’s ability to identify with Berthe as due to 
their both being bourgeois, but Sarraute’s letters contain instances of her asserting that despite 
her novels all speaking of a bourgeois world, she is convinced that the tropisms they contain 
are universal, so that a working-class reader would be able to read her work and experience 
tropisms without being hampered by class difference.
 66. Finas, “Nathalie Sarraute,” 4.
78 •  C H A P T E R 1 
C H A P T E R  2
Inside Wittig’s Chantier
To Build a Trojan Horse
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NATHALIE SARR AUTE was  hardly a political firebrand or activist. While she 
embodied a radical resistance to the regime of identity in her writing, she led 
a quiet life as a bourgeois woman living in Paris’s posh 16th arrondissement, 
writing in cafés, drinking whisky and sodas with friends, traveling around 
the world to speak at universities, and spending time at her country house in 
Chérence. Sarraute did lead a less than quiet life as Nicole Sauvage, her alias 
during the Second World War, when she lived in constant danger of denuncia-
tion, and her refusal to be identified as Nathalie Sarraute, Jew, was an act of 
resistance against the Vichy government and rule by the German occupiers. 
But after the war, Sarraute’s political engagement primarily took the form of 
making donations to various organizations and causes,1 and signing petitions 
and manifestos, as in Le Manifeste des 121 [Manifesto of the 121], which was a 
statement signed by many prominent intellectuals and writers advocating for 
Algeria’s right to self-determination.
Monique Wittig, on the other hand, was a revolutionary when it came to 
her politics. She was a young Marxist involved in the May ’68 student move-
ment, and the sexual discrimination she and other women experienced in it 
 1. For example, a donation of 100 francs to the Comité de Défense du Peuple Grec in 1967, 
when Sartre, representing the organization, called for donations to combat the dictatorship’s 
repression and torture and help provide displaced Greek emigrants with housing, employment, 
and food. Fonds Sarraute.
led her to cofound the Mouvement de Libération des femmes.2 Wittig pro-
tested in the streets, shouted down male chauvinist students at the Université 
de Vincennes, the radical left-wing university where the MLF had its first 
major collective meetings, and she was arrested by the police for her feminist 
actions, such as when she helped place a wreath on the Arc de Triomphe for 
the wife of the unknown soldier. She was involved in the publication of grass-
roots feminist magazines such as Le Torchon brûle [The Dishtowel Burns], 
as well as more academic feminist journals such as Les Questions féministes, 
headed in part by Simone de Beauvoir. We can see the impact of her activism 
on her writing: from Les Guérillères on, Wittig’s writing seethed with an unde-
niably political, anti-patriarchal ethos that had been less explicitly present in 
her first novel, L’Opoponax, which had won the Prix Médicis, and been hailed 
as a work of genius. Here was a writer who had been poised to carry on the 
torch of the avant-garde modernism of the New Novel but had chosen instead 
to take up the torch of radical feminist, lesbian militancy.
Wittig’s identification as a primarily political figure was complete once 
she published The Straight Mind, a collection of politico-theoretical essays 
that deconstructed the dominant heterosexual political, social, and economic 
regime as one that had invented the notion of difference in order to subjugate 
and oppress women and other categories of humanity. While the back cover 
of The Straight Mind describes Wittig as an “acclaimed novelist and French 
feminist writer” and explicitly identifies the essays as being not only politi-
cal and philosophical, but also literary, including a blurb by Germaine Brée 
who writes that “Wittig most brilliantly analyzes certain transformations in 
the textures and structures of literary language,” the predominant critical and 
popular reception of The Straight Mind ended up being that of Judith Butler, 
also featured on the back cover. Butler’s blurb passes over Wittig’s literary 
analysis to focus on the political and theoretical aspects of The Straight Mind: 
“Among the most provocative and compelling feminist political visions since 
The Second Sex. These essays represent the radical extension of de Beauvoir’s 
theory, its unexpected lesbian future. Wittig’s theoretical insights are both pre-
cise and far-reaching, and her theoretical style is bold, incisive, even shatter-
ing.” Butler’s engagement with Wittig as a political and theoretical figure is 
not surprising: two years prior, in Gender Trouble (1990), her landmark text 
 2. “Cofounded” is a bit of a misnomer in that the MLF and all the smaller groups that 
composed the movement were committed to collectivity, such that all the members or partici-
pants in these groups could be said to have founded it. The individual identity implied by the 
word “cofounded” says more about the larger public profile that individual activists such as 
Wittig, Christine Delphy, and Antoinette Fouque had than about their importance to the vari-
ous groups they are associated with.
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of feminist theory that has been recuperated by queer theory as a foundational 
work, Butler had engaged with Wittig’s theoretical essays to read her alongside 
French theorists such as Foucault, Kristeva, and Irigaray. This characterization 
of Wittig as a political and theoretical figure has stuck, at least in the Ameri-
can academy, where on course syllabi, it is primarily her political essays from 
The Straight Mind that are assigned. A quick search of citations using search 
engines like Google Scholar or the MLA International Bibliography shows 
that The Straight Mind is disproportionately cited, demonstrating the extent 
to which Wittig has been taken up primarily as a theorist rather than as a 
novelist.3
Where Sarraute’s bourgeois life and assimilation into the depoliticized 
New Novel have made it difficult for her to be read as a writer of political 
works, Wittig’s visibility as a political figure and as a lesbian, feminist icon 
has made it difficult for her to be read as the writer of literary works. Even 
those who have read Wittig’s novels, and accordingly are familiar with a Wit-
tig beyond the feminist theorist of The Straight Mind, have a tendency to see 
Wittig’s novels more for their political content and impact than for the literary 
process that created them. For these readers, these works’ political program 
dominates over their literary one. The overwhelming weight of Wittig’s repu-
tation as a political figure may explain why, when it was published posthu-
mously in 2010, her Le Chantier littéraire [The Literary Worksite],4 came into 
the world with barely a whimper, in comparison to the resounding bang of 
The Straight Mind.
PUTTING WITTIG BACK TOGETHER AGAIN
What we have in place is a Wittig who has effectively been cleaved apart, so 
that Wittig the writer, the artist working with language as her material, is 
overshadowed, or perhaps a better word would be engulfed, by Wittig the 
 3. As of August 15, 2016, Google Scholar recorded 1536 citations of The Straight Mind, 
as opposed to 4 citations of The Opoponax (52 citations of L’Opoponax), 322 citations of Les 
Guérillères (49 citations of its two English translations), 221 citations of The Lesbian Body (169 
citations of Le Corps lesbien), 18 citations of Across the Acheron (17 citations of Virgile, non), 63 
citations of Lesbian Peoples: Material for a Dictionary (28 citations of Brouillon pour un diction-
naire des amantes), and only 7 citations of Le Chantier littéraire.
 4. I translate chantier as worksite instead of workshop, as it was translated in the excerpt 
published in 2007 by GLQ (see Wittig, “The Literary Workshop”). This is because the French 
chantier carries connotations of labor that are lost in the English workshop, and labor is funda-
mental to Wittig’s conception of literary creation.
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feminist political figure.5 As a result, Wittig’s literary work comes to us always 
already assimilated into a political interpretation. This is not to say that Wit-
tig’s writing is not political—it is—but the problem is that her literariness, 
instead of being taken on its own terms, is seen as already political, so that 
we lose any sense of what is for Wittig the profoundly intimate relationship 
between the literary and the political. We can also frame this splitting in dis-
ciplinary terms. People who know Wittig from French literary studies tend to 
know the former Wittig, the author of L’Opoponax, which was lauded by such 
prominent literary figures as Sarraute, Marguerite Duras, and Claude Simon. 
People who are introduced to Wittig in feminist and queer studies tend to 
know the latter Wittig, the author of The Straight Mind and a figure seen by 
some as a protoqueer theorist.6
In order to put Wittig back together again, we need to consider Le Chan-
tier littéraire, a crucial text for understanding Wittig, to be as important as 
The Straight Mind. Le Chantier littéraire makes clear the importance of Wit-
tig’s investment in literary work and takes the reader into Wittig’s own literary 
worksite, which entails foregrounding Wittig’s passionate relationship with 
Sarraute and her writing. In this text, we see Sarraute’s writing described as 
political in the way it resists the use of language to reify difference, contra the 
dominant narrative that aestheticizes Sarraute’s writing while depoliticizing 
it, and we can see Sarraute’s profound influence on Wittig—the contiguity of 
their writing. Rather than the sort of continuity evoked by the linear metaphor 
of passing on one’s torch, this contiguity has Wittig taking up a torch even 
as Sarraute continues to carry hers. Wittig lights her torch from Sarraute’s. 
Where each writer goes with the torch she carries is different—Sarraute goes 
into the tropism, the psychological, while Wittig goes into the territory of 
mythologies, history, and utopia—but what enables each writer to explore the 
literary terrain she does is a shared fire, a shared conviction in language’s 
capacity to do away with difference and create a radical experience of indif-
ferentiation and indeterminacy, a capacity best seen in literature.
 5. I am dealing here with the American reception of Wittig. Based on the relative paucity 
of critical work done in French on Wittig, and on conversations I have had with French Wit-
tig scholars, who are few and far between, Wittig, both as a writer and as a political theorist, 
appears to have fallen into a state of relative obscurity in France.
 6. See, for instance, Balén, “The Straight Mind at Work,” which critiques Butler’s treat-
ment of Wittig in Gender Trouble and proposes that queer theory take up Wittig’s materialist 
thought that “would not only move us toward developing a more radical theoretical framework 
for a queer studies that Wittig might have supported, but would offer creative frameworks 
for challenging oppression of all kinds.” See also Crowder, “From the Straight Mind to Queer 
Theory,” which discusses how and why Wittig is not assimilable to queer theory. 
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The two writers’ contiguity is captured dramatically in Le Chantier litté-
raire, which is explicitly an extended homage to Sarraute. Though the work 
had been originally written and submitted, in 1986, as Wittig’s doctoral the-
sis under Gérard Genette at the EHESS (École de Hautes Études en Sciences 
Sociales), Wittig continued to work on it long after she had received her doc-
torate, and planned to publish Le Chantier littéraire with P. O. L. in 1999. But 
1999 was the year that Sarraute died, and following Sarraute’s death in Octo-
ber, Wittig pulled out of her publication contract and returned to working on 
the text. Wittig returned Le Chantier littéraire to her own chantier, where she 
was still working on it at the time of her death, from a sudden heart attack, 
in 2003.7
Because Sarraute’s death compelled Wittig to rework this text, we can see 
Le Chantier littéraire as a eulogy to Sarraute, bearing witness to Sarraute’s life 
and work through a personal account of Wittig’s own work and thought. Le 
Chantier littéraire is both an ars poetica and an explicitly literary revisiting of 
the political theory of The Straight Mind. This extended meditation on Sar-
raute’s writing, which fuses these two projects—one literary, one political—
together, is in effect Wittig’s way of putting back together her cleaved self. 
Wittig takes the literary Wittig and the political Wittig and uses Sarraute to 
reassemble them.
Le Chantier littéraire is not only a testament to Sarraute—it can also be 
viewed as Wittig’s last testament. It represents Wittig’s most developed writ-
ing and thought as a text that remained present and current at the moment 
of Wittig’s death, that was still in her chantier. As such, it represents Wittig’s 
mature perspective on both her writing and political thought. With its pan-
oramic perspective on four decades of work and thought, it gives us access to 
Wittig’s goals and is a lens for viewing the entirety of her corpus, both cre-
ative and critical. Le Chantier littéraire enabled Wittig to keep Sarraute alive 
and present, her reflection and work on Sarraute extending her friend’s life 
beyond the grave. And as a posthumous publication—its final form precisely 
not final, not yet declared finished by its creator—Le Chantier littéraire also 
enables Wittig to be present and in process even after death.
Le Chantier littéraire is important beyond the insights it provides on Sar-
raute and Wittig individually. It allows us to see who Wittig is and what she 
does as a writer, which, in turn, allows us to see the foundational role Sar-
raute played in Wittig’s becoming Wittig and sheds light upon Garréta’s own 
project, which takes up the stakes raised by these other two writers. As a 
 7. For more on the conditions surrounding Le Chantier littéraire’s publication, see Audrey 
Lasserre, “Histoire éditoriale,” in Wittig, Le Chantier littéraire, 173–80.
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commentary, manifesto, and a biography of sorts not of the writer as a person 
but of the writer as writer, Le Chantier littéraire enables us to bring together 
these three writers’ works so that we are better able to see that all three are 
animated by a shared experience of language’s potential to transform a reality 
marked by compulsory identification and seemingly inescapable difference. If 
Le Chantier littéraire is able to do so, it is because it brings together the politi-
cal Wittig with the literary Wittig. This fusion lies at the heart of the argument 
I am making about these three writers and their projects, which are political 
because they are literary.
Given the importance of Le Chantier littéraire to understanding Wittig’s 
work and the way it illuminates her writing’s relationship to Sarraute’s and 
Garréta’s writing, its obscurity is that much more striking, especially when 
compared to the success that The Straight Mind enjoyed. The Straight Mind cir-
culated in a wide number of intellectual spheres and disciplines and resonated 
with a broad audience, but Le Chantier littéraire, which takes up many of the 
same points as The Straight Mind—but from an explicitly and unequivocally 
literary perspective—aroused surprisingly little interest. Although Le Chantier 
littéraire was published quietly by a relatively small press, the Presses Univer-
sitaires de Lyon, in collaboration with the French press les Éditions iXe, part 
of it had nonetheless been made accessible to Anglophone readers through 
the publication of a translated excerpt in the 2007 special issue of GLQ on 
Wittig. This issue, featuring such prominent figures of feminist and queer 
studies as Alice Jardine, Judith Butler, and Robyn Wiegman, was undoubtedly 
widely read. Accordingly, the existence of Le Chantier littéraire was revealed 
to the broad readership GLQ commands as a top journal in queer studies, 
and to those who follow the work of the established scholars featured therein. 
However, a decade after the special issue on Wittig, Le Chantier littéraire has 
received virtually no critical attention. To date, there is only one review of the 
work, Renate Günther’s review for French Studies, which gestures toward the 
significance of Le Chantier littéraire as “the first integral text to draw together 
the different strands of Wittig’s work as a writer and theorist; as such it will 
prove an invaluable resource to students and researchers in contemporary lit-
erature, critical theory, and gender studies.”8 Günther’s prediction has thus far 
proven false, and there has been practically no engagement with Wittig’s post-
humous work. This is not simply a question of translation, of Anglophones 
not having access to Le Chantier littéraire in the original French, as one might 
reasonably expect people interested in Wittig’s last publication to refer to the 
 8. Günther, “Le Chantier Littéraire (Review),” 275.
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GLQ excerpt.9 Rather, it seems likely that the timing of the excerpt’s publica-
tion had something to do with this failure to arouse interest. By 2007, the 
humanities had already begun to reject the linguistic turn and embrace the 
new materialist turn, with its privileging of materiality over and against an 
ostensibly immaterial language. Wittig’s insistence on the literary must have 
appeared too stuck in the grand narratives of the twentieth century and their 
elevation of the textual.
We cannot definitively know why certain interpretations and narratives 
stick and others don’t, or why certain texts inspire fierce devotion and enthusi-
asm and others do not. What the resounding silence surrounding Le Chantier 
littéraire seems to point to, however, is a reluctance on the part of feminist and 
queer theory scholars as well as literary scholars to engage with literature as 
theory, and a will to distinguish between literary and theoretical objects. And 
yet, Wittig’s writing is striking precisely for how fiercely it claims an aesthetic, 
literary identity along with the function of critique.10 For her, to theorize a 
language after and without gender—a language without the hierarchy imputed 
to gender by patriarchy—is to create literature in that same language. This is 
best seen in her theorization of innovative literary texts as Trojan horses, as 
war machines that have traction on reality and are capable of transforming 
it. Despite the so-called linguistic turn’s privileging of language and the pres-
tige that its prominent theorists—Foucault, Derrida, and Barthes—accorded 
to literature, literature and theory have diverged substantially. The notion that 
literature itself theorizes seems strangely radical today. The roots of Wittig’s 
writing are in this radicality, and it is to these roots that I wish to turn—roots 
that connect Sarraute to Wittig to Garréta.
Because Le Chantier littéraire remains unknown to most people, even 
those familiar with Wittig, I want to begin by introducing the text, giving 
an account of its major claims and showing how its merging of the literary 
and the political entails a corrective rewriting of The Straight Mind. Once we 
have a working grasp of Le Chantier littéraire’s project, it becomes possible to 
examine Wittig’s novels from this writerly perspective and better understand 
how they are constructed as Trojan horses containing a language capable of 
destroying identity and difference. These war machines, when admitted inside 
 9. According to Google Scholar, there are four citations of the excerpt in question, made 
by two people. The French reception of Le Chantier littéraire is nearly as nonexistent as the 
American one. At the time of writing, I have been able to find only two reviews of the work 
and six essays that cite it.
 10. Theory and critique have come to stand for each other—“critical theory” is so often 
what is denoted by “theory,” and it has become difficult to envision theory that doesn’t function 
as critique. 
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the walls of the reader’s mind, can transform the reader’s conception and 
experience of language, and hence of reality. Where there is a fairly straight 
through-line in the other chapters (Chapters 1 and 3, on Sarraute and Garréta, 
perform readings of their corpora that show how their works enact an experi-
ence of unbecoming, of being a subjectivity without subjecthood; Chapter 4 
works through a shared poetics that is founded in a relationship with language 
that treats it as having a body), this chapter twists and turns and doubles back 
on itself. This is because Wittig occupies a singular position as the fulcrum 
of this book, connecting Sarraute to Garréta, and because, in Le Chantier lit-
téraire, she doubles herself, writing theoretically, in a critical mode and lan-
guage, about what her fiction, her literary writing, itself conceptualizes. But 
by following the labyrinthine movement of this chapter, once you exit through 
the other side, you will be equipped to see how Wittig is what brings together 
Sarraute and Garréta, the political and the literary, the critical and the con-
structive, with her chantier littéraire providing a space in which unbecoming 
language can abide.
INFILTRATING THE ACADEMY: LE CHANTIER  
LIT TÉRAIRE AS TROJAN HORSE
Le Chantier littéraire is an intimate work. While it bears a general resemblance 
to the format of a doctoral thesis, its tone, format, and relationship to knowl-
edge production make it clear that what we have at hand is actually a parodic 
reinvention of the academic text that is consistent with Wittig’s lifelong work 
of subverting generic norms and transforming genres from within.11 Wittig 
hollows out this genre principally through her attack on the objectivity of aca-
demic writing and critical work and on the way this objectivity presumes to 
have a monopoly on rigor. Le Chantier littéraire is a work that does not seek to 
ventriloquize institutionalized academic language, but to invent a new kind. It 
is a Trojan horse that infiltrates the form of the thesis and its codified language 
in order to introduce foreign, new material.12 What passes as a doctoral the-
sis—Wittig was rewarded a doctoral degree as a result of submitting it—does 
not actually observe most of the conventions and exigencies associated with 
 11. In L’Opoponax, Wittig rewrites the bildungsroman, in Les Guérillères, the epic, in Le 
Corps lesbien, the love poem, in Brouillon, the dictionary, in Virgile, non, the allegory, as iterated 
in Dante’s Divine Comedy.
 12. See Audrey Lasserre, “Histoire éditoriale,” 174–75, where she develops the idea of Le 
Chantier littéraire as a Trojan horse that subverts the form of the mémoire, or thesis.
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academic writing. Le Chantier littéraire, in this sense, infiltrated the institution 
of the academy.
Wittig’s disregard for the standards of academic writing is perhaps most 
visible, literally, in her transformation of the footnote. The footnote is typically 
employed, liberally, to cite other scholars and indicate other works besides the 
author’s own that engage with the issue at hand, or to indicate sources, in the 
form of documents or of people, which contributed to the author’s thought 
process. It gestures toward a wider field of references that the reader might 
want to explore to gain a deeper understanding of the subject. It acts as a 
supplement, giving information that is interesting but does not necessarily 
directly develop the author’s question. And it provides detail, which shows 
the author’s familiarity with and knowledge of the object of the footnote, but 
would weigh down a larger, global understanding of the author’s argument. 
In all these functions, the footnote asserts that its author is part of a larger 
conversation and serves as evidence of her erudition—it functions, in other 
words, to render the work to which the footnote belongs more authoritative 
and credible. It is a guarantee of the work’s, as well as the author’s, serious-
ness and respectability, and operates through the footnote’s transparency: the 
actual existence of the references and citations given enables the reader to 
confirm the author’s work and corroborate her line of reasoning, thus inviting 
the reader’s participation in revisiting the sources and works that enabled the 
author to reach her conclusions. The footnote, then, is public: it is addressed 
for the reader’s benefit.
In Wittig’s case, however, she turns the footnote into a private instrument 
that is not used to guarantee the quality or reliability of the text. Precise, ver-
ifiable footnotes give way in Le Chantier littéraire to notes in the margins 
that provide only the vaguest indication of sources, and Wittig cites texts and 
authors in much the same way that Roland Barthes does in Fragments d’un 
discours amoureux [A Lover’s Discourse].13 Without titles, years, or page num-
bers, Wittig’s footnotes, like Barthes’s, often end up making the reader feel left 
out rather than clued in (unless, of course, the reader has the same reading 
history as Wittig), and they function on an intimate level, like notes by the 
author to herself that remind her of what she has already read and would eas-
ily know to return to. Wittig’s text engages the reader—the text is a patient 
explanation to the reader of what transpires inside the literary worksite, on 
the writer’s side of things—but is nonetheless liberally peppered throughout 
with these footnotes that seem to address Wittig herself more than the reader 
 13. Christine Planté, in her preface to Le Chantier littéraire, also makes note of Wittig’s 
footnotes, and cites them as an illustration of Wittig’s parodying of the form of the academic 
thesis. Wittig, Le Chantier littéraire, 16–17.
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whose presence she is evidently aware of. Consequently, reading Le Chan-
tier littéraire and experiencing the disjunction between the main text’s public 
address and the footnotes’ private address is much like having a conversation 
with a person who never meets your gaze.
The footnotes are a visual, immediately apprehensible subversion of the 
norms of academic writing, but where we can best experience Wittig’s disre-
gard for the exigencies of the academy is in the main text, where she draws 
upon her own experience as a writer as an authoritative form of evidence. She 
privileges the personal and anecdotal, which are outside the usual realm of 
sources deemed sufficiently rigorous or academic, and proposes to give the 
reader entry into a space—the literary worksite—that is usually only viewed 
critically from the outside. Wittig insists that the literary worksite can and 
must be viewed critically from the inside, as it is in assuming the writer’s posi-
tion at the intersection of the critical and the creative that Wittig’s vision of 
language—and of the ways in which this language forms the literary and the 
political—becomes accessible.
For Wittig, the writer assumes both creative and critical functions because 
she is both writer and reader: the creative moment of writing is always fol-
lowed by the critical moment of reading what has been written. Moreover, 
writers’ conceptions of the literary possibilities of language are shaped by the 
texts they read, so that they never produce a work in a vacuum, but in conver-
sation with the works that have come before and constitute a literary history 
that they are henceforth a part of. Le Chantier littéraire attempts to give us 
access to both modes by giving us access to Wittig as a critical reader of Sar-
raute’s writing and to Wittig as a creative writer who responds to the inspira-
tion Sarraute’s writing provides for her. In doing so, Wittig explicitly targets 
what she considers to be the narrow vision that literary criticism and scholar-
ship have of what counts as knowledge—a vision that leads to the dismissal of 
the experiential knowledge a writer can provide access to:
Presque tous les courants de la critique littéraire moderne, pour autant que 
je les connaisse ont tendance à liquider le point de vue critique des écrivains 
comme non scientifique, comme pris à la glu dans sa propre intentionnalité. 
Mais c’est pour moi une erreur d’essayer d’éliminer ou au mieux d’en traiter 
avec condescendance. Je ne vois même pas comment on pourrait s’en passer. 
Car c’est un point de vue qui précède en quelque sorte le travail littéraire et 
qui nous donne un aperçu sur le faire, sur le procès d’écrire.14
 14. Wittig, Le Chantier littéraire, 40. All subsequent references to Le Chantier littéraire will 
be made in-text.
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[As far as I know, almost all strands of modern literary criticism have a ten-
dency to dispose of the critical point of view of writers as being unscientific, 
caught up in the glue of its own intentionality. But I think it’s a mistake to 
try to eliminate this perspective, or to, at best, treat it with condescension. 
I don’t see how we could do without it. Because it is a point of view that, as 
it were, precedes literary work and gives us a glimpse of the act, the process 
of writing.]
Rather than cast aside writerly intention as subjective material that will lead 
critics and scholars astray from the straight and narrow path of objectivity and 
rational argumentation, Wittig instead advocates a demystification of the writ-
ing process, so that far from being a mysterious activity caught up in the tran-
scendental language of inspiration or genius, writing is treated as the labor 
that writers such as Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta know it to be.15
Wittig’s statement challenges all who have a stake in interpreting literature 
to engage fully with the object of their study and to see that texts are material 
productions fabricated in a literary worksite by a writer. Wittig critiques liter-
ary criticism that treats texts as self-standing, self-made:
Mais à force de s’en tenir à l’œuvre, au produit (d’un travail), on a fait place 
nette, on a éliminé l’écrivain de l’écriture. Des expressions comme “ce qui 
s’écrit,” “ce qui se donne à lire,” “l’écriture” sont des façons de dire qui rendent 
compte que le travail littéraire a évacué le travailleur (l’écrivain) tout comme 
la parole (le discours) a été vidée de son locuteur par les linguistes. À la fois 
écrivain et locuteur n’ont plus qu’une existence virtuelle. (41)
[But by dint of holding on to the work, to the product (of a labor), we 
have made a clean sweep of things and eliminated the writer from writing. 
Expressions like “that which writes itself,” “that which gives itself up to be 
read,” “writing [l’écriture],” are ways of speaking that attest to how literary 
work has expelled the laborer (the writer) just as the word (discourse) has 
been emptied of its locutor by linguists. Both writer and locutor no longer 
have anything but a virtual existence.]
This does not mean the writer is supposed to have the last word about the texts 
that she produces, but that an essential part of accounting for a text is con-
sidering the writer’s confrontation with a medium as infinite in its possibility 
 15. Garréta, in conversation with me, has described writing as sometimes akin to having 
teeth pulled, and, at other times, exhilarating, but in any case, as a lot of hard work with no 
guarantee that it will produce a functional novel.
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as language, and as loaded—language bears the traces of all the significations 
that it has been used to create, and has had layers of meaning sedimented 
onto it. The text by itself is important, but it is not enough. The text’s situation 
in history and the way a given historical moment influences the evolution of 
literary and aesthetic interests are important, but they are also not enough. 
Neither an ahistorical, purely hermeneutical approach that privileges the text 
nor a completely historicist approach that privileges context are able to take 
the place of an engagement with the writer’s struggle with and work upon the 
material and medium of language.
At this point, it is worth pausing to define what Wittig means by materi-
ality, as it is not entirely materiality in its Marxist sense of being part of the 
concrete, material base for human life from which abstract ideology follows, 
nor is it entirely synonymous with physicality, although Wittig does accord 
great importance to language’s physicality. From the way Wittig uses the term 
throughout Le Chantier littéraire, materiality could be defined as the property 
of form. Language has a concrete form that literature is especially attentive 
to—one that makes it workable as a medium. This formal capacity derives 
from its physicality, from the fact that it can be heard and hence understood, 
seen and thus read. Simply stated, the materiality of language means that lan-
guage is a material that can be worked upon. This emphasis on language as 
a material that can be worked upon—and on the text as the product of such 
labor—means that in addition to focusing on the text as a hermeneutical and 
historical object, we need to take seriously the process and labor by which 
said text is produced. I will be returning to the question of Wittig’s writerly 
materialism later in order to distinguish it from the conception of material-
ity put forth by new materialisms, but let’s first take a look inside her literary 
worksite.
INSIDE THE LITERARY WORKSITE
The literary cannot be contained within the field of literature as such, and 
exceeds the boundaries that demarcate literature from life, which is to say, 
from politics, taken in its broadest sense as signifying what pertains to the 
collective life of the polis, the city, in which polites, citizens, abide together. 
In this sense, politics encompasses the concrete fact of living together and its 
ensuing vicissitudes, the dynamics of power that inhere in living together, and 
the epistemes that determine how we live together and who has access to what 
power. In Le Chantier littéraire, Wittig writes to break down and render inop-
erative the distinctions between the literary and the political that The Straight 
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Mind, with its division into political and literary essays, unintentionally helped 
reinforce. This division did not take the form of the table of contents explic-
itly categorizing one set of essays as political and the other as literary. But if 
one looks at The Straight Mind’s table of contents, the essays are ordered not 
chronologically but thematically: the first five essays (“The Category of Sex”; 
“One Is Not Born a Woman”; “The Straight Mind”; “On the Social Contract”; 
“Homo Sum”) constitute a political critique of gender that does not draw upon 
literature, and the last four essays (“The Point of View: Universal or Particu-
lar?”; “The Trojan Horse”; “The Mark of Gender”; “The Site of Action”) all take 
literature as their starting point, and comment on specific literary texts by Sar-
raute, Proust, Djuna Barnes, and Wittig herself.
To be sure, we could see this artificial division as a simple consequence of 
the anthological nature of the work. After all, The Straight Mind was a collec-
tion of discrete essays that had been published in journals such as Feminist 
Issues and Digraphe, and “The Point of View: Universal or Particular?” had 
been the foreword to La Passion (1982), Wittig’s translation into French of 
Djuna Barnes’s short stories. The essays were gathered together and a structure 
was imposed on them after they’d already been written. Le Chantier littéraire 
proves to be that much more of an indispensable text in that Wittig takes up 
many of the concerns of The Straight Mind, but from a framework that brings 
them all together, privileging literature as a site capable of connecting such 
distinct issues as the social contract, the positioning of minoritarian perspec-
tives vis-à-vis the universal, the category of sex, and language’s production 
of gender. In short, Wittig undoes in Le Chantier littéraire the compartmen-
talization of her thought that was effected for and by the publication of The 
Straight Mind.
The reception of The Straight Mind, which privileges the political over the 
literary, is symptomatic of the sort of compartmentalization and violent cross-
sectioning that critical analysis tends to perform on its objects. In Le Chan-
tier littéraire, Wittig evokes, as a particularly vivid example of such analytic 
violence, what she claims linguists do to the body of language: transform the 
integral, solid body of language into “le grand corps de signes démembrés, 
démantelés, réduits, coupés, tel que nous l’ont légué les linguistes” (95) [the 
large body of dismembered, dismantled, reduced, cut up signs, as it has been 
bequeathed to us by linguists], a mutilated body that she describes elsewhere 
as “fragmentés, sans sens” (43) [fragmented, meaningless]. The implication is 
that the meaning and sense of language come not from being taken apart to be 
examined closely but from being considered as a whole. The writer, in her pas-
sionate and intimate relationship with language, has privileged access to this 
wholeness. Le Chantier littéraire, as a critical perspective that starts and ends 
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with the integrity of language, seeks to restore to language’s dissected body its 
vitality, and it constitutes a critical perspective that enables Wittig to restore 
life to her own work’s dissected body.
Up to this point, I have articulated Wittig’s view that it is necessary to 
take the writer’s simultaneously critical and creative perspective and work into 
consideration—a necessity that derives from the writer serving as the one fig-
ure who respects and experiences the integrality and integrity of language as 
an irreducible and total entity. Examining the construction and the writing of 
Le Chantier littéraire will enable us to see Wittig’s development of an original 
Wittigian exegesis, which we can then apply to Wittig’s own work to reveal 
how the literary and the political come together to provide an experience of 
language’s radically universalizing quality, in the Sarrautian sense of returning 
us to an experience of ourselves as a universe without contours.
Before reading Le Chantier littéraire, its structure already indicates the 
ambitious scope of Wittig’s project and of her vision of a breathtakingly expan-
sive and total language.16 Le Chantier littéraire is composed of an introduction, 
five chapters, and a conclusion. The introduction is itself divided into four 
broad “propositions” or postulates concerning language: 1) De l’hétérogénéité 
et de la versatilité des éléments en présence [On the heterogeneity and versatil-
ity of elements present [in language]]; 2) De la matérialité du langage [On the 
materiality of language]; 3) De l’effet des catégories philosophiques abstraites sur 
le réel social [On the effect of philosophical, abstract categories on social real-
ity]; 4) Des effets divers du langage physique [On the diverse effects of physical 
language]. The subsequent chapters treat, in the following order: Le Chantier 
littéraire [The Literary Worksite]; Le Contrat social [The Social Contract]; Les 
Formes déjà-là: La littérature [Forms Already There: Literature]; Le Langage à 
travailler [The Language to Work On]; Les Catégories philosophiques: Un exem-
ple, le genre [Philosophical Categories: One Example, Gender]. The conclusion 
turns from the writer toward the reader’s fundamental role in realizing an 
experience of literature’s universality—its belonging to all.
Wittig conceptualizes and situates such vast concepts as the literary, the 
social, the political, and the philosophical over the course of Le Chantier litté-
raire. All these things are inflected through language, which, as she establishes 
in her introduction, is heterogeneous, versatile, and material: heterogeneous 
because language exists as both a concrete material signifier and an abstract 
signification; versatile because within language the concrete can become the 
abstract and vice versa; material because it is physically present and imbri-
 16. While I see Wittig’s language as total, it would be a mistake to describe it as totalizing, 
however. For Wittig, language doesn’t appropriate reality because language already is reality.
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cated in forming philosophical categories, which have an impact on social 
reality (44–45). In other words, the introduction treats language as constitut-
ing reality rather than being a mere construct. Before the real, the material, 
the social, or the philosophical has acted on language, language has already 
been involved in the creation of these things.
Language, in Wittig’s estimation, has a particularly complex relationship to 
reality because its materiality, like that of light, is double. Just as light is both 
wave and particle, with both states having a real impact on the matter with 
which they interact, language is similarly double in its nature:
De la même façon la nature du langage est double, participant à la fois de 
l’abstraction, de la pensée conceptuelle en tant qu’opposée au réel et au maté-
riel, le signifié au signifiant, le figuré au propre, et de l’ordre matériel par les 
mots et leur espace géographique et sonore. C’est pourquoi il est possible 
d’affirmer que le langage participe du réel, qu’il est en fait tout aussi réel que 
le référent auquel on l’oppose, tout aussi réel que les relations sociales et que 
le réel physique puisqu’il participe des deux. (45–46)
[In the same way, the nature of language is double, participating at the same 
time in abstraction, in conceptual thought insofar as it is opposed to the real 
and to the material, [acting as] the signified to the signifier, the figurative 
to the proper, and participating in the material order through words and 
their geographical and sonic space. This is why it is possible to affirm that 
language participates in the real, that it is in fact just as real as the referent 
to which one opposes it, just as real as social relations and as physical reality 
since it is part of both.]
In this compact summation of language’s nature, Wittig articulates the foun-
dational idea of Le Chantier littéraire. Language is no longer an abstract and 
less real thing that refers to the more real referent (more real in the sense of its 
existence preceding the existence of the signifier and serving as the condition 
of possibility for the signifier), which is readily accessible to the sensorium. 
Irreducible to a set of referents or signifiers, language is doubly real and has 
an existence that is richer than the one that referents or signifiers alone have 
because language is both abstract and concrete, conceptual and material at 
the same time.
Wittig unpacks this seemingly simple but dense assertion throughout Le 
Chantier littéraire. She turns her analytic gaze onto the concepts of the signi-
fier and signified that have come to be taken for granted, and actually stops to 
think about what it means to claim that language exists as both signifier and 
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signified, formal expression and conceptual content. In what follows, I take 
us through Le Chantier littéraire, chapter by chapter, showing how the entire 
text builds off this interplay between language’s form and content, which is 
most clearly embodied in the metaphor of the Trojan horse, with which Wit-
tig begins the text.
LITERATURE AS TROJAN HORSE
The introduction starts with a vivid narration of the Trojan horse and is Wit-
tig’s first evocation in the text of how a literary work can function as a war 
machine. The Trojan horse’s form was what weaponized it, as its form’s aes-
thetic appeal to the Trojans was what compelled them to open up their gates 
and let the enemy inside. After this, in the first chapter, “Le Chantier littéraire,” 
Wittig turns to the idea of the literary worksite, where Trojan horses are made. 
As we’ve seen, Wittig conceptualizes the worksite as a space that resists aca-
demic discourse, which seeks to cut up language and isolate its content from 
its form. The literary worksite is a privileged space that respects and works 
with, rather than against, language’s double nature. From this introduction 
of the literary worksite, Wittig then moves on to “Le Contrat social,” showing 
what is at stake in the various productions of a literary worksite.
Here, Wittig develops a language-based notion of the social contract, in 
which language is itself the original social contract according to which every 
individual has equal access to and possession of language:
Ce qu’on étouffe dans toutes les sortes de parleries qu’elles soient de la rue ou 
du cabinet philosophique, c’est le langage premier (dont le dictionnaire nous 
donne une idée approximative), celui où le sens n’est pas encore advenu, celui 
qui est de tous, appartient à tous, et que chacun à son tour peut prendre, uti-
liser, courber vers un sens. Car c’est cela le pacte social qui nous lie, le contrat 
exclusif, il n’y en a pas d’autre possible, un contrat social qui existe bien tel 
que Rousseau l’a imaginé et où le “droit du plus fort” est une contradiction 
dans les termes, là où il n’y a ni hommes ni femmes ni race ni oppression, 
ni rien que ce qui ne peut être nommé qu’à mesure, mot à mot, le langage. 
Ici on est tous égaux et libres, sans quoi il n’y aurait pas de pacte possible. 
On a tous appris à parler avec la conscience que les mots s’échangent, que le 
langage se forme dans un rapport de réciprocité absolue, sans quoi qui serait 
assez fou pour vouloir parler. Le pouvoir inouï, tel que les linguistes nous 
l’ont fait connaître, le pouvoir d’utiliser à partir de soi seul tout le langage 
avec ses mots au son et au sens éclatants appartient à tous. Le langage existe 
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comme le lieu commun où on peut s’ébattre en liberté et du même coup à 
travers les mots, tendre à bout de bras à autrui la même licence, sans quoi il 
n’y aurait pas de sens. (60–61)
[What one stifles in all sorts of chatter whether it’s heard on the streets or in 
a philosophical salon, is original language (of which the dictionary gives us 
an approximate idea), language where meaning has not yet occurred, lan-
guage that is everyone’s, that belongs to all, and that each can in turn take, 
use, bend toward a meaning. Because that is the social pact that binds us, the 
exclusive contract, there is none other possible, a social contract that exists 
just as Rousseau imagined it, where “might makes right” is a contradiction in 
terms, where there are neither men nor women nor race nor oppression nor 
anything except that which can only be named as it occurs, word by word—
language. Here we are all equal and free, and if we weren’t there would be 
no pact possible. We all learned to speak with the awareness that words 
are exchanged, that language is forged within a relationship of absolute rec-
iprocity, without which no one would be mad enough to want to speak. 
This incredible power that linguists have introduced to us, the power to use, 
starting with oneself, language, with its words and their dazzling sounds 
and meanings, which belongs to all. Language exists as the communal space 
where we can frolic freely and, in the same stroke, extend, through words, 
the same license to others—without this, there would be no meaning.]
As Wittig describes this situation lyrically, “Le langage existe comme un para-
dis fait de mots visibles, audibles, palpables, palatables” (61) [Language exists 
as a paradise made of words that are visible, audible, palpable, and savory]. 
Wittig evokes this social contract/paradise of language in language reminis-
cent of Sarraute’s reflections on neutrality, as one where men, women, and race 
do not occur. They cannot, in this paradise of words, because they are not 
named à mesure, as they occur, but make sexual difference or race seem like 
originary, rather than constructed, concepts. These words determine rather 
than describe. Wittig’s social contract surges out of the present as a result 
of an encounter with the present. It does not exist in the past to determine 
a future. Language, in its truest and most essential form, guarantees the full 
equality and freedom of all when it remains undeformed, not having lost its 
integrity through being sapped of its vitality and flexibility—its reactivity and 
malleability, its playfulness and its give—through parleries, or deadening uses 
of language.
In its reminder that language belongs to all, the chapter effectively univer-
salizes the literary worksite, the space where “meaning has not yet occurred.” 
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Wittig makes the claim that all people can, through engagement with a literary 
work that is a Trojan horse, learn to relate to language and its double nature 
the way a writer does. This new, writerly relationship to language is supposed 
to reveal language’s liberatory nature, experienced as the original, egalitarian 
social contract that language is supposed to be. By having such an experience 
of language within literature, the reader might be empowered to return lan-
guage in its everyday uses to that original, ideal language, as well.
From this declaration of the radical democratic nature of the literary work-
site as one where language belongs to all, Wittig moves on to “Les Formes 
déjà-là: La Littérature,” which turns to the question of how to relate to what 
is produced in other writers’ literary worksites—other writers’ works. At the 
beginning of this chapter, Wittig defines the Trojan horse as a literary work 
that is innovative and assumes new and unfamiliar forms:
Tout travail littéraire important est au moment de sa production comme 
un Cheval de Troie, toujours il s’effectue en territoire hostile dans lequel il 
apparaît étrange, inassimilable, non conforme. Puis sa force (sa polysémie) 
et la beauté de ses formes l’emportent. La cité fait place à la machine dans 
ses murs. (73–74)
[Any important work of literature is, at the moment of its production, like 
a Trojan horse; it is always carried out in a hostile territory where it appears 
to be strange, inassimilable, nonconformist. Then its force (its polysemy) 
and the beauty of its forms prevail. The city makes room for the machine 
within its walls.]
The rest of the chapter confronts the fact that all innovative literary works, 
once they have been acknowledged as important literary works that perma-
nently alter the literary landscape and the set of possibilities for literary forms, 
become for all writers who come afterwards the old, pre-existing forms against 
which or by which new forms must be found and created. The process by 
which a new form becomes old is in effect the same process by which ready-
made meanings are sedimented onto language. The effort to renew forms by 
breaking away from the old is mirrored by the writer’s effort to engage with 
the material of language, as if for the first time, in order to remove it from 
its predictable or standard uses and do something new with it. The writer, in 
order to create the Trojan horse, must disrupt the seeming naturalness with 
which form and content are made to coincide, the repetition that would bind 
the signifier to a particular signified.
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Wittig treats this problem in the following chapter, “Le Langage à tra-
vailler,” where she addresses the primary problem that a writer faces in working 
with language as a medium. Unlike clay, stone, or sound, which, as materials 
to be shaped into an artistic product, carry no inherent signification in and of 
themselves, “ce qu’il est en écriture se complique du fait que le matériau utilisé 
pour le fabriquer, le matériau brut avant que toute forme en émerge, étant le 
langage, est bien de la matière, mais déjà aussi une forme” (93) [writing is 
complicated by the fact that the material used to make it, the raw material 
before any form has taken shape, being language, is indeed a material, but also 
already a form]. Here, Wittig points to the immediate slippage that occurs in 
language between form and content. Language already has a form, as mani-
fested in all the different words, or signifiers, that exist as possible material 
for a writer to use, and this form already has a content, in that words already 
mean things and signifiers are already joined with their signification. Unlike 
other artistic media, language, the moment it has a form—which is to say, the 
moment it exists, as formless language is an impossibility—already has con-
tent. In “Le Langage à travailler,” Wittig identifies literature as the space and 
writing as the process where this unquestioned fusion of form and content is 
troubled—where the writer is able to engage with language in its original state 
of materiality, when it has not yet had layers of meaning glued onto it.
Wittig sums up the central point of “Le Langage à travailler” as follows: 
“Tout écrivain doit prendre les mots et les mettre à nu” (97) [Every writer 
must take words and strip them bare].17 Where the usual use or signification 
of a word acts as a uniform that it wears, which makes it and its function vis-
ible (the way a doctor’s white coat or a firefighter’s jacket signals its wearer’s 
function), the writer’s task is to remove that word of signifying clothing and 
“le dépouille de son sens conventionnel afin de le transformer en un matériau 
neutre, brut” (97) [strip it of its conventional meaning in order to transform it 
into a neutral, raw material]. The writer must do this so that the word can be 
deployed differently and used to create new forms—so that it can be part of 
a Trojan horse. Wittig is very clear that this work of stripping language down 
does not mean that the writer, in her engagement with language’s materiality, 
can somehow stop it from signifying so that the reader can have as direct an 
apprehension of language’s raw materiality as a viewer can have of the cool, 
smooth marble that makes a sculpture, or a listener of the different timbres 
produced by the different instruments playing in a concerto, for instance. As 
she writes, “Non que les efforts sur le langage en tant que matériel tendent à 
 17. For a development of this essential point, see Wittig, Le Chantier littéraire, 95–97.
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évacuer le sens. Ils ne tendent qu’à évacuer le sens déjà-là, prévenu, vers une 
forme nouvelle, neuve, non encore advenu, d’où forcément se mettra en place 
un sens neuf non encore advenu” (115) [Not that efforts to work on language as 
a material aim to expel meaning. They only aim to expel the predictable mean-
ing that is already there in order to move toward a new form that has not yet 
occurred, within which a new yet-to-occur meaning will be put into place]. 
The writer’s work lies in enabling new meanings, and thus new realities, to be 
produced: this is the function of the Trojan horse as a literary war machine.
Wittig concludes “Le Langage à travailler” by asserting the inseparability 
of language’s form and content (a fusion that Sarraute had insisted upon and 
developed all throughout her work)18 to argue that language not only passively 
receives and replicates meaning but actively creates new meaning. Language is 
thus no transparent instrument that we use to describe the world that exists, 
but is itself what makes the self that lives in the world exist, what makes the 
world exist for the self:
Il y a une dimension de soi qui vit dans le langage et qui implique la mobi-
lisation de ses facultés intellectuelles: compréhension, appréhension, juge-
ment, imagination, mémoire. Tous les faits de langage, les paroles, les écrits, 
les actions à tout moment forment et transforment le moi qui en même 
temps qu’il les agit est agi par eux. (122)
[There is a dimension of the self that lives in language and implicates the 
mobilization of the self ’s intellectual faculties: comprehension, apprehen-
sion, judgment, imagination, memory. At all moments, all the acts of lan-
guage in speech, writing, and actions form and transform the self, which is 
acted on by them at the same time as it acts upon them.]
Wittig moves from this assertion of the mutual traction that the self and lan-
guage have on each other to her last chapter, “Les Catégories philosophiques: 
Un exemple, le genre,” to consider another relationship between language and 
the world: that between language and a philosophical category such as gender, 
which obviously functions as a political category as well.
Here, Wittig revisits the arguments of her now classic essay “The Mark of 
Gender” (1985), which shows how the very existence of gendered language 
excludes women from that social contract of equality and freedom that lan-
guage’s inherent universality undergirds. In “Les Catégories philosophiques,” 
Wittig takes up the questions found in this earlier essay and frames them within 
 18. Sarraute describes this fusion in her essay “Flaubert le précurseur.” See Sarraute, 
Œuvres complètes, 1628.
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a larger project of breaking down the artificial barrier between philosophy and 
literature by foregrounding language. She maintains that philosophical catego-
ries are not contained within the realm of philosophy, but instead “réside plus 
ou moins implicitement dans la langue, le discours de tous les jours, les disci-
plines des sciences sociales” (129) [reside more or less implicitly in language, in 
everyday discourse, the disciplines of the social sciences], that is, in language 
that deals with lived life, with concrete experience. It would follow that philo-
sophical categories reside also in literature, which is made of language and 
rooted in human experience. Wittig uses her own novels, L’Opoponax and Les 
Guérillères, to show how those texts, as literary works, are able to work on the 
usual gendered logic of pronouns to wrest universality away from the mascu-
line. “The Mark of Gender” in The Straight Mind also discusses her novels, but 
there are differences between “The Mark of Gender” and “Les Catégories phi-
losophiques” that show that, in the latter, Wittig was making a concerted effort 
to commingle and imbricate the political with the literary.
In “The Mark of Gender,” the essay is neatly divided into two numbered 
parts, where the first part addresses the way gender, and the oppression with 
which it is synonymous, is created and replicated through language, and the 
second draws upon her own writing to show how literature is the site for 
confronting such a philosophical and political issue. Through this division, 
“The Mark of Gender” recreates The Straight Mind’s cleaving of the politi-
cal from the literary. In “Les Catégories philosophiques,” however, Wittig 
does away with the numbered parts. While the development of her argument 
remains similar, having the “abstract” philosophical and political discussion 
and the “concrete” literary discussion occupy the same, undivided body of 
text establishes a visual continuity that implicitly affirms that the two subjects 
are coextensive.
In another departure from “The Mark of Gender,” Wittig draws upon Sar-
raute to make the transition from the theoretical discussion of gender and its 
manifestation in and through language, to the literary argument made from 
the perspective of the writer inside her literary worksite:
Un écrivain comme Sarraute est très conscient que le langage loin d’être un 
reflet “des choses” et de la réalité sociale, est en quelque sorte ce qui la traite 
(“bien sûr vous l’y trouvez dans la réalité puisque vous l’y avez mis”) et même 
ce qui la crée. Toute son œuvre nous confronte à nos fabrications et ce qui 
s’écrit c’est ce qui y résiste. (140)
[A writer like Sarraute is very aware that language, far from being a reflec-
tion of “things” and of social reality, is, as it were, what processes it (“of 
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course you find it in reality since you put it there”) and even what creates 
it. All of her work confronts us with our fabrications and what is written is 
what resists those [fabrications].]
By using Sarraute to bring together gender and language, making Sarraute the 
thread that ties together this political object with a literary one, Wittig reiter-
ates just how central Sarraute is to her work as both theorist and writer. For 
Wittig, Sarraute was the paragon of literature that theorizes the political—she 
was someone who wielded language in such a way as to render inoperative 
the distinction between the conceptual and the concrete, who understood lan-
guage’s double nature in being both these things at once.
And from this reaffirmation of the non-distinction between the literary 
and the political, Wittig concludes Le Chantier littéraire by interpellating the 
reader not as passive receiver or consumer of finished products but as the 
writer’s equal partner in the literary worksite:
Quels que soient d’ailleurs l’effort et le travail fournis par l’écrivain pour 
tendre à l’universalité, il ne peut aller qu’à mi-chemin. L’autre versant de 
l’effort et du travail appartient au lecteur sans lequel il n’y aurait jamais trans-
formation complète et universalité réussie. (150–51)
[Besides, whatever effort and work the writer puts in to reach universality, 
he can only go halfway. The other half of the effort and work belongs to the 
reader without whom there could never be complete transformation and the 
attainment of universality.]
Wittig charges the reader with the writerly task of engaging with language’s 
double nature to make possible the literary and political project of the uni-
versalization of a particular point of view:19 it is only when the reader is able 
to share the experience of the writer that they can each be brought from their 
respective particularity into an experience of the universal afforded by the 
paradise of words.
Le Chantier littéraire, from beginning to end, develops the idea of the dou-
ble nature of language in order to articulate its most important consequence, 
that “il y a une plastie du langage sur le réel” (46) [there is a plasticity of 
language on the real]: language and reality shape and act on each other. The 
text’s primary argument could be distilled as follows: literature is an art that 
uses language as its medium. Language as a medium is different from other 
artistic media because of its double nature, where it is both form and content, 
 19. For Wittig’s elaboration of this idea, see Wittig, The Straight Mind, 59–67.
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concrete and abstract, material and conceptual. Writers can and should exploit 
this specific quality to create innovative works of literature that function as 
Trojan horses to create new forms, and hence, new meanings. By doing so, 
language is used not simply to describe or reflect a preexisting reality, but 
to create and fashion a new one. Through this literary labor, which operates 
through the writer’s passionate engagement with language, literature can resist 
received ideas of what should and does constitute reality, and work instead to 
create a new reality.
Literature’s aesthetic drive toward new forms engages a political dimen-
sion that aspires to new realities, and it is in this double movement, which 
engages with language’s double nature, that the aesthetic and the political are 
revealed to be co-constitutive. This has implications for how we are to read 
Wittig specifically and literature generally: we are to match the writer’s labor 
with our own as readers and read for how the writer’s work on language cre-
ates new forms, and for how those new forms create reality.
WITTIG’S MATERIALISM
One could criticize Le Chantier littéraire for being dated, fixed on a particular 
moment in literary criticism that does not describe literary criticism today 
(much literary scholarship today has moved beyond the structuralism and 
poststructuralism that Wittig critiques and responds to). However, such criti-
cisms do not diminish the importance of this text insofar as it enables us to 
understand Wittig as she understood herself, that is, as a writer whose work 
on language through literature was also a political action that had real traction 
on social and philosophical, as well as aesthetic, reality. This belief in litera-
ture’s traction on the real is rooted in Wittig’s materialism—her singular and 
original perspective on the materiality of language.
Wittig’s materialism cannot be assimilated either to the poststructuralist 
doxa about the discursive construction of reality, or to new materialisms’ turn 
away from language in contemporary theory. Rather than affirm discourse as, 
in Foucault’s words, “practices which systematically form the objects of which 
they speak,”20 Wittig teases apart language from discourse and insists on lan-
guage’s, not discourse’s, reality, and language’s, not discourse’s, giving reality 
its shape and form. If Wittig is able to distinguish language from discourse, it 
is because of the particular materiality that language has—its capacity to be a 
raw material ready to be worked on. This distinction is what enables Wittig’s 
 20. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 49.
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materialism to resist new materialisms’ concerted attack on poststructuralist 
affirmations of the discursive construction of reality and their theorists’ desire 
to move beyond the human.
I use new materialisms in a broad sense to encompass such heterogeneous 
strands of thought as feminist science studies, object-oriented ontology, and 
speculative realism, all of which can be placed under the sign of a posthuman-
ism interested in conceptualizing the non-human. They share the desire to 
move beyond an anthropocentric account of the world to return to “the real,” 
understood as the matter that exists independently of or beyond the reach 
of human thought and its will to mastery. The real is thus matter that exists 
outside human mediation, and it critiques the exceptional status humanity 
has accorded itself by treating the human as a material thing: conceiving of 
the human as material, just like the rest of the world it inhabits, levels the 
difference between the human and non-human that anthropocentric types 
of thought would establish. Given the way language has been mapped onto 
the human—language distinguishing humans from non-human animals—as 
a way of standing in for the human, an important part of new materialism 
has been a strong anti-linguistic stance, a rejection of the primacy accorded 
to language by the poststructuralist thought that dominated during the years 
preceding the rise of new materialism, where language and discourse, and the 
human subjectivity tied so closely to them, constitute immaterial things from 
a new materialist vantage point.21
Wittig is decidedly not a posthumanist. Her writing, both critical and 
fictional, is the manifestation of a strong belief in human subjectivity and in 
the power of language. Wittig prevents the humanist baby of language from 
being thrown out with the discursive bathwater by holding on to the mate-
riality of language as a way of resisting a human entrenchment in discourse, 
which deprives the lives we lead and the thoughts we think of a relationship 
to a vital, material language and the potentiality it holds. New materialisms, 
which do not make the distinction between language and discourse as Wit-
tig does, have effectively relinquished both in order to turn to the real and 
the material. Wittig, on the other hand, says that to turn to language, as 
separate from and opposed to discourse, is to turn to the material. In other 
words, Wittig’s materialism represents a radical kind of materialism, one 
 21. See Coole and Frost, New Materialisms; Huffer, “Foucault’s Fossils” for succinct over-
views of various new materialisms’ critical stakes and of the diversity of this relatively new 
field whose outlines have not yet been firmly traced. See also Apter et al., “A Questionnaire on 
Materialisms” for reflections from over forty thinkers on the possibilities of new materialisms, 
in particular, as it relates to the arts.
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that is built on language, rather than on that which exists outside it. It is an 
important counter to new materialisms’ eagerness to move past language 
(and the human).
By holding on so strongly to language as a material thing, Wittig brings 
together the human and the material in a way that does not invalidate sub-
jectivity. Material language is instead the key to a subjectivity without sub-
jecthood, which we can reformulate as a subjectivity that has language, but 
that has not been petrified by discourse and the deadening, constrictive reali-
ties discourse would build. Neither poststructuralist nor posthuman, Wit-
tig provides a politically vital alternative to both discursive realities and a 
materiality devoid of human subjectivity, and invites readers to join her in 
this alternative. Le Chantier littéraire reconceptualizes the role of the reader 
in a way that exceeds familiar narratives of readers who play a fundamental 
role in literature as a co-creator of texts: in Wittig’s vision, what is at stake 
is no longer simply the constitution of the text, or the reader’s vital role in 
enabling a text to come into being. Instead, Wittig demands that the reader 
separate language from discourse and from the socially sedimented mean-
ings that it is assimilated with. Wittig insists that the reader be a laborer of 
language, because it is through this labor that language’s materiality can be 
experienced.
Literature becomes the way for us, as readers, to engage with a language 
that does not simply exist as discourse and shape us as such, but impels us to 
be like writers and create new forms of language. This, in my view, is what 
makes Le Chantier littéraire so important, and it is a point to which I shall 
return. But before doing so, I want to read L’Opoponax, her first novel, through 
the exegetical model that Le Chantier littéraire provides. By doing so, we can 
see how Wittig goes about constructing a Trojan horse in her literary worksite 
in order to produce a literature that engages both the reader and language itself 
in a project of dismantling difference, and brings together the literary and the 
political such that they cannot be understood or experienced except along with 
and as each other. I focus primarily on L’Opoponax because it is considered less 
political and more aesthetic than the works that follow it, which have explic-
itly political plots and themes. L’Opoponax is a particularly good case study 
for seeing how fundamentally imbricated the literary and the political are in 
Wittig’s work. While it lacks the bellicose language and overtly anti-patriarchal 
themes of Les Guérillères or Virgile, non, for example, or the explicit lesbian 
sexuality of Le Corps lesbien, in L’Opoponax Wittig still works on language to 
produce a form that combats the straight mind—a form whose political force 
derives from innovative work on and with language.
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THE DEMANDS OF L’OPOPONAX
L’Opoponax was published in 1964 to great acclaim. Sarraute was on the jury 
of the Prix Médicis that year, and L’Opoponax took the prize. Nathalie Sar-
raute, Claude Simon, Alain Robbe-Grillet, and Marguerite Duras—the most 
prominent avant-garde writers of the moment—praised the novel. They con-
sidered it a masterpiece and an exemplar of the récit d’enfance, the narrative 
of childhood. This particular genre is a familiar one, which inspires certain 
expectations,22 and it constitutes the form of this particular Trojan horse of a 
novel. Just as the original, mythic Trojan horse was recognizable as a horse but 
foreign to the Trojans in its form, L’Opoponax was recognizable to readers as 
a narration of childhood, but was foreign in its form: the novel is an account 
of childhood as written from the point of view of Catherine Legrand, a young 
girl growing up in the French countryside. As befits a bildungsroman, the 
novel presents a series of formative moments: the first experience of death, 
the acquisition of language through learning to read and write, the first day of 
school (the first time away from the familiarity and safety of one’s home), the 
first experience of desire, which, in Legrand’s case takes the form of a transi-
tion from the homosociality of her all-girls Catholic school to the homosexu-
ality of her desire for a classmate.23
The novel’s form, on the other hand, pushed, and continues to push, the 
limits of our expectation that a narrative of childhood should look like a tra-
ditional realist Balzacian novel, with conventions such as clear-cut characters 
and a decipherable plot, and correct punctuation and grammar. Even more 
avant-garde writers like Georges Perec or Raymond Queneau still produced 
largely readable works that retained most of the conventions of language and 
literature in their récits d’enfance, W ou le souvenir d’enfance and Zazie dans 
le métro, despite formal innovations such as Perec’s use of the frame narra-
tive, or double narrative, and Queneau’s work on defamiliarizing language 
 22. The narration of childhood has a long history in French literature, treated most com-
monly from an autobiographical angle, as with Rousseau’s Confessions, Georges Perec’s W ou 
le souvenir d’enfance, or Violette Leduc’s La Bâtarde, for example, or through the angle of the 
bildungsroman, as with Colette’s Claudine à l’école or Raymond Queneau’s Zazie dans le métro.
 23. This homosexual desire is mediated by the Opoponax, an invention of Catherine 
Legrand’s that, although it resonates with opopanax, which “refers to an acacia tree, a plant 
belonging to the parsley family, a fragrant gum resin or the extracted perfume of this resin” 
(Bourque, “Shattering the Gender Walls,” 120), is something entirely other. The Opoponax 
shares with opopanax a multiplicity of forms—“On ne peut pas le décrire parce qu’il n’a 
jamais la même forme. Règne, ni animal, ni végétal, ni minéral, autrement dit indeterminé 
(L’Opoponax 179)—and is a shape-shifting, ungraspable creature that is used by Legrand to 
communicate with Valerie Borge, the object of her desire, and to forge an intimate relationship 
that Catherine Legrand by herself would have been unable to achieve.
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through unusual orthography (recall his now famous phonetic transcription 
of “D’où qu’il pue donc tant?” [What’s stinking up the place so much?] as 
Douikipudonktan [translated by Barbara Wright as Howcanaystinksotho]).
Queneau and Perec, for all their innovations, did not undermine conven-
tions enough to make the structure of the traditional, Balzacian novel col-
lapse, requiring a new structure to be built in its place.24 But most importantly 
for a discussion of Wittig’s formal innovations, their novels do not take on 
the task of reworking language to force the creation of a new reality. While 
both novels could be considered political in their content—with Perec’s auto-
biographical novel constituting a reflection on the horrors of the Holocaust, 
and Queneau’s whimsical tale portraying a nuanced and sympathetic portrait 
of marginalized members of society, such as homosexuals, single mothers, 
and, of course, children—neither novel tries to renovate language to get at 
the root of both the Final Solution and social inequality: the imputing of dif-
ference onto certain categories of human life. Wittig, on the other hand, in 
L’Opoponax, disrupted conventions in a sustained manner, such that at no 
point in the novel does she return to familiar forms for narrating childhood, 
and her rejection of the conventional récit d’enfance has form work in tandem 
with content to produce a text that contains, in a less immediately evident 
form, the radical universalizing quality that would be rendered explicit in the 
programmatically lesbian works to come.
That Wittig subverted the traditional form of the novel is apparent in 
L’Opoponax even before reading the text. Flipping through the pages, we can 
see a visible formal innovation in her rejection of division: the novel has no 
paragraph breaks, written instead as a solid block of text, divided seemingly 
arbitrarily into seven untitled and unnumbered chapters. The continuity of 
each chapter’s block of text reflects the continuity of life as it is lived, as one’s 
experience of childhood can hardly be neatly divided into discrete chapters 
and episodes in the moment of its living. These blocks of text contain sen-
tences that run on, such as the following, from the novel’s opening page, 
which narrates the experience of Catherine as a little girl going to school for 
the first time:
 24. These remarks are specific to the récits d’enfance in question and are not meant as blan-
ket statements about Perec and Queneau. Indeed, some of their other works could be pointed to 
as being revolutionary in the genesis of new forms such as Perec’s intricately constructed La Vie 
mode d’emploi, or La Disparition, written entirely without the letter “E,” or Queneau’s Exercices 
de style, which tells the same story in 99 different styles, its perspectival multiplicity recalling 
that of cubism.
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Il y a beaucoup d’enfants qui jouent dans la cour de l’école mais pas du tout 
de grandes personnes seulement la mère de Catherine Legrand et il vaudrait 
mieux qu’elle ne rentre pas dans l’école c’est seulement les enfants, il faut lui 
dire, est-ce qu’il faut lui dire, et dedans l’école c’est très grand, il y a beau-
coup de pupitres, il y a un gros poêle rond avec encore du grillage à losanges 
autour, on voit le tuyau qui monte presque jusqu’au plafond, par endroits 
il est en accordéon, ma sœur est sur une échelle contre la fenêtre, elle fait 
quelque chose, elle essaie de fermer la dernière vitre.
[There are lots of children playing in the playground but not a single grown-
up except for Catherine Legrand’s mother and it would be better if she did 
not come again, school is only for children, she’d better tell her, should she 
tell her? Inside, the school is very big, there are lots of desks, there is a big 
pot-bellied stove with more of the diamond-shaped fencing around it, one 
can see the stovepipe which goes almost to the ceiling, it is pleated in places, 
Sister is standing on a ladder by the window, she is doing something, she is 
trying to close the top window.]25
The run-on nature of the sentence conveys the atmosphere of childhood 
with remarkable immediacy, transmitting how sensorially and emotionally 
overwhelming it is to be a child exposed to so much newness. By the end of 
L’Opoponax, when Catherine has grown up and become an adolescent, the 
breathless cadence of childhood wonder has been replaced by the more mea-
sured cadence of a young woman who is able to negotiate her world with some 
sense of mastery, having consented to the rules and conventions of socializa-
tion. This conformity, which comes with age, can be seen in sentences that 
now resemble more the orderly sentences taught and enforced in school as the 
correct use of language:
L’eau tout à l’heure transparente a maintenant le bleu céruléen du ciel, les 
arbres sont ocres orangés rose pâle. [. . .] Il faut faire pour demain une prépa-
ration latine. Catherine Legrand lit le passage des Géorgiques lentement d’un 
bout à l’autre. On ne comprend pas, quelque fois on a l’impression qu’un mot 
est familier ou un groupe de mots à cause de la racine qu’on rapproche de 
celle d’un ou de plusieurs mots français mais si on se reporte aux notes qui 
 25. Wittig, L’Opoponax, 7–8; Wittig, The Opoponax, 5–6. All subsequent citations will be 
made in-text. The English translation takes certain liberties that dampen the dramatic effects 
of Wittig’s formal experimentation: it translates on as you rather than one, and, in this instance, 
this sentence has been divided into two shorter sentences. I replace the translator’s you with one 
and otherwise occasionally modify the translation.
106 •  C H A P T E R 2 
se trouvent au bas de la page on voit bien qu’on n’y a rien compris à moins 
qu’elles se trouvent là pour semer la confusion, pour tromper l’élève ennemi, 
pour donner une piste fausse. (250–51)
[The water which was transparent a little while ago is now the cerulean blue 
of the sky, the trees are ochre orange pale pink. [.  .  .] One has to do one’s 
Latin homework for tomorrow. Catherine Legrand reads the passage from 
the Georgics slowly from beginning to end. One doesn’t understand it, some-
times one thinks one recognizes a word or a group of words because the 
root is similar to one or more French words but if you look at the notes at 
the bottom of the page one finds that one hasn’t understood a thing unless 
they are only there to create confusion, to deceive the pupil, to give a false 
scent.] (168)
We’ve gone from the simplicity of a description like “un gros poêle rond” [a big 
pot-bellied stove] to “le bleu céruléen du ciel” [the cerulean blue of the sky], 
from the straightforward anxiety of “il faut lui dire, est-ce qu’il faut lui dire” 
[she’d better tell her, should she tell her?] to the lyrical one of “pour semer la 
confusion, pour tromper l’élève ennemi, pour donner une piste fausse” [there 
to create confusion, to deceive the pupil, to give a false scent]. In other words, 
style has entered the picture. Communicating or conveying something matters 
less than how that something is communicated. Wittig is clearly mindful of 
language, attentive to both its quality and style, and to what the style commu-
nicates—here, the growth and maturation of Catherine. But this attentiveness 
to style, while certainly innovative, does not in and of itself make L’Opoponax 
a Trojan horse, and with these innovations alone, the novel would be at best 
an empty Trojan horse—an unmanned, deactivated war machine, whose unfa-
miliar and fascinating forms contain nothing transformative inside. Simply a 
sculpture . . .
What activates L’Opoponax as a Trojan horse and endows it with revolu-
tionary substance is Wittig’s pronoun work, seen in her unconventional use of 
on as the primary narrative pronoun.26 The narrative takes place entirely from 
the perspective of the little girl Catherine and in her voice, but Wittig, instead 
of using the first-person pronoun je, the pronoun of interiority, uses (save in 
three exceptional instances) the third-person pronoun elle, which is singular 
and gendered. Most noticeably, she uses on, which is personal, but indefinite, 
able to stand in for an individual subject or a plural one, representing no fixed 
gender. Wittig makes good on the double nature of language through her pro-
 26. For an extensive linguistic analysis of the pronoun on in L’Opoponax, see Chapter 5 of 
Livia, Pronoun Envy.
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noun work, joining together form and content, her labor traversing both. The 
use of on has the consequence of transforming stylistic issues into political 
ones. The novel transforms an innovative description of childhood into the 
inscription of a new reality rendered possible through the creation of a new 
perspective, that of a subjectivity that exceeds difference—in this case, gender.
Wittig is able to do this and turn the pronoun into the material with which 
to build a Trojan horse by capitalizing on on’s capaciousness, which enables it 
to be both particular and general, concrete and abstract, singular and plural.27 
For example, on can stand for both Catherine and the group of children that 
she socializes with:
Catherine Legrand se couche tout du long sur la vache, c’est doux, on tombe 
un peu mais on peut se retenir au cou de la vache c’est ferme chaud les flancs 
sur lesquels on roule ça sent bon la paille chaude, le fumier frais. Véronique 
Legrand a envie de se coucher sur la vache, Pierre-Marie Fromentin a envie 
de se coucher sur la vache, Pascale Fromentin a envie de se coucher sur la 
vache. On se couche tout du long sur la vache à tour de rôle qui se laisse faire 
en faisant de temps à autre un mugissement en tournant la tête du côté où 
on est. On est sur le toit des poudrières. (117)
[Catherine Legrand lies down full length on the cow, it’s nice, one slips a 
little but one can steady oneself against the cow’s back it is solid and warm 
the flanks on which one rolls smell good of warm straw and fresh dung. 
Véronique Legrand wants to lie down on the cow, Pierre-Marie Fromentin 
wants to lie down on the cow, Pascale Fromentin wants to lie down on the 
cow. One takes turns lying down full length on the cow, who lets one do it 
mooing from time to time and turning her head towards one. One is on the 
roof of the powder mill.] (78–79)
In this passage we can see the progression from an on limited to the experi-
ence and sensations of Catherine Legrand to a larger on encompassing the 
experience of the other girls, Véronique and Pascale as well as that of the boy, 
Pierre-Marie. But on can also be deployed in such a way as to exclude Cath-
erine, as when it is used to represent the experience of a subjectivity or sub-
jectivities from which she is excluded:
On se relève. On enlève les bouquets qu’on a dans la ceinture, les tiges sont 
écrasées et les fleurs têtes pendantes ne sont plus bonnes à rien. C’est au pied 
 27. See Écarnot, L’Écriture de Monique Wittig, 25–27, for more on the importance and capa-
ciousness of on.
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du hêtre que Catherine Legrand oublie le foulard de soie que la mère lui a 
prêté à condition qu’elle ne le perde pas. On est sous le préau. Il fait déjà 
complètement nuit sauf une vague clarté du côté du couchant. On entend 
que Catherine Legrand se souvient tout haut d’un coup du foulard sous le 
hêtre. Elle veut y retourner sur-le-champ. (89–90)
[One gets up. One throws away the posies one has in one’s belt, the stems 
are broken and the flowers with their drooping heads are useless. Catherine 
Legrand leaves the silk scarf which her mother lent her on condition that 
she did not lose it at the foot of the beech tree. One is in the playground. It 
is already completely dark except for a dim glow where the sun went down. 
One hears that Catherine Legrand suddenly remembers that she left the scarf 
under the beech tree. She wants to go back right now.] (60–61)
Catherine is on an outing with her classmates, and the passage begins with 
on representing all of them together but quickly shifts to excluding her, since 
she stands out in the narrative as the only one to have forgotten something. 
The narrative shifts suddenly away from the permeability of the pronoun on 
to Catherine’s impermeability and specificity, and the elle that is now used 
instead to represent her. The moment on and Catherine Legrand inhabit the 
same sentence, a splitting of subjectivity takes place: Catherine’s person is 
contained exclusively within the signifier Catherine Legrand, the subjectivity 
of her classmates represented, then, in on without her. Catherine’s separation 
from the others is accentuated in the last sentence of the passage: elle occu-
pies the sentence by itself, and Catherine Legrand’s subjectivity is thus further 
isolated, set apart. However, because on is also used to describe Catherine’s 
subjectivity, tension is created between it and elle.
This tension that Wittig sets up is key, as it mirrors the tension that exists 
between the particular and the universal, and reenacts the way false univer-
salism operates by isolating particularity as difference: elle, forced to bear the 
weight of gender as an exclusively particular pronoun, is excluded from the 
universality enjoyed by either the masculine il or indefinite on. Her project for 
pronouns in L’Opoponax is to resolve this tension between the on and elle. As 
the novel progresses, elle is eventually subsumed into the on. On renders inop-
erative the usual distinctions between particularity and generality in order 
to express, as universal, Catherine Legrand’s childhood. Gone is the default 
male subject of the bildungsroman whose coming of age is taken to represent 
a universal coming of age.28 In its place, Wittig installs a female subject whose 
 28. See Butler, “Wittig’s Material Practice” for a commentary on this displacement of the 
bildungsroman’s usual subject.
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coming of age represents a universal coming of age whose gendered particu-
larity is hollowed out through the process of being absorbed by on. This, in 
short, is precisely the universalization of the minority point of view that Wit-
tig describes as being the purpose of her writing, the end goal of the Trojan 
horse’s assault on the straight mind.
It is no coincidence that it’s at the end of the novel, when elle has disap-
peared completely into the on, that je makes its only appearance as a pronoun 
that represents Catherine Legrand’s subjectivity in all its fullness and radicali-
ty.29 In the famous closing line of the novel, Wittig transitions from on to je: 
“On dit, tant je l’aimais qu’en elle encore je vis” (281) [One says, I loved her 
so much that in her I still live].30 This je, after nearly 300 pages of on and elle, 
displaces the on that begins the last sentence and constitutes a stunning dec-
laration and irruption of interiority in what was up to that point a text nar-
rated from the outside. In Catherine’s assumption of the first-person voice, 
two things occur: first, the splitting of her subjectivity into on and elle is rec-
onciled, taken up and contained by the unity of the individual and the integral 
subjectivity expressed by je; second, Catherine, as a locutor, for the first time, 
appropriates all of language for herself, thus claiming for herself the freedom 
and the equality of the social contract that is language. As Wittig argues in Le 
Chantier littéraire, in a gloss on the linguist Emile Benveniste’s theory of the 
connection between subjectivation and language:
L’exercice du langage (entre autres la locution) fonde le sujet en tant que 
sujet, en tant que sujet absolu de son discours [. . .] Parler, dire je, se réap-
proprier tout le langage, ne peut se faire que par un je entier, total, univer-
sel, sans genre. Sans quoi il n’y a pas de parler possible. Un sujet relatif ne 
 29. Je occurs first at the beginning of the novel, when, in response to a question by a little 
girl named Josiane Fourmont, a voice that we take to be Catherine Legrand’s responds with a 
“J’aime ma mère, oui j’aime ma mère” (23) [I love my mother, yes I love my mother]. The other 
time je appears is in the middle of the novel, but as a je of free indirect discourse, attributed 
to the Opoponax that is Catherine Legrand’s invention. The first instance of je represents an 
immature Catherine Legrand who has not come to internalize and fully own her lesbian resis-
tance to a patriarchal social order—this je thus lacks the depth and force of the novel’s final je. 
And this final je at the end of the novel is a more direct representation of Catherine Legrand’s 
subjectivity and interiority than the je of the Opoponax who, like the pronoun on, represents 
Catherine Legrand as well as the other girls who are suspected of being the Opoponax. See 
Wittig, L’Opoponax, 247–48. For more on the implications of why so many critics of the novel 
(including Wittig herself) efface these other instances of the je in their discussions, see Livia, 
Pronoun Envy, 104–5.
 30. My translation: Weaver’s translation leaves tant je l’aimais qu’en elle encore je vis 
untranslated.
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pourrait pas parler du tout sauf à se faire l’écho, à pratiquer un langage de 
perroquet, emprunté. (138)
[The exercise of language (among other things, locution) creates the subject 
as a subject, as an absolute subject of her discourse. [. . .] To speak, to say I, 
to reappropriate for oneself all of language, can only be accomplished by an 
I that is whole, complete, universal, genderless. Otherwise there is no speech 
possible. A relative subject would not be able to speak at all except to become 
an echo, to speak a parroted, borrowed language.]31
It is significant that Catherine is able to found herself as “an absolute subject 
of her discourse” by borrowing tant je l’aimais qu’en elle encore je vis from the 
sixteenth-century French poet Maurice Scève. This would at first appear to be 
the epitome of speaking a borrowed language and being a relative subject, but 
it is instead the manifestation of Wittig’s description in Le Chantier littéraire of 
the writerly imperative to strip words bare and expel the predictable meaning 
that is already there in order to be able to make new forms.
For readers trained in French literature, this appropriation and others of 
lines borrowed from sources as varied as Baudelaire, Flaubert, Malherbe, Lou-
ise Labé (and also non-French sources such as Virgil and Giacomo Leopardi), 
reveal the way Wittig’s writerly method is one of cannibalization, where she 
writes with language that has come from elsewhere.32 Wittig’s borrowings are 
more than just echoes or parroting of the canon. She hollows out this familiar 
language, founded in sexual difference and used to tell heterosexual narra-
tives, and invalidates their predictably straight meaning in order to create a 
lesbian meaning and attendant form instead. She shows, through Catherine 
Legrand’s navigation of her own literary education, how to use literature dif-
ferently to carve out a lesbian subjectivity (and the language with which to 
express it) from language that was never meant to be used in this way. This 
lesbian interiority, instantiated by Catherine Legrand’s assumption of Scève’s 
je, thus shows how new forms and new realities arise not from the creation of 
new language, but from reinventing language—doing things to the language 
we already have. And for readers who are completely oblivious to the novel’s 
intertextuality, the main point of Catherine’s assumption of the first person 
still obtains: while they miss the novel’s subversive intertextuality, they are still 
 31. This seems to respond to Benveniste’s assertion, “It is in and through language that man 
constitutes himself as a subject, because language alone establishes the concept of ‘ego’ in reality, 
in its reality which is that of the being.” Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, 224.
 32. For more on the intertextuality of L’Opoponax, see Duffy, “Rereading ‘L’Opoponax’”; 
Lebovici, “La Bonne,” 189.
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able to feel the impact of Catherine’s fully taking hold of her lesbian subjectiv-
ity through the shift to the first person.
Through Catherine’s appropriation of language and all its possibili-
ties, Wittig ends L’Opoponax by bringing Catherine out of the exteriority of 
both on and elle into the possibilities opened up by occupying je, which she 
describes as follows: “La possibilité de dire je c’est pour tous les individus la 
possibilité de se parler, de se concevoir au-delà des genres” (139) [The pos-
sibility of saying I is for all individuals the possibility of speaking, of being 
conceived beyond genders]. Wittig isn’t talking simply about the first person 
as a grammatical concept, in which case a woman who assumes the first per-
son in French is decidedly not beyond gender when she has to feminize past 
participles in writing a sentence like “Je suis allée” [I went]. Instead, Wittig 
is acknowledging the way one’s experience of interiority does not operate in 
gendered or differentiated terms when one is a je. Taking a cue from Sarraute’s 
insistence on the indeterminacy of subjectivity, Wittig sets up je as a pronomi-
nal space where one does not experience oneself either as a tu, interpellated 
by another person who reduces one to identity categories, or as an il or elle, 
where one’s subjectivity is effectively evacuated so that one is no longer pres-
ent as an interlocutor, a participatory presence in a scene of language. The je, 
for Wittig, is the pronoun that indicates that its wielder is present in the use 
and exchange of language, and irreducible to difference and the categories it 
creates.
The irruption of the je at the end of the novel is thus a declaration of 
the completion of the process of universalization of a minority point of view, 
where the task of destroying gender is achieved: unfettered by sexual differ-
ence, Catherine is able to represent the universal. This is the final destination 
of a journey made through pronouns: Catherine’s subjectivity, which began 
inscribed within the fixed particularity of elle, was progressively detached from 
this pronoun’s definite genderedness and placed under the sign of on instead. 
Then, on, whose lack of loyalty to any given point of view renders it less fixed 
and less particular than its definite pronominal counterparts, was taken over 
by je, with its appropriation of language and its existence beyond and outside 
the limits of an externally, socially imposed difference and particularity.
Wittig, in evaluating the success of L’Opoponax’s universalizing enterprise 
in Le Chantier littéraire, demurs and gives the last word to Claude Simon, the 
acclaimed Nobel laureate and New Novelist:
Si j’en crois ce que Claude Simon a écrit de L’Opoponax, la tentative d’univer-
salisation, à partir d’un groupe marqué, au moyen d’un pronom personnel 
indéfini (plutôt que de dire qu’il s’agit d’un genre masculin) a réussi. Il a écrit 
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en parlant du caractère principal de L’Opoponax, une petite fille: “Je regarde, 
je respire, je mâche à travers ses yeux, sa bouche, ses mains, sa peau . . . Je 
deviens l’enfance.”
[If I believe what Claude Simon wrote about L’Opoponax, the attempt to 
universalize a marked group through a pronoun that is personal and indefi-
nite (rather than say that it is the masculine gender) succeeded. He wrote in 
speaking of the main character of L’Opoponax, a little girl: “I look, I breathe, 
I chew through her eyes, her mouth, her hands, her skin .  .  . I become 
childhood.”]33
Wittig draws on Simon’s praise to support her claim that L’Opoponax was 
about universalizing a marked group, that is, about degendering femininity 
(not to be confused with masculinizing the feminine),34 through a concerted 
labor on and with pronouns as a part of language particularly imbricated with 
subjectivity.
Moreover, by showing how Catherine appropriates Maurice Scève for her-
self, making it mean something new for her and Valerie, Wittig presents us 
with the same opportunity to appropriate L’Opoponax as readers and use its 
language for ourselves to have the same experience of universalization. This 
act of appropriation is what Wittig refers to when she describes the purpose 
of the pronoun on in the novel and why she opted for this particular pronoun: 
“One, on, lends itself to the unique experience of all locutors who, when say-
ing I, can reappropriate the whole language and reorganize the world from 
their point of view.”35 That is, just as on, in its capaciousness and its resistance 
to definition, enabled Wittig to detach Catherine from the particularity of 
elle by taking her into itself, so too does on take us in as locutors who also 
experience language the way Catherine does: we can claim for ourselves the 
universality that Wittig sees within the pronoun je. To return to the framing 
metaphor of the Trojan horse, the goal of L’Opoponax as a war machine is to 
unleash a reality in which difference, as gender, for example, is inoperative. 
 33. Wittig, Le Chantier littéraire, 143.
 34. This degendering of femininity means degendering masculinity as well. Wittig argues 
explicitly against masculinizing the feminine or feminizing the world: “The direction I was 
striving toward [. . .] wasn’t toward the feminization of the world (something as horrifying as its 
masculinization) but toward trying to render categories of sex obsolete in language.” Wittig, La 
Pensée straight, 123. This passage, while published in the French translation/reworking of “The 
Mark of Gender,” is not present in the original English version. Dominique Bourque conceives 
of this project under the interesting rubric of démarquage, or unmarking. See Bourque, Ecrire 
l’inter-dit.
 35. Wittig, The Straight Mind, 84.
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The innovative use of on constitutes the material and form of this particular 
Trojan horse. What it contains, the substance that it lets out once it has gained 
entry into the minds of readers through the process of reading, is this je that 
guarantees full participation in the social contract, acting as the gateway to 
a paradise of words that provides full freedom and equality to all within it.
L’Opoponax is exemplary in bringing together the aesthetic with the politi-
cal. The work on pronouns, it must be remembered, was motivated by Wittig’s 
desire to create a new literary—that is, aesthetic—form: Wittig was able to 
work on language in this way because she was inside the literary worksite, not 
outside it as a socialized individual trying to use pronouns in a way that would 
be incomprehensible in social situations and normal conversation. In this text, 
whose full political import was lost on many readers, who saw in it nothing 
but a virtuosic continuation of the depoliticized, modernist New Novel move-
ment, there is a concerted effort to take hold of pronouns and force elle to pass 
through on and be transformed by it into an integral and universal je. This 
transformation of subjectivity through pronouns is a stunning installation of 
a reality that operates outside the parameters of the straight mind, or reality 
as we know it. It isn’t Wittig’s fault that critics saw L’Opoponax as simply an 
experimental récit d’enfance,36 restricting the universalizing power of language 
to the retrospective recollection or reenactment of a universal childhood 
(Mary McCarthy titled her review of the novel, “Everybody’s Childhood”), 
instead of seeing it as a war machine that directs its universalizing power to 
a present (not past) reality and personhood. Beyond a writing of childhood, 
L’Opoponax is a restoration of individual subjectivity not yet interpellated by 
the ideology of the straight mind into assuming an identity.
Through the exegetical model that Le Chantier littéraire provides, it 
becomes clear that L’Opoponax is in fact more ambitious than the texts that 
follow. Les Guérillères, Le Corps lesbien, and Brouillon pour un dictionnaire 
des amantes, for example, employ lesbianism as a provisory concept,37 a sort 
 36. For example, Mary McCarthy recognizes its literary innovations as constituting a “dis-
covery in the laboratory of the novel,” Albert Sonnenfield deems the novel a dull (because 
experimental) “autobiographical novel of childhood,” and Duras considers the novel “the first 
modern book on childhood.” See McCarthy, “Everybody’s Childhood”; Sonnenfeld, “Review of 
The Opoponax”; Duras, “Une œuvre éclatante.”
 37. Wittig theorizes lesbian as a concept, writing that “Lesbian is the only concept I know 
of which is beyond the categories of sex (woman and man).” Wittig, The Straight Mind, 20. In 
other words, lesbian is the only concept that exists outside the straight mind. It is provisory 
insofar as the goal isn’t to establish lesbian as a dominant or privileged identity, itself a site of 
difference, but to deploy lesbian against the straight mind’s categories of sex. Le Chantier lit-
téraire does not mention lesbian as a concept, which speaks to a more confident articulation of 
literature’s capacity to take us to universality immediately.
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of stepping-stone to the universality in which L’Opoponax places us directly, 
without the conceptual support and relative concreteness of lesbianism serv-
ing as an intermediary. Granted, L’Opoponax, if thematized, could be charac-
terized as the account of a first experience of lesbianism, but unlike Wittig’s 
subsequent novels, it does not foreground lesbianism as the principal material 
of the novel, even if it is the culminating experience and the means through 
which Catherine assumes the liberatory pronoun and perspective je. Applying 
Le Chantier littéraire, Wittig’s last work, to L’Opoponax, her first work, brings 
her writing full circle, returning us to her conviction, lost because of her own 
success as a theorist, that the political and the literary come from the same 
material—language.
As I have argued, because L’Opoponax is the least immediately and explic-
itly political novel in Wittig’s corpus, it provides a better case study of Wit-
tig’s bringing together of the literary and the political, of the double nature of 
language, than her other novels, whose bold, anti-patriarchal, lesbian content 
delivers their political impact without the reader’s having to do as much work 
to recreate the writer’s work of inhabiting her chantier and experimenting on 
language. Because the novel seems to describe a familiar reality rather than 
create a new one, L’Opoponax’s political impact is not as readily visible. With-
out fantastical narratives such as that of Amazonian women warriors, as in Les 
Guérillères, or of lovers tearing each other apart only to put each other back 
together with their saliva, as in Le Corps lesbien, the new reality experienced 
by the reader of L’Opoponax resembles the extratextual reality of the reader’s 
world (even with fifty years’ distance, the novel, apart from a few dated details, 
such as the extraordinary nature of Catherine Legrand’s wearing pants, reads 
as surprisingly present). In order to release the political content contained 
deep within this Trojan horse’s pronominal material, the reader is required 
to fully recreate the writer’s work in order to achieve the process of univer-
salizing a minority point of view. Granted, this outcome is not a guaranteed 
one, as it would be easy, for a reader who does not fully engage with the new 
use of language in the way Wittig herself did in order to create it, to see noth-
ing new about this other reality that the novel creates, to see L’Opoponax as 
simply another narrative of childhood. As becomes clear in Le Chantier lit-
téraire, however, with her explicit appeal to readers to do the same work on 
language that writers do, Wittig wagers that those readers who do see how 
language can transform reality into something new will be equipped to take 
that transformative experience of language from the literary worksite into the 
extraliterary space of the world to turn social space, and its language, into its 
own chantier. Wittig’s commitment to literature is inseparable from her politi-
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cal commitment. For her, both literature and activism are ways of responding 
to and reshaping reality, of effecting a revolution. This revolution, as we shall 
see, is a Sarrautian one.
WITTIG’S SARRAUTIAN REVOLUTION
For Wittig, Sarraute was a revolutionary. In a letter, Wittig told her that if the 
world were made up of Sarrautes, or if everyone contained even just a little bit 
of Sarraute in them, then the revolution would already have taken place.38 The 
recent uprisings of May ’68, although De Gaulle’s militaristic police had ulti-
mately suppressed them, had made revolution on a large scale seem possible,39 
and the MLF, carrying on that revolutionary spirit, was at its peak in agitating 
for a fundamental change in the place of women and the ways in which they 
were perceived. Given Sarraute’s distance from the sort of political activity 
Wittig and her feminist comrades were engaged in, such a statement of Sar-
raute’s revolutionary credentials seems surprising. What could Wittig possibly 
mean by saying Sarraute was the ultimate model for revolution?
Wittig’s conviction that literary work can and does have an impact on 
society, and her insistence on the relationship between language and real-
ity, have their antecedent in Sarraute’s own convictions. Wittig’s notion of an 
immanently political literature has its roots in Sarraute, who approaches the 
question of the political obliquely. Sarraute, in 1960—the year she signed the 
controversial Manifeste des 121, and at a time when Sartre was the French 
left’s dominant intellectual force, and committed literature claimed for itself 
the privilege of being the only socially engaged and responsible form of writ-
ing—responded to a questionnaire sent out by the Marxist journal, La Nou-
velle critique, asking about the political role of the writer. Sarraute responded 
by claiming that a literary work’s political or revolutionary impact was an 
unintended but fortuitous consequence of a writer’s commitment to literary 
innovation:
Sometimes, a writer, in expressing, with the most sincerity possible, the real-
ity that gives itself up to his investigations, has the fortune of also being a 
writer who contributes directly to the transformation of society. Take Brecht, 
for example. But those who don’t have this fortune are also, albeit in the long 
 38. Fonds Nathalie Sarraute, letter dated August 8, labeled “Après 1970s.”
 39. See Ross, May ’68 and Its Afterlives, for an account of May ’68 that attends to how radi-
cal, subversive, and politically potent this event was, unlike the youth revolt and non-event that 
May ’68 was eventually reframed as.
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run, in a more deferred and diverted way, revolutionary writers. Because 
their works, in unveiling unknown aspects of reality, pierce appearances, 
sweep away received ideas, make all conventions shatter. All true literature 
has the opportunity to also be revolutionary, in the social meaning of the 
word. Look at the literature of reactionary writers: that of Balzac who was a 
monarchist; that of Dostoyevsky, a passionate tsarist.40
For Sarraute, revolutionary impact, rather than serving as a conscious goal, 
is the inevitable result of literary innovation, of the writer’s sincere efforts to 
make something new, but with the caveat that the temporality of such politi-
cal impact may very well be deferred to some unknown future. The political, 
in literature, is an accidental by-product that can only be obtained through 
an aesthetic engagement with form. Sarraute’s description of the political 
potential for literature closely resembles Wittig’s own language in Le Chantier 
littéraire when, for example, Sarraute describes how literary works that sin-
cerely seek to innovate by treating some new or undiscovered aspect of reality 
destroy conventions.
Sarraute, in her response to La Nouvelle critique, essentially articulates 
the same sorts of ideas that Wittig would go on to theorize through the figure 
of the Trojan horse. However, Sarraute displaces the political as the primary 
subject of interest, in contrast to Wittig. Or rather, she displaces the temporal-
ity of the political presence of writing, where a literary work is revolutionary 
in an aesthetic manner in its present moment, while it is revolutionary in a 
political manner in a future moment, as a sort of afterlife of the work. Sarraute 
frames the political impact of literature as automatic and unchosen, outside 
the realm of intention, and as usually occurring outside the writer’s own time. 
By placing the writer and the political in a relationship of non-coincidence, 
she is able to maintain her own narrative of being an apolitical writer, who, 
while not opposed to the idea of her writing possessing a political afterlife, in 
no way seeks it out.
Rather than wanting to have her (political) cake and eat it, too, Sarraute 
instead refuses to eat it, so that it is up to others to find and experience the 
political quality of her works. Her most explicit avowal of her writing’s political 
purchase is rather underwhelming: “I believe that my books, which describe 
movements observed in the bourgeois (but I’ll say it again, one finds move-
ments of the same order in everyone), constitute, indirectly, a critique of the 
bourgeoisie.”41 Rather than claim her writing’s self-critical dynamic (Sarraute, 
in the same response, identifies both herself and all other French writers as 
 40. Sarraute, in “À quoi servez-vous?,” 86.
 41. “À quoi servez-vous?,” 87.
 I N S I D E W I T T I G’S  C H A N T I E R  •  117
belonging to the bourgeoisie, so that any critique is necessarily a self-reflexive 
one), Sarraute qualifies her statement: her critique of the bourgeoisie isn’t spe-
cific but universal, applying to everyone, the proletariat along with the bour-
geoisie, and it’s indirect. The political project of Sarraute’s writing, then, is far 
removed from and watered down in comparison to that of Brecht, whom she 
evokes as an exemplar of revolutionary writing. Far from seeking to foment 
revolution through her writing, Sarraute saw the writer’s principal obligation 
as the pursuit of new forms that enable the expression of new or hitherto 
unknown realities, a task she did not see as inherently political.42
How do we get, then, from Sarraute’s tepid acknowledgment of literature’s 
potential political life and her decidedly non-activist literary sensibilities to 
Wittig’s energetic revolutionary project and a conception of literature as a war 
machine? And is it fair to characterize Wittig’s deep, uncompromising politi-
cal drive as deriving from Sarraute and her corpus of unrelenting interiority? 
I would argue that it is indeed fair, despite the unlikeliness of Wittig’s obtain-
ing a political education from Sarraute. What is at work here is not simply a 
matter of Wittig taking the indirect nature of Sarraute’s critique—where the 
action of description itself has the function of critique if its object and the 
form it takes is new43—and proceeding to transform it, through the force of 
her activist temperament, into a blisteringly direct critique of difference that 
would compel the temporality of the work’s impact to coincide with the pres-
ent moment of its publication. Wittig’s vision of revolutionary literature goes 
beyond critique to combine it with the construction of a different reality, and 
it obtains directly from her reading of Sarraute’s fiction and the impact of Sar-
raute’s theorization of language and its relationship to reality.
In her essay “Roman et réalité” [The Novel and Reality], Sarraute develops 
the idea of reality and its coextensivity with language as follows:
What is this invisible thing that literature renders visible, which is not the 
obvious, banal, already revealed reality that is known, mined from all direc-
tions, and that each person can perceive effortlessly?
It is something that is made of scattered elements that we guess at and 
sense very vaguely, of amorphous elements that lie there deprived of exis-
tence, lost in the infinite mass of possibilities, virtualities, which are melted 
into a magma, imprisoned in the gangue of the visible, suffocated under-
neath the already-seen, banality and convention. [. . .]
 42. Sarraute, “L’Ère du soupçon,” in Œuvres complètes, 1587; Sarraute, “Roman et réalité,” in 
Œuvres complètes, 1644.
 43. That is, if, as Sarraute puts it, the writer attains “a morsel of unknown reality and the 
discovery of a form in which this reality can be captured.” “À quoi servez-vous?,” 85.
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In the absence of a form that creates them, it is obvious that these ele-
ments would have stayed invisible. Only form makes them exist. Without 
form, they are nothing. But—and here is the important point—the reverse 
is true: form is nothing without them.44
Reality cannot be experienced as reality unless it has a form, and for Sarraute, 
this form is made of language. Reality exists through language and language 
exists through reality—to try to separate the two into distinct concepts or 
experiences is impossible for Sarraute, for whom to have the one is necessarily 
to have the other. As Sarraute would say in an interview, “Form and content 
[are] one and the same.”45 This coextensivity informs Wittig’s assertion that 
language shapes the real, that to shape the one is to shape the other, and that 
language, in its double nature, is both form and content, both what shapes 
and is shaped.
Wittig’s revolution is thus a Sarrautian one. But where Sarraute is inter-
ested in making visible and apprehensible a present but as yet unexplored or 
unknown reality, Wittig is interested in creating a reality that does not yet 
exist. Her reality is a future one—we aren’t yet in a world beyond the straight 
mind—that breaches the present through the literary work’s ability to bring 
textual temporality together with our extratextual one. Sarraute’s writing, as 
she conceives of it, reveals what is already there—the fundamental sameness 
of people that exists before any creation of difference—and acts like an X-ray 
to show what is beneath these layers of socialization and categorization. Wit-
tig uses her writing not as an X-ray but as a high-pressured power washer 
that works to scrape off these sedimented, exterior layers, so that we might 
be able to get to that foundational bedrock of equality upon which we might 
build—it is preparatory, anticipatory. Sarraute’s writing places us immediately 
in tropismic space—characterized, as we saw in Chapter 1, by indeterminacy 
and a rejection of socially constructed categories—and moves inwards, react-
ing to menacing categorizing external forces by retreating to the surer space 
of a difference-less interiority in which to unbecome. Wittig, firmly planted 
in the outside world, uses her writing to attack social conventions directly.
For Sarraute, conventional, non-tropismic reality exists through the 
banal, categorizing, normative language that she writes against, and the uni-
versal tropism exists through the disorienting, indeterminable, and shifting 
language that is the substance of all her works. For Wittig, a world outside 
the straight mind becomes possible through her creation and use of a lan-
guage that eschews gender and linguistic inscriptions and replications of dif-
 44. Sarraute, Œuvres complètes, 1644–45.
 45. Sarraute, 1660.
 I N S I D E W I T T I G’S  C H A N T I E R  •  119
ference and particularity. Both Sarraute and Wittig are writing a new reality 
into being, whether already present or situated in the future. They work on 
language to resist the language of the old reality, which can be best described 
as discourse—language that has been used to form utterances that, through 
repetition, acquire meaning intelligible to the social order that created that 
meaning to begin with. What are banalities and clichés, received ideas and 
imposed categories, if not discourse? Sarraute, by pitting discourse against tro-
pismic language in her writing, paves the way for Wittig to launch a full-out 
war against the discourse of the straight mind with the arsenal at her disposal 
in the chantier littéraire, where language can be stripped of its discursive hab-
its and made to signify and create something else other than the well-worn 
narratives of difference. Wittig takes seriously Sarraute’s steady assertion that 
form and content, signifier and signified, cannot be cleaved apart, and turns 
it into the foundation for her writing, upon which everything else is built.
BEYOND DISCOURSE
As we saw earlier, Wittig takes a radical stance by insisting that it is language, 
and not discourse, that constructs or shapes reality. For Wittig, language, in 
its raw materiality and concrete, physical existence, already participates in and 
is part of reality before its realness has had the opportunity to be interpreted 
and processed into socially intelligible terms—before language has turned into 
discourse. For Wittig, that is where the importance of the literary worksite 
and the work of literature lies: literature is precisely where the writer (and 
reader) can experience the reality of language before it has been pressured 
into becoming discourse. Here again, we can see Sarraute’s influence, as Sar-
raute also wants to take the reader back to what she calls a living language, 
which, for her, is a language that resists the deadening power of discourse. In 
the interiority that Sarraute’s language inhabits and imposes, even though the 
tropism and the language that captures it exist in response to social interac-
tions, Sarraute effectively cuts language off from the exterior social space in 
order to contain it in the polyphonic interiority of an indeterminate human 
subjectivity: she replaces society with the sociality of our own individual sub-
jectivities, as seen most dramatically in Tu ne t’aimes pas.
In both writers’ cases, the transformative experience that one can have of 
language is a distinctively individual one, framed as interiority by Sarraute, 
and by Wittig as the absolute appropriation of the universality that the first-
person point of view and pronoun provides. No question of a “we” or a “you” 
or a “them” and much less a “s/he” encountering a vital language in this way: it 
120 •  C H A P T E R 2 
must happen through the “I,” through the immediate and intimate experience 
that literature can provide, which gives the reader an opportunity to experi-
ence language in its materiality—the sort of materiality that a writer must 
confront if she is to create a new form and reality. The individual appropriates 
language absolutely, as opposed to receiving a social and contingent distribu-
tion or allocation of language (e.g., the gendered language to which women 
are constrained). This is a different way of relating to language and has pro-
found political ramifications. This radical vision of language is the vision of 
the absolute equality of all before and through language.
If Wittig insists on language’s relationship to reality rather than dis-
course’s, which is what most thinkers of the relation between language and 
reality focus on from both poststructuralist and new materialist perspectives, 
it isn’t because discourse cannot be worked on—obviously it can, as discourses 
evolve—but because it isn’t engaged with primarily as a medium. Discourse, 
while it has a form, isn’t engaged with in its form. Instead, the essence of dis-
course lies in its content and the impact that this ideological content has on 
the social spaces in which it circulates. As a consequence, discourse is less 
material than language in that it isn’t treated as a form, but as an effective 
method of communicating a message. Discourse is as concrete as language 
because it is made up of words, which are physical, but discourse, being dead 
and deadening language, in the Sarrautian sense, is not material in the Witti-
gian sense because it can no longer be worked upon while it is caught up in its 
signifying. Discourse thus circulates in social reality defining bodies, norms, 
concepts, etc., working on subjectivities to turn them into subjects.46
Let us turn to Wittig’s description of the relation among language, dis-
course, literature, reality, writing, and reading, with which she concludes “Le 
Contrat social”:
One of the effects of Sarraute’s work is to strip down the social pact (lan-
guage), to show it for what it is (discourse) when it has been domesticated, 
enslaved like the subject who speaks it, and to show it for what it can be in 
reality (as in literature), powerful and liberatory, if the locutor (all locutors) 
did in her acts of speaking the same work as the writer who writes. (72)
 46. A new materialist like Karen Barad has a very different conception of discourse, and 
rejects the idea of discourse as a linguistic or signifying phenomenon, characterizing such an 
approach to discourse as a “mistake of representationalist thinking.” Barad, Meeting the Uni-
verse Halfway, 147. For Barad, discourse is material because it isn’t a “human-based practice” 
(149). Her conception of discourse is obviously at odds with Wittig’s, but where Baradian and 
Wittigian conceptions of discourse converge is in the idea that discourse produces boundaries, 
e.g., the way discourse produces the boundaries of identity.
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While activism and explicitly political action and discourse are necessary inso-
far as they make visible the need for change, they are not in and of themselves 
enough to realize it. They might make space for change, but are unable to fill 
that space with a new and unbecoming subjectivity, which, through a new 
experience of itself, has effected a radical reconceptualization of reality. For 
Wittig’s powerful and liberatory reality to be realized, language is required, 
and hence literature, as it is literature that demonstrates the way language is 
material that can be worked on to build up or dismantle the reality of the cat-
egories that subject us—it is literature that shows the locutor, or reader, how 
to work the way a writer works.
Wittig’s metaphor of the Trojan horse explains how literature can act on 
us to subtly but thoroughly rework our subjectivity so that we can rework, as 
writers do, the language that built up our subjecthood: contained within the 
seemingly familiar form of the text, waiting to spring out, is the experience 
of language in its fullness, a language that has been stripped down and freed 
of predictable, sedimented, conventional meaning. This is the language that 
emancipates and makes possible a truly absolute je. Literature, for Wittig, is a 
revolution that happens in interiority, through an encounter with language. It 
is not the spectacular revolution of a politics that takes to the street: it works 
on people one by one, changing each individual’s reality and reworking their 
subjectivity so that they can unbecome, breaking loose from the difference 
that has mired them in particularity and subjecthood in order to experience 
the paradise of the free and equitable exchange of language between two abso-
lute jes described earlier in “Le Contrat social.” It spreads the word that a dif-
ferent reality, a different social contract, a different language is possible.
I want to return to another passage I cited earlier, zeroing in on the section 
that imagines what a collectivity formed of such jes might look like:
Here we are all equal and free, and if we weren’t there would be no pact pos-
sible. We all learned to speak with the awareness that words are exchanged, 
that language is forged within a relationship of absolute reciprocity, without 
which no one would be mad enough to want to speak. This incredible power 
that linguists have introduced to us, the power to use, starting with oneself, 
language, with its words and their dazzling sounds and meanings, which 
belongs to all. Language exists as the communal space where we can frolic 
freely and, in the same stroke, extend, through words, the same license to 
others—without this, there would be no meaning. (61)
This is not simply a utopian vision of what life could look like. It is the affir-
mation of a space that is already open to us—the space of literature—as seen 
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in Wittig’s use of the present tense (“here we are all equal and free”; “language 
exists”), and it is the expression of a desire for what life together might look 
like were we to live outside literature the way we can in it. This is a political 
statement that lays out how we are to live together so that language, and the 
power that inheres in its use, rather than subject us, is the ground for equal-
ity and freedom. This language, which is conceived of as a communal space, 
begins first with the self, originating thus in the sort of experience of subjec-
tivity that literature, as created by Sarraute and Wittig, provides, where the 
writerly experience of language is taken up by the reader as her own.
When readers and regular locutors become writers in their use of lan-
guage, their new relationship to language is the foundation for a new inter-
locution, a sociality of absolute reciprocity where the determining aspect of 
personhood is not an identity category always already embedded in hierarchy, 
but rather, the exchange of a language that is free and for all, not partitioned or 
owned. These lessons in using language differently, in being used by language 
differently, are ones that Le Chantier littéraire teaches us through the Trojan 
horses it produces. The Trojan horse follows its course, becoming dismantled 
and losing its form (the horse that has been broken out of is no longer the 
horse it was) in order to create something new, and this is a lesson in reverse 
engineering for the reader who becomes a writer—someone who experiences 
language in its materiality and works with it to make something new. The 
chantier is not only where weapons are built, but also where one rebuilds what 
its Trojan horses destroy. The Trojan horse produced by the chantier littéraire 
destroys preexisting forms, yes, but only in order to create new ones in a con-
stant renewal of form, so that nothing can ever become fixed, conventional. As 
Wittig describes the chantier, “le chantier littéraire pour vaste qu’il soit n’a pas 
d’espace propre excepté dans la page blanche” (78) [the literary worksite, as 
vast as it is, does not have a space of its own save the blank page]. The chantier 
is, at its core, a space of creation, and the blank page, an emblem of the infinite 
potential of a form perpetually renewed.
Reading Le Chantier littéraire, and reading Wittig’s fiction through this 
overlooked text, demonstrates that Sarraute’s work provides the blueprints for 
Wittig’s chantier. Sarraute’s insights into language, discourse, and reality com-
pelled Wittig to build this chantier from which she would attack the founda-
tion of the straight mind and its seeming universality in order to replace it, 
bit by bit, with the original social contract, the paradise of freed language. 
Wittig’s commitment to such writing would not go unnoticed and was taken 
up by Garréta, born sixty-two years after Sarraute and twenty-seven years after 
Wittig. Coming of age after May ’68 and having her formative years inflected 
through postmodernism seem to render the collective impossible for Garréta, 
 I N S I D E W I T T I G’S  C H A N T I E R  •  123
whose sense of the political consequently does not resemble either Sarraute’s 
or Wittig’s: Sarraute hollowed out the depoliticized modernism of the New 
Novel to fill it with the contourless, indeterminate experience of a subjectivity 
not subject to categories; Wittig transformed the Marxist feminist materialism 
that was a driving force of the MLF, and at the same time that the personal 
was discovered to be political, she made the literary political; Garréta appro-
priates queer theory and queer models of resistance.
Profoundly affected by her encounter with Wittig’s Trojan horses, Garréta 
builds her own chantier, and, with materials and tools shaped by her particu-
lar historical and social situation, takes up the project of writing against dif-
ference and refusing to submit to costly identity categories. Sarraute provided 
Wittig with the material with which to make her writing political; Wittig pro-
vides Garréta with the ability to access the revolutionary in a postmodern 
moment, if fleetingly, by giving her the experience of the literary political, the 
political literary.
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WE’ VE SEEN HOW the political nature of Sarraute’s writing and the aesthetic, 
literary nature of Wittig’s writing have been occluded by the categories used 
to account for them. Garréta’s literary project has been similarly occluded 
by categorization. In Garréta’s case, her membership in the Oulipo has come 
to dominate characterizations of her so that she is primarily introduced and 
known as an Oulipian. This handle has stuck to her as tenaciously as that of 
New Novelist stuck to Sarraute, and, like Sarraute, Garréta is the lone female 
novelist in a group of experimental male writers.1 As in Sarraute’s case, the 
categorization of Garréta is productive to a certain degree: examining Garréta 
through the lens of the Oulipo draws attention to the fundamental role the 
constraint plays in her construction of her texts, demonstrating the impres-
sively intentional and motivated nature of her formal choices. And the group’s 
commitment to the idea of literature’s potential inflects Garréta’s writing 
with an interesting positivity—an investment in the capacity of language to 
constantly renew itself through a literature whose production will never be 
exhausted—that complicates the otherwise pessimistic, melancholic negativity 
that permeates her novels.
 1. While Garréta is not the only female member of the Oulipo, she is its only female nov-
elist. The English translation of Sphinx, published in 2015, takes up both categories to market 
the book on its back cover, lauding it as “a landmark literary event: the first novel by a female 
member of the Oulipo in English.”
What the category of the Oulipo does not do, however, is make visible the 
political dimension of Garréta’s writing. The Oulipo enjoys a level of media 
attention and popularity that is rare for literary figures (it’s difficult to imagine 
any other writer or group of writers, who, month after month, would draw in 
a public large enough to fill the auditorium of the Bibliothèque nationale de 
France as the Oulipo is able to do with Les jeudis de l’Oulipo), but their reputa-
tion is decidedly apolitical—their political commitment resembles Sarraute’s 
declaration of engagement as a citizen, not a writer, more than it resembles 
Wittig’s conceptualization of literature as war machine.2 Through her associa-
tion with a group known primarily for the both ludic and impersonal effects 
of its members’ constraint-driven experimentation, Garréta also falls under 
the depoliticized light cast upon the rest of the Oulipo. The constraint turns 
the reader’s attention toward facture without provoking, as with Wittig’s writ-
ing, an examination of how a text’s construction can be used toward political 
ends. The Oulipo’s self-consciousness about form does not produce the same 
political consciousness as Wittig’s because their concern with form is limited 
to the way language works within the confines of a single given text—the 
constraints in operation in one text do not have a direct impact on the form 
of another text—whereas Wittig’s concern with form is expansive, coming to 
bear upon the entire operation of language not just within the text, within 
that instance of textual reality, but within social reality. Identifying Garréta as 
an Oulipian is a convenient way of making her writerly identity intelligible by 
reducing it to the constraint, a narrative that’s occluded that of Garréta’s debt 
to Wittig and her literary, political vision.3
There is another category that Garréta is placed into, which has the oppo-
site effect of politicizing Garréta, but, I would argue, misses the more radical 
political dimension of her writing to be found in its formal innovations. It 
politicizes Garréta without attending to how the literary is political in its liter-
ariness. This category is the category of queer. In the overwhelmingly straight 
 2. Jean-Jacques Poucel comments on Oulipo’s reputation as an apolitical group: “Among 
certain orders of contemporary vanguards, there is one criticism that seems never to tire: 
namely that the Oulipo as a group insistently refuses to align its research with an explicit 
ideological or political platform.” Poucel, “Family Vocation” (paper presented at Oulipo@ 50/ 
L’Oulipo à 50 ans, Buffalo, New York, October 5–8, 2011), http:// vimeopro .com/ user10120706/ 
methodigital-1/video/35599044). This doesn’t mean that Oulipians haven’t been political: for 
example, Jacques Jouet, Jacques Roubaud, Michelle Grangaud, and Hervé Le Tellier made a 
public declaration explaining they were holding a reading in Strasbourg on March 27, 1997 to 
protest the extreme-right Front National’s assembling there that day. Nonetheless, the apolitical 
reputation still holds.
 3. A rare example of scholarship that treats Wittig’s influence on Garréta can be found 
in Feole, “Le déchaînement littéraire,” which compares Garréta’s Sphinx to Wittig’s Le Corps 
lesbien.
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French literary field, Garréta is a rare explicitly, visibly queer figure. She was 
the plenary speaker for Sciences Po’s4 Queer Week in 2013; the 2015 English 
translation of Sphinx was marketed and lauded as a landmark work of queer 
literature; and Pas un jour, a novel recounting lesbian love affairs or encoun-
ters, was motivated by the desire to write against the silence that lesbian sexu-
ality is relegated to in the French literary landscape.5
Similar to the category of the Oulipo, however, the category of queer is 
also reductive when it comes to examining Garréta’s writing, and obscures 
the political project of writing against difference: queer leads people to read 
Garréta through an identity politics that focuses on her biographical self. 
The fact that she writes as an identifiably queer person about explicitly queer 
things places what she does with language under the sign of queerness. This 
results in Garréta’s political impact being situated in her subjecthood, which 
is to miss the anti-identitarian core of her writing. While the category of the 
Oulipo places Ciels liquides and La Décomposition—her novels that don’t seem 
to treat recognizably queer subject material—under the sign of the apolitical, 
the category of queer appropriates texts like Sphinx and Pas un jour for an 
identitarian politics.6 Pas un jour and Sphinx become political as a result of 
their anti-heteronormative avowal of queer sexuality, their performance of the 
literary equivalent of Queer Nation’s battle cry: “We’re here, we’re queer, get 
used to it!” Garréta’s decision to be out not simply in her personal or social life 
but in her writing is undoubtedly political, but that is not where her deepest 
political impact lies.
If we keep Garréta within this frame, the political-because-literary quality 
of her writing retreats from view, and the political impact that remains visible 
operates on a purely thematic level. Similar to the way Wittig’s imbrication 
of the literary with the political is more recognizable in her post–1968 works, 
which are all set in a utopian lesbian universe, than in L’Opoponax, Garréta’s 
Sphinx and Pas un jour are also easier to take up as having a political project 
because they feature protagonists who reject conventional notions of gender 
and heteronormativity.7 That is, Garréta’s writing is seen as political in propor-
 4. Sciences Po is the nickname for the Institut d’études politiques de Paris (Paris Institute 
of Political Studies), a prestigious French university that has produced many leading French 
political and business figures.
 5. Lucille Cairns has described Pas un jour as a “decidedly queer text.” Cairns, “Queer 
Paradox/Paradoxical Queer,” 71.
 6. While queer as a concept was meant to destabilize identity, it arguably functions as an 
identity, despite the anti-identitarianism it has become identified with.
 7. For examples of such readings of Sphinx and Pas un jour, see Feole, “Le déchaîne-
ment littéraire”; Rye, “Uncertain Readings and Meaningful Dialogues”; Kosnick, “Reading Con-
temporary Narratives as Revolutionaries.” Much Garréta scholarship passes over an explicitly 
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tion to how lesbian or queer its subject matter is. This sort of reading seeks 
to find in these undoubtedly queer novels subjects who can be identified as 
queer, in direct disregard of the admonitions we find in her writing not to 
take her novels as sites from which a subject can be excavated. In Pas un jour, 
where she explicitly disavows the subject and its possession of identity, Gar-
réta addresses her seemingly autobiographical narrator in the second person: 
“[T]u n’as pas le cœur de leur dire (d’ailleurs, [les lecteurs] refuseraient de 
te croire, car cela est une effrayante nouvelle tant que nous n’aurons pas fini 
de cuver l’ivre-mort de notre petit moi) que nul sujet ne s’exprime jamais 
dans nulle narration” [You don’t have the heart to tell them that no subject 
ever expresses herself in any narration. And besides, [readers] would refuse 
to believe this terrifying bit of news—we’re still punch drunk on our little 
selves].8 In Garréta’s mind, or at least, in the mind of Garréta’s authorial pres-
ence, as readers and writers, we’ve yet to come fully to our senses as long as 
we’re invested in the idea that a subject can be found within literature.
If, instead of looking at Garréta through the categories of the Oulipo and 
queerness, we look to Sarraute and Wittig instead, it becomes clear that the 
political dimension of her writing, like Sarraute’s and Wittig’s, exists as part 
and parcel of the aesthetic or literary dimension. It operates not through recu-
perating a subject to whom (or which) we can ascribe political capital—the 
lesbian, the queer, the gender-nonconforming, etc.—but by leading the reader 
away from identity and its determinism toward indeterminate, identity-less 
subjectivity in all its potential, toward unbecoming.
While the easiest and most obvious way to read Garréta for the political 
is through the lens of identity politics, the less obvious but, I would contend, 
more productive way to read her is for a poetics that turns away from a poli-
tics of representation (the politics of a queer voice or perspective). Instead, we 
ought to apprehend an aesthetics of language whose formal possibilities point 
not to how humans use language to become subjects endowed with political 
agency, but to how language can act on humans to erode subjecthood. Where 
Wittig conceives of the novel as a space in which to use language to bring us 
back to an originary, egalitarian social contract, Garréta constructs the novel 
through constraints in order to free the reader from the constraint of identity 
and create an experience of a subjectivity without subjecthood.
political consideration of her work, despite its self-conscious queerness, and instead examines 
formal concerns such as the constraint and intertextuality (e.g., O’Meara, “Georges Perec and 
Anne Garréta”; Andrews, “Intertextuality and Murder”) or thematic concerns such as the role 
of technology (e.g., Durand, Un monde techno).
 8. Garréta, Pas un jour, 10; Garréta, Not One Day, 3.
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In what follows, I undertake readings of two of Garréta’s novels, Sphinx 
and La Décomposition, which draws her out of the usual categories of the 
Oulipo and of the queer under whose signs she is placed, to align her instead 
with Wittig, and through Wittig, Sarraute. By understanding the influence of 
Wittig, the bridge between these two writers who come from opposite ends of 
the twentieth century, we can see that Garréta adds her own distinctively post-
modern twist to a Wittigian politics that finds its origins in Sarraute. I begin 
with Sphinx, Garréta’s first novel, as it is the novel for which Garréta explicitly 
acknowledges Wittig’s influence.
SPHINX: DIFFERENCE IS NEVER THE ANSWER
In April 2015, with the publication of the English translation of Sphinx, the 
French novelist Anne Garréta became accessible for the first time to an Anglo-
phone readership. When it was first published in 1986, this love story irrupted 
onto the French literary scene. The novel, which tells of the tragic encounter 
between a nameless young theology student turned DJ and A***, an African 
American cabaret dancer, astonished its readers through the virtuosic feat of 
keeping its protagonists’ genders completely indeterminable. Garréta, then a 
twenty-three-year-old normalienne, had scrubbed the French text of all marks 
of gender.9 Critics, both then and now, have marveled at this complete era-
sure of gender, even as they have overlooked Garréta’s other treatment of dif-
ference—the emphasis on racial difference that accompanies her systematic 
effacement of sexual difference in the novel.
The love story is traditionally understood as requiring difference, in the 
broadest sense of the term, given that the whole point is that love joins two (or 
more) individuals. In Garréta’s iteration of the love story, however, she erases 
sexual difference and presents race as the difference that love can then recon-
cile or traverse: her love story features the relationship between a white Euro-
pean and a black American. This raises the question of why erasing sexual 
difference should either produce or expose racial difference when the novel 
was written to express the principle of “fuck difference,” as Garréta shared 
 9. This elimination of gender indicators applies only to the protagonists, who constitute 
an indeterminate duo in the midst of the other gendered characters. Jeanette Winterson pub-
lished her own version of an indeterminate love story with Written on the Body (1992), written 
in English, which is a less gendered language than French. It is unclear whether Winterson was 
aware of Garréta’s work, and Written on the Body is different in its experiment with sexual inde-
terminacy in that only the narrator’s gender is indeterminate, while the love object is identified 
as a married woman.
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with me in a March 2013 interview in Paris.10 While the difference Garréta 
denounces is sexual difference, which she considers to be fetishized dogma, 
and not racial difference, it seems inconsistent and politically incoherent to 
decry one form of fetishized difference while promoting another when the 
problem surrounding difference is precisely the process by which it assumes 
the status of a concept around which an entire social order can be organized. 
I thus see “fuck difference” as applying more broadly to all fetishized differ-
ence that has been solidified into identity even if the original statement was 
narrower in its scope. Accordingly, a careful examination of what may be read 
as a caricatural treatment of racial difference will show that Garréta’s seeming 
instrumentalization and exploitation of race for the purposes of destroying 
sex, or gender, are actually consonant with what I see as her larger project of 
writing against difference tout court, an investment that we can trace to the 
major influence of Wittig on her own writing and thought. In other words, if 
Garréta seems to build up racial difference in Sphinx, it is only to tear it down 
after having shown how such difference is built up through language in the 
first place.
Michel Foucault has taught us that discourse has the power to create iden-
tity. His La Volonté de savoir [The Will to Knowledge], the first volume of his 
unfinished Histoire de la sexualité [The History of Sexuality], argues that the 
homosexual did not exist as such until the category of the homosexual was 
created by sexologists and began to circulate in discourse. This and other iden-
tity categories were thus effects of discourse rather than its cause. Thanks in 
large part to feminist and queer theories informed by Foucault’s insights, the 
idea that identity is discursively constructed with nothing natural about it is 
now commonplace. While we are quick to recognize the force of discourse, it 
is not so clear how it comes to have that force—the power to ossify difference 
and create categories such as sex and race. Discourse is language that has been 
fixed into a function, but as we saw in Chapter 2, Wittig insists that it also be 
unfixed, that language can be teased apart from discourse. To put it another 
 10. Garréta pronounced these strong words in Eng lish in reaction to the celebration of 
sexual difference that dominated both the literary and intellectual land scape of France in the 
1970s and 1980s by means of écri ture féminine and the codification of a body of thought that 
came to be known as “French Feminism” in the Anglo-American academy, both of which 
advocate combatting phallogocentrism through attending to and giving voice to the feminine 
that has been repressed by patriarchy. (Evidence of the artificial nature of the construct “French 
Feminism” can be seen in the way Monique Wittig, a fiercely anti-difference feminist, is fre-
quently grouped and cited along with Hélène Cixous, Julia Kristeva, and Luce Irigaray, all three 
philosophers of difference.) For a polemical account of the origins of French Feminism, see 
Delphy, “The Invention of French Feminism.” For a more measured account, see Moses, “Made 
in America.” See Chapter 4 for more on écriture féminine and French Feminism.
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way, discourse can be returned to language. But how does language become 
discourse in the first place? How does it become fixed?
As a mode of writing that programmatically claims to reflect the world it 
describes, literary realism often does little to strip discourse down to language 
in a way that would allow readers to question the gendered norms that have 
become thoroughly embedded into social practice.11 In the conventional realist 
novel, language only exists in an already socialized form and is thus unfit to 
do the work that Wittig describes in Le Chantier littéraire of stripping words 
of the social significations that have sedimented onto them. Language must 
be stripped of the history of its social usage, thus allowing words to return 
to their pure materiality, to language in its raw, pre-signifying state, before it 
has been mobilized around some ideological or conceptual purpose.12 Wittig 
teases language apart from discourse in order to tap into the radical political 
potential to be found in turning to language, rather than discourse, as a site 
for new meaning. Precisely for this reason, Garréta, like Wittig before her, 
treats the experimental (as opposed to the conventional) novel as a cultural 
form where discourse and language can be played against each other.13 The 
self-awareness of the experimental novel’s literary language calls attention to 
the materiality of language. Because the novel must also reference the world 
outside itself in order to make good on its promise of a textual simulation of 
lived reality, or a textual experience of an unlived reality, it also calls atten-
tion to itself as discourse. This double function gives the novel an advantage 
over theoretical texts as the means for working with, on, and against language 
to work against identity and the difference that undergirds it.14 It is the novel 
that has the potential to effect change, reader by reader, by undoing those cat-
egories that seem to make sense of reality and order the world in a necessary 
way. In short, it is the novel, and not theory, that functions as a Trojan horse, 
the figure Wittig uses to explain how a literary text such as Sphinx “can oper-
 11. There are some notable exceptions, such as Charles Dickens’s Dombey and Son, where 
the “son” is actually a daughter, or Balzac’s La Cousine Bette, where a masculine Bette takes 
advantage of her feminine position in order to achieve a masculine position of domination. 
In both cases, though, these individual aberrations only prove the rule, and the structures of 
social norms are preserved. I am grateful to Nancy Armstrong for drawing my attention to 
these examples.
 12. Wittig, Le Chantier littéraire, 92–102.
 13. Because of their political investments in the novel, Garréta and Wittig tease apart lan-
guage from discourse to come up with new ways of using language much more than other 
writers who do not resist the gendered machinery of the French language.
 14. Wittig, Le Chantier littéraire, 44.
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ate as a war machine upon its epoch,” an epoch marked then, in the 1980s, as 
it is now, by difference.15
Garréta sees herself writing “after” Wittig in a double sense—after Wittig 
chronologically and after her in the sense of deriving inspiration from Wit-
tig’s writing:
Monique Wittig is an extremely important writer to me. In a way, she made 
it possible for me to write my first novel, Sphinx, which attempted to take 
literally what she means when she says that it is necessary to eliminate and 
destroy the mark of gender in language, and that this can only happen 
through exercising language itself.
I thus have a debt that is not a debt but that obligates me nonetheless—it isn’t 
that I owe something to Monique Wittig, but that she opened up a possibility 
for me. So it is important to me that I continue to pass on something that I 
think she offered to me, that I have not found except in her. I am absolutely 
committed to this.16
In this homage to Wittig, Garréta offers up a paradoxical characterization of 
her debt as “not a debt,” but something that still has the weight of an obliga-
tion, even if she does not think of the obligation in terms of owing anything, 
but of compelling a new possibility. In this, Garréta reconceptualizes debt as 
something that no longer puts the debtor in a position of having to give up 
something of herself in proportion to the value of what she has received, giv-
ing the creditor influence over the debtor. Garréta understands her debt to 
Wittig as a liberating possibility that is conceived of in terms of something 
that can be passed on to others to do with as they please. Her obligation does 
not mean hewing to Wittig’s way of experiencing this possibility; rather, it 
obligates Garréta to become Garréta. This debt demands creativity rather than 
conformity.
Garréta’s obligation is to do something with this possibility of using lan-
guage to undo difference, to attempt to free others from the categories of iden-
tity that are embedded in language—and that are made of and by language. As 
Wittig explains, rather than having language do things to you, you must begin 
doing things to language:
The ontological farce that consists of trying to divide a being in language 
by imposing a mark on her, the conceptual maneuver that wrests away 
 15. Wittig, The Straight Mind, 69.
 16. Garréta, “Wittig, la langue-le-politique,” 25.
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from marked individuals what rightfully belongs to them—language—must 
cease. It is necessary to destroy gender entirely. This endeavor can be entirely 
accomplished through the use of language.17
The same language that genders women and marks them as particular can also 
destroy that mark of particularity, provided one knows how to make it do so. 
Wittig uses the lesbian subject to displace the universal male subject implied 
by the unmarked term through her work on pronouns as we see in her revi-
sions of various literary genres. In L’Opoponax (1964), Wittig exploits the inde-
terminate nature of the pronoun on to dismantle the gendered bildungsroman 
and universalize a young lesbian’s point of view. She reworks the epic in Les 
Guérillères (1969), by expanding the feminine third-person plural elles to rep-
resent all humanity instead of the specificity of groups of women. Reworking 
lyric love poetry in Le Corps lesbien (1973, The Lesbian Body), she works upon 
and breaks down the je and tu to establish a relationship of intersubjectivity 
and interlocution that is based on an absolute reciprocity and interchangeabil-
ity between the first- and second-person pronouns that are normally distinct. 
In Brouillon pour un dictionnaire des amantes (1976, Lesbian Peoples: Material 
for a Dictionary) and Virgile, non (1985, Across the Acheron), she defamiliarizes 
such familiar texts as the standard dictionary and Dante’s Divine Comedy by 
overturning their androcentric perspectives.
Through these works, Wittig demonstrates that genre as literary genre has 
been built on genre as gender. Garréta similarly defamiliarizes genre by taking 
the traditional love story, the seemingly ageless articulation of heterosexual 
desire, and removing gender from the equation. She works with the possibility 
opened up by Wittig and makes it hers by replacing Wittig’s lesbianized sub-
ject with her own project of rendering the subject indeterminable and undif-
ferentiated. But, as we will see, Garréta experiments not only with sex but 
also with race, and the project of indeterminability is brought to bear on both 
categories. It is precisely Garréta’s experimentation with sex and race—where 
the first is somewhat expected when it comes to deconstructing difference 
through language, while the latter is unexpected—that makes the novel so 
important. Let us turn now to Sphinx to see the kind of work Garréta does on 
and to language—work that shows race to be as unnatural a category as sex 
and makes the text’s racial differentiation ultimately serve her project of indif-
ferentiation and indeterminacy.
Sphinx was written and published well before Garréta was inducted into 
the Oulipo in 2000 and before she became known in academic circles for 
 17. Wittig, Le Chantier littéraire, 138–39.
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her familiarity with American approaches to queer and gender studies. None-
theless, Sphinx anticipates what was to become Garréta’s investment in writ-
ing within the constraints for which the Oulipo is known, and it exposes the 
discursive formation of identities that would become a key insight of queer 
theory.
Garréta’s future intellectual positions are already apparent in Sphinx. The 
language of the novel does away with sexual difference by refusing to reveal the 
sexes of the protagonists. The reader is given no clues as to whether the rela-
tionship is between two men, two women, or a man and a woman. Were she 
writing in English, she would be writing a novel without using he or she, him 
or her to describe the main characters. In French, subject pronouns, adjectives, 
compound past tense verbs, and direct object pronouns can all indicate gen-
der, so Garréta carefully avoids these parts of speech and privileges the infini-
tive, imperfect, and preterit passé simple over compound tenses, indirect objects 
over direct objects, and impersonal, passive constructions in place of the gen-
dered subject pronouns il and elle.
If the result is surprising in English translation, it is even more so in 
French. Writing against what seems to be the naturally gendered grain of 
French, Garréta also resists the naturalness of bodies and their sexed nature. 
This carefully wrought withholding of deterministic language exposes the 
constructed nature of identity, or what Judith Butler describes as performa-
tive identity,18 a notion that would be popularized by queer theory. It seems 
hardly a coincidence that A***—who calls to mind Josephine Baker, another 
African American cabaret dancer who was a master of turning identity into 
a performance on Parisian stages—and the narrator, as a DJ, both inhabit the 
novel as part of the performance industry. From the very beginning, Garréta 
keeps her protagonists’ identities indeterminate when it comes to their sex 
and sexuality, thus setting her readers up to think of identity as something 
performed, not something fixed that can be ascertained.
Garréta refuses to let her protagonists’ bodies bear the mark of sexual 
difference. A sexual encounter would be the ultimate occasion for either 
ascertaining sexual difference, in the case of heterosexual encounters, or for 
disavowing it, as in the case of homosexual ones.19 In Sphinx, however, the 
body remains stubbornly illegible in terms of its sex:
 18. Butler, Gender Trouble. See particularly Chapter 3, “Subversive Bodily Acts.”
 19. This reading is necessarily reductive in its generality and does not account for the pos-
sibility of experiencing sexual difference in homosexual relationships, a question Judith Butler 
poses provocatively in Butler, “Critically Queer.”
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J’ai dans la bouche, encore, le goût d’une peau, de la sueur sur cette peau. 
Contre mes mains l’impression tactile que me firent et cette peau et le 
modelé de cette chair [. . .]. Je ne saurais raconter précisément ce qui advint, 
non plus que décrire ou même faire mention de ce que je fis ou de ce dont je 
fus l’objet [. . .]. Sexes mêlés, je ne sus plus rien distinguer.
[I have in my mouth, still, the taste of skin, of the sweat on that skin; against 
my hands, the tactile impression of skin and the shape of that flesh [. . .]. I 
don’t know how to recount precisely what happened, or how to describe or 
even attest to what I did, what was done to me [. . .]. Our sexes mingled, I 
no longer knew how to tell anything apart.]20
The sexed nature of bodies in sexual encounters is occluded by treating the 
body as unspecific skin, flesh, and sweat, and by disregarding genital specific-
ity to articulate instead the confused nature of the coupling. Unintelligible in 
terms of its sex, the indeterminate and protean body can reflect whatever the 
reader desires it to be. The title Sphinx evokes this indeterminacy by referenc-
ing the impossibility of knowing, or in this case, the impossibility of figuring 
(out) the body and assigning it an identity. Falling into an identitarian trap, 
reviewers have tended to read the relationship in Sphinx as heterosexual or 
homosexual depending on their own sensibilities. Finding it difficult to sus-
pend certainty and commit to indeterminacy, they have assumed there must 
be some form of sexual difference (or identity) that Garréta had intended to 
write into being.21
This striking feat of her sustained refusal of sexed bodies is accompanied 
by a less spectacular, perhaps, but equally significant recoding of the bodies in 
question in terms of race. The novel identifies the narrator as white and A*** 
as black: “J’appris qu’une peau noire telle celle de A*** exigeait un maquil-
lage d’une tout autre teinte et d’un tout autre dessin qu’une peau blanche” [I 
learned that black skin like A***’s demands makeup of a completely different 
hue and variety than white skin] (22; 9). In the absence of sexual difference, 
racial difference is introduced, as if bodies still have to be differentiated one 
way or another for their connection to be meaningful. In Sphinx, A***’s black 
body signals both racial difference and cultural difference. A*** is not simply 
 20. Garréta, Sphinx, 1986, 78; Garréta, Sphinx, 2015, 54–55. The translation is slightly modi-
fied here and elsewhere. All subsequent citations will be made in-text.
 21. See, for example, Savigneau, “Un genre énigmatique.” For an account of more instances 
of willful gendering, see also Livia, Pronoun Envy, 52–54. Garréta has described Sphinx to me 
as a way of holding up a mirror to readers and revealing their own desires, showing how these 
desires shape the experience of reading.
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given a black body as a black iteration of the French citizen. The character is 
not French or Francophone but foreign, which, in this context, means Ameri-
can. A*** and the narrator therefore have different languages as well as differ-
ent skin tones, and they come from different places. While removing sexual 
difference, then, Garréta has nonetheless doubled difference. She has inscribed 
the bodies of both A*** and the narrator with the category of race, a difference 
embedded in a narrative of biological essentialism that translates greater or 
lesser levels of melanin and pigment into the concepts of blackness or white-
ness. She has also inscribed their bodies with the purely cultural difference 
of nationality. A body does not announce its Frenchness any more than it 
announces its Americanness, but in Sphinx Garréta has tied this cultural dif-
ference to racial difference. However, these categories of identity do not carry 
equal semiotic weight in the novel.
In the second half of the novel, the cultural difference manifest in the 
language and customs of A***’s American family, which stands in for black 
America at large, assumes principal importance. Once they become lovers, 
the narrator and A*** go to Harlem and then visit A***’s extended family 
somewhere in either Long Island or New Jersey. The narrator describes the 
experience of conversing and eating soul food with this family as a profound 
experience of feeling at home:
Il me semblait être là chez moi, tant ils surent me donner l’impression d’ap-
partenir à leur famille, oubliant sans effort la différence de race, de couleur, 
de civilisation, de classe et tout ce que l’on voudra bien pointer et accentuer 
parmi les traits possibles d’altérité. Il me semblait avoir toujours entendu 
cette langue qu’ils parlaient entre eux, avoir depuis toujours mangé de cette 
même nourriture qu’ils m’offrirent.
Et les vieilles mammas noires riaient de plaisir à me voir manifester un tel 
appétit. A***, qui toujours me vit, à l’endroit des nourritures terrestres, faire 
montre d’ennui ou d’indifférence, s’étonnait et se réjouissait. Il semblait que 
j’oubliais de dépérir, que je goûtais enfin à la vie, que j’y mordais sans l’en-
tremâcher de paroles, propos de table qui, en Europe assez généralement et 
en France en particulier, constituent la substance essentielle des dîners. (88)
[I felt at home there, so much did they make me feel like a part of their 
family, effortlessly forgetting our differences in race, color, culture, class—
everything that one might cite as possible traits of alterity. It was as if the 
language they were speaking and the food they were cooking had always 
been familiar to me.
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And the old black mammas laughed with delight to see that I had such an 
appetite. A***, who was used to seeing me bored or indifferent when faced 
with earthly sustenance, was astonished and overjoyed. It seemed that I was 
forgetting to waste away, that I was finally tasting life, that I was biting into 
it without words getting in the way, those tableside conversations that, in 
Europe generally and France in particular, constitute the essential substance 
of meals.] (63)
Here, Garréta’s narrator figures the alterity of African Americanness as able to 
do away with all alterity. Black America’s culture and dialect—which the nar-
rator finds as familiar as French—is the means of forgetting or transcending 
alterity and tasting the freedom to be oneself regardless of color, creed, class, 
etc. The narrator casts black language as naturally resistant to difference in a 
way that French is not. I contend that it is no accident or contradiction that 
in her attempt to erase difference, Garréta, through her narrator, appears to 
shore up African American difference as somehow exemplary and salvific.
This turn toward black America shifts the focus away from biological 
expressions of racial difference, emphasizing instead cultural and especially 
linguistic expressions. It would appear that Garréta has bundled the biologi-
cal with the cultural in order to approach the question of racial difference 
through language and, in this way, to insist that this other difference, like 
sexual difference, also be approached in terms of language. Where Garréta 
deploys language as a means to undo sexual difference in French, the narrator 
privileges black language as the site where the desire for hybridity, for a fluid 
identity liberated from the strictures of fixed difference, is best realized. In 
the description of eating soul food with A***’s family, what comes to the fore 
is not the difference between cuisines so much as the difference in languages. 
For the narrator, meals centered around soul food do not require the sort of 
conversation—i.e., language—that a French meal does; in the narrator’s tell-
ing, conversation around the French dinner table invariably diminishes one’s 
appetite for life. The primary difference between the two cultures represented 
by the pair of lovers is thus linguistic, and language will consequently be the 
means of turning the categorical oppressiveness of French, and its embedded 
difference, against itself.
However, we have to question Garréta’s use of a caricatural image of black 
America in a novel dedicated to blurring identity and destroying the founda-
tional difference of identity categories. Why does she perpetuate any stereo-
types of racial alterity, even if to combat other stereotypes? Indeed, Garréta’s 
use of a worn-out stereotype such as the “old black mamma,” uncomfortably 
close to the mammy figure, would seem to legitimate an unquestionably crude 
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form of difference. This is especially remarkable coming from a feminist who 
uncompromisingly rejects the notion of essential difference. Garréta’s call to 
“fuck difference” is most powerful if it is not a watered-down version of femi-
nism that objects to one form of difference but tolerates another.
It is completely possible that Garréta’s anti-difference ethos, which aspires 
to the universal in the absoluteness of its declaration, in fact depends on a 
fetishization and instrumentalization of blackness—universalism, as we know 
all too well, often turns out to be an oppressive, supremacist particularism. 
It may be that Sphinx is in fact very much a text of its time: the 1980s was 
a moment when the inconsistencies and racist blind spots of second-wave 
feminism—i.e., “white” feminism—became all too apparent (as seen in the 
necessary critique performed by intersectionality).22 It is possible that Gar-
réta’s anti-difference ethos has itself evolved over the decades from one that 
targeted gender and sexuality at the expense of race to one that is more explic-
itly anti-racist.23 All these interpretations are possible, but I intend to posit 
another one, which makes Sphinx politically potent today, so that the novel is 
not simply an artifact of less enlightened times.
From an apparent fetishization of blackness, coupled with the caricatures 
and stereotypes that pop up throughout the novel, it would be easy to cast 
Garréta as a writer insensitive to matters of race, but such a reading conflates 
Garréta with the narrator. Given that Garréta is undeniably behind the scrub-
bing of gender difference in the novel, it’s tempting to confuse Garréta with 
the narrator and, when it comes to race, attribute that same intentionality to 
Garréta rather than to the problematic character of the narrator. If I insist 
on distinguishing between Garréta and her narrator—as I did in my discus-
sion of the family dinner—to attribute the problematic treatment of race to 
the latter, it isn’t merely to perform a recuperative reading of or to offer an 
apology for Garréta. On a number of fronts, I believe it makes the most sense 
and results in the most productive reading to distinguish Garréta’s narrator 
from Garréta herself. First, if we take seriously Garréta’s debt to Wittig, it is 
logical to treat the novel as a hollow text, a Trojan horse, instead of adopting 
the perhaps more obvious reading, in which Garréta’s twenty-three-year-old 
self ’s feminist politics turn out to be not particularly developed, as evinced by 
 22. While intersectional, or third-wave, feminism is often credited with calling out second-
wave feminism’s inattention to matters of race, the need for a feminism attentive to race and 
class was already being voiced by black feminists in the 1970s. See, for example, the Combahee 
River Collective Statement, which explicitly called attention to “the fact that the major systems 
of oppression are interlocking.” Smith, “Combahee River Collective Statement,” 264.
 23. The 1980s are often evoked as a racist decade, but it is worth noting that it was also the 
decade in which France began to develop a collective consciousness regarding matters of race, 
as seen in the founding of the NGO SOS Racisme in 1984.
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a deeply problematic conceptualization of race. This reading, which requires 
no interpretation because of its obviousness, turns the text into a solid rather 
than a hollow object. Second, the less facile reading, beyond being consonant 
with the Wittigian mode of writing a literary text as a Trojan horse that con-
tains something very different from what its equine form promises, integrates 
Sphinx into the rest of Garréta’s anti-identitarian corpus. Garréta’s first novel 
can thus be read with the novels that follow rather than as a one-off that 
doesn’t belong with the rest of her literary production. And finally, Garréta’s 
entire corpus demonstrates that she is anything but an easy or transparent 
writer. Her novels are meticulously constructed, and reading them requires 
work—they are not beach reading, easily consumed.24 A simplistic reading of 
Sphinx—without the necessary labor to attend to Garréta’s own labor in creat-
ing the novel—will miss the revelation that the novel is anything but racist: it 
grapples directly with the problem of racism in order to enjoin the reader to 
dismantle both racial difference and sexual difference.
Before proceeding with an analysis of the complex construction of Gar-
réta’s deconstructive work, I want to first address the enormous riskiness of 
Garréta’s Trojan horse venture. I am making a case for seeing Garréta’s deploy-
ment and construction of racial difference as a means to tear it down, but such 
a reading requires labor. The astounding blindness to race that Sphinx’s read-
ers have demonstrated is a perfect example of what happens when you don’t 
read laboriously. Instead of a powerful “fuck difference” ethos that articulates 
a radical political vision of a new sociality unordered and unfettered by any 
form of difference, an effortless reading may lead to a celebration of the dis-
solution of sexual difference at the cost of tacit acceptance of racial difference, 
and not just any form of racial difference, but a racist one. In other words, 
this reading results in a “white feminist” text that does more harm than good 
in promoting the idea that some invidious forms of difference must be toler-
ated for the sake of abolishing another. These are the high stakes of Garréta’s 
novel, and we can certainly debate whether or not it’s worth the risk. In what 
follows, however, I will show what happens if we do put in the work to activate 
the Trojan horse of Sphinx.
To read Sphinx laboriously is to read Garréta’s deployment of racial ste-
reotypes critically, to see it as the means of ironically calling attention to the 
way the narrator turns cultural differences into natural differences as they 
are attached to certain bodies. Following this line of thinking, we could say 
 24. For example, Garréta explained to me that her 1999 novel La Décomposition was writ-
ten according to multiple principles of construction, such as “a systematic transduction algo-
rithm applied to chunks of À la recherche du temps perdu” in the text of the novel, and that 
many of the structuring principles of her novels are opaque and go unperceived by readers.
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that Garréta uses fiction in much the same way Étienne Balibar uses political 
theory, to argue that “biological or genetic naturalism is not the only means 
of naturalizing human behaviour and social affinities [. . .]. [C]ulture can also 
function like a nature, and it can in particular function as a way of locking 
individuals and groups a priori into a genealogy, into a determination that is 
immutable and intangible in origin.”25
In other words, Garréta’s apparent investment in racial difference is an 
ironic one, and the reinforcement of racial difference that accompanies the 
radical destruction of sexual difference serves as a decoy for difference that 
reveals itself as hollowed out. This irony, which is hardly obvious or self-evi-
dent, can be seen in the narrator’s description of black American dialect:
L’anglais que je parle a gardé les stigmates de cette fréquentation presque 
exclusive des Noirs. Imperceptiblement, des expressions, des incorrections 
caractéristiques de leur parler se sont glissées dans le tissu de langue acadé-
mique qu’on m’avait enseignée au lycée. Cela, depuis, m’a été un trouble dans 
mes conversations: cette langue que je parle est un hybride monstrueux; j’ai 
mêlé Oxford et Harlem, Byron et le gospel. (89)
[My English still bears the stigmata of keeping company almost exclusively 
with black people. Imperceptibly, the expressions and characteristic impro-
prieties of their speech slipped into the tissue of the academic English I had 
been taught in high school. This has disrupted my conversations: the lan-
guage I speak is a monstrous hybrid, mingling Oxford and Harlem, Byron 
and gospel.] (64)
Garréta here doles out the clichés: of course, black American English is rid-
dled with ungrammatical variations on standard English, of which the most 
correct iteration is to be found at Oxford; of course, the most obviously black 
idiom is gospel music, and it goes without saying that Harlem is the purest 
iteration of black American culture. This characterization is disturbing in its 
racial insensitivity and caricatural treatment of American black culture, but I 
would argue that Garréta does so in order to parody facile caricatures, rather 
than to reproduce them uncritically.
The obvious reading of Garréta that takes this passage at face value repro-
duces a fetishistic view of blackness. Black American language—the sign that 
turns racial difference into cultural difference and naturalizes the distinction 
between them—is the guarantor of hybridity and subversion. It undoes Eng-
 25. Balibar, “Is There a ‘Neo-Racism’?,” 22.
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lish by undermining the correctness of white, Anglo-Saxon, Puritan English. 
According to this reading, Garréta’s grounding of the novel’s anti-difference 
enterprise in an essential black language is a concession made in the name 
of eliminating sexual difference, the seemingly universal difference that cuts 
through other differences such as race and class. The marginal status of black 
English leads directly to the fetishization of black culture and desire for the 
black body. Following this logic, the narrator sees in blackness the perfect 
medium for breaking up fixed categories of identity, but the price for such 
destabilization is the fixing of blackness.
While the French language fixes difference with its gendered grammar, 
black African American language counteracts that fixity through soul. The 
narrator claims: “Mon Amérique à moi est noire: sa musique, ses voix, sa 
nourriture. Noires, il y a un terme pour cela, soul: soul music, soul food” [My 
America is black: its music, its voices, its food. These black things have a name, 
soul: soul music, soul food] (87; 62). Black culture, refracted through soul, pro-
vides Garréta with the possibility of a language that is not beholden to the 
subordinating logic of French. Blackness comes to stand in for an identity 
that is more American than the soulless, sanitized Americanness of what the 
narrator describes as “l’Amérique blanche, anglo-saxonne et puritaine” [white, 
Anglo-Saxon, Puritan America] (87; 62). Black Americanness consequently 
permits a greater distance from French and from France, whose “universal” 
citizen is configured as white, heterosexual, and male. By contrast, black skin, 
black language, and black culture exemplify a language that offers a promised 
land of freedom and equality. The narrator’s desire for a differently racialized 
body is not so much the desire for a different kind of body as it is the desire 
for a language and culture less dependent on difference than French language 
and culture. Black language provides a model for what Garréta is trying to do 
with French, that is, to undo its gendered and gendering operations. While 
this racializing might be positive in its valence of a certain black superiority, 
it remains grounded in an essentializing difference. One form of difference 
is swapped out for another, and we wind up right where we began, stuck in 
difference.
The true allegory of Sphinx is not the allegory of black alterity as a dif-
ference that might create more fluid ways of being human; it is an allegory 
for the invidiousness of all forms of difference. To read Sphinx laboriously, to 
read it as a complex text, we have to reject the narrator’s reading of race as 
the allegorical production of a better kind of alterity. Rather than be taken in 
by a difference that promises to transcend other differences, Garréta rejects 
racial difference as the lure that would lead the reader back into the trap of 
difference. Garréta’s polarized stereotypes and the caricatures they form offer 
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parodic representations of black language that are not meant to be swallowed 
whole, taken as they are. A necessary condition of the Trojan horse is that it 
resembles closely enough the object it claims to be—a statue of a horse, in the 
Trojans’ case, a racist and reductive rendering of blackness, in Garréta’s—in 
order to be let inside the city walls (the reader’s mind) to launch its attack. For 
Garréta to reject racial difference as the lure that would lead the reader back 
into the trap of difference, it must first be able to pass as an alluring difference.
Garréta’s attention to the language of black difference, which assumes a 
more important role than black skin, points to the crucial role language plays 
in creating and reifying forms of difference. When she places language that 
eliminates sexual difference in relation to language that shores up racial differ-
ence, Garréta exposes the equally constructed nature of both these differences. 
By bundling racial difference with cultural difference, she shows how easy it is 
for us to slide from the cultural, to the biological, to the essential. The social 
order has primed us to identify difference and then compels us to perform it. 
Once the reader sees Garréta’s use of stereotypes for what it is, it becomes dif-
ficult if not impossible to accept her construction of blackness. This leads us 
to examine the tendency to bundle differences, as if we could impute a more 
complex identity to individuals by doing so. Why, she forces us to ask, must 
we insist on transforming bodies into signs? According to this reading, in dis-
tinction from her narrator, Garréta is saying that bodies are not simply meant 
to be read and identified so much as to be lived in. In a Foucauldian gesture, 
she invites us to consider her novel as the site for new “bodies and pleasures.”26
Garréta challenges her reader to resist the instrumentalization of bod-
ies that occurs when we inscribe them with difference through signifiers of 
identity. Rather than giving us access to richer, fuller subjectivity, difference 
deadens our subjectivity, quite literally, in Sphinx: A*** dies tragically, as does 
A***’s mother, and with them, the kinship structure based on the redemp-
tive difference ironically described in the novel, and the salvific relationality 
it contained. In a nod to the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century novels that 
are Garréta’s academic specialty, she ends this novel by also murdering her 
narrator, as if to say that the narrator must pay for the knowledge that may 
have been gained.27 Reading Garréta, the early modern specialist, with these 
eighteenth-century heroines in mind, her killing of both the narrator and the 
narrator’s love object can be read as a repudiation of knowledge and a warn-
 26. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 159.
 27. I imagine that Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Julie, from La Nouvelle Héloïse [Julie, or the New 
Heloise] and Denis Diderot’s Sapphic Suzanne (along with the various abbesses Suzanne left in 
her wake), from La Religieuse [The Nun], were at the back of Garréta’s mind when she killed 
off her narrator.
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ing against the kind of misleading knowledge that identity, founded in differ-
ence, is mistakenly thought to provide. Both race and gender exemplify such a 
promise of knowledge, where a person is known or at least knowable—where 
being identifiably something makes you identifiably someone. In Sphinx, the 
spectacular removal of gender and the display of race work together simul-
taneously to make clear the extent to which we, as socialized subjects, equate 
knowledge with identity. Indeterminacy, as enacted in the novel, is preferable 
to the fatal determinacy of presuming to know. For the anti-identitarian Gar-
réta, literature is the site of not knowing rather than the site of revelation.
We can also view the death of the narrator as an inevitable consequence of 
a writerly commitment to a certain vision of the aesthetics of literature, which 
is what the philosopher Jacques Rancière argues in his essay “Why Emma 
Bovary Had to Be Killed.”28 In Rancière’s analysis of the relation between Flau-
bert and Emma, Emma must die because she betrays the novelist’s aesthetic by 
trying to translate the pure sensations captured by literature into a concretely 
pretty, pedestrian life. Because Emma tries to concretize the aesthetic expe-
rience she finds in literature and incorporate it into her life by buying trin-
kets, furniture, and dresses, thereby missing the point of literature, she must 
be killed to teach the reader a lesson about literature. In Garréta’s case, the 
aesthetic stakes concern difference, not literariness. Garréta’s narrator’s death 
reprises Emma’s death at Flaubert’s hands, insofar as it serves as a warning to 
the reader. The narrator of Sphinx is shown to be invested in the aesthetics 
of difference, retaining racial difference in the narrative despite getting rid of 
sexual difference. In this, the narrator betrays Garréta’s literary vision of free-
ing experience and sensation from the identitarian categories through which 
they are understood and processed, and has to be killed.
Perhaps it is no coincidence that Garréta, like Wittig, chooses a sculp-
tural figure as her operative metaphor: the mythical sphinx is best known to 
us through its sculptural representations, and the Trojan horse was able to 
 28. I invoke Rancière not merely as someone who theorizes the authorial need to kill off a 
character, but as an intellectual touchstone for Garréta, who is interested in his philosophy of 
radical egalitarianism. If Garréta’s work displays an affinity for Rancière’s thought, it is no sur-
prise, given her debt to Wittig. More than a decade before Rancière coined littérarité [literarity] 
as a way of connecting the literary and the political, Wittig, in her 1986 PhD thesis, was already 
articulating a radical conception of living language as language freed, through a writerly action 
on and with the materiality of language, from the social meanings attached to it. This living 
language is theorized as the original social contract in which absolute reciprocity and equal-
ity found intersubjective relations, as seen in Chapter 2. Wittig thus articulates the political 
potentiality of literature from a practitioner/artist’s perspective, while Rancière approaches the 
question from a more abstract, philosophical point of view. See Rancière, The Flesh of Words, 
103, 108. Wittig, Le Chantier littéraire, 55–72. For more on literarity as a political operation, see 
Chambers, “The Politics of Literarity.”
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function as a war machine because it was received as a wooden sculpture, as 
a work with aesthetic qualities. Existing in three dimensions, the sculpture’s 
form and materiality are apprehended immediately, while the medium, be it 
stone, or wood, or metal, is recognized as raw material, or “matériau brut” 
as Wittig puts it, that has been worked.29 Through a title associated with the 
sculptural, Garréta insists on the importance of form for literature, an idea 
foundational to Wittig’s theorization of the literary text as a Trojan horse, a 
war machine that “pulverize[s] the old forms and formal conventions.”30 Wit-
tig’s logic and literary practice manifest her conviction that the pulverization 
of old forms and formal conventions can lead to the pulverization of social 
forms and conventions as well. This coming together of the political with the 
aesthetic, or literary, can be seen in Sphinx, in Garréta’s work against differ-
ence and in her stance of “fuck difference.” Garréta’s mobilization of the novel 
to engage in literary formal experimentation that does this political work of 
dismantling identity follows Wittig’s interpretation of Marcel Proust.
Wittig characterizes À la recherche du temps perdu [In Search of Lost Time] 
as a Trojan horse that infiltrated a straight Parisian society and homosexual-
ized it; the act of reading forced Proust’s readers to acknowledge that despite 
themselves, the novel was constituting a homosexual subject as undeniably 
real. In order to read the Recherche, they had to assume Proust’s homosexual 
point of view as their own and enter fully into the work’s homosexualized 
textual reality. Through literature, Proust was able to alter the terms through 
which an entire social order viewed itself, making the straight world and the 
straight mind interpellated by Proust no longer quite so straight. If Proust 
had this effect, Wittig maintains, it is only because he used his artistry to 
universalize his particular, homosexual point of view and present it so that 
it could take the place traditionally occupied by the universal straight white 
male. Wittig explains what it took for Proust to get his Trojan horse past the 
walls of Parisian society:
History, I believe, intervenes at the individual and subjective level and mani-
fests itself in the particular point of view of the writer. It is then one of the 
most vital and strategic parts of the writer’s task to universalize this point 
of view. But to carry out a literary work one must be modest and know 
that being gay or anything else is not enough. For reality cannot be directly 
 29. Wittig, Le Chantier littéraire, 93. Wittig treats the Trojan horse as a sculpture and aligns 
it with the work of the writer precisely because the sculpture results from the sculptor’s brute 
force and labor on its materials. Wittig sees the writer as undertaking the same work on a simi-
larly resistant material, language. See Wittig, 93–98.
 30. Wittig, The Straight Mind, 69.
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transferred from the consciousness to the book. The universalization of each 
point of view demands a particular attention to the formal elements that 
can be open to history, such as themes, subjects of narratives, as well as the 
global form of the work. It is the attempted universalization of the point of 
view that turns or does not turn a literary work into a war machine.31
For Wittig, the literary work emerges through the particularity of the writer’s 
point of view. For the work to shape the world, however, to “operate as a war 
machine upon its epoch,” it cannot stay particularized: the literary work must 
open up onto something larger.
Ultimately, Garréta’s novelistic experiment in indeterminability oper-
ates more as a Trojan horse than as a sphinx, which serves as the guardian 
of thresholds, determining who can or cannot pass. Instead of drawing in 
certain readers and ignoring and blocking others, Garréta’s literary language 
constructs the novel as a universalizing war machine. Rather than homosexu-
alize the reader, as Proust does, or lesbianize the reader, as Wittig does, Gar-
réta’s novel confronts the reader with an indeterminable identity. At first, there 
appears to be a difference to rally around—racial difference—but that differ-
ence functions as a Trojan horse. Just as the original Trojan horse is a wooden 
sculpture that announces its facture, its materiality, Garréta’s novelistic Trojan 
horse shows that it is made of language. If Garréta demonstrates that language 
creates difference as it becomes discourse, she then asserts that discourse, and 
hence difference, can be returned to language by destroying sexual difference 
and hollowing out racial difference. In doing so, she gestures toward a Wit-
tigian vision of literary language as the means by which the writer might “tear 
open the closely woven material of the commonplaces, and [. . .] continually 
prevent their organization into a system of compulsory meaning.”32
Sphinx rejects the idea of insurmountable difference or differences and 
supersedes individual identity in order to create new forms of indeterminacy 
that address everyone and no one in particular. As Wittig sees it, if a novel 
is to have political impact and staying power as literature, it must be able to 
speak to all readers: it cannot screen readers for whatever configuration of 
differences would constitute an ideal reader—it cannot be a gay novel, or a 
feminine novel, or a black novel. For Garréta, as for Wittig, this universaliza-
tion is able to come about in the novel precisely as it permits readers to reen-
act the writer’s task of separating language from discourse. Through the act of 
reading a Trojan horse, the reader is able to break open the particular catego-
ries discourse creates and circulates, to access language as language, in all its 
 31. Wittig, 74–75.
 32. Wittig, The Straight Mind, 100.
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potential. Sphinx invites us to disallow identity as a valid concept despite how 
costly it may be to do so. It overdetermines racial identity to show the reader 
that the inability to determine identity is preferable to fixing it.
Sphinx is a dark novel of loss and punishment, where the protagonists’ 
sexual indeterminateness is not able to eradicate the sexed and raced nature 
of society. The scene of their sexual encounter stands out, however, as a rare, 
utopian suspension of the compulsory difference of the social order. As the 
narrator describes the combining of bodies, seeking to recall the feeling of 
indeterminate flesh pressed against indeterminate flesh, not only is sexual dif-
ference rejected, but—so subtle as to be easily overlooked—racial difference 
disappears as well.33 In this sexual encounter where the narrator and A*** are 
rendered equal, where both act and are acted upon (“ce que je fis [. . .] ce dont 
je fus l’objet”), Garréta, who first evokes the protagonists’ skins in racialized 
terms, refrains from doing so in describing this contact of black skin against 
white skin. This places the scene firmly under the sign of “fuck difference,” 
driven by a vision where race, far from being fetishized or reified, is also to be 
dismantled.
This scene gives us a glimpse of a world in which we do not consent to 
difference, where we are able to experience and encounter the other without 
structuring that experience through ready-made concepts. Where Foucault’s 
utopian gesture in The History of Sexuality imagined bodies and pleasures 
that operate outside the “austere monarchy of sex,”34 Garréta’s gesture is even 
more expansive, envisioning the overthrow of that other austere monarchy, 
the monarchy of race. The hope is that we will not consent to be subjects of a 
monarchy that does not serve us, and instead refuse familiar scripts for identi-
ties that limit us to a predetermined set of possibilities. Just as Foucault does 
not offer a blueprint for how to overthrow the monarchy of sex, Garréta does 
not offer instructions for how to overthrow sex and race. She instead creates 
a horizon of possibility and shows us that, however we get there, if we ever 
get there, it will have to be through language, through working to break down 
and let go of the well-worn language that has made us who we are so that we 
might become who we’ve never been.
LA DÉCOMPOSITION: DECOMPOSING IDENTITY
In my discussion of Sphinx, I focused primarily on the way Garréta hollows 
out identity by setting up racial difference as a straw man. In the novel, the 
 33. I thank Hannah Frydman for calling my attention to this absence.
 34. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 159.
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pronoun is also important as a tool for compelling the reader to relinquish 
identity, or at least, to pay attention to how tightly we hold on to identity, 
despite the ways in which identity binds and oppresses us. In Sphinx, Garréta 
sets up je as a pronoun that refuses to let gender stick to it, to be determined. 
If we read the narrator as being male, we are compelled to reveal the processes 
by which we take the seemingly neutral absence of the mark of gender and 
perform precisely what Wittig describes as the default universalization of mas-
culinity, where the masculine gender is taken as that which operates outside 
or without gender. And if we read je as being female, we reveal our tendency 
to conflate the author and the narrator in addition to our instinctive assign-
ment of identity to people. Sphinx, in its relentless identification of our own 
processes of categorization, makes it impossible for us, in good faith, to natu-
ralize difference in its various iterations. Though Sphinx targets racial differ-
ence as well as sexual difference, Garréta’s choice to exploit the ambiguity and 
indeterminacy of je as a pronoun most clearly serves the purpose of disman-
tling gender in her skillful avoidance of gender-marked language and is more 
obvious than the subtler work against the naturalization of racial difference.35
In La Décomposition (1999), Garréta’s third novel, her work on pronouns 
shifts away from a frontal assault on gender to a more subtle attack on the sub-
ject as a self-contained, distinct entity whose integrity and clear boundaries are 
concretized in the boundaries of pronouns, where a pronoun serves as both the 
means by which the human subject is constituted and as proof of the subject. 
Émile Benveniste, the French linguist who was an important influence on Wit-
tig’s own thinking about the pronoun and its political potential, comments on 
the relation between the pronoun and the constitution of human subjectivity:
It is in and through language that man constitutes himself as a subject, 
because language alone establishes the concept of “ego” in reality, in its real-
ity which is that of the being.
The “subjectivity” we are discussing here is the capacity of the speaker to 
posit himself as “subject.” [. . .] Now we hold that that “subjectivity,” whether 
it is placed in phenomenology or in psychology, as one may wish, is only 
the emergence in the being of a fundamental property of language. “Ego” is 
he who says “ego.”36
For Benveniste, the subject as an “ego” that can posit its subjectivity by pro-
claiming its fully realized selfhood is as unproblematic as his taking man as 
 35. For a more critical take on Garréta’s pronoun use, see Chapter 2 of Livia, Pronoun Envy.
 36. Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, 224.
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the universal human subject. Garréta cannot consent to such a bundling. She 
teases apart the subject and subjectivity Benveniste views as a unity: her reten-
tion of subjectivity is built upon a resounding rejection of the subject. How-
ever, in doing so, Garréta, like Benveniste, Wittig, and Sarraute before her, 
still takes up the pronoun as playing a particularly important role in con-
structing identity and making subjectivity intelligible. In La Décomposition, 
she strips the pronoun of its tendency to shore up subjecthood, of the identity 
that accompanies the subject like a faithful shadow. As we’ll see, she performs 
this by severing the naturalized connection between proper names and bod-
ies, and between pronouns and their antecedents, which calls attention to how 
fragile referentiality is and how easily it can be diverted or thwarted. By cut-
ting the thread that sutures subjectivity to subjecthood, Garréta transforms 
the pronoun. No longer does the pronoun, which stands in for the name, 
shore up identity and the well-defined subjects that it takes under its wing. 
The pronoun, in Garréta’s novel, constitutes an anti-identitarian shore: there is 
no clear line of demarcation between water and land, between our subjectivity 
and the world we live in, but a constantly shifting shoreline that’s stable only 
in its mobility and mutability.
La Décomposition is a 244-page pastiche of Proust that does Proust at the 
same time as it undoes, or decomposes, him, turning the Proustian cathedral 
of À la recherche du temps perdu into a veritable bloodbath, the site and cause 
of serial murder.37 The premise of the novel is simple: the narrator, an aspiring 
serial killer, turns to Proust’s magnum opus as a literary model for his murder-
ous opus. The narrator looks to Proust’s characters to determine which ran-
dom people are the objects of his depopulating enterprise. For example, the 
thirty-seventh sentence of the Recherche contains the first mention of Mme 
de Saint-Loup. The narrator is to then go to some public space, such as a 
metro station or a café terrace, and count the passersby. If the thirty-seventh 
passerby has the same gender as the Proustian character of reference—in this 
case, if she’s a woman like Mme de Saint-Loup—they are elected as the nar-
 37. The novel is filled with references to and rewritings of Proust: “Longtemps je me suis 
consumé de bonheur aux récits de duels, de massacres, de tueries” [For a longtime, I was con-
sumed by happiness from stories of duels, massacres, and slaughter], riffs on Proust’s famous 
incipit, “Longtemps je me suis couché de bonne heure” [For a longtime, I went to bed early]. 
Garréta, La Décomposition, 35. All subsequent citations will be made in-text. The mythical, 
romantic images of the magical lantern from Marcel’s childhood are replaced by criminal, vio-
lent ones, and the lover conjured up during sleep is replaced by a fraternal assassin. The mad-
eleine’s ability to conjure up memories long gone is restaged, this mnemonic power housed, 
in Garréta’s version, in a crime scene’s chalk outline announcing a once-present body. For an 
interesting analysis of the novel that focuses on the Oulipian constraint and on intertextuality, 
see Andrews, “Intertextuality and Murder.”
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rator’s victim. If the passerby has the wrong gender, then the narrator is not 
to murder that day (28–29).38 Once the murder is successfully accomplished, 
the narrator is to delete all mentions of that character from a digital version 
of the Recherche, the idea being that eventually, the narrator will be able to 
completely decompose Proust’s novel and evacuate it of the characters that 
give the work its meaning:
Il s’agit par cet alliage sanglant d’un nom et d’un corps, d’un personnage de 
roman et d’une personne réelle que forgera le meurtre, de faire coup double, 
et double grâce. D’une part, dépeupler le monde selon un principe formel, 
impersonnel; d’autre part, décomposer un trop long roman en en effaçant 
les personnages. (27–28)
[Murder will forge this bloody alloy of a name and a body, of a character 
in a novel and a real person, by which it will realize two blows that are also 
acts of grace. On the one hand, depopulate the world according to a formal, 
impersonal principle; on the other, decompose a novel that’s too long by 
erasing its characters.]
Coupling murder with erasure—redacting “real” living human beings with 
the same precision that goes into redacting text—provides the material for 
the narrator’s own novel, from which we readers will hopefully learn to divest 
literature of real subjects, and more broadly, recognize identity for the pipe 
dream it is.
While the novel’s plot is certainly singular, of an erudition that we do 
not expect of a crime novel or polar, La Décomposition is also singular for its 
anachronistic return to an eighteenth-century non-distinction between philo-
sophical writing and literature—the majority of the novel is filled with the 
narrator’s expounding on the baselessness of identity and personhood and 
hence, the subject and self, as concepts. Garréta describes the dual nature of 
La Décomposition as a philosophical treatise in a novel:
We mustn’t forget that in the eighteenth century, the separation between 
literature and the belles lettres, ideas and philosophy, was an inoperative dis-
tinction. The separation between fiction and the intellect produced two mon-
 38. Making the murders contingent on gender agreement reprises Sphinx’s targeting of 
gender as a pernicious form of difference. Garréta writes, “Cette règle d’accord sera ma loi, le 
principe, la focale de mes meurtres” (28) [This rule of agreement will be my law, the principle, 
the focus of my murders]. In Sphinx, gender is what is destroyed; in La Décomposition, gen-
der—or rather, submitting to and upholding the rule of gender—is dramatized as leading to 
destruction.
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sters: the didactic novel (read, Zola, whom I abhor); and the dumbing-down 
of average fiction, which has resulted in there no longer being anything but 
didactic novels or brainless ones. Yet the novel enables us to process ideas 
with all the necessary irony, and destabilize a corpus of doctrines.”39
The novel, in Garréta’s view, processes ideas and can reconceptualize the 
world. Fiction doesn’t have to be the vehicle for either the handing down of 
knowledge or mere entertainment. In Garréta’s hands, the novel becomes a 
tool for challenging the usual boundaries of our thought, the received ideas 
and categories by which we navigate a world that we take for granted or sub-
mit to unthinkingly.
La Décomposition is able to attempt a decomposition of its readers’ invest-
ment in identity and subjects on two levels: first, through the philosophi-
cal statements made by the pedantic narrator who feels the need to lay out 
in painstaking detail his murderous method, in the academic sense of the 
term; second, through Garréta’s unconventional use of second-person pro-
nouns, which uproots the stability that makes pronouns such reliable recep-
tacles for and indicators of subjects. We can see that La Décomposition sets 
out to decompose identity through both discourse and language: through the 
philosophical arguments that comprise a discursive anti-identitarianism, and 
through the medium of language, exploiting the pronoun, à la Wittig and 
Sarraute, as a material to be worked on and with to make pronominal form 
deform rather than reaffirm identity.
I begin my analysis with the philosophical arguments against identity 
because they are the most straightforward iterations of anti-identitarianism 
in the novel. These arguments, as with the erasure of the mark of gender 
in Sphinx, stand out as the most visible attack on difference. At the crux of 
the narrator’s project is a joining together of murder and aesthetics, of (the 
creation of) death and literature, where perfection in crime and perfection 
in literature are each marked by a certain impersonality. Toward the novel’s 
beginning, Garréta’s narrator proclaims this quest for impersonal criminal and 
aesthetic perfection:
Il nous faut donc raisonner nos raisons et assurer à nos meurtres l’imperson-
nalité rigoureuse d’une contrainte. Le meurtre est un processus gouverné par 
des règles: l’art réside dans l’invention concertée et systématique de règles 
nouvelles, et non dans notre soumission à un code ordinaire des passions 
ou de l’imitation qui a nom vulgaire “inspiration” et n’excède jamais le degré 
 39. Garréta, interview with Lindon, “À quoi ça sert?”
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de subtilité d’une simple signalétique. [.  .  .] Mais quelle difficulté à fonder 
un art du meurtre qui fasse l’économie de la notion de motivation! La loi 
incarne depuis son origine ou plutôt depuis l’origine de la réflexion sur la loi, 
la croyance en des sujets plus ou moins constants. (23)
[We must thus think through our reasons and ensure that our murders have 
the rigorous impersonality of a constraint. Murder is a process governed by 
rules: art resides in the concerted and systematic invention of new rules, not 
in our submission to an ordinary code of passions or to the imitation that 
goes by the vulgar name of “inspiration” and never surpasses the subtlety of 
a simple system of signs. [. . .] But how difficult it is to make murder an art 
that does without the notion of motivation! The law, from its beginning, or 
rather, the beginning of reflection about the law, embodies belief in subjects 
that are more or less constant.]
Referring to the aesthetic principles of the constraint-driven Oulipo that she 
would be inducted into in 2000, the year following La Décomposition’s publi-
cation, Garréta articulates an aesthetic project that takes the eradication of the 
personal as its goal. The impersonal is conceived of as aesthetically superior 
to the expression of the personal, to works that codify a subject. In the world 
of La Décomposition, the narrator turns on its head the usual narrative of real 
subjects who exist outside and in distinction from fiction. Subjects do not 
exist, identities are destroyed, and fiction is taken as facticity:
Hors la fiction, il ne se trouve point de crime parfait? Loin de conclure de 
cette maxime à la fictivité (et donc à l’inexistence) du crime parfait, je l’en-
tends littéralement comme l’aveu de sa facticité. (26)
[There’s no such thing as a perfect crime outside fiction? Far from conclud-
ing from this maxim that the perfect crime is fictional (and thus nonexis-
tent), I understand it literally as a confession of its facticity.]
The literal and the literary converge in a disturbing, murderous vision of real-
ity, where the literary has the power to literalize and the distinction between 
reality and fiction no longer holds.
Garréta insists on distinguishing between fictionalization and falsification, 
where the former participates in the real in a way that the latter does not. She 
takes the example of autofiction, a genre of writing especially popular in con-
temporary French literature, characterized as fictionalized autobiography, in 
order to make this point:
 G A R R É TA •  151
Enfin, n’y avait-il pas de l’obscénité, de la facilité (et une facilité dangereuse 
pour celui qui s’y abandonne) [. . .] pour un auteur à raconter et faire passer 
sous couvert de roman le rebut de son journal intime? C’est là confondre 
fiction et falsification. (207)
[Finally, isn’t there something obscene, facile (a dangerous facility for who-
ever abandons himself to it) [. . .] about an author recounting and having pass 
as a novel the dregs of his diary? That’s confusing fiction with falsification].
For Garréta, there is more integrity and truth in “pure” fiction than in the adul-
terated fiction of autofiction, which derives literary capital from the allure of 
knowing that part of what you are reading is “real”—from peddling the distinc-
tion between fiction and reality that La Décomposition is trying to do away with.40
But returning to murder, why tie it to aesthetics, and in particular, to lit-
erature? Garréta comments on this combination of objects by explaining how 
what’s at stake in the novel is the “forging of a necessary link between fiction 
and reality” and the collision of aesthetics with ethics—an aesth-ethics.41 The 
traditional character, alive and well in contemporary fiction despite Sarraute’s 
systematic attempt to destroy it, is taken up by Garréta as the ideal site for 
bringing together fiction and reality, and eliminating a boundary that contin-
ues to be zealously guarded today. In choosing Proust, Garréta’s narrator has 
taken as his target a literary monument that exemplifies the use of literature 
to shore up identity through identification. He speaks disparagingly of the way 
Proust’s characters have been mobilized by “real” people living outside the 
novel to reinforce the identities of friends and acquaintances:
[Ils] s’amusent à dire de tel de leurs amis, assidu au bordel comme au musée, 
“mais c’est un vrai Swann!” (tout comme du médecin qui leur révèle, pauvres 
poulets crédules, la vérité de leurs entrailles, “notre Du Boulbon”; ou encore 
du vieil oncle homosexuel qui dissipe l’héritage auprès de gigolos, “ce Char-
lus au petit pied”). (26)
[They have fun saying that a friend who visits brothels as diligently as he 
does museums “is a real Swann!” (just as they call the doctor who reveals 
the truth of their entrails to them, poor credulous fools, “our Du Boulbon”; 
 40. Autofiction, even as it claims to blur the boundaries between fiction and reality by 
bringing the two together so that one can’t know where fiction ends and reality begins, still 
relies on the cachet of the “real” as distinct from pure fiction. For more on Garréta’s critique of 
autofiction, see my “Autofiction Infiltrated.”
 41. Frédéric Grolleau, Interview for Paru.com, September 1, 1999, archived at http:// 
cosmogonie .free .fr/ paru .html.
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or the old homosexual uncle who squanders his inheritance on gigolos, “this 
little Charlus”).]
In other words, readers already elide the boundary between the fictional and 
the real by identifying real people with and as fictional characters, the same sort 
of elision we see in everyday speech where “literally” stands for “figuratively.” 
Garréta takes this casual link that’s already made between fiction and reality 
and treats it seriously, turning it into a causal link instead, where what happens 
in fiction has a direct impact on the real, and vice versa. In a gesture that has an 
oddly moralizing quality to it, Garréta makes our casual use of literature have 
consequences. Forcing and forging a connection between fiction and reality 
sends us back to Wittig’s theorization of literary language’s traction on the real. 
Where Wittig theorizes this necessary connection in Le Chantier littéraire, Gar-
réta does so in the novel itself, but couched in ironic terms, as irony is a quality 
that she seems to consider crucial to being able to process ideas.
In the “method” chapter ironically entitled “Œdipe & Amok” (a barb 
at psychoanalysis’s psychologizing and subject-driven language and the 
importance it attributes to the Oedipal complex), Garréta’s narrator, having 
announced his intentions to bring together fiction and reality, clearly articu-
lates the novel’s anti-identitarian project. Anticipating his reader’s possible 
objections and questions as to his method, which could lead to a real per-
son being murdered as that character without bearing any resemblance to 
the Proustian character that he or she is identified as, the narrator glosses the 
fictive nature of identity:
“Madame de Saint-Loup” ne présente aucun des traits que le roman prête à 
Mme de Saint-Loup? C’est bien là le clou! L’identité s’opère en vertu non pas 
d’une ressemblance mais d’un baptême résultant d’un calcul. (29–30)
[“Madame de Saint-Loup” doesn’t have any of the traits that the novel assigns 
to Mme de Saint-Loup? There’s the rub! Identity operates not through resem-
blance but rather through a baptism resulting from a calculation.]
Because the narrator tries to maintain, or at least, to not resist, the discrep-
ancy between the fictional Proustian character and the corresponding real 
person, the connection between fiction and reality is revealed as operating not 
through resemblance or identification—the qualities that drive the casual col-
lapsing of fiction with reality, which Garréta is punishing—but rather, through 
calculation, being planned so that fiction has traction on reality, the one coex-
tensive and consubstantial with the other.
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According to the narrator’s philosophy, identity—this powerful motor of 
the vehicle of the subject in which the social order traffics—is neither natu-
ral nor motivated. Maintaining the interval between “Mme de Saint-Loup” 
and Mme de Saint-Loup proves that point, and is meant to render visible the 
process by which identity is created and conferred onto someone, a process 
that’s invisible in those instances when the gap between the idea of the iden-
tity (Proust’s Mme de Saint-Loup) and the person to whom that identity is 
attributed (the person in real life whom one refers to as a Mme de Saint-Loup) 
is minimal—when the identity seems to fit, in other words. The narrator, by 
targeting victims who do not seem to fit the identity he assigns to them—who 
do not resemble the characters they’re taken as—does so to prove that identi-
fication is not a natural process, but one that’s constructed and ritualized: just 
as baptism is a ritual that serves to induct its object into the church and make 
the baptized person a member of an institution that seeks to shape the course 
of their life, so too is identity the consequence of a ritual that serves to induct 
its objects into a social order whose ideology, the narrator argues, is as delib-
erately formulated, or calculated, and far-reaching as theology. From here, 
it’s not a particularly far leap to connect the identity that Proust’s characters 
stand in for to the sorts of identity at stake in identity politics. Garréta seems 
to be arguing that other identities such as race, gender, and sexuality oper-
ate through the same logic of correspondence or resemblance, where raced, 
sexed, and sexualized persons are considered such because they seem to fit 
with the idea of the race, sex, and sexuality they’re thought of as embodying. 
La Décomposition has a stake in denaturalizing identity.
Here, though, is the rub for us as readers of La Décomposition. The novel 
is like a laboratory in which factors have been carefully controlled to enable 
the theory to play out according to Garréta’s own anti-identitarian terms. Of 
course, it’s possible, with enough assiduity, to write a novel that both sets the 
starting premises and ensures an ending that follows from them—to prove 
one’s point tautologically. Garréta, by writing a novel that corresponds to the 
narrator’s ideology, would seem to be committing the same circular error that 
Wittig attributes to psychoanalysis when she writes that Lacan, rather than 
making any real discoveries, simply invented the psychoanalytic concepts that 
he proposed to have found.42 La Décomposition would seem, then, to be a case 
of Garréta discovering non-identity because she put it there.
This potential tautology is why the second-person pronoun plays such an 
important role in the novel: Garréta’s use of it takes the anti-identitarianism 
 42. “Who gave the psychoanalysts their knowledge? For example, for Lacan, what he calls 
the ‘psychoanalytic discourse,’ or the ‘analytical experience,’ both ‘teach’ him what he already 
knows. [. . .] In my opinion, there is no doubt that Lacan found in the Unconscious the structures 
he said he found there, since he had previously put them there.” Wittig, The Straight Mind, 23.
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outside the laboratory and enacts it in the space of lived experience, in the 
reader’s encounter with the text. Through the pronoun, the reader can confirm 
that the novel’s anti-identitarian results have not been falsified—that the anti-
identitarianism that the narrator is gunning so hard for can and does exist in 
the real world of the reader. The pronoun bridges the world of the novel and 
the world of the reader (whose situation in the world is molded by the pro-
nouns that place people in relation to each other) so that by being addressed 
in the second person, the reader’s relationship to the narrator is put into sharp 
relief. It is no longer a matter of a novel’s character behaving the way he or she 
ought to because that is the writer’s will. Instead, a real person—the reader as 
the person behind the pronoun—is the locus of experience.
The novel, by making the anti-identitarian experience it contains tran-
scend the seemingly evident boundary between the fictional world and the real 
world, collapses the distinction between them. This was the narrator’s goal all 
along. At one point he apostrophizes the reader, evoking the idea that a book 
is limited to its pages, that by closing a book we can exit the textual world, 
only to deny us that possibility by denying that these two spaces are distinct:
Lecteur, sais-tu seulement par où tu es entré et où se trouve la porte, et s’il 
y en a même une? Tu peux certes sortir de ce récit par effraction, en refer-
mant maintenant le livre. Mais la chambre noire ne s’en évanouira pas pour 
autant. Dans cette chambre noire, pour toute éternité, et quand bien même 
tu en condamnerais la porte, je t’attends, lâche lecteur.
Car cette chambre, et telle est l’énigme inscrite au front de la chimère ou 
du golem qui en garde l’invisible seuil, tu y étais déjà avant que d’y entrer et 
tu y seras encore quand tu en sortiras. (159)
[Reader, do you know where you entered and where the door is and if there 
even is one? You can certainly leave this narrative by force, by shutting the 
book now. But nonetheless, the darkroom will not vanish. In this dark room, 
for all eternity and even if you should seal off the door, I am waiting for you, 
cowardly reader.
Because in this room, and such is the riddle inscribed on the forehead of 
the chimera or the golem who watches over the invisible threshold, you were 
already there before entering and you will still be there when you leave it.]
This room that Garréta evokes is la chambre noire, the darkroom that she 
describes in the novel as the space where reader and writer meet. This space is 
the text: “Nous revoilà lecteur, vous et moi, dans la chambre noire, sans portes 
ni fenêtres, du texte” (155) [Here we are again, reader, you and me, in the 
darkroom, without any doors or windows, of the text]. Chambre noire evokes 
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the camera obscura43 [literally, dark room] as a space where reader and writer 
join to figure an image. However, both are invisible to the other—unfigurable: 
“Je ne puis vous voir, vous ne pouvez me figurer” (155) [I cannot see you, you 
cannot depict me]. In the text, reader and writer are caught up together in the 
act of representing and looking at something, and the surface upon which this 
representation is projected is the wall of the mind—the reader’s mind as she 
reads, and the writer’s mind as she writes, with the medium of language con-
stituting this shared surface. The narrative is both what contains the space and 
what is figured inside it. To be more precise, the text constitutes this camera 
obscura’s shape and contours, and the narrative is what fills it, what is pro-
jected—conjured up, represented—inside it. The narrator’s challenge to the 
reader to figure where and how she found herself in the text functions as a 
rhetorical question. I would wager, however, that there is an actual answer, 
and that the point of entry, despite the absence of doors and windows, is the 
pronoun as that which lets us inside but does not let us out. We’re challenged 
to try to seal off a passageway (“condamner une porte”) while Garréta uses the 
pronoun in such destabilizing ways that the pronoun becomes impossible to 
seal off, or perhaps, in.
Before I examine Garréta’s unsettling deployment of second-person pro-
nouns, let me turn your attention to a passage from La Décomposition that’s 
particularly useful both in its disdain for our investment in the idea of sub-
jecthood and individual identity, and in the way it signals that these things are 
embedded pronominally, particularly in the first-person pronoun je:
Qui vous croyez-vous? Une âme immortelle, substance et principe éternels, 
jetée ici-bas pour son malheur et sa repentance? Un fantôme de conscience, 
statue intérieure perchée, comme sur des échasses, au sommet de l’altière 
colonne de mémoire carottée dans le riche tuf du temps passé et perdu? Un 
enchevêtrement unique et original de fibres subtiles, chacune empreinte du 
chiffre, de la signature en code exprimable, de votre individuelle identité? 
Et tapie au centre, là-haut dans la boîte noire derrière vos yeux, Sa Majesté 
le Je? (228)
[Who do you think you are? An immortal soul, eternal in substance and 
principle, cast down here to be unhappy and repent? A ghost of conscious-
ness, an interior statue perched, as if on stilts, on top of the stately column 
 43. The Oxford English Dictionary defines camera obscura as “an instrument comprising a 
darkened room or box with a convex lens or a pinhole on one side, used for projecting an image 
of an external object on to a surface inside the instrument so that it can be viewed, drawn, or 
(in later use) reproduced on a light-sensitive surface.”
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of memory, sampled out of the rich tuff of past and lost time? A unique and 
original entanglement of subtle fibers, each imprinted with the figure, the 
signature—in an expressible code—of your individual identity? And crouch-
ing at the center, up high in the black box behind your eyes, Their Majesty 
the I?]
Garréta assembles all the usual trappings of identity and of belief in our unique 
subjecthood: interiority, consciousness, soul, memory, a singular genome and 
the genetic identity that comes with it, a mind—that black box behind our 
eyes—in which reigns the all-powerful I. The reference to Their Majesty the I 
ties all these assertions about human identity and subjecthood (which Garréta 
would characterize as fictions, but, as is borne out all too clearly in life, fic-
tions with very real consequences) to the self, the very idea of which is made 
possible by and depends on the first-person pronoun Je that names it and acts 
as a guarantor of its existence. It’s because of a simple pronoun that all these 
other ideas—consciousness, soul, memory, etc.—are able to cohere into the 
subject they serve to define and prove. The pronoun, in other words, is not 
merely a simple component of language that neatly signals an antecedent, but 
actually serves to bring that antecedent into being. The antecedent of the pro-
noun—the subject—is not anterior to the pronoun that seems to come after it.
Garréta’s narrator makes very clear his disdain for the work that the first-
person pronoun does, and all the concepts and meaning that get decanted into 
je, but it’s actually in Garréta’s use of the second-person pronouns, tu and vous, 
that we can see the writerly work Wittig theorizes in Le Chantier littéraire 
of stripping language of its conventional signification, of playing discourse 
as a socially codified form of language against language as a medium full of 
potential. In Garréta’s second-person pronouns, we can see the way her formal 
experimentation—and refusal to abide by the rules of linguistic sociability, 
where the pronouns have their proper place and get along together—leads to 
the decomposition of identity as we know and live it. Garréta’s drawing and 
quartering of Their Majesty the I, while compelling and polemical, still main-
tains the conventional use, form, and function of the first-person pronoun. 
The pronoun and what it stands for might be reviled and abused, but the 
pronoun maintains its integrity unlike in the case of Garréta’s use of tu and 
vous, which is triply transgressive: she uses tu when we might expect a vous 
to be more suitable, vous where we might expect tu normally, and she uses 
the second person to refer to the actions and feelings of a person who better 
corresponds to the narrator than to the addressed reader.44 All these things 
undermine those pronouns’ usual functions.
 44. This anticipates Garréta’s use of tu as the narrative pronoun in Pas un jour.
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As readers familiar with French know, tu and vous have different func-
tions, and their distinction is invested with much social capital (take, for 
example, the anxiety of figuring out which pronoun to use).45 Tu is the pro-
noun of informality, close relation, and familiarity—it implies either the equal 
or superior social status of the locutor—and it’s singular. Vous is the pronoun 
of formality, a certain relational and affective distance, social transactions, and 
respect—it implies either equal or inferior social status—and it can be either 
singular or plural. In La Décomposition, however, Garréta turns these uses of 
the pronoun on their head, and, through a disturbingly canny combination 
of transgressing and observing pronominal norms, upends the hierarchy they 
maintain. It isn’t a full-on frontal assault against the pronoun, but an eating 
away of it from the inside, similar to the way termites eat away at a house’s 
wooden beams until the structure has completely lost its integrity.
Garréta’s constant shifting between tutoiement and vouvoiement begins 
early on in the text, before any of the murders has been narrated. As the nar-
rator lays out his project and complicated method, he speaks directly to the 
reader in familiar tones: “Lecteur, tu me trouves obscure encore? Faut-il vrai-
ment tout t’expliquer?” (27) [Reader, do you still find me obscure? Do I really 
have to explain everything to you?] only to retreat, on the very next page from 
the informal tu to the honorific vous: “Mais pourquoi ce roman-là? Parce que, 
l’avez-vous assez soupiré, frivole lecteur, la vie est trop courte et Proust est trop 
long” (28) [But why this novel? Because, and you’ve sighed about this enough, 
frivolous reader, life is too short and Proust is too long]. Garréta’s tone shifts, 
from the exasperation we express toward people with whom we’re close to one 
of arch irony. This sort of shifting between tu and vous continues throughout 
the text, and is most striking when the reader is placed at the scene of the 
murder with the narrator. For example, in a chapter dedicated to the murder 
of a woman who’s been baptized Françoise, after the faithful servant and cook 
in Combray, the narrator addresses the reader in a solicitous tone:
Aujourd’hui, jour de marché, mon lecteur je vous emmène. Où? Devant une 
pyramide des plus belles asperges. Quoi faire? Attendre que paraisse notre 
prochaine victime. (109)
 45. On the vicissitudes of navigating the second-person pronoun in French, see Haget, “On 
se tutoie?”
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[Today, market day, I am taking you, my reader, somewhere. Where? In front 
of a pyramid of the most beautiful asparaguses. To do what? Wait for our 
next victim to appear.]
The narrator shifts tone dramatically as he narrates following Françoise 
home to her apartment from the market and slitting her throat by posing 
as an expected dinner guest. He insults the reader and drops the honorific, 
returning to tu: “car poli je suis, au-delà de toute mesure, grossier lecteur qui 
n’essuies pas même tes pieds au paillasson” (115) [because I am polite, beyond 
all measure, you vulgar reader who doesn’t even wipe your feet on the door-
mat]. The narrator withdraws the generosity with which he’d initially shared 
his victim and brought the reader into a complicitous nous [we], the tu dis-
tancing him from the reader.
The vacillation is constant between tu and vous, between being a maligned 
reader and a respected one. As readers, we never know where we stand in the 
narrator’s estimation, and this uncertainty is an indication of the ambivalence 
that he himself feels toward us. The narrator cannot help but be ambivalent 
as we occupy a position of paramount importance: it’s our readerly presence 
that enables the narrator to speak, to relive his past crimes and re-experience 
his pleasure in the present. The narrator’s murderous project, which targets 
the connection between human life and the representation of such life in lan-
guage, depends on the reader: “Il suffit d’un lecteur et d’un seul, d’une victime 
et d’une seule, pour que mon projet s’achève et que l’infinie et transsubstan-
tiative réversibilité de la prose en crime, du crime en prose s’opère” (150) [A 
single reader and only one, a single victim and only one, is sufficient for my 
project to be accomplished and for the infinite and transubstantiative revers-
ibility of prose into crime, of crime into prose, to be effected].
The narrator’s ambivalence toward the reader presents us with an uncom-
fortable alternative between a tu and a vous that have both lost their positive 
potential. We can either identify with a tu that does not signal a reciprocal 
intimacy but is used to insult us as being slow-witted or ill-mannered—an 
alienating tu—or with a vous that, rather than indicate unfamiliarity, distance, 
or respect, accuses us and implicates us as the narrator’s accomplices—a crim-
inal vous. But what’s ultimately more unnerving than having intimacy joined 
with insults, or respect tied to criminal complicity, is the way, by the end of 
the novel, Garréta has somehow pulled off a pronominal sleight of hand so 
that the vous—the reader brought in from the outside to witness the nar-
rator’s criminal exploits—has become the narrator himself, and the distinc-
tion between the je and the vous has been effaced. No longer are we mere 
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accessories to a murderous project we don’t think represents our desires,46 
but we’re forced by the second-person pronoun into inhabiting a subjectivity 
that we’d like to reject but are not allowed to, if we are to keep reading. Gar-
réta accomplishes this quite subtly by eventually eliminating the addressing 
of the reader as reader—mon lecteur, lecteur frivole, grossier lecteur, etc.—that 
initially accompanies all these second-person pronouncements, so that there 
are sentences featuring vous where the distance that the explicit identification 
“mon lecteur” provides is no longer there, leaving us with the unsettling ques-
tion of who is who and who is doing what.
This indistinction and the ambiguity of the referent for Garréta’s vous are 
represented effectively in the novel’s last chapter, which features the narrator 
in a sleeping car of a train shooting at a mirror (or similarly reflective surface), 
mistaking the victim’s image for the victim. The scene is completely ambigu-
ous and difficult to decipher, putting our ability to identify and distinguish 
one identity from another into crisis: it’s unclear whether the mirror the nar-
rator shoots at is in his train or a different train or even how it would be pos-
sible to shoot into another sleeper compartment from one’s own, which leads 
to the possibility that the mirror that the narrator shoots at is in fact in his 
own compartment, and is in fact his own image, which puts the gender of the 
narrator, who has up to this point used masculine adjectives and verbal con-
structions to refer to himself, into doubt, as the victim targeted is Albertine, 
a woman. Perhaps he mistook his own image for that of another person? Per-
haps he’s a woman and mistook her own image for that of another woman’s?47
The novel’s ending gives no clarity as to what actually happens. The novel 
draws to an indeterminate close in which distinction, which is crucial to 
 46. Allow me to address you directly, reader. Would you really identify with a desire to 
depopulate the world, slit throats, push bodies over a highway overpass into oncoming traffic, 
shoot someone in the back of the head at the movie theater—desires that our narrator realizes?
 47. In an earlier chapter, “À l’éditeur” [To the Editor], which takes the form of the nar-
rator’s letter to his publisher, such a deliberate masking of gender is suggested when the 
narrator claims that the editor prefers the narrator to be a man: “Vous serez, je n’en doute 
pas, du parti de préférer un sujet masculin. Il faut que puisse en effet planer, comme un 
parfum diffus et quelque peu écœurant, le soupçon d’une identification possible entre notre 
sujet et la matière de mon récit. Or, vous le savez, le meurtre—et le meurtre violent plutôt 
que feutré—est province presque exclusive de la moitié mâle de l’espèce: les statistiques le 
prouvent, l’opinion commune le croit, la vraisemblance et l’homophonie l’exigent” (140) [You 
will undoubtedly side with those who prefer a masculine subject. It’s necessary that, like a 
diffuse and slightly sickening perfume, a hint of a possible identification between our subject 
and the material of my narrative might linger. Now, as you know, murder—and violent, rather 
than muted, murder—is the domain almost exclusively of the male half of the species: the 
statistics prove it, popular opinion believes it, plausibility and homophony require it]. This 
suggestion of the falsification of the narrator’s gender, at the demands of the well-socialized 
reader’s expectations, is rendered more trenchant with our knowledge that the voice behind 
the narrator is that of a woman, Anne Garréta.
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asserting identity, and the originary identity of the novel—the narrator’s—are 
called into question. The question of what’s fiction and what’s “real” emerges 
within the boundaries of the text, only to have the distinction between the two 
crumble upon contact. What the narrator proclaims, Garréta effects through 
her writing. This is precisely the reversibility of prose into crime, of fiction 
into reality. This reversibility, the collapsing of fiction and reality, is able to 
occur because of the indeterminability imposed by the feedback loop of a 
hermeneutic instinct in crisis. Garréta’s deployment of the second-person pro-
nouns mobilizes the reader, with or against her will, into serving as the agent 
of this reversibility: through Garréta’s use of tu and vous, the narrator claims 
us as fully with him in his world, and we can no longer skulk on the sidelines 
with one foot in our world and one foot in the novel’s, getting to have our 
fiction and our reality, too, as separate things. Because of La Décomposition’s 
pronominal instability, the distinction between narrator/writer and reader col-
lapses, which resonates with Wittig’s vision in Le Chantier littéraire of a read-
erly writer and a writerly reader.
Garréta has said, “I think one of the things that works in the book is the je 
that addresses the tu and the vous that are the reader, and that constantly dis-
places the point of view,” and she draws attention to the impact this pronoun 
trouble creates, when, in the same interview, she likens La Décomposition to “a 
videogame from a first person point of view, but sometimes you find yourself 
the target.”48 Pronouns, these seemingly small elements of language, can have 
outsize consequences, and Garréta’s use of them is not only unsettling, but vio-
lent, targeting identity and subjecthood. The novel effectively places our iden-
titarian desires in the line of fire, and it’s with marked aggression that Garréta 
attacks the way we use pronouns to solidify and corroborate identity, where 
pronouns house our identity the way a hermit crab uses shells to house its 
fragile body. Not only does Garréta, by putting into place a constantly shifting 
point of view that makes it impossible to properly situate and locate ourselves, 
make it impossible for us to use pronouns to contain our subjectivity within 
a reassuringly solid and stable identity, but she also has those pronouns cor-
respond to subjectivities we would rather not inhabit—the murderer, the idiot, 
the victim. We are left exposed as a subjectivity that has not yet been assimi-
lated into deterministic categories, and that is exactly where Garréta wants us.
The underlying moral of La Décomposition, beneath the narrator’s moral 
of depopulating the world, is that we need to get out of the subject-hood.49 
 48. Garréta, quoted in Axelle Le Dauphin, “Gare à Garréta.”
 49. The last chapter’s mirror scene can be seen as a metaphor for the way subjecthood, or 
identity, is not so much fiction as it is false. It’s an image that fakes us out, representing some-
thing that isn’t actually there.
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Assailed by pronouns we don’t want, having our pronouns taken away from 
us just as we get used to them, the novel effectively works to drive us out of 
our pronouns, which house our identities as discrete subjects. But this leaves 
us with the question of where we go from here. After hundreds of pages of 
a hostile, deranged, and sociopathic narrator doing his best to destroy iden-
tity from both sides of the fiction/reality divide that the novel reveals is not 
a divide at all, after this bloody trail of death and destruction, where do we 
go? The novel ends on an ambiguous and negative note, with the narrator’s 
destination uncertain and the narrator in a state of terror, his heart skipping a 
beat—failing is the word Garréta uses (défaillir)—with every gun-like sound of 
the train rattling against the rails, each sound a potential bullet targeting the 
narrator. And that is where the reader is left as well—unsure of where we are, 
and terrorized. The logical, or at least, the most obvious response to this ques-
tion of “where to now?” would seem to be, well, elsewhere. If we cannot stay 
in subjecthood, in identity, then we must move on to a place without these 
things. Garréta seems to realize that this is a frightening venture. It involves 
not simply relinquishing the identification of others—a difficult enough task—
but, more difficultly, letting go of our own identity. La Décomposition’s ending, 
as unresolved as it is, acknowledges the gaping distance that exists between a 
reality built on the subject and its manifold identities and the reality that has 
been not so much depopulated as de-identified (which amounts to the same 
thing insofar as the idea of population is built on the idea of demography, the 
biopolitical ordering and categorization of human life).
Garréta doesn’t take us to this other place, unlike her narrator, who takes 
the reader all over his city in pursuit of his victims, and unlike Sarraute, whose 
writing plunges us immediately into an experience of subjectivity without 
contours, and unlike Wittig, whose utopian spaces of universalized particu-
larity place the reader in a different place that’s already-here even though it’s 
nowhere. What Garréta does, unlike Sarraute and Wittig, is to put the reader 
through the painful process of being stripped of identity. She makes it impos-
sible for us to turn back to identity. The idea is that we will move forward 
because the alternative has been destroyed—nothing is left, identity has been 
revealed to be a false image in a shattered mirror that can no longer represent 
that image. We can be like Narcissus, caught up in an image, albeit a broken 
one, or we can turn away from this image of ourselves that we’ve been so 
seduced by, and be in the world in all its and our unknown-ness. The world 
she proposes to bring us into is one that’s real because it’s joined together with 
fiction but stripped of the falsity that characterizes what’s taken as a reality 
severed from fiction. Garréta confronts the reader with the choice and pos-
sibility of venturing into fiction that posits non-identity as facticity, but leaves 
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it up to us as to how we clear that difficult path from identity to non-identity, 
from subjecthood to unbecoming.
QUEERER THAN QUEER
Where Sphinx clearly bears the influence of Wittig’s vision for turning the 
pronoun into a war machine, La Décomposition displays a Garréta whose pro-
noun-work more closely resembles Sarraute’s. Her use of the pronouns tu and 
vous destabilize the reader’s pronominal position and turn the reader’s sub-
jectivity into a site that’s always changing, thwarting whatever will the reader 
might have to enter the text as a stable, identity-laden subject. Garréta, simi-
larly to Sarraute, uses pronouns to force us to undo our own identities and 
take off our identity clothes to enter the text. In the shifting pronouns we 
encounter in La Décomposition, however, we can see the mark of the queer 
1990s, and Garréta’s work bears this influence in a way that Sarraute’s does not.
La Décomposition was published in 1999, at the close of a decade that saw 
the conception of queer theory and the publication of foundational texts of 
queer theory such as Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble (1990), Eve Sedgwick’s 
Epistemology of the Closet (1990), Michael Warner’s edited volume Fear of a 
Queer Planet (1993), and the special “Queer Theory” issue of differences (1991) 
that introduced the term into academic discourse. The 1990s saw the explo-
sive entry of queer theory into the intellectual and cultural domain, and the 
dissemination of ideas that have since become synonymous with queer the-
ory—in particular, the idea of identity as performative and queer theory’s 
imperative to erode identity and make it fluid and unstable by transgressing 
the rigidity of categories such as homosexual and heterosexual, thwarting such 
binary thinking through queerness’s refusal to respect such boundaries. Queer 
acts of subversion, such as drag, which Butler discusses at length in Gender 
Trouble, are taken as destabilizing existing structures of oppression. But for all 
of queer theory’s impact in promoting a radically subversive notion of identity, 
for which it has been dubbed anti-identitarian, its destabilization has failed 
to destroy and bring down these structures even as it has made them more 
porous. Queer theory has introduced the notion of movement and fluidity, so 
that rather than being trapped by these identity categories, we can circulate 
freely within and through them.50 But for Garréta, a wider range of movement 
 50. While queer theory tends to celebrate the destabilization of identity as politically salu-
tary, one could argue that destabilizing identities actually reinforces them by turning them into 
something around which to mobilize. For example, in Sexing the Citizen, Judith Surkis demon-
strates how masculinity became stronger in Third Republic France for being seen as in crisis.
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isn’t enough. She pushes queer destabilization to its limit, imbuing her acts of 
destabilization with so much forceful, consistent pressure that they actually 
break down identity completely, rather than simply create openings within it. 
Garréta’s queer project, in other words, can be considered to be queerer than 
queer in its outdoing of queerness—it actually reaches the non-identity that 
serves as queer theory’s asymptote or that queer theory finds, intermittently, 
in the orgasmic interval of jouissance.
When the novel comes to a close, the reader, after a sort of death by a 
thousand destabilizations, is left with either a radically different experience 
and conception of identity that lead to its rejection, or with the uncomfort-
able knowledge that she’ll return to an identity that’s been voided of substance. 
Garréta isn’t a particularly optimistic writer (her corpus is marked by morbid-
ity, melancholy, and violence), but I would submit that in this textual blowing 
up of our identitarian present, Garréta demonstrates an investment in the 
future, a gesturing toward a non-identitarian horizon that crystallizes a dire 
alternative between staying inside a decomposed cadaver of an identity or 
moving into a life whose form has yet to be discovered.
Garréta’s texts compel us to confront identity and demand that we destroy 
it using the weapons that Garréta herself puts at our disposal: these queerer 
than queer Trojan horses of the chantier littéraire she shares with Sarraute and 
Wittig. To have access to one writer’s war machines is to have access to the 
others’, which is to have access to language as a living and creative material 
that can exceed discourse’s stultifying and oppressive constructions of reality. 
It’s to have as intimate a relationship to language as Sarraute, Wittig, and Gar-
réta do—to take on the same debt that is not a debt but a gift, an obligation, 
an imperative.
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Toward a Poetics of Unbecoming; or, 
Language Has a Body
165
A S W E’ V E S E E N in the last three chapters, in Sarraute, Wittig, and Garré-
ta’s works, language, rather than being co-opted almost immediately by dis-
course, is prevented from being used to discursively construct and reinforce 
categories of difference that trap us in identity. What I’d like to do in this 
chapter is move beyond the anti-identitarian processes and operations of each 
writer’s corpus to examine their poetics—what animates their writing. The 
anti-difference feminist theory and practice of those materialist feminists—
e.g., Monique Wittig, Christine Delphy, Colette Guillaumin, Nicole-Claude 
Mathieu—who followed Simone de Beauvoir in rejecting femininity as a per-
nicious social construct created to always put women in a position of alter-
ity and immanence, has been largely forgotten in our historical accounts of 
French feminism. Particularly in the American context, when we think of 
French feminist thinkers and writers, we tend to jump straight from Simone 
de Beauvoir to Hélène Cixous, Luce Irigaray, and Julia Kristeva, her post-
structuralist successors. In a literary context, the absence of a visible corpus of 
anti-difference writers has made it harder to theorize a feminist poetics that 
has literary language bypass, rather than embrace, difference.1 But we’ve had a 
corpus of writers against difference all along. With the benefit of hindsight, we 
can see Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta’s collective corpus as enabling a poetics 
 1. Simone de Beauvoir was a brilliant, key philosopher of the twentieth-century, but Beau-
voir’s innovation was more apparent in her philosophy than in her fiction, which hardly bucked 
formal conventions.
against difference to be conceived and articulated, whose political stakes Wit-
tig articulated in her theoretical writing.
French Feminism, as mentioned in the Introduction, is now a historical 
term referring to the American academy’s codification of Cixous, Kristeva, 
and Irigaray as the vanguard of feminist literary criticism in the 1970s and 
1980s. It was American feminist academics’ way of responding to the impor-
tation en masse of the French male theorists of French Theory with female 
theorists of their own.2 If American feminist literary critics invented French 
Feminism and placed its literature under the loaded sign of difference, we 
can correct this, not by inventing a new French Feminism, but by looking 
to the literature that’s already there—Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta—to show 
how there’s been a literature against difference all along, just as there’s been 
an anti-difference French feminism as well. Because of the strong chain of 
influence that connects these three writers to each other, theirs is a cohesive 
corpus, which makes their poetics—a poetics of unbecoming—strong enough 
to stand on its own against écriture féminine and the monopoly it’s enjoyed 
when it comes to feminist poetics. However artificial the grouping of Cixous, 
Kristeva, and Irigaray is, and however little resemblance it bore to the real-
ity of French feminisms on the ground,3 their codification as the thinkers of 
French Feminism did have one particularly important consequence: écriture 
féminine’s visibility as an emancipatory feminist poetics grounded in the body, 
which can thus serve as a foil for the poetics of unbecoming, which is also an 
emancipatory feminist poetics grounded in the body.
Cixous coined the term écriture féminine in her 1975 manifesto, “Le Rire de 
la Médusa” [“The Laugh of the Medusa”], where she joyously calls for women 
to harness their feminine difference and libido, and translate them into writ-
ing and cultural production, turning their bodies into texts, thereby produc-
ing radical political and social change.4 While Kristeva and Irigaray do not 
specifically use the term, as thinkers of sexual difference who each see eman-
cipatory potential in femininity, they have also been placed under the sign of 
 2. See Moses, “Made in America”; Braidotti, “Thinking with an Accent.” Now that we’ve 
moved on from the heyday of French Theory, the members of this trio have been able to be 
taken up in other ways: Irigaray and Kristeva are taken up more in feminist philosophy than in 
feminist literary scholarship, and Cixous is a celebrated novelist and playwright. French femi-
nisms nowadays have branched out considerably beyond Cixous, Kristeva, and Irigaray, but are 
quite diffuse and not very well taken up by the American academy. See Descarries, “Language Is 
Not Neutral” for a critique of the way the hegemony of the English language in contemporary 
feminist work isolates French-speaking feminists and prevents them from being better known.
 3. See Winter, “(Mis)Representations” for an indictment of French Feminism’s disconnec-
tion from the reality of French feminist activism and thought.
 4. Cixous, Cohen, and Cohen, “The Laugh of the Medusa.”
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écriture féminine.5 Cixous, Kristeva, and Irigaray are all strongly influenced by 
psychoanalysis, and they see women as having been repressed by patriarchal 
culture and a phallocentric language that has excluded them. Écriture féminine 
describes what happens when women have been liberated from repression by 
turning to the feminine body as the source of a new, non-alienated language 
and discourse. For all three, they espouse the feminine not in order to simply 
invert patriarchy—none of them advocate replacing the cult of the phallus 
with the cult of the feminine at the price of oppressing the masculine. Rather, 
their recuperation of the feminine is in pursuit of a deconstructive transcend-
ing of the binaries of masculine/feminine, man/woman. They pursue a mode 
of relation—what Irigaray would call an ethics of sexual difference6—that 
would put them not in a relationship of opposition or hierarchy but in a rela-
tionship of difference, one not co-opted by patriarchy or by matriarchy.
Cixous, Kristeva, and Irigaray formulated complex theoretical responses 
to the problem of language and oppression and grappled with the difficulties 
of thinking (about) language with/in language itself. But their poetics of dif-
ference acts as an apology for something—difference—that we might just be 
better without. Thinkers of difference like them may try to set up difference 
as something distinct from opposition (the logic of A and B as opposed to the 
logic of A and not-A), where opposition is at the heart of the sorts of binariz-
ing logic that have been so invidious. Wittig, however, rejects the notion of 
difference as non-oppositional because, in the world we inhabit, difference, 
even if it’s conceived of as not being in the service of opposition, inevitably 
winds up being co-opted by political and social forces that tether difference to 
hierarchy—difference cannot maintain a pure existence in the world as simply 
difference. Wittig puts it succinctly: “Thought based on the primacy of dif-
ference is the thought of domination.”7 Non-oppositional, non-hierarchical 
difference cannot exist in lived reality.8 The theoretical space in which differ-
 5. Kristeva sees revolutionary writing such as Lautréamont’s and Mallarmé’s as register-
ing the repressed, unconscious jouissance of femininity on the symbolic order through illogical 
construction and unconventional grammar and syntax, disrupting the symbolic order’s will to 
mastery. Irigaray sees feminine auto-eroticism as inherently multiple, as manifested in the way 
the vulva’s lips are always touching themselves, and models a parler-femme (translated by Toril 
Moi as womanspeak in Sexual/Textual Politics) on this auto-eroticism as a language uniquely 
feminine in its difference from the usual phallocentric language. See Kristeva, Revolution in 
Poetic Language; Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One.
 6. Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference.
 7. Wittig, The Straight Mind, 2.
 8. Even seemingly innocuous differences such as hair color aren’t preserved from hierar-
chical valuation as seen in the statement, “Blondes have more fun.” Granted, this type of hier-
archy may seem anodyne or trivial, but it still shows the automatic way humans use hierarchy 
to process difference or plurality.
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ence can be something other than opposition is so short-lived as to be nonex-
istent: difference, assuming the stance of the always-already, always devolves 
into domination. Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta maintain a suspicious view of 
difference, and difference, once removed from the psychoanalytic grounding 
they reject, has no redemptive value. Their writing takes us away from the 
glistening architectures of difference that difference promises to produce if we 
were just able to tap into a language proper to it. Instead, their writing takes 
us to unbecoming, to subjectivity without subjecthood.
We need an anti-differentialist poetics that can mobilize positivity the way 
écriture féminine does, with its vision of a transcendent, libidinal feminine 
body. In Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta’s writing, we can find such a poetics—a 
poetics of unbecoming. Like écriture féminine, this poetics is also founded on 
the body, one very different from the feminine body: the body of language. 
There is still a difference in place; however, it isn’t the difference of sexual dif-
ference, but rather, the difference between human and language, a difference 
akin to Saussurean difference—the interval or space in which signification 
can take place. Écriture féminine is characterized by desire—the unleashing 
of desire, of feminine libido, according to Cixous, and the recognition of the 
multiplicity of feminine desire, according to Irigaray—and the poetics of 
unbecoming is too. But the poetics of unbecoming houses a desire that draws 
the human out of the bounds of the human body. In what follows, I look to 
some of Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta’s novels to see how they enact this poet-
ics of unbecoming—how their desire, as writers and as humans, transcends 
the boundaries and the strictures of a strictly human body to be desire for the 
body of language, for language as a body, but one that is not human. Theirs is 
a poetics of desire, not desire in language9—where language is the structure of 
desire, where desire animates language and makes it exceed speech, commu-
nication, and meaning—but desire for language. And not just any desire for 
language, but one that desires language outside the psychoanalytic frame that 
would presume to contain and explain both language and desire.10
 9. I’m alluding to the collection of essays by Kristeva translated and published in English 
under the title Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art (1980).
 10. This is where the poetics of unbecoming departs from what could appear at first to be 
the closely aligned position of Barthes, who, in works such as The Pleasure of the Text, calls for 
an embodied, desiring relationship to language and sees the writerly text (le texte scriptible) 
as one that necessitates the active effort and engagement of the reader, which results in jouis-
sance. This text of jouissance resists ideology and doxa, and takes the reader outside sociality 
and subjecthood. The emphasis on jouissance, which shows the influence of Lacan, stands at 
odds with the anti-psychoanalytic grounding of the poetics of unbecoming, which does not 
operate through jouissance’s interruption and loss of consciousness and signification. Unbe-
coming is not a transgressive violation of boundaries—the sort of limit experience that jouis-
sance entails—but rather, an emancipatory reworking of subjectivity, a shedding of the ill-fitting 
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CORPS-À-CORPS WITH LANGUAGE
“Un écrivain se trouve situé, confronté, corps à corps, avec ce panorama 
du langage [. . .].”
A writer finds herself situated, confronted, body to body, with this panorama 
of language [. . .].
—Wittig, Le Chantier littéraire, 51–52
Before discussing Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta’s writing and the ways in 
which they treat language as a corporeal, autonomous, non-human entity that 
can be interacted with and desired, it seems worthwhile to first consider the 
question of the body. The body is a peculiar term: it seems to be self-evident 
and universal so as to need no explanation or gloss (surely everyone has a 
general sense of what body refers to when it’s deployed to shore up a distinc-
tion from the mind or the immaterial, or to elucidate phenomena that are 
taken to be embodied such as desire, sexuality, materiality, sensation, affect, 
etc.), but it also needs constant explanation and glossing (the body is mate-
rial, yes, but it is also discursive; what comes first, the body or our idea of the 
body, etc.). The ease with which body takes a definite article—The Body—is 
a testament to how naturalized and seemingly self-evident its existence as a 
thing is, and to how we take for granted the body’s epistemic accessibility and 
a certain democratization of experience (the body—now here’s something that 
everyone has and experiences).11 We think we know our bodies, we think we 
know what our body is in our inhabiting it—we know it to be different from 
all those other bodies around us that we don’t inhabit but come into contact 
with, and yet we know it to also be very like those other bodies. We want con-
flicting things from the body: we want it to be treatable in material terms and 
to exceed materiality.12 We want the body to be both immanence and tran-
scendence, signifier and signified, to be us and to be separate from us. The 
body seems completely contingent, and yet we deploy it as if it were somehow 
a stable thing, and the many metaphorized uses of the body—the body politic, 
the social body, a literary or artistic body of work, a body of water—speaks to 
identity clothes we wear. Rather than lose ourselves, we become more ourselves as unbounded 
subjectivities; rather than stop meaning, we mean more.
 11. We can see this in scholarly work on the body that foregrounds the body in titles, as 
with Bordo, Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body; Suleiman, ed., The Female Body in West-
ern Culture; Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body; and Canning, Historical Perspectives on Bodies, 
Class, and Citizenship, to name just a few. The body is never accompanied by a question mark 
in the title but is taken as a graspable object of examination.
 12. A now classic case of this desire to reconcile the body as materiality with the body as 
a discursive site is Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter (New York: Routledge, 1993).
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its ability to be treated as stable even if it is anything but. If we can reach any 
sort of consensus about our conceptualization of the body, it would seem to 
be that the body is a contested site for signification, but one that, despite the 
proliferation of discourses of, on, and around the body, takes the body as an 
experiential site of sensation.
To use mathematical terms, we treat the body with precision but not with 
accuracy. We complicate the body in myriad ways, but do so after appending 
the before it to pin it down so that we might be able to complicate it, unable 
to do so without that act of fixing it. And in fixing it, we theorize the body’s 
effects and its operations, but not what it is.13 The body, because of our inabil-
ity to separate ourselves from it, because of its constant presence in all our 
activities, whether welcome or not, frustrates our attempts at analysis and 
critique. Thankfully, for my purposes, I’m not trying to come up with yet 
another theorization of the body, nor to weigh in on the various theoretical 
models we have, but rather, to show how a new poetics comes to light when 
we allow language to get in on body as well, when we take body of language 
not as metaphor but as description.
We can compare the non-human body of language that founds the poetics 
of unbecoming with other approaches to language’s corporeality, which tend 
to take corporeality metaphorically or anthropocentrically: in the Christian 
tenet of holding that Christ is the Word made Flesh, the Word takes on human 
flesh, so that it doesn’t have a body proper to it. In Derrida’s reflections on 
language as prosthesis in Monolinguisme de l’autre, ou, la prothèse d’origine 
[Monolingualism of the Other, or, The Prosthesis of Origin], the idea of pros-
thesis takes the human body as its point of reference, thus mapping language 
onto the human. The Canadian poet Daphne Marlatt treats language as a body 
to striking effect in her essay “Musings with Mothertongue,” and writes that 
language is “a living body we enter at birth, [which] sustains and contains 
us. it does not stand in place of anything else, it does not replace the bodies 
around us. [. . .] it is both place (where we are situated) and body (that con-
tains us), that body of language we speak, our mothertongue. it bears us as 
we are born into it, into cognition.”14 This body, even as it is described as not 
standing in place of anything else, or replacing the human bodies around us, 
is still described in maternal terms, which has the effect of maintaining the 
anthropocentric angle and attributing human functions and relational forms 
 13. In this respect, we treat the body much as the linguistic turn treats language. That is, 
primarily through its effects: the linguistic turn attends to discourse, which is certainly a form 
and a use of language, one that emphasizes how language circulates in society and the effects it 
has in socializing humans, while passing over language in its non-discursive forms.
 14. Marlatt, “Musings with Mothertongue,” 53.
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to it. The French Symbolist poet, Stéphane Mallarmé, came up with the idea 
of écriture corporelle [corporeal writing], as embodied by dance, which takes 
the human body in movement as a kind of writing, or language, a notion that’s 
been taken up by other writers, such as the American poet Paul Auster.15 But 
in this line of thought, the body replaces the usual signifiers of language, and 
such a replacement is antithetical to the autonomy and distinctness that Sar-
raute, Wittig, and Garréta attribute to language in their writing, where lan-
guage cannot be replaced by anything: it is only ever itself. Marie-Ève Mathieu 
proposes that when we read, the human body becomes language, corps langa-
gier, roughly translatable to linguistic (language-y) body, which is what makes 
a relationship between reader and writer mediated by the text possible.16 This 
inverts the expected dynamic, decentering the human, but this vision of a 
human-language effaces the difference between human and language.
Postcolonial writing has also provided much rich material on the role and 
operation of language, as its writers have had to contend with an imposed, 
obligatory multilingualism, which often results in considerations of the rela-
tionship between body and language, as both are caught up in colonialism. 
Abdelkebir Khatibi, for instance, attends to the intimate imbrication of body 
and language, when he writes, “But the mother tongue, which is opened [qui 
est entamé], cannot disappear from the body’s syntax.”17 But here again, the 
human body is the primary focus, and despite the inextricability of the one 
from the other, the human body remains the point of reference, and language’s 
corporeality is integrated into human corporeality.
More recently, new materialisms, animated by a potent posthumanism, 
have turned away from language as the ultimate form of anthropocentrism to 
take up instead the material and the real, eschewing epistemology in favor of 
ontology, knowledge and representation in favor of existence and experience. 
Even a new materialist who is interested in language, as is Mel Chen, trained 
as a cognitive linguist, stops short of according language the sort of vital body 
that Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta do. Chen seeks to counter new materialist 
“moves to evacuate substance from language, for instance, the notion that 
language is simply dematerialized”18 and treats sign language as an exemplary 
case of language’s materiality, where the body, in all its materiality, is language. 
In language reminiscent of Wittig’s, Chen writes:
 15. See Abecassis, “Montaigne in Brooklyn.”
 16. Mathieu, “Des corps textuels,” 118.
 17. Khatibi, Maghreb pluriel, 199.
 18. Chen, Animacies, 51.
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Language is as much alive as it is dead, and it is certainly material. For 
humans and others, spoken and signed speech can involve the tongue, vocal 
tract, breath, lips, hands, eyes, and shoulders. It is a corporeal, sensual, 
embodied act. It is, by definition, animated. [. . .] Words more than signify, 
they affect and effect. Whether read or heard, they complexly pulse through 
bodies (live or dead), rendering their effects in feeling and active response.19
The only body that is recognized in Chen’s description of an alive language 
is a human or animal one. Language is accorded materiality, vitality, and 
agency, but it lacks a body proper to it, and it is not recognized as an entity 
with which humans can enter into a relationship. That is, Chen is concerned 
with the way language can affect and effect, but not so much with the way 
language is itself affected and effected. But it is precisely this reciprocity that 
exists between language’s non-human body and ours that is at the core of the 
poetics of unbecoming.
In looking at Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta’s writing, what emerges are 
scenes of writing that are confrontations between the writer—necessarily 
embodied even if that body loses its fleshly materiality when we as readers 
access the writer through the words on the page—and language as similarly 
endowed with a body, albeit a body that is not a human body, but a body that 
is a body insofar as it is responsive, a material manifestation that constitutes a 
site of experience and a point of contact and interface with the human bodies 
of the writer (and of the reader, who comes afterward). At this point, one may 
wonder why I insist on language’s corporeality over and beyond its materiality, 
given that there are non-corporeal materials that can respond to stimuli and 
serve as stimuli. I do so partly because Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta use the 
language of corporeality to write of language, and I want to take that seriously, 
as being more than just a rhetorical device, and partly because of the deeply 
affective dimension of these writers’ relationship to language, which is expe-
rienced as reciprocal. And affect, as affect theorists have convincingly argued, 
belongs to the realm of the somatic.20
The body of language with which Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta enter into 
a passionate corps-à-corps21 is not as easily apprehensible as the bodies of those 
writers: we’ve seen their bodies in photos, heard their voices in person or in 
 19. Chen, 53–54.
 20. See Reber, Coming to Our Senses, in particular, the introduction, “Headless Capitalism,” 
for a complex and wide-ranging account and interrogation of affect as soma and the conse-
quences thereof for and in capitalism.
 21. Corps-à-corps is difficult to translate into English: literally, it means body-to-body, and 
it signifies both hand-to-hand combat and lovemaking. In either case, what we have are bodies 
in close contact with one another.
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recordings. We don’t question their embodiment because it takes the same 
form as ours in our mortal fleshliness. In reading Sarraute, Wittig, and Gar-
réta, we gain access to the body of language through hearsay (or rather, read-
say). That is, the confrontation these writers have with the body of language 
takes place offstage, and even the writers themselves can only attest to the con-
frontation after the fact. In this sense, the writers love and desire language in 
a situation of asymmetrical revelation akin to the relationship between Cupid 
and Psyche, where Psyche loved and was loved by Cupid, but with the con-
dition of being unable to look upon or identify him through anything but 
physical contact. If we are to experience the body of language ourselves, it will 
only be through undertaking the difficult task of entering le chantier littéraire.
One final caveat: as with most theoretical proposals, the final truth-value 
of a claim cannot be readily proved or disproved. As with difference, the claim 
that language has or is a body is disputable. Some may find language’s embod-
iedness persuasive, and others not at all. However, what’s clear is that in their 
writing, Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta articulate a relationship to language that 
treats language as if it has a body, and take that body as something other than 
a human or animal body—language’s body turns out to be proper to language. 
This stance of as if is what’s interesting and theoretically productive. In the 
end, it doesn’t matter whether language has or doesn’t have a body—that isn’t 
what’s really at stake. What’s at stake is that when one writes, as do Sarraute, 
Wittig, and Garréta, in relationship to and with a language that’s experienced 
as corporeal, autonomous, vital, and alive, it creates a space for a feminist 
poetics of unbecoming, for a writing that can forego difference while still 
holding on to desire as the motor for all creation.
SARRAUTE: THE TROPISM’S SUBSTANCE VIVANTE
Sarraute kept writing the same thing throughout her long career of nearly 
seven decades. Each of the works that comprise her corpus pursues the tro-
pism, which she has described as a substance vivante [living substance]. This 
immediately implicates corporeality, as to qualify as alive is, in our current 
understandings of biology, to have a body. Though she never explicitly states 
that tropismic language is endowed with a body, the body of Sarraute’s sub-
stance vivante is something we encounter, again, as in the case of Cupid and 
Psyche, through its effects on the human body of the writer. For Sarraute, the 
tropism and the reality that it constitutes are invisible, like the invisible bodies 
of the microorganisms that inhabit the world around us, and while Sarraute 
may not be able to show us the body of this substance that exists outside our 
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perceptive capacities, she works to enable us to ascertain its presence through 
its acting upon us.
In her essay “Roman et réalité” [“The Novel and Reality”], Sarraute 
describes tropismic reality as follows:
For the novelist, reality is the unknown, the invisible. It’s what he feels he is 
the first and the only one to see; what doesn’t allow itself to be expressed by 
forms that are known and already in use. But that requires, in order to come 
to light, a new mode of expression, new forms. [. . .]
It’s something made up of scattered elements—which we perceive and sense 
very vaguely—of amorphous elements that lie there, deprived of existence, 
lost in the infinite mass of possibilities, of virtualities, melted into a magma, 
imprisoned in the crust of the visible, suffocated under the already seen, 
under banality and convention.22
Sarraute conceives her writing practice here as seeking to bring back to life 
this unknown reality, this tropismic language that’s been killed by the con-
ventional forms of language that proliferate as its most visible manifestation. 
The tropism, and the reality that it undergirds, is like a species that has been 
endangered and whose very existence has been occluded by the overpopula-
tion of conventional, banal language that dominates this ecosystem of signifi-
cation and experience. The writer must make space for this species of substance 
vivante through the construction of a new form. Sarraute’s writing, then, can 
be thought of as an act of linguistic habitat creation and preservation.
Sarraute sees the tropism as a mass of infinite possibility that is trapped 
by social conventions—by the more easily accessed, dead and deadening lan-
guage of the immediate world, which immobilizes it. She further elaborates 
the crucial role that form plays in liberating the tropism from the tyranny of 
the regime of the visible, the goes-without-saying, the self-evident, the already 
signified, the conventional: “Only form makes them exist. Without form, [the 
tropism’s elements] are nothing. But—and here’s the important point—the 
reverse is true: form is nothing without them.”23 The tropism is thus compos-
ite, like lichen, which is a single entity created from the joining of algae and 
fungus, or the human body, which is the site of populations of incredible bio-
diversity such as the bacteria that occupy our gastrointestinal tracts.24
 22. Sarraute, Œuvres complètes, 1644.
 23. Sarraute, 1645.
 24. Obviously, this metaphor has its limits, as form is not a living entity, but the point is 
that two different entities can fuse together to constitute another entity, that one life-form can 
be more than one, or, as Irigaray might put it, a life that is not one.
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The tropism, though irreducible to language, cannot be experienced sepa-
rately from language and is caught up in an automatic and necessary relation-
ship similar to the one we as humans have with our bodies. We’re more than 
just our bodies—a dissection or analysis of our body, hormones, brain chem-
istry, or histological constitution cannot fully account for the emotions and 
thoughts that drive us to make our lives and our persons what they are—but 
we cannot experience life except as embodied beings. Similarly, the tropismic 
reality that is the raison d’être of her writing is not itself language, although 
it’s what animates and constitutes language. Sarraute’s description of the tro-
pism as sous-conversation, existing in a layer of psychic reality just beneath 
conversation, is instructive. Conversation, as an inherently intersubjective 
and communicative deployment of language, is in the realm of speech. To 
have a conversation with someone is to experience language as speech. The 
tropism, as it exists beneath or before conversation, and as it’s experienced 
instinctually—before thought, before cognitive processes of understanding—
can be thought of as a becoming-language, caught before it has become trans-
formed, through a social and intersubjective interaction, into speech, into 
language meant for others. The tropism is an about-to-be-language that arises 
in response to the social, to being treated as a subject, but it’s experienced 
internally by a subjectivity without contours, which is how Sarraute figures 
the subjective site of tropismic activity.
In text after text, Sarraute painstakingly and meticulously tracks the tro-
pism to show that we cannot experience the tropism outside its incarnation 
in language, which is immanently physical, possessing texture, weight, and 
tone. Sarraute’s œuvre attests that language, if it is to transmit sensation and 
experience to us, as Sarraute would have her writing do, cannot bypass our 
physical senses. In an essay on the language memoir, Alice Kaplan speaks to 
the power that language has to shape us: “Language is the place where our 
bodies and minds collide, where our groundedness in place and time and 
our capacity for fantasy and invention must come to terms.”25 To experience 
language in its transformative potential, the body must be as fully mobilized 
as the mind. Sarraute goes one step further in asserting the importance of the 
body, however. For her, not only the human body, but the body of language 
as well, must be mobilized.
Sarraute’s texts all bear witness to the corporeal dimension of human 
encounters with language, and her autobiographical novel, Enfance (1983), is 
exemplary in this regard. With its vivid accounts of multilingualism, which 
stage her movement between Russian and French, Enfance treats the different 
way each language acts upon the body. In a passage where Sarraute compares 
 25. Kaplan, “On Language Memoir,” 64.
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her French to her father’s French, her accent-less French “r” and his Russian-
inflected one, and her Russian to his, she describes the physical requirements 
for being able to produce this Russian “R”: “Il me rend la pareille en me fai-
sant prononcer comme il faut le ‘r’ russe, je dois appuyer contre mon palais 
puis déplier le bout retroussé de ma langue . . .” [He gets his own back when 
he teaches me to pronounce the Russian “r” properly, I must curl up the tip of 
my tongue and press it against my palate, then uncurl it . . .].26 The difference 
between langue as language and as tongue is elided as Sarraute stages language 
as a positioning and an action of the tongue: langue coincides with langue, and 
language appears to inhabit the human body as its own.
Sarraute plays with the coincidence of language and tongue in a particu-
larly poignant episode where Natacha (Nathalie’s Russian name), just eight 
years old, is on the train from her mother’s home in St. Petersburg to her 
father’s home in Paris. Natacha is distressed by this departure, which would 
end up being her last, with Sarraute’s mother abandoning her daughter to her 
ex-husband’s custody. To console herself and manage the emotional pain of 
this rupture, Natacha plays with the two languages at her disposal, French 
and Russian, and Sarraute describes the respective corporeal configurations 
each entails:
Par moments ma détresse s’apaise, je m’endors. Ou bien je m’amuse à scander 
sur le bruit des roues toujours les mêmes deux mots .  .  . venus sans doute 
des plaines ensoleillées que je voyais par la fenêtre . . . le mot français soleil 
et le même mot russe solntze où le l se prononce à peine, tantôt je dis sol-
ntze, en ramassant et en avançant les lèvres, le bout de ma langue incurvée 
s’appuyant contre les dents de devant, tantôt so-leil en étirant les lèvres, la 
langue effleurant à peine les dents. Et de nouveau sol-ntze. Et de nouveau 
so-leil. Un jeu abrutissant que je ne peux pas arrêter. Il s’arrête tout seul et 
les larmes coulent. (1048)
[Now and then my distress abates, I fall asleep. Or else, I amuse myself by 
chanting the same two words in time with the sound of the wheels . . . always 
the same two words which came, no doubt, from the sunlit plains I could 
see out of the window . . . the French word soleil and the same word in Rus-
sian, solntze, in which the ‘l’ is hardly pronounced, sometimes I say sol-ntze, 
pulling back and pushing out my lips, with the tip of my curled-up tongue 
pressing against my front teeth, and sometimes, so-leil, stretching my lips, 
my tongue barely touching my teeth. And then again, sol-ntze. And then 
 26. Sarraute, Œuvres complètes, 1012; Sarraute, Childhood, 36. All subsequent references 
will be made in-text.
176 •  C H A P T E R 4 
again, so-leil. A mind-destroying game which I can’t stop. It stops of its own 
accord, and the tears flow.] (94–95)
The alternation between solntze and soleil entails physical configurations of 
contact and absence, of the tongue pushed up against the front teeth (contact) 
and the tongue barely touching them (absence), of the lips gathered together 
(contact) and the lips stretched out, apart from each other (absence). For Sar-
raute, what starts off as an exercise in referentiality—Natacha looks outside 
her window, sees the sun on the fields, and begins to pronounce the words 
solntze and soleil that seem to index the light hitting the snow outside—winds 
up an exercise in creation, in the transmission of sensation that is at the heart 
of her literary project. No longer do the words for sun refer to the sun, but 
they create the sensations of contact and absence—language uses the body, 
which produces it, to figure contact and absence.
Natacha’s multiple languages constitute different ways of inhabiting her 
body, and these different physical postures in turn indicate different affective 
registers of connection and disconnection, contact and absence. In pairing 
solntze and soleil, Russian and French, Sarraute is able to bring together body 
and mind, fully mobilizing each to permit a negotiation of a painful reality: 
it’s no coincidence that it’s Russian, Natacha’s mother tongue, that brings the 
parts of her mouth together and models contact and presence, while French, 
this foreign tongue in a foreign place that imposes distance between her and 
her mother, separates her lips and the parts of her mouth in a configuration 
of absence. I would wager that if the demands soltnze and soleil made on the 
body were different, such that the Russian would enact absence while French 
enacted presence, that this episode would not be part of Enfance.27
My examination of Enfance thus far would seem fairly basic in its treat-
ment of language’s corporeality. No one would dispute that language is cor-
poreal: speaking is a physical process that involves our lungs, tongue, and 
teeth; reading is a physical process where we use our eyes (or our fingers, in 
the case of Braille) to make out words; writing is a physical process where 
we use our hands to grasp the pen or type at our computers. Thus far we’ve 
seen language as a product of human corporeality, but Sarraute goes further: 
her corpus demonstrates the way language has its own corporeality. Here, the 
analogy of the human body and its relationship to the microorganisms who 
 27. While this passage might readily evoke the famous account of Freud’s grandson’s game 
of fort-da, where he throws a spool and pulls it back in an attempt to cope with the trauma of 
maternal absence, I don’t want to impose a psychoanalytic reading on her, as both the uncon-
scious and the difference that are foundational to psychoanalysis are concepts that I’m working 
without and against.
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inhabit it reemerges as a useful one, demonstrating how a body can be part 
of another body while still having its own body. Sarraute doesn’t conceive of 
language’s autonomy as meaning that it can have an existence apart from that 
of the human that is its source,28 but she treats language’s having a body as a 
necessary condition for its being able to enter into contact with our embodied 
selves. The logic goes something like this: since the transmission, or rather, 
re-creation, of sensation is the goal of her writing, and because sensation is 
necessarily somatic, for language to operate on the level of sensation, it must 
also be somatic, corporeal.
We can see this idea of the necessarily embodied encounter between lan-
guage and the human in Sarraute’s reflection on writing as the process of lis-
tening to language: “Because when I write, I listen. I always listen to each 
word and the same goes for when I say things. Everything I say, I hear, I 
always hear words, I always hear them internally, I hear the rhythm, I hear 
the words—besides, it’s like that when I read, I always read while hearing the 
text.”29 For Sarraute, dealing with the written word means taking it off the 
two-dimensional page and into the three-dimensional space of her body. To 
produce or receive language is to feel the way a word sounds—its rhythm, 
weight, timbre, and tone. If reading is the way we can see language, hearing 
(and speaking) is a way we can touch language, our body entering into contact 
with its body. Sarraute speaks in general terms here of what Wittig articulates 
specifically in Le Chantier littéraire as the mutual imbrication of human and 
linguistic corporeality:
Pour en revenir aux métaphores qui sont utilisées pour la parole: il y a des 
verbes comme toucher, frapper, choquer, fracasser, commotionner [. . .]. La 
métaphore de l’action de ces verbes concernant les paroles peut qualifier 
les mots écrits aussi bien, tels qu’on peut se les imaginer toucher la vue. Le 
plan visuel se prête aussi bien que l’espace sonore à l’actualisation du lan-
gage où il lui permet de se réverbérer à la fois sur la page et derrière l’œil 
dans le cerveau et ses agents, à l’infini, sous les formes cryptiques, les plus 
emblématiques, les plus abstraites, dans un échange obscur et secret avec la 
conscience. C’est sans doute cette dimension de leur réalité qui est la moins 
connue. C’est-à-dire ce qu’un mot accomplit dans la conscience par sa forme 
 28. Ouvrez (1997), Sarraute’s last published work, does come close, however, by erasing the 
human and social context for language as much as possible to stage the myriad dramas and 
conflicts that exist between words. Individual words are the primary actors, but the human is 
not completely eliminated, simply moved off stage, similar to the way adults are removed from 
the world of Charlie Brown in the comic strip Peanuts, a removal that in no way means that 
adults are nonexistent.
 29. Sarraute, Lecture.
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matérielle, la plus brute, la plus dénuée de sens, la plus concrète et la plus 
abstraite à la fois (chaque mot en soi un Cheval de Troie) [. . .].
[To return to those metaphors used for spoken words: there are verbs like 
touch, hit, shock, smash, disconcert, rattle [. . .]. The metaphor of the action 
of these verbs about words can apply to written words as well, as one can 
imagine them impacting one’s sight. The visual field lends itself as well as 
the acoustic field does to actualizing language: each permits language to 
reverberate endlessly, at once on the page and behind the eye in the brain 
and its agents, in an obscure and secret exchange with consciousness in the 
most cryptic, emblematic, abstract forms. It is undoubtedly the least known 
aspect of their reality. That is, it is what a word accomplishes in the con-
sciousness through its material form, which is at the same time the most 
crude, the most meaningless, the most concrete and abstract (each word in 
itself a Trojan horse).]30
Wittig’s reference to the dark and secretive exchange that language has with 
consciousness (which brings us back to Kaplan’s assertion that language is 
where body meets mind), makes the point that human physicality enables 
language to be meaningful (without our bodies, we cannot read, write, hear, 
or speak—activities necessary to experiencing language as meaningful). Con-
versely, language’s physicality enables human physicality to become meaning-
ful—to attain consciousness. When we make sense of language, either from 
having read or heard it, the words enter our bodies and have an impact on our 
minds before the latter imbues them with meaning: the physicality of language 
does work on us before we do work on it. Having a physical encounter with 
language isn’t optional, something we can opt out of. It is thus incumbent on 
us to make sense of the implications of that physical encounter.
At this point, one might concede the point about language’s physicality 
and materiality, but still not consent to the idea of language having a body. 
Sure, language can act on our bodies because it’s material, but isn’t it unrea-
sonable to impute to language a body and agency? Or, in a slightly different 
vein, one might consent to language’s body and agency, but only in metaphori-
cal and figurative terms, where language is consigned to a relationship of simi-
larity or analogy to corporeality and never allowed to have it. This is where 
Sarraute’s novel, Entre la vie et la mort [Between Life and Death], can show the 
importance of language’s being granted a body and agency, above and beyond 
its physical and material reality. In this novel, Sarraute writes from a position 
 30. Wittig, Le Chantier littéraire, 107–8.
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of dead seriousness about language as a living thing, as it is through language’s 
life that the tropism, and Sarraute’s entire corpus, is validated.
Entre la vie et la mort (1968), Sarraute’s fifth novel, takes up the question 
of what’s at stake in writing, where the life and death evoked in the title is that 
of language. At this point in her career, Sarraute had already ascended to a 
position of literary influence and legitimacy after the publication of L’Ère du 
soupçon in 1956 and her incorporation into the New Novel. Between then and 
Entre la vie et la mort, she had published Le Planétarium (1959) and Les Fruits 
d’or (1963), and branched out into theater with two plays written for radio, 
Le Silence (1964) and Le Mensonge (1966), published together by Gallimard 
in 1967. In 1968, Sarraute enjoyed critical acclaim. In Entre la vie et la mort, 
however, she casts a critical eye on the position a writer occupies in society, 
and deconstructs literary success and fame. In the face of her own success, 
Sarraute reiterates her first loyalty to writing and language above all. Entre la 
vie et la mort pushes the limits of genre by presenting as a novel what reads 
as an ars poetica. Because of how un-novelistic the novel appears to be, Sar-
raute has to remind her reader in the “Prière d’insérer” that Entre la vie et la 
mort is in fact a novel and “n’est nullement [.  .  .] un art poétique” [is in no 
way an ars poetica]31 despite the extended reflections on writing and language 
that characterize it. Eschewing events, actions, and characters, Sarraute helps 
us understand the writing process as she envisions it by dramatizing the two 
possible paths a writer can take.
One path is characterized by a torturous solitude that leads to being 
received with incomprehension or derision by both readers and other writers 
who don’t understand or believe in living tropismic language. It’s a path where 
the writer must be their own reader in order to be understood, alienated from 
others but able to participate in the life of the text and interact with the words 
that are its living bodies. The other is a path of empty sociality, paved with the 
cadavers of a lifeless text—“un champ jonché de cadavres” [a field littered with 
cadavers]32—whose language has been killed through conventional forms, cli-
chés, and facile aesthetic conformity. But it’s a path that can lead to acclaim by 
readers and entry into the society of Writers—into a Literary Life based not on 
working with language to create a living text but on performing Writerly-ness, 
fulfilling the public’s expectations and preconceived notions of what a Writer 
is. It’s the path of a writer motivated not by his relationship to language but 
rather by human sociality and status.
 31. Sarraute, Œuvres complètes, 1831.
 32. Sarraute, 729.
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In Entre la vie et la mort, Sarraute depicts the writer’s task and the process 
of literary creation, and what an enormous burden it is. In Sarraute’s case, 
this burden is also a privilege: critics and writers, then as now, recognize Sar-
raute’s singular ability to delve into this area of reality where language and the 
innermost parts of the human psyche commingle and form each other.33 Sar-
raute is a pioneer, a tropism whisperer who has privileged access to this living 
substance that she discovered, able to interact with, perceive, and represent 
it unlike any other writer before or after her.34 Poised between language’s life 
and death, Sarraute stays with the tropism, and through her careful working 
and reworking of language, serves as an intermediary. She turns herself into a 
medium for the tropism, between life (the tropism) and death (conventional 
language), working to render the former accessible to readers.
Sarraute takes the question of literary and aesthetic creation (treated from 
the reader’s perspective six years earlier in Les Fruits d’or) and approaches 
it from the writer’s side. She depicts the writer’s experience of writing, the 
writer’s consciousness as it is situated in language not yet written, not yet fixed 
into sentences on the printed page. Throughout the novel, Sarraute features 
scenes of writing, which are not to be confused with images of a writer. She 
isn’t interested in drawing up a portrait of The Writer at Work, and the mono-
lithic identity that the definite article implies, nor is she interested in drawing 
a portrait of a writer, and the particular and concrete identity that the indefi-
nite article implies. Instead, she presents contradictory narratives of writing 
so that the reader cannot give in to the temptation to create a character out of 
the experiences being presented by assigning them to one individual history 
or person. The focus of the novel is not the story of a writer, but rather, the 
dynamic, affectively fraught relationship that exists between writer and living 
language.
In Entre la vie et la mort, Sarraute characterizes language in a dizzying 
number of ways, moving from one mode of sensation to another to keep 
up with language’s movements. We could characterize Sarraute’s distinction 
between living language and dead language as follows: living language is made 
up of the substance vivante of the tropism and as such is always in move-
ment, and if it’s to be experienced as living, it must be apprehended sensori-
ally in the moment, not conceptually after the fact. This mobility makes such 
language resistant to conventional narration, which flattens (and thus kills) 
 33. See Mauriac, L’Allitérature, 321; Ann Jefferson, “Notice” to Entre la vie et la mort in Sar-
raute, Œuvres complètes, 1830; Wittig, Le Chantier littéraire, 69–70.
 34. To paraphrase Wittig’s critique of psychoanalysis, one could say Sarraute finds the tro-
pism because she invents and puts it there, but that in no way lessens the fact that Sarraute 
remains the foremost—indeed, the only—writer of the tropism.
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language, turning it into a medium that can convey experience after the fact, 
or narrate, by being converted from a sensorial experience of the present into 
bits of textual data that speak of a moment already passed.35 Another distinc-
tion we could make is that living language eludes mastery—it has agency and 
autonomy—while dead language has been domesticated by the human, and 
killed in the process.
In the earlier parts of the novel, Sarraute emphasizes language’s mobil-
ity and materiality by treating it as a germ, microbe, and virus—something 
microscopic, vaporous, or unseen—that works its way into your body; as a 
growing plant that needs to be transplanted into fertile soil; as an animal that 
needs to be captured alive:
Des mots surgis de n’importe où, poussière flottant dans l’air que nous respi-
rons, microbes, virus . . . on est tous menacés. [. . .] Des mots très ordinaires, 
si je vous les répétais vous vous moqueriez de moi, et pourtant ils ont péné-
tré en moi, ils se sont incrustés, je ne peux plus m’en débarrasser, ils enflent, 
ils appuient . . .
[Words sprung from just anywhere, dust floating in the air we breathe, 
microbes, viruses . . . we’re all threatened. Very ordinary words, if I repeated 
them to you, you would laugh at me, and yet they entered into me, they 
became encrusted, I can’t get rid of them, they are swelling, pressing . . .]36
Il faut capter cela, ce mouvement, l’isoler, chercher .  .  . n’est-il pas possible 
pour qu’il se reproduise avec plus de netteté et se développe de créer ces 
conditions plus favorables? . . . le faire passer ailleurs, dans d’autres images 
mieux assemblées, d’autres paroles ou intonations, comme on transplante 
une pousse sauvage dans un terrain amélioré, enrichi de terreau, nourri d’en-
grais, dans un lieu bien clos, une serre où sera maintenue constamment une 
température appropriée? . . . (666–67)
[This movement must be caught, we must isolate it, try . . . wouldn’t it be pos-
sible in order for it to recur more clearly and evolve, to create more favorable 
conditions? . . . to insert it elsewhere, among other, better assembled images, 
other words or intonations, the way we transplant a wild shoot in improved 
 35. Sarraute refers elsewhere to her work as akin to that of a slow-motion effect in cinema, 
where she, rather than pinning down the tropism, which would kill it, is able to slow it down 
enough to allow the lay reader to perceive it. Sarraute, Œuvres complètes, 1554.
 36. Sarraute, Œuvres completes, 654; Sarraute, Between Life and Death, 52. All subsequent 
references will be made in-text.
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earth, enriched with loam, fortified with fertilizer, in an enclosed spot, a 
hothouse in which the appropriate temperature is constantly maintained? 
. . .] (72)
C’est là, comme une bête vivante, lovée sur elle-même, chaude, qui respire, 
palpite doucement, l’œil mi-clos, prête à se dérouler . . . ils vont s’en appro-
cher, surpris, inquiets . . . ils vont la toucher . . .  (678)
[It’s there, like a live animal curled up to itself, which breathes, gently pul-
sates, eyes half-closed, about to uncurl . . . they are going to touch it . . .] (92)
Sarraute uses these metaphors to convey, in as many different ways as pos-
sible, that language is not just material but alive, or at least, to be treated as 
such. The categories that we have for classifying biological life are inadequate 
to the task of classifying language’s living-ness, hence Sarraute’s moving from 
the microbiological to the vegetal to the animal, leaving each behind in a rest-
less attempt to find ways of expressing what sort of life language has. While 
Sarraute might succeed in conveying language’s vitality by enabling readers to 
experience the sensations that living, tropismic language provokes, she doesn’t 
come up with a new category of life to account for a language she cannot treat 
as anything but alive. In these iterations of language’s materiality, which occur 
toward the novel’s beginning, Sarraute emphasizes the effects language has on 
the (human) body to insist on the foreignness of language. She defamiliarizes 
this thing that, through its assimilation with the act of human communica-
tion, has become so completely subordinated to the human that it’s thought of 
as an immanently human thing, an extension of our human selves. Sarraute 
pushes against this overly familiar relationship with language by asserting that 
language isn’t merely an instrument of communication but something com-
pletely other. While Sarraute might not come up with a category that seems 
adequate to describe language (and why would she, when her work is anti-cat-
egorical and her evocations of these other categories of life results in placing 
language outside them?), she maintains that language, far from being simply a 
human invention, is so different as to be of an entirely different species.
In much the same way that humans can master and manipulate life on 
the cellular level with innovations in biomedical technology, dominate animal 
life through hunting, and control and cultivate plant life through botanical 
and horticultural knowledge, they can also exercise some degree of control 
over the foreign substance of language. But, just as there are microbes and 
viruses against which humans are helpless, wild animals that remain outside 
the purview of animal husbandry, and plants that grow against our will or in 
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no relation to it, language can never be fully tamed or possessed by humans. 
If anything, language winds up having the last word in the novel. By setting 
up language as so other, Sarraute is better able to convey that language’s life 
is its own, and not a reflection or a projection of our human life. She must 
first make this rupture between language, the defining quality of humanity,37 
and humanness, to ensure that we understand language’s autonomy. Once she 
makes this rupture, she’s able to move on in the later parts of the novel to 
treating language in terms that are less antagonistic and more passionate, and 
do not depend on a dynamic of possession or subjugation, although she will 
give plenty of examples of this sort of use of language in order to demonstrate 
what not to do. Sarraute strives not only to show how language is living, but 
also to show how writers can kill language, reducing it to static and lifeless 
forms.
Later in the novel, after having made the case for language’s alterity, Sar-
raute begins to refer to language in anthropomorphic ways, which promotes 
the idea of a relationship with language even in its foreignness. She accords 
language a consciousness that enables it not just to act on humans as a foreign 
body but to relate to them. In the earlier instances of this anthropomorphiza-
tion, the relationship is never conceived of as one of reciprocity or equality but 
one of writerly subservience to language:
[L’écrivain] est derrière les mots pareil à la vieille servante au visage gris, 
aux yeux, aux mains usés, qui tapote un pli de la robe aux lourdes broderies, 
redresse un nœud de moire, pique sur le corsage une fleur toute simple, tan-
dis que ses jeunes maîtresses s’impatientent, s’arrachent à ses mains, pren-
nent leur envol pour le bal. [. . .]
Les mots sont ses souverains. Leur humble sujet se sent trop honoré de leur 
céder sa maison. Qu’ils soient chez eux, tout est à eux ici, ils sont les seuls 
maîtres . . . Qu’ils s’abandonnent à leurs fantaisies de grands seigneurs, qu’ils 
étalent partout pour sa joie, pour sa fierté, leur désinvolture, leur insolence 
savamment concertée. (663)
[[The writer] stands behind the words like an old servant, gray of face, with 
worn eyes and hands, who pats the pleats of a heavily embroidered gown, 
 37. Language is widely held to demarcate the human from the nonhuman, as articulated by 
linguists like Émile Benveniste (see Benveniste, Problèmes de linguistique générale, 1:62, 259–60 
and philosophers like Martin Heidegger (in “Letter on Humanism,” he refers to the “human 
being as not only a living creature who possesses language along with other capacities. Rather, 
language is the house of being in which the human being ek-sists by dwelling, in that he belongs 
to the truth of being, guarding it.” Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill, 254.
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arranges a knot of moire ribbon, pins a single flower on a corsage, while her 
young mistresses grow impatient, escape from her hands, take their flight 
for the ball. [. . .]
Words are his sovereigns. Their humble subject feels only too honored to 
give up his home to them. They should make themselves at home, every-
thing is theirs, they are the only masters . . . Let them give free rein to their 
lordly imaginations, let them display elsewhere, to his joy, his pride, their 
off-handedness, their sophisticatedly concerted impertinence.] (67)
In each depiction of language here, as young mistresses whose beauty and 
energy stand in sharp contrast to the gray face and worn hands of the old 
servant woman representing the writer, and as a haughty feudal lord who can 
displace the writer and take over his home, language’s will and agency are cast 
as completely subsuming the writer’s. In each case, this submission is cast as 
positive, enabling the writer to derive joy from seeing language’s power and 
energy in action, from being chosen to provide language with what it wants. 
The writer here is satisfied with letting language take center stage.
As the novel progresses, however, the characterizations of language as sov-
ereign and writer as subservient fall away. These later descriptions are imbued 
with passion, and Sarraute writes about language in terms of love. For exam-
ple, after a particularly unpleasant interaction with other writers who deride 
the writer when they simply don’t understand the tropismic substance he’s 
pursuing, the writer sheds his former servility, replaced now by a protective, 
passionate, paternal indignation mixed with shame and humiliation:
Une fureur, une haine qu’enfle la souffrance, l’amour humilié—celle d’un 
père qui voit sa fille chérie, qu’il a amenée au bal, dédaignée de tous, faire 
tapisserie—le pousse à faire sortir d’ici, allons, ça suffit, il faut rentrer, la fête 
a assez duré .  .  . à trainer loin de leurs regards l’objet dérisoire de tant de 
soins, le porteur indigne de tant d’espoirs . . . à le dissimuler, qu’il disparaisse, 
surtout qu’on n’y pense plus, qu’on oublie. (679–80)
[Fury, hatred swollen by suffering, by humiliated love—the hatred of a father 
who sees his darling daughter whom he has brought to the dance, slighted by 
everybody, a wall-flower—impels him to remove from here, come now, that 
will do, we must go, the party has lasted long enough .  .  . to take far from 
their sight the absurd object of such solicitous care, the unworthy bearer of 
such fervent hope . . . to hide it, may it disappear, above all, they should not 
give it another thought, forget it.] (94)
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Language is no longer the writer’s master. Instead, a filial language is depicted 
as an extension of the humiliated progenitor: its success is his success, its fail-
ure falls equally on him. The relationship here is still not one of equality, as 
paternity entails authority over the (female) child, but unlike the previous 
relationships, this one isn’t founded exclusively on domination. We find an 
element of mutuality, derived from shared origins and kinships, that’s absent 
from those other hierarchical relationships. With the familial metaphor, Sar-
raute introduces the notion of commonality, which works to attenuate the 
absolute otherness invoked by her first metaphors of microbial, plant, and 
animal life-forms. Language is still other, just as a child is a separate person 
from their parent, but there’s reciprocity, an ability to see oneself in the other. 
Before, language simply acted on the writer, their relationship reduced to one 
of cause and effect, marked by disposability and interchangeability (a servant’s 
function can be carried out by another servant, a subject can be replaced with 
another subject). Now, the writer is able to identify with language and feel part 
of his own subjectivity caught up in how language is received by others. He’s 
imbricated with language, his life caught up with its.
As the novel progresses, Sarraute shifts terms again, this time replacing the 
familial metaphor with that of language as a friend or lover with whom the 
writer has fallen out of touch. This metaphor places language and the writer 
on equal footing, unlike the hierarchy of the father-daughter relationship:
Et tout d’un coup, c’est comme si dans la salle de bains tiède recouverte 
d’émail étincelant où il se détendait, trempant toujours plus amolli, plus affai-
bli dans l’eau mousseuse et parfumée, une petite fenêtre s’était entrouverte 
. . . Il perçoit, il reconnaît, montant d’une ruelle par-derrière, d’une arrière-
cour, des odeurs, des bruits familiers . . . relents de linge humide, de détritus 
. . . tumulte assourdi des disputes, injures, cris, taloches, rires, chants . . . cela 
monte vers lui de là-bas . . . où tout s’agite, foisonne, s’épand, s’abandonne, 
désordonné, informe, impur, innocent . . . Il faut s’arracher d’ici, courir, reve-
nir vers cela . . . Vers elle qui se tient là avec en elle ce vacillement, ce louche 
flageolement . . . il sent, tandis qu’il s’approche d’elle, cette avidité d’autrefois, 
cette humilité, cette tendresse . . . “Il y a des éternités . . . Je suis si content . . . 
Pourquoi ne se voit-on plus jamais? Quand pourrait-on se revoir? Bavarder 
un peu, comme on faisait dans le temps, dîner ensemble?” (721–22)
[And suddenly, in the warm, gleaming enameled bathroom, where he was 
relaxing, soaking away, getting limper, weaker every moment in the foamy, 
perfumed water, a little window had opened . . . It’s as though he recognized, 
rising from a little back street, from an inside courtyard, familiar odors, 
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sounds .  .  . whiffs of damp linen, garbage .  .  . a sort of muffled tumult of 
quarrels, insults, shouts, blows, laughter, singing . . . in which everything is 
in movement, swarming, it spreads out, lets itself go, disordered, formless, 
impure, innocent . . . He must tear himself away from here, hurry, return to 
that .  .  . To the thing that is waiting there, bearing in itself that wavering, 
that ambiguous trembling .  .  . he feels, as he approaches it, the old avidity, 
the humility, the affection . . . “It’s been ages . . . I’m so glad . . . Why do we 
never see each other anymore? When shall we meet again? To talk, the way 
we used to do, dine together?”] (163)38
The writer’s subjectivity, in isolation from living language, is deadened, over-
come by lassitude, such as one feels when soaking in a hot bath. Language, as 
it exists outside his subjectivity, represents the world, the energy and move-
ment (and conflict) that make up life. If the writer is to get out of the lulling 
warmth or security of his self-contained subjectivity and create, he must move 
toward language and engage with it in a relationship. Language is conceived 
of as a person who has a life of their own, and any interaction—seeing, speak-
ing, dining—that takes place does so because of a concerted effort to make 
time and space for it. In this scene, the writer recognizes that language is not 
an ever-present medium or material that can be taken for granted, at the dis-
posal of his whims and rhythms. Language will not come to or wait on him; 
he must go to it. Above all, language provokes a deep emotional response in 
the writer—tenderness, desire, humility—that is at the heart of his reaching 
out to it. This latest metaphor for language emphasizes affectivity and affinity 
as the foundation for the writer’s relationship with it, treating language not as 
some thing but someone.
Finally, at the end of the novel, after having taken the reader from lan-
guage as foreign life-form or body, to language as dominator, then ward, then 
friend or lover, Sarraute comes full circle and returns to the role of language in 
writing. After having communicated language’s alterity, power, vulnerability, 
and desirability, Sarraute returns to the question of how language operates in 
the chantier littéraire, and the last pages of the novel confront the reader with 
the decision the writer, and hence Sarraute, is constantly confronted with: 
to choose between living or dead language—the entre la vie et la mort of the 
novel’s title. The choice between two different kinds of writing is cast as a 
choice between two different kinds of bodies. In an illustration of what sort of 
body dead language has, Sarraute shows the writer betraying language and its 
 38. Jolas translates elle as “it,” but it could just as easily refer to a “she.”
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fragile vitality by starving it to make it fit into the clothes literary convention 
would have it wear:
[.  .  .] cette petite chose impalpable, timide, tremblante, qui chemine, pro-
gresse doucement, propulsant les mots, les faisant vibrer .  .  . qu’elle daigne 
juste se montrer . . . tout sera mis en œuvre pour la servir . . . et il a essayé 
de la dresser, veiller sa ligne, à se faire toute mince pour bien porter ces 
modèles de grand couturier, ces phrases qu’avec tant de soins, d’efforts il a 
dessinées, sobrement élégantes ou savamment désordonnées, ou brochées 
et chamarrées de mots somptueux . . . il lui a appris, lui aussi, comme tant 
d’autres, à s’effacer pour mieux les présenter, les mettre en valeur, et elle doit 
maintenant . . . il préfère ne pas aller regarder, il ne veut pas s’en assurer . . . 
d’ailleurs lui-même probablement ne verrait rien . . . elle doit avoir fini par 
acquérir la grâce anonyme et grêle, la désinvolture appliquée des manne-
quins . . . (721)
[.  .  .] that little intangible, timid, trembling thing, the thing that plods 
steadily along, progresses gently, propelling the words, making them vibrate 
.  .  . may her ladyship deign to make an appearance .  .  . everything will be 
done to serve her . . . and he had tried to train her, to teach her good man-
ners, he made her watch her figure, become very slender so as to look good 
in the models of the big dressmakers, in these sentences he designed with 
such care, such effort, soberly elegant or cleverly disordered, or brocaded 
and embroidered with sumptuous words . . . he also taught her, like so many 
others, to be self-effacing, the better to present them, to show them off, and 
now she must have . . . he prefers not to go and look, he doesn’t want to make 
sure of it . . . he himself, moreover, would probably see nothing . . . she must 
have ended by acquiring the anonymous, high-pitched grace, the studied 
offhandedness of mannequins . . .] (161–62)
The writer has violated the integrity of language’s body, turning it into an 
anorexic one, abusing it in the name of literary fashion and subduing its 
agency. Instead of respecting its will and desire, he has reduced language’s 
body to that of a beautiful, anonymous, and ultimately lifeless mannequin’s 
in order to dress it up in well-cut but unoriginal sentences.39 Sarraute, in a 
 39. French mannequin means both model and mannequin in English, but, given that a 
human model’s function is to be a walking mannequin, a walking object, the characteriza-
tion of the mannequin as lifeless—and Jolas’s choice of the English mannequin over model—
seems fair.
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moment of something resembling optimism, stops short of pronouncing that 
language dead, and proposes instead to resuscitate it:
Juste peut-être ici, on dirait qu’il y a comme une vibration, une pulsation 
.  .  . un pouls à peine perceptible bat .  .  . il faut se dépêcher avant qu’il soit 
trop tard, sinon il sait maintenant ce qui va arriver .  .  . les belles phrases 
vont s’assembler en une forme qui aura un jour l’aspect lugubre d’un champ 
jonché de cadavres où ceux qui viendront retrouveront partout des visages 
qui leur sont connus, où chacun pourra sans peine identifier ses morts . . .
Mais rien n’est encore perdu, et c’est encore là, encore tiède, vivant, il 
faut le dégager, l’arracher d’ici, faire éclater ces phrases rigides, briser ces 
formes parfaitement modelées . . . le ranimer, que cela se redresse, se déploie 
librement, rejetant tout ce qui l’entrave, sauf juste ici et là quelques fragments 
. . . (729–30)
[Just here, perhaps, there would seem to be a sort of vibration, a pulsation 
. . . a barely perceptible pulse is beating . . . he will have to hurry before it’s 
too late, if not, he knows now what will happen .  .  . the fine sentences are 
going to gather together in a form that one of these days will take on the 
lugubrious aspect of a field strewn with corpses, where at every turn the 
people who come there will find faces that are known to them, where every-
one will be able to identify with no trouble his own dead . . .
But nothing is lost yet, it’s still there, still warm, alive, it must be extri-
cated, torn away from here, those rigid sentences must be exploded, those 
perfectly modeled forms must be broken up . . . revive it, let it rise up, spread 
out freely, rejecting everything that impedes it, except just these few frag-
ments here and there . . .] (176)
Sarraute sets up a striking contrast between the wan, weak body of language 
as model, objectified and stripped of the tropism,40 and the warm, animated 
bodies of a language allowed freedom and agency. The life of language is based 
in its capacity to move, in both senses of the word, and its beauty comes not 
from how it measures up to literary trends or is received by the critical com-
munity of readers and writers, but from the relationship, necessarily intimate 
and private, that the writer can have with it.
 40. Elsewhere in the novel, Sarraute describes the deleterious effects of trying to separate 
or extract the tropism from language: “Il est impossible d’en arracher une parcelle sans que cela 
se vide de sa sève, de son sang” [It’s impossible to tear off a scrap of it without its losing its sap, 
its lifeblood] (678; 92).
 TO WA R D A P O E T I C S O F U N B E CO M I N G •  189
The writer’s choice entre la vie et la mort is this: does the writer go along 
with literary fashion, with what’s easily and widely received as a beautiful use 
of language, and instrumentalize language for his gain, or does he take the 
body of language, starved for the sake of “beauty,” and resuscitate it, bringing 
it back to health? Which is more important: being able to negotiate society 
as a Writer who is part of the confrérie of Writers who perform that identity 
and please the reader-consumers who buy (into) that identity when they buy 
books? Or exploring tropisms with and through a language that is a substance 
vivante, as equal partners in the quest for the life and reality found at the lim-
its of what human and language together are able to reach?
For Sarraute, in her dogged dedication to the tropism, there is only one 
choice: one must choose the language of life instead of leaving lifeless bod-
ies in one’s wake as victims to a culture of literary consumption. The closing 
paragraphs of Entre la vie et la mort act as a sort of vow of fidelity that the 
writer makes to language:
Il faut avoir la force de m’arracher à eux [the atropismic Writers], de me 
réveiller, de revenir à moi, il faut me boucher les oreilles, me pincer . . .
La suivre où elle voudra . . . Elle qui ne se laisse pas nommer . . . ce que je 
sens . . . moi seul . . . cette chose intacte, vivante . . . Je ne sais pas ce qu’elle 
est. Tout ce que je sais c’est que rien au monde ne peut me faire douter de 
sa présence. Bien que par les moments je la perde de vue si longtemps que 
je suis sur le point de flancher, de me laisser persuader qu’elle n’existe pas.
Je la cherche, agité, anxieux, partout où il est possible qu’elle se montre, 
qu’elle me fasse signe . . . de ces petits signes entre nous que personne d’autre, 
semble-t-il, ne perçoit. [.  .  .] Heureusement elle est là, elle le seul garant, 
le seul guide .  .  . elle s’impatiente, nous n’avons pas de temps à perdre .  .  . 
(733–74)
[I must have the strength to tear myself from them, to wake up, come to 
myself, I must stop my ears, pinch myself . . .
Follow it wherever it will .  .  . It, the unnameable .  .  . what I feel .  .  . this 
untouched, living thing . . . I don’t know what it is. All I know is that noth-
ing in the world can make me doubt its presence. Although at times I lose 
sight of it for so long that I am on the point of giving in, of letting myself be 
persuaded that it doesn’t exist.
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I look for it, upset, distressed, everywhere it might possibly appear, make me 
a sign . . . those little signs between us that no one else apparently, perceives. 
[. . .] Fortunately it’s there, the only guarantor, the only guide . . . it is grow-
ing impatient, we have no time to lose . . .] (181–83)
While there is only one choice to be made, it’s a difficult one, and Sarraute 
acknowledges the relative facility of choosing the other path to fame and suc-
cess, despite the costs to language. The writer who chooses to write because of 
language, and not such extraliterary objects, writes ultimately for himself. He 
does not turn his relationship with language into a spectacle to be consumed, 
thus objectifying and instrumentalizing it. Rather, he seeks out language, waits 
on it, follows it. Language here is akin to Dante’s Beatrice, a guide who, unlike 
the poet Virgil—the writer—can enter into Paradise. With this allusion, lan-
guage is cast as someone the writer must respect and love in order to reap the 
rich fruits of their complicity.
Despite staging the relationship between the writer and language as an 
intimate one, as a tête-à-tête (or, in Wittig’s terms, a corps-à-corps), Sarraute 
doesn’t want to limit the we in “we have no time to lose” to that dyad. The we 
here opens up onto other possible configurations of collectivity, as Sarraute 
ends the novel by directly invoking “vous mon double, mon témoin” (734) 
[you my double, my witness] (183) in an invitation to join the writer. Ann 
Jefferson sees this we as a splitting of the writer into reader and writer, a divi-
sion that ensures the authenticity of Sarraute’s writing.41 Sarraute often splits 
the writer’s subjectivity, which we can see most clearly and dramatically in 
Enfance, where Sarraute sets up a masculine interlocutor alongside her nar-
rating je, who questions her decisions and memories to ensure that the writer 
remains truthful. What’s important about the we in this particular instance is 
the way it breaks open, through its polysemy, the dyadic relationship of writer 
to language to allow for and even require a third party. While the reader mod-
eled here is a part of the writer himself, Sarraute creates the possibility for 
a truly third party—the outside reader—to join the writer in his attempt to 
hold on to language and follow it wherever its tropismic life takes it. Sarraute, 
after all, does not write Entre la vie et la mort and keep it secret. She publishes 
it and makes it available to a public and unknown set of readers. The intent 
isn’t to perform a privileged relationship with language to the exclusion of the 
reader, but to enable readers to have a writerly relationship with language (as 
Wittig theorizes in Le Chantier littéraire).
 41. Jefferson, “Notice” to Entre la vie et la mort, in Sarraute, Œuvres complètes, 1828.
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Even though Sarraute criticizes insensitive and insensible readers within 
the novel itself, she has a certain faith that her readers, regardless of how much 
or how little they resemble what we imagine to be the expected consumer of 
modernist literature, will understand what she’s doing when they have their 
own encounter with tropismic language. Sarraute wants to expand the num-
ber of people who experience language as living, as she does. The novel thus 
confronts its readers with the same choice as the writer’s: it asks us either to 
choose living language and seek out the tropism, or to choose dead language 
and settle for a ready-made and readily available aesthetic experience of lit-
erature that has been deemed beautiful or worthwhile by the market and the 
commentariat. The journalist Martine de Rabaudy describes Sarraute’s desire 
to reach out to readers as “[preferring] to conquer readers over a public.”42 The 
writer’s observation of “those little signs between us that no one else, appar-
ently, perceives” doesn’t express a will to exclude all other readers and set 
up the tropismic writer (and hence Sarraute) as the only individual who can 
know tropismic language. By showing the process through which the writer 
navigates between the life and death of language to choose the former, Sar-
raute guides us in our own navigation of the language we’re immersed in as 
human beings living in the social realm. Entre la vie et la mort is an invitation 
to readers to experience language as Sarraute does—tropismic and alive.43
To convey to readers what such an experience entails, Sarraute proceeds 
carefully in Entre la vie et la mort, using each successive metaphor to bring 
us closer to a radical notion of language’s equality with us, of our relationship 
with language as one of mutuality that preserves our respective autonomy. It’s 
unsurprising that in her metaphors staging our relationship to language, Sar-
raute likens language’s body to that of a human’s, endowed with a pulse and 
a human kind of mobility, as our conception of relationality remains anthro-
pocentric.44 And it follows that Sarraute would use metaphors of other spe-
cies to stage language’s full autonomy and alterity. But the point is not to take 
these metaphors at face value—if we did, we would be stuck in contradiction. 
 42. Rabaudy, “Nathalie Sarraute.”
 43. For a reading that sees Sarraute coercing rather than inviting readers into becoming 
tropismic readers, see Courson, Nathalie Sarraute, 124. Courson takes the reader and writer to 
be in an antagonistic relationship with each other, such that the reader is forced to submit to 
the writer the way the writer is forced to submit to language. This characterization strikes me as 
too harsh, however, and overlooks the reader’s agency as well as that of the writer (who chooses 
whether to follow language).
 44. Certainly, there’s been a vigorous theoretical movement to dethrone the human from 
its place at the top of the ontological hierarchy (e.g., new materialisms), and plenty of pet own-
ers refer to their animals as having human emotions and being related to them (e.g., having 
granddogs), but that seems less like an affirmation of real ontological equality and more like 
projection—the fact remains that anthropocentrism is difficult to shake off.
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Rather, the proliferation of metaphors serves to approximate, using the vocab-
ulary available, how language functions as a body—as a life-form that can act 
and be acted upon—and how it functions relationally, endowed with an affec-
tive capacity.45 They show how language is inadequate for capturing language’s 
body and vitality. The only adequate language in this case is an experience 
of such language itself, rather than the use of representational language. To 
return to the novel’s ending, “I don’t know what it is. All I know is that noth-
ing in the world can make me doubt its presence.” All the metaphors deployed 
by Sarraute are not meant to capture for us what living language is, but rather, 
to testify to Sarraute’s experience of having been present with it, and guided 
by it—a testimony that invites us to also choose a life with living language.
WITTIG: AN OFFERING TO A GODDESS
Wittig, as one of Sarraute’s most faithful readers, responds to Sarraute’s invita-
tion with a resounding yes. In Wittig’s case, allowing a living language to guide 
her leads not to a project of tropismic writing, as it does for Sarraute, but to 
a program of political lesbian writing—to her Trojan horses. Thus far, I’ve 
privileged Le Chantier littéraire as a text that elucidates Wittig’s literary prac-
tice as well as Sarraute’s and Garréta’s. As discussed in Chapter 2, Le Chantier 
littéraire proposes a deeply materialist conception of language, and it’s in that 
text that Wittig explicitly declares that to be a writer is to be caught up in 
a corps-à-corps with language, in a passionate, corporeal encounter. As with 
any critical and theoretical text, Le Chantier littéraire makes claims and offers 
explanations, but it cannot enact those claims the way fiction can. Le Chantier 
littéraire describes the writer’s worksite, but it’s only within the fictional text 
itself that readers can enter into the chantier as more than observers. Thus, to 
track how Wittig relates to language as an embodied and autonomous entity, 
I turn from Le Chantier littéraire to Le Corps lesbien (1973), where her politi-
cal utopianism intersects with a singular vision and experience of language’s 
corporeality that is enacted textually in a way unlike what is found in the rest 
of Wittig’s works. It is an exemplar of Wittig’s conception of the corporeality, 
desirability, and vitality of language as a very real body.
Le Corps lesbien, in both its content—the novel recounts the repeated pas-
sionate and mutual dismemberment and reconstitution of the lesbian lovers’ 
 45. As you’ve undoubtedly noticed, Sarraute’s work focuses more on how language makes 
the writer feel than on how the writer makes language feel, and one could accuse Sarraute of 
anthropocentrism, or one could reframe that in generous terms to suggest that Sarraute is sim-
ply avoiding the arrogance and hubris of speaking for another.
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bodies—and its title, foregrounds human corporeality. The female body and 
its viscera provide the material for both the plot and the pages of lists of body 
parts (in all capital letters) interspersed throughout the text. It’s thus no sur-
prise that critics and readers have privileged human corporeality in their dis-
cussions of the text—that corporeality is what hits the reader over the head 
on every page. While Wittig’s innovative use of language and her unorthodox 
syntax do not go unremarked, these readings of the novel examine how Wit-
tig acts upon language in order to upend our notion of the universal human 
body: they take the female body as the point of reference rather than the 
male body that serves as the standard bearer for ideal human embodiment, 
à la Leonardo Da Vinci’s Vitruvian Man. In these readings, the female body 
is a powerful tool that dethrones the phallus and introduces a new regime of 
signification that, unlike écriture féminine, would be unsexed.46 While these 
readings speak powerfully of the political potentiality of Wittig’s writing, their 
focus on human corporeality comes at the expense of leaving language’s cor-
poreality unexamined, privileging human over linguistic agency.47
In what follows, I use Le Corps lesbien to examine how the human, figured 
through the body, is a way to see through to language’s own body. Focusing 
less on what the human lovers do to each other, I concentrate on how Wittig 
makes room in the text for language’s agency, for the way an embodied lan-
guage acts upon her as the writer. By concentrating on language’s corporeality 
as opposed to that of the human lovers, I work to strip away the illusory trans-
parency and passivity of language as medium and material to show the body 
of language that lies beneath—this body cannot be possessed or mastered by 
the human, but only experienced and sensed. In order to see how language 
is embodied in this text, we need to first see what the text is and does, and 
 46. Karin Cope, in “Plastic Actions,” focuses on the lesbianization of language, exam-
ining how Wittig continues the demasculinization and unsexing of textual space begun in 
L’Opoponax and Les Guérillères. Namascar Shaktini, the first American to work on Wittig, also 
focuses on the lesbianization of language, on how “her restructuring of meaning establishes the 
lesbian body in its place as a new primary signifier in a new nonphallocentric Symbolic order” 
(Shaktini, “Monique Wittig’s New Language,” 90), and, in “Displacing the Phallic Subject,” she 
devotes much attention to Wittig’s rewriting of phallocentric myths such as those of the Odys-
sey and Orpheus and Eurydice and to her lesbianization of ancient gods by turning them into 
goddesses—the canon equivalent of stripping the masculine pronoun of universality.
More recent work on Le Corps lesbien continues to focus on lesbianizing language and 
subverting the Western tradition. See Bourque, Ecrire l’inter-dit; Brooks, “The Body in the Text”; 
Davis, Beautiful War.
 47. Or, if language’s corporeality is examined, as in Lynn Higgins’s reading of the novel, 
it’s treated as a metaphor that can elucidate the human body, thus maintaining language as 
something that belongs to the human or is in service to it. See Higgins, “Nouvelle Nouvelle 
Autobiographie.”
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what its agenda is. Doing so will allow us to see through to the body that is 
then revealed.
According to Wittig, Le Corps lesbien’s political motives are as follows: 
to reappropriate pornographic language, severing it from its objectification 
of the female body; to effect a similar rupture with the language of love and 
erotic literature, which serves to reify the female body as the quintessential 
love object; and, most broadly, to give a voice to lesbians and create a les-
bian text that severs all relations with masculine culture and literature and the 
phallocentric history that they represent:
The wager [in Le Corps lesbien] was to triumph over the very captivating 
words of pornography.48
This anatomical vocabulary is cold and distant and I used it as a tool to cut 
off the mass of texts devoted to love.49
Le Corps lesbien has lesbianism as its theme, that is, a theme that we can’t 
even describe as being taboo since it doesn’t have any real existence in the 
history of literature. Male homosexual literature has a past and a present. 
Lesbians, they’re mute—like all women are as women on all levels.50
Wittig uses one form of language (anatomical vocabulary) to counter an ideo-
logically charged language (pornography, love literature), using the clinical 
language of the former to neutralize the highly charged and motivated lan-
guage of the latter. With this neutralized language, Wittig sets out to start a 
new tradition of lesbian literature that doesn’t borrow from or refer to any of 
the literature devoted to masculine sexuality—literature tout court, as we’ve 
known it through the canon. Wittig’s Corps lesbien is an attempt to build a 
lesbian corpus.
Le Corps lesbien consists of 110 poetic vignettes that are set on islands 
that, as Wittig explains in her preface to the English translation, “allude to the 
Amazons, to the islands of women, the domains of women, which formerly 
existed in their own culture. They also allude to the Amazons of the present 
and the future.”51 In the utopian space of this virtual, transhistorical Lesbos, 
Wittig stages the passionate relationship between two amantes: a j/e that’s bro-
 48. Wittig, Le Chantier littéraire, 108.
 49. Wittig, “Some Remarks on The Lesbian Body,” 46.
 50. Wittig, online catalogue for the Éditions de Minuit, “Le Corps lesbien.”
 51. Wittig, “Author’s Note,” 9. There is no author’s note to the original French edition of 
the novel. This addition to her project is likely because of the English translation’s inability to 
represent the split nature of the j/e in the English I, which has only one letter, and for the way 
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ken, cut in two by a slash, who constantly addresses a tu that’s whole, the 
object of j/e’s love and desire. They are surrounded by a society of elles who are 
at turns both antagonistic and sympathetic, but always a third party to their 
union, which is never peaceful, but piece-full, consisting of a continuous tear-
ing apart of each other’s bodies. C. J. Rawson succinctly summarizes the novel 
as he enumerates the myriad forms of its constant violence:
Here, bodily violation is itself love. The heroines of Wittig’s Sapphic uto-
pia spend nearly two hundred pages mutilating, dismembering, eviscerating 
one another, chewing each other’s sinews and vitals, vomiting, decomposing, 
penetrating and being penetrated through every orifice and to the depths 
of every vital organ. Innards are fondled. Bits of lung are spat out, chewed, 
pressed against the lover and given to her to swallow. Gentle tendernesses of 
love-biting turn to the crunching and the tearing apart of the beloved, piece 
by piece, muscle by muscle and vein by vein.52
In its repetitiveness and unrelenting explicitness, the violence recalls pornog-
raphy, where there is nowhere to hide from the bodies on display. There is no 
respite from this constant mutual destruction of each other’s bodies save the 
irruption of an alternative text every ten to fifteen pages.
This other body of text is composed of line after line of anatomical vocab-
ulary printed in large capital letters (at least three or four times larger than 
the typeface used for the lovers’ narrative), and weaves in and out of the text 
with no apparent logic and reason (fig. 2). Each intervention takes up two full 
pages—the visible surface of the open book—so that the narrative it interrupts 
is hidden. In this text’s layout on the page, there are no page numbers present 
to situate the reader:53 this second text exists outside the narrative text’s logic. 
Although part of Le Corps lesbien, it refuses to be organized by or in relation 
to the narrative. It thus exists separately, self-contained and unaware of the 
tumultuous narrative taking place around it. At every irruption of this blaring 
stream of anatomical language, the reader is hit with a sudden block of mean-
inglessness. Like words in a dictionary, which mean nothing by themselves, 
these very large and in-your-face body parts are not connected to each other 
through syntax—Wittig isn’t using them to communicate in the usual way. In 
the English translation is unable to render the feminine specificity of such forms of address as 
ma douce, ma bien-aimée, ma très belle that are scattered throughout the text.
 52. Rawson, “Cannibalism and Fiction,” 285.
 53. Since the pages are themselves unnumbered, in order to find these pages, one must 
turn to the pages either before or after to situate oneself. In the English translation, this anatom-
ical text only ever occupies one page and remains numbered, diminishing its impact somewhat.
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this sense, this anatomical vocabulary and its manifestations throughout the 
text constitute a sort of lexicon akin to the dictionary, which Wittig describes 
in Le Chantier littéraire as follows:
Mais il y a le dictionnaire cet alter ego des écrivains. Là est la carrière du 
chantier où les mots gisent comme matériau. [. . .] Cependant le dictionnaire 
est différent de toutes les autres formes où se manifeste le langage en ce sens 
qu’il le fournit comme global, un corps global, dans un ordre (l’ordre alpha-
bétique) qui n’est pas producteur de sens et qui expose de ce fait les mots 
fournis un à un dans leur matérialité (scripturale, graphique), ne serait-ce 
que dans son énumération, et en ce sens qu’il offre à l’appréhension une 
diachronie, un ordre discontinu dans lequel le langage ne s’offre jamais dans 
son utilisation puisque pour devenir actuel il obéit à une syntaxe (à un ordre 
synchronique).
[But there’s the dictionary, this alter ego of writers. There’s the worksite’s 
quarry where words lie still as material. [. . .] However, the dictionary is dif-
ferent from all other forms where language manifests itself insofar as the dic-
tionary produces language as global, a global body, in an order (alphabetical) 
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FIGURE 2. An example of interrupting text from Wittig, Le Corps lesbien, 112–13.
that doesn’t produce meaning and that, through this fact, exposes words in 
their materiality (scriptural, graphic), even just through its enumeration. 
In this sense it offers up for our apprehension a diachrony, a discontinu-
ous order in which language never offers itself up in its utilization since to 
become present it obeys syntax (a synchronic order).]54
Wittig returns the language used to describe bodies—in particular, the female 
body (the text lists non-sexually differentiated organs, such as the lungs, but 
also female reproductive organs, as opposed to male ones)—to a place before 
meaning, as it is when words are ordered syntactically into sentences that they 
start to signify. By doing so, she attempts to give readers access to a language 
that exists before ideology, unlike words that are sentenced to produce mean-
ing. Wittig describes this language as “le langage premier (dont le dictionnaire 
nous donne une idée approximative), celui où le sens n’est pas encore advenu, 
celui qui est de tous, appartient à tous, et que chacun à son tour peut prendre, 
utiliser, courber vers un sens” [the first language (of which language now gives 
us an approximate idea), language where meaning has not yet occurred, lan-
guage that is everyone’s, that belongs to all, and that each can in turn take, use, 
bend toward a meaning].55 But even though language before syntax is osten-
sibly devoid of meaning in its potential form as a collection of words wait-
ing to be used, Wittig, in her modification of words (e.g., “LES TENDONS 
D’ACHILLEA,” which feminizes Achilles), shows that her raw language is not 
phallocentric, and has already appropriated the universal for the feminine. Le 
Corps lesbien’s anatomical pages act as a dictionary, a writerly alter ego exist-
ing in a utopian time—that of the guérillères after their victorious appropria-
tion of the universal.
As Wittig commented, she intends for this lexical mass to purify porno-
graphic language, to strip the words used to describe women’s bodies of their 
ideological charge and inject a clinical distance between them and the reader. 
Wittig acknowledges that even this so-called scientific, objective language is 
still ideologically charged: for example, vagin [vagina] derives from the Latin 
word for sheath, defining this organ in relation to what it’s supposed to con-
tain—the penis. Nonetheless, she still sees this language as being less ideologi-
cally loaded than non-scientific language and sees it as able to “réduire à nèant 
(pendant la durée du livre) cet autre ‘langage’ institutionnalisé” [reduce to 
nothing (during the book’s duration) this other, institutionalized ‘language’].56 
The mouth, breasts, genitals, hair, buttocks, anus—body parts and orifices 
 54. Wittig, Le Chantier littéraire, 98.
 55. Wittig, 60.
 56. Wittig, 108.
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typically possessed by men in pornography and literature—are removed from 
their usual sexualized context. No longer ordered by a syntax commanded by 
a hegemonic, phallocratic sexuality, they’ve stopped being objects of a man’s 
action. Instead, they lie fallow alongside a legion of other body parts that are 
not usually thought, much less named (e.g., la duremère [dura mater], la pie-
mère [pia mater], la plèvre [pleura]), but are here articulated with care and 
precision. Their absorption into this desexualized language neutralizes them.
The anatomical text not only neutralizes: it also confronts us with a lan-
guage stripped of a narrator, of a human voice. It’s a language not beholden 
to some human will or subjectivity that animates and orders it into meaning. 
Beyond the obvious fact that Wittig chose these terms herself, the text comes 
as close to existing in and of itself as possible, and because of its asyntactical 
quality, it asserts a certain autonomy. Looking at the large characters and feel-
ing the visual impact of these words, we process them first as a block of text, a 
visual object consisting of black marks on white paper, before we make them 
out as discrete words. Because of these words’ separation from communica-
tion, their un-instrumentalized nature (they’re not visibly in the service of 
some authorial or narrative power) translates to autonomy. Where Sarraute 
turns to complex metaphors to try to persuade us of language’s autonomy, 
Wittig takes a much more direct route that takes advantage of the page’s physi-
cality and the typography’s visual impact.
Wittig insists that this anatomical vocabulary cuts off and frees language 
from masculinist ideology and phallocentric influence, thus imparting its 
autonomy to this other language. This raises the question, however, of why 
she takes up an ostensibly liberatory (though clinical and cold) vocabulary to 
recreate and reproduce what appears to be a pornographic, sadistic violence. 
Why would she found the lesbian love she narrates on what looks like the 
very same violence it’s supposed to be counteracting? Take a typical passage 
like this one:
M/on clitoris l’ensemble de m/es lèvres sont touchés par tes mains. A travers 
m/on vagin et m/on utérus tu t’introduis jusqu’à m/es intestins en crevant la 
membrane. Tu mets autour de ton cou m/on duodénum rose pâle assez veiné 
de bleu. Tu déroules m/on intestin grêle jaune. Ce faisant tu parles de l’odeur 
de m/es organes mouillés, tu parles de leur consistance, tu parles de leur 
mouvement, tu parles de leur température. Tu essaies à ce point d’arracher 
m/es reins. Ils te résistent. Tu touches m/a vésicule verte. J/e m/e morfonds, 
j/e m/e plains, j/e tombe dans un gouffre, ma tête est entraînée, m/on cœur 
m/e vient au bord de m/es dents, il m/e semble que m/on sang s’est tout figé 
dans m/es artères. Tu dis néanmoins que tu le reçois en quantité énorme sur 
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tes mains. Tu parles de la couleur de m/es organes. J/e ne peux pas les voir. 
J//entends ta voix siffler dans m/es oreilles. J/e m/e concentre pour t’écou-
ter. J/e m/e vois étendue, toutes m/es entrailles sont déroulées. J//ouvre la 
bouche pour chanter une cantate à la déesse m/a mère. Par cet effort le cœur 
m/e faut. J//ouvre la bouche, j/e reçois ta langue tes lèvres ton palais, par toi 
monstre adoré j/e m/e mets à mourir tandis que tu ne cesses pas de crier 
autour de m/es oreilles.
M/y clitoris m/y labia are touched by your hands. Through m/y vagina and 
m/y uterus you insert yourself breaking the membrane up to m/y intestines. 
Round your neck you place m/y duodenum pale-pink well-veined with blue. 
You unwind m/y yellow small intestine. So doing you speak of the odour of 
m/y damp organs, you speak of their consistence, you speak of their move-
ments, you speak of their temperature. At this point you attempt to wrench 
out m/y kidneys. They resist you. You touch m/y green gallbladder. I have 
a deathly chill, I moan, I fall into an abyss, m/y head is awhirl, m/y heart is 
in m/y mouth, it feels as if m/y blood is all congealed in m/y arteries. You 
say nevertheless that you receive an enormous quantity of it on your hands. 
You speak of the colour of m/y organs. I cannot see them. I hear your voice 
hissing in m/y ears, I concentrate on listening to you. I see m/yself stretched 
out, all m/y entrails are unwound. I open m/y mouth to sing a cantata to 
the goddess m/y mother. M/y heart fails in this effort. I open m/y mouth, I 
admit your lips your tongue your palate, I prepare to die by your side adored 
monster while you cry incessantly about m/y ears.57
What starts off as a description of a seemingly typical sexual encounter 
quickly turns, by the end of the second sentence, into something else as tu 
penetrates j/e with a totality exceeding the usual bounds of human sexual-
ity. Their lovemaking turns into a vivisection. The exposed organs turn into 
the site of union, displacing the more predictable and usual erogenous zones 
as the place to feel the other’s body. Tu violates j/e’s body in that she violates 
its wholeness, reducing j/e from a unitary body to its constitutive organs. Tu 
guts j/e and removes her vital organs so that she is at the point of death. This 
reads less as une petite mort that we would associate with orgasm, but une 
grande mort from which there is no return to the body. Why does Wittig make 
recourse to this violence when her goal is to counteract the violence done to 
women throughout the ages in the name of a naturalized phallocentrism? The 
violence, while it might seem to reproduce the very violence Wittig repudi-
ates, is different in three fundamental ways.
 57. Wittig, Le Corps lesbien, 33–34; Wittig, The Lesbian Body, 37–38.
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First, unlike patriarchal violence, which has silenced women and lesbians, 
this violence produces speech: j/e speaks constantly, addressing both her lover 
tu and the elles that surround them. She is never silent, and as readers, we are 
confronted with her voice as much and as constantly as we are with the lov-
ers’ bleeding and dismembered bodies. Tu is also not silent, and she sings and 
speaks and responds to j/e. Although we don’t have direct access to the con-
tent of her speech, we know that she speaks, as she discusses the smell, tem-
perature, and color of j/e’s organs. This incredible violence pushes the lovers 
further into language rather than into silence or language-less sounds of pain.
Second, the violence is completely mutual, which is perhaps the most sur-
prising element of the text. The patriarchal violence Wittig is responding to is 
unidirectional and founds a heterosexual society that depends on the domi-
nation of women. In Le Corps lesbien, however, the violence is marked by 
mutuality, as j/e kills tu as often as tu kills j/e. These killings do not result in 
a permanent death: the lovers are always restored to life in the next vignette, 
ready to kill and be killed again. In their commitment to a wholly recipro-
cal violence, the lovers appropriate dying and resignify it. J/e and tu’s deadly 
lovemaking is figured as a representational act, where what is represented is 
a truly radical egalitarianism—no organ is too insignificant or significant to 
be spared, no one ever has the upper hand. The text is one of equal dismem-
berment, where each lover gets to consume the other’s organs as much as she 
gets to have her own organs consumed. J/e does not possess tu more than she 
is herself possessed. She does not destroy more than she is herself destroyed. 
She does not dominate more than she is herself dominated. The relationship 
between j/e and tu is one of absolute reciprocity, indicated by the constant 
role reversal the lovers perform between dominance and submission. Their 
relationship enacts a state of equilibrium, that point at which roles, in their 
fluidity, never become fixed, never set.
Wittig’s violence is thus used to represent an unbounded relationality 
whose reciprocity and equality are based in endless mobility—there can be 
no inequality and hierarchy if there is no way to fix subjectivities long enough 
to be able to assign relative value to them. This mobility is reinforced meta-
phorically throughout the text as the lovers give up even their human embodi-
ment to assume the bodies of different species of life: spores, protozoa, horses, 
sharks, fish, butterflies, microscopic cells, to name a few.58 These lovers reject 
roles and cannot be confined by them—how can they when they are not even 
anchored within human corporeality? Bodies, in Le Corps lesbien, do not con-
fine; they do not contain and house and preserve the autonomous individual. 
 58. Wittig, Le Corps lesbien, 24, 42, 57, 67, 101, 172, 173; Wittig, The Lesbian Body, 29, 45, 56, 
64, 91, 152, 154. All subsequent references will be made in-text.
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The continual breaking down of the lovers’ bodies enables them to experience 
the other with a fullness that they couldn’t were they to remain sealed her-
metically, human beings contained within skin bags.
Finally, this violence, which results in death (albeit one that lacks finality), 
is transcendent, leading to resurrection. The Egyptian myth of Isis and Osiris, 
with its focus on dismemberment and resurrection, mirrors Le Corps lesbien’s 
structure.59 Through rewriting the myth, Wittig writes death as life. The fol-
lowing passage, where the lovers assume the roles of Isis and Osiris, frames 
their violence as mutual, as a gift of sorts that provides j/e with the opportu-
nity to resurrect the body it has killed:
[. . .] elles m/e demandent où te faire une sépulture dans quel ordre ramasser 
tes fragments ce qui fait que j/e m/e redresse hurlante, j/e prononce l’in-
terdiction d’enregistrer ta mort, que la traîtresse responsable de ton déchi-
quètement ne soit pas inquiétée, j/e prononce que tu es là vivante quoique 
tronçonnée, j/e cherche en toute hâte tes morceaux dans la boue, m/es ongles 
raclent les menues pierres et les cailloux, j/e trouve ton nez une partie de ta 
vulve tes nymphes ton clitoris, j/e trouve tes oreilles un tibia puis l’autre, j/e 
te rassemble bout à bout, j/e te reconstitue, j/e remets en place les yeux, j/e 
rapproche bords à bords les peaux séparées, j/e produis avec empressement 
des larmes de la cyprine de la salive en quantité voulue, j/e t’en enduis à 
toutes tes déchirures, j/e mets m/on souffle dans ta bouche, j/e réchauffe 
tes oreilles tes mains tes seins j//introduis tout m/on air dans tes poumons, 
j/e m/e redresse pour chanter, [.  .  .] m/oi Isis la très puissante j/e décrète 
que comme par le passé tu vis Osiris m/a très chérie m/a très affaiblie [. . .] 
(86–87)
[They ask m/e where you should be interred in what order to collect your 
fragments which makes m/e recoil shrieking, I pronounce a ban on the 
recording of your death so that the traitress responsible for your being torn 
to pieces may not be alerted. I announce that you are here alive though cut 
to pieces, I search hastily for your fragments in the mud, m/y nails scrabble 
at the small stones and pebbles, I find your nose a part of your vulva your 
labia your clitoris, I find your ears one tibia than the other, I assemble you 
part by part, I reconstruct you, I put your eyes back in place, I appose the 
separated skin edge to edge, I hurriedly produce tears vaginal juice saliva 
in the requisite amount, I smear you with them in all your lacerations, I 
put m/y breath in your mouth, I warm your ears your hands your breasts, 
 59. See Higgins, “Nouvelle Nouvelle Autobiographie,” 160; Cope, “Plastic Actions,” 87–88.
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I introduce all m/y air into your lungs, I stand erect to sing [. . .] I Isis the 
all-powerful I decree that you live as in the past Osiris m/y most cherished 
m/y most enfeebled.] (80)
Wittig takes the transcendence of the body’s usual boundaries—represented 
elsewhere as the metamorphosis into other species—to a radical end. Death, 
and the resurrection that it produces, is the necessary condition for a union 
that’s as complete as it is imaginable: the resurrection and the reconstruction 
of the lover’s broken body is realized through and by j/e’s own body, who, in 
re-integrating and re-membering tu, integrates her body with tu’s. J/e uses 
her tears, saliva, and cyprine (the neologism Wittig coins to refer to vaginal 
secretion) to put tu back together. Tu’s new breath comes from j/e’s breath 
and tu’s warmth comes from j/e’s. Tu’s life is thus bound up with j/e’s, a one 
becoming two that’s reminiscent of childbirth while rejecting maternity.60 To 
reinforce this theme of death and resurrection, of death as a necessary means 
to enter into true life, taken to mean complete union with the lover, Wittig 
casts the narrator j/e as a feminized Jesus Christ—“Christa la très crucifiée” 
(30) [Christa the very crucified] (35). In this rewriting of a grand narrative, 
j/e’s body is mortified and brought back to life.
Despite these differences between Wittig’s vision of violence and the patri-
archal violence and dominance she’s reacting against, the question of what 
makes this violence necessary remains. In writing a lesbian text and beginning 
a new type of literature, free from masculine influence, couldn’t a narrative of 
tenderness (instead of tenderized flesh) have been written instead? Couldn’t 
Wittig have opted to recount an eternal passion that knows no death? What 
could motivate this violence? I submit that the driving force for this violence 
is the desire to make language’s body emerge, to make it visible and percep-
tible to the reader.
Just as the mortification of the lovers’ bodies leads to their resurrection, a 
process that renders their vitality that much more urgent and evident, Wittig’s 
mortification of language throughout the novel serves to render its body and 
vitality that much more urgent and evident as well. Wittig’s violence toward 
language, however, registers as less stunning than her more spectacular vio-
lence toward human bodies. And yet, the violence depicted toward the female 
bodies in the novel, as shocking as it may be, is a secondary, or later violence. 
Wittig’s violence acts first upon language before it’s mobilized by narrative 
 60. Elsewhere, in the anatomical text, there’s an extraordinary moment where Wittig 
diverges from the enumeration of organs to slip in the formula, XX + XX = XX (144; 128). 
Wittig’s most explicit rejection of maternity is in the entry “Mère” in Brouillon pour un diction-
naire des amantes.
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to act upon fictional human bodies: before we consume the narrative, before 
our piecing together of the story results in the tearing apart of the lovers. The 
moment we open the book and turn to any page, before we read words and 
the sentences they form and the narrative woven from those sentences, we see 
the slashes that aggressively attack the language connected to j/e’s narrative 
subjectivity. We see the singular first person’s pronouns, possessive adjectives, 
and objects cut up and fragmented: je cut into j/e, me into m/e, moi into m/
oi, j’ separated from verbs that began with vowels with a double slash (//), 
as with me when it is an object before verbs that also begin with vowels. On 
every page, we see the visible signs of a je cut off from language and a language 
that’s maimed to realize that rupture. Language is visibly violated. Normal 
syntax, grammar, and orthography come undone61 and instead of an orderly 
subject and a well-ordered language, we get a fragmented, disruptive because 
disrupted j/e. Wittig explains the use of this j/e:
The fascination for writing the never previously written and the fascination 
for the unattained body proceed from the same desire. The desire to bring 
the real body violently to life in the words of the book (everything that is 
written exists), the desire to do violence by writing to the language which I 
[j/e] can only enter by force. ‘I’ [j/e] as a generic feminine subject can only 
enter by force into a language which is foreign to it, for all that is human 
(masculine) is foreign to it, the human not being feminine grammatically 
speaking but he [il] or they [ils]. [. . .] J/e is the symbol of the lived, rending 
experience which is m/y writing, of this cutting into two which throughout 
literature is the exercise of a language which does not constitute m/e as a 
subject. J/e poses the ideological and historical question of feminine subjects. 
[. . .] If I [J/e] examine m/y specific situation as subject in the language, I [J/e] 
am physically incapable of writing ‘I’ [Je], I [J/e] have no desire to do so.62
Two things stand out for me in this text: first, the emphasis on the body as the 
object of writing, and second, Wittig’s situating the writer as being confronted 
with a choice between two types of language, as with Sarraute in Entre la vie 
et la mort.
Wittig brings together as analogous the desire for an unattained lover’s 
body (the thrill of the pursuit, the distance that drives courtly love, etc.) and 
the desire to write the new (which, for Wittig, as a good student of the New 
 61. For more on this subversion of language, see Bourque, “On dirait une revolution.”
 62. Wittig, “Author’s Note,” 10–11. Le Vay renders this broken j/e in the English as an 
italicized I, which has the unfortunate effect of accentuating I’s wholeness rather than its 
brokenness.
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Novel, amounts to being a real writer). She identifies desiring a human body 
and desiring to do things with language as both proceeding from the same 
desire. This desire for a corps-à-corps with language animates Wittig’s entire 
corpus and is shared by Sarraute and Garréta. While we might assume that 
the “real body” here refers to a human body, it’s instructive to read it instead 
as the body of language. It’s important to note that Wittig sees the bringing to 
life of this real body as taking place through violence. If we take this real body 
to be that of language, we begin to realize how we normalize that violence to 
language: our shock or disturbed sensibilities end up being provoked instead 
by the violence recounted in the narrative. In privileging human corporeality 
over the visibly maimed body of language, which we don’t normally consider 
to be corporeal, we opt to respond to the violence of content over the violence 
of form. Wittig, however, attempts to force us to pay attention to the forgotten 
material—language—and see it as a real body.
Now, Wittig, as a woman, a minority subject, sees writing as forcing a 
choice between two situations: one, use language “normally” and consent 
to a language that represents alienation, domination, and oppression, thus 
perpetuating those very things by collaborating with and participating in it, 
and two, resist language’s normal use and disrupt language’s reproduction of 
oppression, cutting off this masculinist language’s ties to the universal through 
violence upon the material of language. Obviously, Wittig opts for the lat-
ter, which corresponds to Sarraute’s writer’s choosing life. For Wittig, you can 
either do violence to language or let language do violence to you. In the latter 
case, that violence doesn’t lead to a joyous resurrection but rather oppres-
sion under patriarchy. In the former case, that violence leads to a new life for 
language.
To do violence to language, then, is the prerequisite to writing a lesbian 
text, and moreover, to writing a text whose language retains its autonomy 
and vitality. Wittig recuperates the minority subjectivity of lesbians from 
silence and gives it a voice in j/e, who, as a wielder of language and dis-
course, is not monolithic (already, the slash that cuts it into two prevents j/e 
from coalescing into any sort of hegemonic subject position), the way the 
masculine universal subject of phallocentric language—the je—is. J/e embod-
ies the minority subject, which, as Wittig articulates in La Pensée straight, 
isn’t whole, even as it attains the universal, as all great literature does in her 
estimation:
[Historically,] the minority subject is not self-centered as is the [logocentric] 
subject. Its extension into space could be described as being like Pascal’s 
circle, whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere. 
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[The minority subject can disperse itself into many centers, it is forcibly de-
centered, a-centered.]63
The minority subject, the feminine subject, the lesbian subject—none can 
attain universality the way the heterosexual masculine subject does by tak-
ing itself to be the center, the stable point of reference. The minority subject 
operates by always moving away from a center. This self-dispersal and decon-
structive creation of multiple centers (seen in Le Corps lesbien in the lovers’ 
transformation into various goddesses and species) necessitate fragmentation 
and proliferation. By breaking the je into j/e, the minority subject is univer-
sal without being monolithic. It is universal without inscribing itself inside a 
clearly delineated circumference that determines who’s in and who’s out (as 
with the boundaries between species, sexes, races, etc.). J/e’s minority subjec-
tivity, in its movement, breaks language in order to open it so that women are 
no longer on the outside of a language from which they are estranged.
This linguistic violence, taken as necessary given Wittig’s political aims, 
still doesn’t explain the need for violence on the narrative level. To make sense 
of this second violence, we need to allow language to be a real body, maimed 
by Wittig in order to enter into it: a body that rises up and strikes back—the tu 
to Wittig’s narrating, authorial j/e. When we shift our framework to allow the 
language of Le Corps lesbien to be a body—but not a human body, despite the 
descriptions of tu’s entrails and genitals and secretions—then the violence’s 
motivation becomes clear, and the resonance between j/e and tu’s violent rela-
tionship and the violent breaking open of language in order to enter into it 
and be unalienated from it is more than coincidental: it’s a deliberate, concep-
tual coinciding.
When we look past tu’s seemingly human body—the narrated body—to 
see it as a linguistic body, then the violence wrought upon this lover stops test-
ing our limits as readers for how much guts, vomit, and pus we can take in, 
stops being provocative to the point of obscenity. By undoing and dismember-
ing language’s body, we can come to think of it as truly alive. It’s through its 
undoing and unbecoming that language can assume its body. In the dynamic 
of this reciprocal violence, language’s body is given space to act upon and be 
acted upon—to become something we can experience, with which we can be 
in relationship, as j/e and tu are in relationship. This violence, rather than 
seeking to test the reader, is a generous gesture toward the reader: it’s a meta-
phorization of how Wittig renders language’s body concrete and visible in the 
 63. Wittig, La Pensée straight, 101. More or less the same passage is found in The Straight 
Mind, 61–62. I’ve bracketed where the two texts differ: e.g., logocentric subject is called the 
straight subject in The Straight Mind.
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anatomical text—a long narrative gloss that explains what we are to do with 
language’s body. As with Sarraute, Wittig thus invites the reader to join this 
experience of the relationship between writer and language.
We’ve seen that the cycle of dismemberment, death, and resurrection 
ultimately works to bring the lovers closer, integrating the body of one with 
the other while still maintaining each one’s autonomy. This integration—this 
passion and fusion—is what Wittig feels as a writer for language: she finds 
herself “situé, confronté, corps à corps, avec ce panorama du langage” [situ-
ated, confronted, body to body, with this panorama of language], where the 
corps-à-corps consists of “cette étreinte mortelle avec ses mots violents, véhé-
ments, passionnés” [this mortal embrace with its violent, vehement, passion-
ate words].64 The passion Wittig writes is a literary, linguistic passion between 
her body and language’s body, more so than between two human bodies. Wit-
tig’s comments on the genesis of Le Corps lesbien support this reading:
So let’s go back to my literary workshop, where I am with fire between my 
teeth and still nothing but my blank page. Suddenly giving me a big laugh 
(for one can laugh even in anguish) two words came in: Lesbian Body. Can 
you realize how hilarious it was for me? That is how the book started to 
exist: in irony. The body, a word whose gender is masculine in French with 
the word lesbian qualifying it. In other words “lesbian” by its proximity to 
“body” seemed to me to destabilize the general notion of the body.65
The corps lesbien in question does not take a lesbian’s physical body as its ref-
erent—it cannot, because for Wittig, lesbianism is not a sexual orientation, 
defined by physical acts or drives, but a political identity. Wittig’s lesbian is 
a defector from the heterosexual social contract, someone who creates and 
seeks out her (or his) own society by refusing to be defined in relationship to 
a man economically, politically, and ideologically—a refusal that places her 
outside the categories of sex, beyond the concepts of man and woman:
Lesbianism is much more than homosexuality (the conceptual homologue 
of heterosexuality). Lesbianism is much more than sexuality. Lesbianism 
opens onto another dimension of the human (insofar as its definition is 
not founded on the “difference” of the sexes). Today, lesbians discover this 
dimension that is outside of what is masculine and feminine.66
 64. Wittig, Le Chantier littéraire, 51–52.
 65. Wittig, “Some Remarks on The Lesbian Body,” 46.
 66. Wittig, La Pensée straight, 93. An earlier version can be found in Wittig’s essay “Para-
digms,” originally published in English in Stambolian and Marks, eds., Homosexualities and 
French Literature.
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Wittig’s definition does not take woman or women as its foundation (in con-
trast to the “woman-identified woman”67 at the heart of American radical les-
bianism), thus allowing for the possibility of those we call males, as well as 
females, to be part of lesbian society (although the bodies of j/e and tu are 
female).68
In Le Corps lesbien, the ostensibly human lesbian body pointed to in the 
title is in fact a foil for the body of language, which emerges (or rather, is sub-
merged) as the actual lesbian body. For Wittig, the idea of a lesbian body is 
laughable and impossible, as it sets up lesbian as an essential identity. If we fol-
low her logic, which rejects femininity and the ways it does patriarchy’s work 
by attaching itself to ideas and activities through the adjective feminine, then 
we must also reject the idea of a lesbian body, where lesbian ends up doing the 
same essentializing work. While no one would contest that lesbians have bod-
ies—one could refer to a lesbian’s body—lesbian body is a non-starter. Wittig’s 
point in Le Corps lesbien is to show the impossibility of there being a lesbian 
body save in language, save through the assembly and ordering of words. Lan-
guage is thus a lesbian in Le Corps lesbien, as it should be, since it does not 
exist in relation to masculine, phallocentric language and culture. The body 
not only exists as a function of language, it is language. Before, there was no 
lesbian body (lesbian in the Wittigian sense), but after Wittig’s mind put those 
two words together, a lesbian body began to exist. Because of its linguistic 
origins, the only “real” lesbian body is a textual one. It’s to this lesbian corpus, 
this textual body, that Wittig ascribes all the workings of a physical woman, 
of an amante, in a metaphorization of Wittig’s desire for language’s étreinte 
mortelle. Whatever the j/e does to tu, Wittig as writer does to language.
Let’s return to Wittig’s rewriting of the Isis and Osiris myth to read it as 
the literary, fictional site of all the processes she lays out in Le Chantier lit-
téraire. The reintegration and resurrection of Osiris’s fragmented body, of tu, 
requires much work to search for and find all the body parts that are lying 
around in the mud. Once found, more work is required to put them together 
again, with j/e pouring her own body and soul into tu. And after the work of 
re-memberment and reassembly, Isis, j/e, brings Osiris back to life through 
her language: “j/e decrète que comme par le passé tu vis Osiris” [I decree that 
you live as in the past Osiris]. When we read tu as being language itself, as a 
body that’s no less real or alive for being textual, the process of dismember-
 67. Radicalesbians, The Woman-Identified Woman.
 68. As Marie-Hélène (now Sam) Bourcier, the translator into French of The Straight Mind, 
puts it, “Wittig is the only one to not prescribe identification to woman only, to leave the door 
open to bearded lesbians.” “Wittig la politique,” in La Pensée straight, 33.
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ment and resurrection reads very much like the process of writing described 
in Le Chantier littéraire.
Wittig conceives of writing as requiring violence against language to strip 
it down to its raw, originary state, if these words are to be able to be brought 
back as a real body alive with potential:
[. . .] l’ensemble des mots, le vocabulaire, est pris dans la glu du sens, des sens 
conventionnels (de ce que Barthes a appelé ‘la cuisine du sens’), ils arrivent 
chargés et sont tout sauf ‘bruts’. [. . .] Il faut faire sur le langage une opéra-
tion de réduction qui le ramène ‘au degré zéro,’ qui le dépouille de son sens 
conventionnel afin de le transformer en un matériau neutre, brut. [. . .] Cette 
opération n’est pas une opération mineure et à vrai dire je ne sais pas qu’on 
ait déjà parlé de ce sujet de façon systématique. Tout écrivain doit prendre 
les mots et les mettre à nu.
Il faut obtenir un mot brut tel qu’un diamant avant d’être taillé, un mot 
dans sa gangue, gros de possibilités. Et au départ ils sont tels quels (tels qu’on 
les connaît à la fois dans la langue et le langage littéraire), aussi éloignés de 
l’état brut que des images de messieurs et dames attifés et encore corsetés le 
sont du corps nu. (96–97)
[The totality of words, vocabulary, is stuck in the glue of meaning, of con-
ventional meanings (of what Barthes called ‘the kitchen of meaning’), words 
arrive weighed down and anything but ‘raw.’ [. . .] It’s necessary to perform 
an operation of reduction on language that takes it back ‘to degree zero,’ that 
strips it of its conventional meaning in order to transform it into a neutral, 
raw material. [. . .] This operation isn’t a minor one and to be honest, I don’t 
know that anyone has already spoken of this subject in a systematic way. 
Every writer must take words and strip them down.
It’s necessary to obtain a raw word like a diamond before it’s been cut, a 
word in its gangue, fat with possibility. And at first, they (the way we know 
them both in speech and in literary language), are as removed from this raw 
state as images of decked out and corseted gentlemen and ladies are from 
the naked body.]
Wittig insists on the primary work of the literary worksite as being that of 
turning ordinary language, which comes to the writer already used by others 
in speech and in other texts, and thus already coated in meaning and steeped 
in ideology (discourse, in other words), into le langage brut—language that 
can be worked with as a raw material. Wittig uses anthropomorphic vocabu-
lary to speak of this process and language’s embodiment: the writer must strip 
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words of their meaning, strip them naked, remove the corsets and vestments 
with which these words have been covered, dressed up, and ultimately, con-
strained. (For Wittig, as for Sarraute, words are best experienced in the nude.)
This stripping is a major process, as seen in Le Corps lesbien’s anatomical 
text, which Wittig glosses in Le Chantier littéraire, explaining that this ana-
tomical text is used to get language back to its brute state:
D’où l’apparition systématique, manifeste du corps de mots décrivant le 
corps humain dans ses termes cliniques et médicaux, choisis comme appar-
tenant à un vocabulaire technique et scientifique et à cause de cela moins 
totalement investi par l’idéologie [. . .]. Il m’a semblé que les mots réduits à 
leur plus simple forme, pourraient ainsi, gisant comme corps de texte paral-
lèle au texte qui s’écrit, quand employés dans ce corps de texte, partir à neuf 
comme si de rien jamais n’avait été, dans la jubilation de leurs lettres et de 
leurs formes, appelés là uniquement pour le plaisir. C’était aussi leur donner 
carte blanche et leur donner toute l’impulsion rêvée (qu’ils soient entiers, 
qu’ils bouleversent tout) afin qu’ils accomplissent si faire se peut une trans-
formation de la réalité sociale. Une bande de chevaux de Troie, désarmés, 
offrande à une déesse. (109)
[Hence the systematic appearance, manifested in the body of words describ-
ing the human body in clinical and medical terms, chosen as belonging to 
a technical, scientific vocabulary less totally vested with ideology [.  .  .]. It 
seemed to me that words reduced to their simplest form, motionless like the 
body of text parallel to the written text, could thus, when employed in the 
body of that text, start over as if nothing had ever happened, in the jubilation 
of their letters and their forms, summoned there solely for pleasure. This 
also entailed giving them carte blanche and whatever impulse they dreamt 
of (that they be whole, that they turn everything upside down) so that they 
might accomplish, if possible, a transformation of social reality. A band of 
Trojan horses, disarmed, an offering to a goddess.]
Each word in its brute state is a Trojan horse, but in this case they are dis-
armed, not yet used, not yet sent out into the city of the reader’s mind—they 
are in a state of potential. This language is one of possibility, a possibility 
founded in jubilation and pleasure, a desirable and desiring language, a lan-
guage conceived of as immanently political and universal.
The most beautiful and striking sentence in this passage is the last one, 
where Wittig refers to language, liberated from ideology, meaning, and con-
vention, as an offrande à une déesse [offering to a goddess]. Which goddess 
is Wittig referring to when Le Corps lesbien is replete with goddesses, from 
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Ishtar and Isis to Aphrodite and Artemis? Wittig answers the question when 
she writes, “Tes dents l’une après l’autre j/e les arrache [.  .  .] j/e les regarde 
briller, elles sont prises avec leurs racines, à laquelle en faire offrande sinon 
à Sappho la très lointaine” (143) [I wrench out your teeth one by one [.  .  .] I 
see them gleaming, they are removed with their roots, to whom should I offer 
them if not to Sappho the most distant] (127). The offering is to be made to 
the poet Sappho, who, while not part of the usual pantheon, is elevated to 
such status by Wittig, who invokes her far more often than she invokes any 
deity. Sappho occupies a privileged position in Wittig’s imaginary as a writer 
of lesbian texts. Her accession to divinity comes from her power to use lan-
guage. Wittig’s deity, instead of a Christian God who is the Word made Flesh, 
is a woman of flesh who makes words. The offering j/e makes to Sappho of 
extracted teeth is a bodily analogue for the band of Trojan horses described in 
Le Chantier littéraire. Each tooth, with its exposed roots, is a tooth that cannot 
be used in its toothy capacities to bite, chew, and produce speech. These teeth 
that Wittig would offer up are effectively disarmed and unable to be deployed, 
like the Trojan horses she offers. They lie still, like the anatomical words that 
punctuate the novel. Wittig, as the authorial j/e, gives these teeth, this brute 
language, to Sappho, who represents literary creation and the jubilant and 
pleasurable space of a culture and language outside the straight mind. She 
offers up her body and the body of her beloved tu, language, in service to this 
liberated and liberatory writing.69 Although it means having to perform a vio-
lence akin to that of pulling out teeth by their roots or of having her entrails 
ripped out like Prometheus, Wittig is willing to do so because this passion 
is passion in all sense of the term—suffering, as well as intense physical and 
emotional love.
As with Sarraute, writing, which requires the entire mind and body, 
isn’t an easy task for Wittig. The stakes are high, unto death, but this death 
results in life as a writer, and the life of language through the text. Wittig 
doesn’t try to break language just to do violence to a language that has been 
used to do violence to her, a linguistic tit for tat, but rather, to recuperate 
language for a new kind of literature, which can be shared. This literature, 
animated by a passionate relationship with language, results in a reciprocal 
unbecoming: the reader and writer unbecoming subjects, freed into sub-
jectivity, and language’s constraints unbecoming, disintegrating, its body’s 
freedom restored.
 69. Here, tu’s double meaning as not only the second-person pronoun but also the past 
participle of taire [to silence], emerges. The teeth, these brute parts of language, in their poten-
tial, are silent—they do not speak yet: they are offered up to a goddess who will use them to 
speak—an integration into yet another subjectivity, another life.
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As the principal dynamic between language and human, this reciprocity 
enables Wittig, in addition to entering language and taking its body apart 
and putting it back together as a lesbian body, to be herself entered by lan-
guage and acted upon. She is torn apart, no longer the unitary body sta-
ble in its deadening individual identity, but something closer to a universe 
without contours. Just as language can be reappropriated from masculinity 
through a pronoun, a small target that results in repercussions for all of lan-
guage, language, when it enters Wittig, can affect her in her body’s totality:
[Les mots] caressent l’œil mais ils ne s’en tiennent pas là, le corps est gagné 
comme dans l’amour, un geste de caresse commence à un endroit précis et 
de là le corps est touché dans son ensemble. Et comme dans ces caresses 
carnales qui parfois sont plaisantes simplement mais peuvent aller jusqu’au 
dérangement, ainsi font les caresses des mots.
[[Words] caress the eye but they don’t stop there, the body is won over as 
in love; a caressing gesture begins in a specific location and from there the 
entire body is affected. And as with these carnal caresses, which are some-
times simply pleasant but can also disturb, so too with the caresses of 
words.]70
Wittig’s language is clear here. The writer’s role has been reversed, and, instead 
of being the one to touch and manipulate words, down to their viscera, she is 
touched and manipulated—in a state of dérangement, overcome by language. 
In her possession of and by language, her caresses of and by language, she is 
never language’s proprietor or master. The moment we open the pages of Le 
Corps lesbien and enter the text, regardless of what sex we are, we’re given 
access to the band of Trojan horses, to the uprooted teeth, and we’re asked, 
through the syntactical ordering and assemblage of our reading, to arm and 
assemble them. We are invited to become j/e, to unbecome and be broken. 
Through our intervention, that raw language—those words lying still in the 
writer’s quarry, those dismembered parts of a body—becomes a lesbian text, a 
lesbian body, language’s living body.
GARRÉTA: “TO THE LOST ONE”
Dérangement is an apt characterization of Garréta’s reaction to language. 
Her experience of language, as it is represented in her work, is profoundly 
disturbing, both for the reader, as seen in her hostile and queer use of pro-
 70. Wittig, Le Chantier littéraire, 122.
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nouns in Sphinx and La Décomposition, and for the writer, as we will see in 
the dérangement that pervades Ciels liquides (1990) and Pas un jour (2002). 
Unlike Sarraute and Wittig, who both write of a present passionate encounter 
with language, Garréta’s passion, as is appropriate for someone who identi-
fies with a melancholic postmodernity where true collectivity is impossible, 
is relegated to an irretrievable past. Garréta’s writing expresses a passion for 
language that’s always already passed into memory. Her passion is marked as 
much by language’s absence as by its presence. This tension between presence 
and absence is a fault line through which desire for language emerges as the 
core of Garréta’s work. In La Décomposition, for instance, we see the narrator’s 
pursuit of aesthetic perfection entail the maiming of both human bodies and 
of the body of Proust’s magnum opus. In a darker echo of Wittig, this aes-
thetic fulfillment is unable to be realized save through violence of an absolute, 
fatal nature, which doesn’t result in resurrection. In Ciels liquides and Pas un 
jour, Garréta is à la recherche de la langue perdue [in search of lost language], 
and those two novels are filled with both thematic and textual violence—her 
response to a desire that’s both unrealizable and irremovable. While Wittig’s 
violence toward language summons and resurrects a language that’s alive and 
present, in Garréta’s writing, this gesture comes too late—it’s an attempt to 
bring back a language that has slipped away or is yet to come. In what follows, 
I examine first Pas un jour and then Ciels liquides, going in reverse chrono-
logical order, to show the trajectory from desiring a language that’s slipped 
away to desiring a language that is yet to come. By going backward, Garréta’s 
desire for language becomes more apparent.
Pas un jour, for which Garréta won the Prix Médicis, is a novel ostensibly 
produced under an Oulipian constraint: write from memory, for five hours a 
day, about a woman the author has desired or been desired by, faithfully tran-
scribing what memory dictates. Though published as a novel, the coincidence 
of Garréta the biographical subject with the narrator, compounded by the 
photograph of Garréta herself peering out from the Livre de Poche edition, 
makes it difficult not to read this as an autobiographical work.71 On a struc-
tural level, Garréta, in keeping with the etymology of dérangement as a dis-
ordering, flouts the order that is supposed to govern Pas un jour: in the last 
section of the novel, entitled “Post Scriptum,” Garréta confesses to not only 
breaching the autobiographical pact but her contract with her self-imposed 
constraint by having inserted a completely fictional section. She provokes us 
 71. See Killeen, “Esquives, pièges et désaveux” for a reading of Pas un jour as an autofic-
tional text that tries to operate in an anti-confessional mode in an attempt to open up new 
possibilities for a self-writing that can bypass confession.
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by commanding us to “Cherchez la fiction” [Look for the fiction].72 Garréta’s 
structural bad faith is a form of textual violence that casts uncertainty onto the 
whole text as we become dérangées as readers, unable to find the fiction, either 
giving up the task, or taking the novel in its entirety to be fiction, which may 
be Garréta’s point all along, one of her aims in the novel being to wean read-
ers off any facile adherence to the concepts of identity and subjecthood that 
validate the idea of the autobiographical author. The dérangement does not 
stop at the structure, however, and I want to turn away from this structural 
disordering to look instead at what sort of dérangement language produces in 
the writer and the desire that it reveals, provokes, and sustains.73
Pas un jour has contradictory aims: on the one hand, to narrate desire 
by recollecting the women the narrator has desired and been desired by—
“l’alphabet bégayant du désir” (11) [the stammering alphabet of desire] (4)—
and on the other, to evacuate desire from the narrative and channel the 
constraint as a way of separating memory from a direct and free contact with 
desire—“Le récit ne sera que cela, le dévidage de la mémoire dans le cadre 
strict d’un moment determiné” (12) [That will be the narrative: the unwinding 
of memory in the strict framework of a given moment] (5). In other words, 
the point is not to relive those past desires. The writing is not to stir up feel-
ing, the past is not to contaminate the present in an unfettered way: “Froideur 
du récit, consonante à la froideur du désir” (90) [A cold narration, consistent 
with the coldness of desire] (53). This desire will be handled and contained, 
with a fixed beginning and end, and none of the urgency and heat we nor-
mally associate with it. At the same time as she points to the force of the 
desire that inhabits her memories through the imposition of a constraint to 
keep them in check, the narrator also undercuts this desire by insisting that 
her subjectivity, as attached to a notion of the self, is nowhere to be found 
 72. Garréta, Pas un jour, 144; Garréta, Not One Day, 87. All subsequent references will be 
made in-text, and the translation will be occasionally modified.
 73. After having just articulated Garréta’s will to disarticulate the biographical, flesh-and-
blood author from the narrator, I want to recognize that I perform a slippage between them, a 
slippage I perform with Sarraute and Wittig, as well, when I attribute desire or intentionality 
to them as opposed to their narrators. I think this is justified: when I speak of the writer, I’m 
speaking of her as a person in relationship with language. Through their narrators, who may 
or may not correspond to the biographical and social data that is collated to the social entities 
that these writers also are, writers create fictional persons, who, for being fictional, are not any 
less real. I believe that narrators are transposed onto the writers who give them shape, form, 
and substance, and that a narrator’s relation to language reflects the writer’s own relation, as 
the writer is the animating force for the narrator’s language, a force that cannot but leave traces. 
Given that I am seeing a certain relationship to language that is present in all their works—a 
consistency across their corpus even as the narrators change—I think it’s fair to point to the 
writer behind the narrators.
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in the novel. Desire—“le passe-partout de la subjectivité” (10) [the one key 
to unlock the secret of our subjectivity] (3)—opens a door onto nothing. Or 
does it? This key, which she implies is false, has a real function. If the self and 
attendant subjectivity of an (auto)biographical Garréta whose life experiences 
can be mapped onto the episodes do not exist, if there is no transparent and 
one-to-one connection between the self who writes and the self who lives, if 
Garréta, the person endowed with a passport and civil status who writes, isn’t 
the person whose desires are being recounted, there is still a subjectivity that’s 
evinced—the desire for language that is unwound throughout the text along 
with memory. This desire and subjectivity—how can one have desire without 
subjectivity?—do not originate from without the text, but from within it.
Garréta’s desire for language, unlike the desire for and of women that 
constitutes Pas un jour’s narrative thread, cannot be unwound and recounted 
in the strict frame of a given moment: unlike these memories, this desire 
isn’t something that belongs to the past, existing solely through recollec-
tion. Instead of being re-counted, it is still being counted, and is behind the 
recounting of these other desires. It passes through these episodes of a past 
and passed desire and makes itself known, in the writing of these encounters 
with women, as a very present desire. Over the course of the twelve sections 
that correspond to eleven episodes of desire with eleven women—one of the 
sections, entitled “I,” is not devoted to a specific woman but to the American 
landscape as experienced on the road, and reads as an ode to the Interstate—
Garréta paints portraits of very different women, from a high school crush to 
the stepdaughter of a writer, to an older colleague at a university. But they all 
have in common the way women stand in for language as surrogates: Garréta 
doesn’t avoid describing sexual encounters in physical terms, and the book is 
filled with women’s bodies, but the language she uses to describe their seduc-
tion (of and by her) and their coupling is as textual as it is sexual. She relates 
to and treats these women’s bodies as if they were texts: what she pursues in 
pursuing them is an experience of their bodies as language. Garréta’s writing 
doesn’t suggest that language’s corporeality is the same as human corporeal-
ity. Instead, in the wake of a language that seems inaccessible and absent, the 
human body stands in as an inadequate substitute for language’s body.
In the closing line of the Ante Scriptum that introduces the novel, Gar-
réta writes, “Car la vie est trop courte pour se résigner à lire des livres mal 
écrits et coucher avec des femmes qu’on n’aime pas” (16) [For life is too short 
to resign ourselves to reading poorly written books and sleeping with women 
we don’t love] (8). In juxtaposing badly written books with unloved women, 
Garréta sets up a parallel between reading and sex, where an encounter with 
a textual body can be considered in the same light as a sexual encounter with 
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a physical body—an erotic current subtends both. In the very next sentence 
that follows, which opens the section on the woman known as B*, Garréta 
continues this elision, writing: “Mémoire du corps: son inscription dans un 
espace, son ancrage dans une lumière” (17) [Memory of a body: inscribed in 
a given space, anchored in light] (9). Garréta chooses language that casts the 
human body in linguistic, textual terms, as something inscribed, and ancrage 
[anchoring] evokes its homophone encrage [inking], which evokes writing. 
Instead of choosing souvenir to refer to the memory of B*’s body, Garréta opts 
for the ambiguous mémoire, which, without an article to indicate its gender, 
could signify both memory (une mémoire) and essay (un mémoire). “Mémoire 
du corps” could mean both the body that is represented—remembered—and 
the body that represents.
The section continues with the narrator’s analysis of her seduction by B* 
at a villa for academics where both are in residence. The narrator is attracted 
to B* and desires her body because it is the vessel for her language—it’s B*’s 
language, her voice and the things she says with it, that are compelling:
Tu y revenais, tu l’esquissais, cette nuit virtuelle avec B*, et il te semblait que 
tu aurais à son corps le même délice qu’à sa parole, qu’elle aurait au jeu de 
l’amour la même souplesse et fermeté qu’au jeu du langage et de la pensée, 
que le corps à corps aurait même vigueur sensuelle, même inventive vitalité. 
(22)
[You kept coming back to it, sketching out this virtual night with B*, and 
it seemed to you that her body would offer the same delight as her words, 
that the lovemaking would have the same sensual vigor, the same inventive 
vitality.] (12)
The narrator desires B* insofar as her body is a figuration of her language, of 
the way B* speaks and writes and thinks. She imagines getting to the human 
body as a way of getting to language. The body is the promise of a language 
made tangible, translated into flesh—the same vitality that animates B*’s lan-
guage is bound to be found in her body, even if it is not language’s body itself.
This same will to access language through a woman’s body, to treat human 
flesh as a window onto language that can be seen through, opened up, and 
entered into, continues throughout the novel. For example, with C*, the nar-
rator identifies the source of desire as C*’s language: “Dans les phrases, dans 
le souffle qui porte les phrases, dans la voix qui profère les mots qu’avait-elle 
glissé, quel charme .  .  .” (29) [In the sentences, in the breath that carries the 
phrases, in the voice that pronounces the words, what had she slipped, what 
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charm .  .  .] (17). The women that populate Pas un jour are idealized récit-
femmes, women-narratives, the fusion of human corporeality and language, 
and they are appealing for that reason: the narrator gets to desire both the 
human and linguistic objects of her desire simultaneously. Even when Garréta 
writes an episode where the narrator desires and is desired by a woman whose 
language seems to lack the charm and virtuosity of B* and C*’s language, she is 
still able to anchor desire in language by turning the woman’s body itself into 
language, as is the case with Z*, whom she bites hard enough to leave a mark:
[Z*] la sent comme une brûlure sourde dans son dos, ou encore un trou 
dans sa peau, n’ouvrant sur rien, sans fond ni bord. Quand tu y songes, elle 
ressemble sans doute à toutes les empreintes que laissent des dents sur la 
chair vivante. [. . .] Tandis que vous cheminez, tu la presses soudain d’ima-
giner que ton avion s’écrase: la trace dont elle souhaite la disparition, de peur 
qu’elle la trahisse, et toi avec elle, cette trace, combien elle lui deviendrait 
chère quand aurait disparu celle qui l’imprima sur sa peau. [. . .] Tu lui dis 
encore de s’imaginer jour après jour la sachant s’évanouir, nuit après nuit 
plus pâle dans le miroir voilé d’un deuil tenu secret, la mémoire de toi s’effa-
çant enfin de son corps et ce signe palimpseste des sens qu’elle seule—qui ne 
le voit pas—, et toi seule—qui ne serais plus—auraient su déchiffrer, devenir 
lettre morte. (136–38)
[[Z*] feels it like a dull burning in her back, or else a hole in her skin, open-
ing onto nothing, with neither bottom nor edge. [.  .  .] While you stroll 
together, you suddenly urge her to imagine your plane crashing: the trace 
that she wants to disappear, out of fear that it betray her, and you also, that 
scar, how it will become dear to her when the one who imprinted it on her 
skin will have died. [. . .] You tell her again to imagine, day after day knowing 
it will vanish, night after night more pale in the mirror veiled by a mourn-
ing kept secret, the memory of you fading at last from her body and this 
palimpsest sign that she alone—who cannot see it—and you alone—who 
will no longer be—would have known how to decipher, will become a dead 
letter.] (83)
Though Z* is not endowed with a seductive, charming language, the narra-
tor supplies her with that language through her body. Z* is transformed into 
a text: her body is treated as paper and the narrator’s mouth as printer. Even 
while the mark is fresh, Garréta already pushes this scene of writing into the 
past, turning the still fresh lettre into a lettre morte, a letter cut off from its des-
tination, which goes unheeded, unremarked—out of reach. Garréta builds her 
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representation of Z*’s body as text, as a site of signification, on the condition 
that the narrator, in the authorial position, be dead, unable to enjoy it, unable 
to assume the position of reader vis-à-vis her creation.
The desire for language is articulated most clearly in section “D*,” which 
treats most directly the activities of reading and writing. With D*, “une femme 
hétero” (42) [a straight woman] (24), the narrator doesn’t desire her, but she 
allows herself to be desired by D*, giving in to D*’s demands for clandestine 
sex. In this episode, where their encounter is marked not by passion but by 
fatalistic submission, a retrospective sense of disgust, and the desire to forget 
that this ever happened, her desire is still present. This time, it’s framed com-
pletely outside the human body. As an alternative to D*’s desire for the narra-
tor’s body and the botched story it results in, the narrator articulates instead 
her desire for texts:
Tu achètes—car tu ne saurais résister au désir d’un volume qui te promet 
des transports de pensée ou d’imagination—des livres que tu ne te résous 
jamais à abandonner derrière toi (pourquoi te faut-il garder la trace de tes 
transports? pour les pouvoir réitérer?), tu te lestes de leur poids, et le désir 
du transport s’achève en malédiction de la possession et de l’accumulation 
des signes, des objets. Tu as fait franchir l’Atlantique dans les deux sens à des 
milliers de volumes; tu t’y es courbatu les reins, rompu les bras. Tu dissé-
mines le fric que tu oublies de dépenser sur de multiples comptes, car tu n’as 
de désirs que pour des livres [. . .]. (37, my emphasis)
[You buy—for you wouldn’t be able to resist the desire of a volume that 
promises flights of fancy or thought—books you can never resolve to leave 
behind (why must you keep traces of your transports? To be able to reiterate 
them?), they weigh you down, and the desire to be transported ends in the 
accursed possession and accumulation of signs, objects. You have carried 
thousands of volumes both ways across the Atlantic; you have the backaches 
and sore arms to prove it. You scatter money that you forget to spend in 
multiple accounts, for you have desire only for books [. . .].] (21)
The parallels between the desire for books and the narrator’s encounter with 
D* are striking. With D*, the narrator gives in to D*’s desire despite her bet-
ter judgment, and this ambivalence is reflected in Garréta’s writing about the 
narrator’s giving in to her desire for books, something that results in malédic-
tion and physical pain. Garréta’s description of the narrator’s body post-book 
mirrors her description of her body post-D*: “A l’issue de ces trois jours, des 
crampes irrémissibles dans le poignet, les doigts raides à ne plus pouvoir tenir 
un stylo, les reins courbatus, les bras, les épaules, la nuque douloureux, le dos 
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lacéré” (46) [At the end of these three days, shattered, your wrist inexorably 
cramped, fingers stiff and unable to hold a pen any longer, loins sore, arm, 
shoulders, neck aching, back lacerated] (27). The repetition of sore arms and 
back links, once again, the act of reading, or taking in language, with the act 
of taking in a body. This link is reinforced by the notion of “accursed posses-
sion and accumulation of signs,” which connects to Garréta’s description of 
D*’s body as the site for the possession and accumulation of signs, part of a 
signifying economy.
The narrator chalks up her attraction to D* as having stemmed from the 
interplay of signs and semiotic possibility that D* had signified:
A y resonger, une part cruciale de ton attraction pour D* a tenu à cela: la 
secrète captation des signes qui, au milieu d’une société aveugle et sour-
cilleuse tout ensemble, permettaient la reconnaissance initiatique du désir. 
[. . .] Tu ajouteras ici deux choses. Que D* n’a pas été la seule femme à t’offrir 
le vertige de cette communication ésotérique du désir. Et que, dans ce que la 
langue commune s’acharne à désigner sous le nom d’homosexualité, la part 
qui a eu toujours sur ton imagination l’emprise la plus forte n’est autre que la 
sémiotique et l’herméneutique si singulières qui découlent des situations de 
secret qu’elle peut impliquer. Enfin, c’est ce plaisir des signes, de leur laby-
rinthe où cacher et capter ce qui ne se peut dire, car hors la loi des codes, des 
langages institués et publics [. . .]. (42)
[On second thought, a crucial part of your attraction for D* was tied to pre-
cisely that: the secret grasping of signs which, in the middle of a society both 
blind and supercilious, permitted the initiatory recognition of desire. [. . .] 
You will add two things here. That D* was not the only woman to offer you 
the vertigo of this esoteric communication of desire. And that, in what the 
common language persists in designating by the name of homosexuality, the 
part that always had the strongest pull over your imagination is none other 
than the semiotics and hermeneutics, so singular, that stem from situations 
of secrecy that homosexuality may involve. Finally, it’s this pleasure of signs 
that you hold dear above all else, their labyrinth where one hides and cap-
tures that which cannot be said (for it is outside the law of normative codes 
and public languages) [. . .].] (24–25)
It isn’t so much D*’s body in and of itself that is attractive, but the way her 
body acts as a signifier—something to be decoded and intercepted. The sexual 
act and its attendant pleasures are simply the physical manifestation of “ce 
plaisir des signes” [this pleasure of signs], of coming into close contact with 
a woman’s body that is semiotic in its constitution. Without the body’s semi-
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otic potential, there is no spark of attraction, no impelling need to possess, no 
overwhelming desire.
Garréta takes seriously the model of textual erotics and erotic textuality 
that Roland Barthes, an intellectual influence,74 puts forth in Fragments d’un 
discours amoureux [A Lover’s Discourse] (1977) and Le Plaisir du texte [The 
Pleasure of the Text] (1973). Pas un jour combines Le Plaisir’s positing of the 
text as having corporeality, as being “an anagram of the body,” its contours 
delineating “a body of bliss consisting solely of erotic relations,”75 with the sort 
of semiotic sleuthing Barthes undertakes in Fragments, where he decodes the 
various signs that are housed in and produced by the object of his desire and 
recounts how this amorous discourse seduces him.
Time and time again throughout Pas un jour, Garréta sets up women as 
texts to be decoded, read, understood. Saussure puts forth the notion of the 
sign as made up of the signifié [signified] and the signifiant [signifier], and 
Wittig refers to the latter as the charpente acoustique [acoustic structure/
skeleton].76 For Garréta, each woman operates as a collection of signs, and 
her body is the signifier to the signified it contains—it is a charpente charnelle 
[fleshy structure]. Even in the episodes that don’t recount a specifically sexual 
desire, the body still operates as the fleshy framework for a text. For example, 
section “L*” recounts an encounter with a ten- or eleven-year-old girl, the 
stepdaughter of a writer attending the same academic conference as the nar-
rator. The girl has a crush on the narrator. While there’s no real sexual tension 
or dynamic in play, the narrator describes herself, the object of desire, as hav-
ing been textualized in the process of being desired: she’s assumed the role of 
Prince Charming, a figure in a book come alive for the little girl (100–101; 60).
Even in section “I,” which is about the American road and not about any 
human body, Garréta treats this geographic body in the same way, as a text to 
be read. The section features the narrator with her Rand McNally, mapping 
out the American landscape with proper names. She names the roads she 
takes (I-95, New Jersey Turnpike, US-33 (75–76)), the cars she drives (Pontiac 
Grand Am, Buick Regal, Chevrolet Lumina, Toyota Solara (74)), the places she 
passes through (la côte Est [the East Coast], les Appalaches [the Appalachians], 
New York, New Haven, Houseatonic [sic], Newark, Philadelphie, Virginie de 
l’Ouest [West Virginia], Marmet, Charleston, Ripley, Ohio, Pomeroy, Michigan, 
Illinois, Géorgie, Caroline, Chesapeake Bay, Tappan Zee Bridge (75–77)). Gar-
 74. Garréta, in conversation with me, recounted having attended the last season of his 
seminar at the Collège de France (December 1979–February 1980), before he died after being 
struck by a laundry truck.
 75. Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, 17.
 76. Wittig, Le Chantier littéraire, 106.
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réta traces the contours of this American body through the names of the roads 
the narrator has driven on, the cities that act as points of articulation for these 
roads. The narrator possesses and experiences America through the names 
she conjures up to capture it, these instances of language a way to touch the 
country and attach it to her memory, but also to recreate its body.
Garréta conceives of this section as an allegory, a sublime figure of desire: 
“Aurais-tu pu concerter plus belle allégorie, figure plus sublime du désir?” 
(83) [Could you have devised a more beautiful allegory, a more sublime fig-
ure of desire?] (49). The desire in question is for “la Grand Am de Pontiac, 
cette grand-dame ou âme américaine que tu ne cesses de désirer, objet de tes 
désirs les plus constants” (82) [the Pontiac Grand Am, that grande dame or 
âme, American soul that you never stop desiring, object of your most constant 
desires] (49). The narrator needs to name the American landscape, this alle-
gorical figure of her desire, and she traces its topography—contact with the 
road an automotive analogue for making love to a woman’s body—through 
descriptions of the places, which act as an overlay to this inventory of their 
names and the contours they sketch out.77 It is as if these names have a tal-
ismanic power, and the narrator takes evident pleasure in invoking them, 
sounding out the un-French charpente acoustique of these words in her French 
mouth. As with the other, humanly embodied objects and subjects of desire 
in the novel, Garréta’s America is an assemblage of names, a text to be read, 
and in that sense is as much woman as the other initials who stand in for the 
flesh-and-blood women of the other episodes.
Pas un jour exemplifies Derrida’s oft-quoted dictum that Il n’y a pas de 
hors-texte, that there is nothing outside of text,78 which certainly proves to be 
true for desire in the novel. Here, desire is inseparable from language, from 
textuality. As much as desire acts on the senses and the body, it does so with 
signification at stake: corporeality is tied to signification, desire to reading 
and writing. In Pas un jour, the body only matters insofar as it can read and 
be read, signify and be interpreted. But the passionate encounters with these 
women-texts are all accessed retrospectively, and Garréta seeks to contain 
 77. One could criticize Garréta here and see an uncomfortably close parallel between this 
charting out of the American body and the ways place-names bear the traces of a both impe-
rialist and patriarchal conquering of “virgin territory.” The white conquerors and explorers 
come in, raping native women and giving the geographical features of the conquered country 
sexualized names, such as the Grand Teton mountain in Wyoming, which means literally “Big 
Breast.” The ex-French colonies and French territories are especially rich in this regard: e.g., Les 
Mamelles [Breasts], in the Seychelles, Trou de Madame Coco [Madame Coco’s Hole] in Gua-
deloupe. For more on the erotics of place names, see Kristin Graves, “Mapping La Belle Créole” 
(PhD diss., Yale University, 2014).
 78. Derrida, De la grammatologie, 227.
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them temporally in another moment, another carefully delineated frame. She 
casts the narrator as a solitary figure who stays up at night, revisiting these 
past desires and textual-sexual moments in those quiet hours when no one 
else is awake. Garréta writes this solitude explicitly into the text as she has the 
narrator describe herself as wearing headphones in the middle of the night, 
planted in front of her computer, the machine into which she writes all these 
desires: a portrait of the modern writer (73–75; 43–44). Her desire for the 
pleasure of signs is a solitary one, channeled through the absence that these 
women, these instances of signs and language have left behind. The Garrétian 
writer has only the traces of language to remember.
The desire she has for a language lost, a desire for something absent, 
becomes clearer when Ciels liquides, Garréta’s second novel, is taken into con-
sideration: elegiac in tone, it directly evokes the loss of language. As we move 
now toward Ciels liquides, what I want to take away from this examination of 
Pas un jour is the intensity of this desire for language, rendered equivalent to 
erotic desire, and the melancholic frame within which this desire circulates. 
Looking at Ciels liquides will take this desire for language outside the human 
realm, and place the desire that emerges in Garréta’s writing alongside Sar-
raute and Wittig’s in conceiving of the body of language as being something 
other than human.
Ciels liquides, like Sphinx, is narrated by a young student, but here the 
anonymous narrator studies political science instead of theology, and we 
know the student is male. The novel is divided into two narratives: the frame 
narrative, in italic type, places the narrator at his family’s country home, inside 
its cellar, with limited food and supplies, waiting out some sort of nuclear 
apocalypse that has left him the sole survivor. This frame narrative begins the 
novel and is set in the present. The framed narrative, in regular type, recounts 
the narrator’s life before the cataclysmic event. It recounts how this member of 
France’s elite, slated to become part of the next generation of leaders, loses his 
language when he’s stricken by aphasia. He first suffers gaps in his vocabulary, 
no longer able to name the things he used to be able to, then becomes inca-
pable of reading or writing, and finally entirely loses his capacity to speak and 
to understand what others say to him. Ciels liquides is a tale of language lost, 
of language found, and of what other things are lost along the way.
Garréta pays close attention to the physical body in its language-less 
state, and, throughout the novel, she continually associates the corporeal with 
the linguistic and conceives of the narrator’s desire for language as a bodily 
one. What distinguishes the staging of language vis-à-vis the human body 
in this novel versus that of Pas un jour is the way the drama of the relation-
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ship between human and language, between language and corporeality as it is 
commonly understood, plays out primarily within the narrator’s body in Ciels 
liquides. The narrator’s body is considered the source and originary site of lan-
guage, and language is concentrated within that particular body in a way that 
departs from the proliferation of corporeal sites of language we find in Pas un 
jour. Ciels liquides can be read as a laborious progression from a somewhat 
instrumentalizing view of language where a human engages in a deeply corpo-
real, physical relationship with language (but takes language as an object and 
something that can be incorporated or assimilated into the human body), to 
a view of language that treats it as autonomous, other, non-human, although 
close to the human.
At the beginning of the novel, before the narrator’s fall from linguistic 
grace, he gorges himself on language and his desire to learn language is akin 
to a physical hunger: “Je passai des mois entiers à me gaver de nourritures et 
d’idiomes exotiques” [I spent entire months stuffing myself with exotic food 
and languages].79 Language is described as something that can be taken in and 
absorbed by the body. Garréta continues this association between language 
and body, or more accurately, between language and a certain bodily assimila-
tion of it, by describing the earliest stage of the narrator’s aphasia as one where 
his mind is likened to a page and his thoughts to ink:
Je parvins à cacher quelque temps cette infirmité récurrente dont j’éprouvais 
plus de honte que de peur. C’était un soudain trou d’ombre, une tache d’encre 
que je sentais poindre et s’étendre puis se résorber avant qu’une vague de 
nuit ne vienne recouvrir les vocables et ne me contraigne d’interrompre la 
conversation engagée, la phrase commencée.
Je rusais un temps: prévenant la lame obscure, je renvoyais à mon inter-
locuteur sa parole, répétant très vite ses derniers mots avant qu’ils ne fussent 
eux aussi engloutis, ou bien encore laissais choir sur la page trois gouttes de 
cette encre soudain inondant mon crâne. (27)
[For some time, I managed to hide this recurring infirmity about which I 
felt more shame than fear. It was a sudden pocket of shadow, an ink stain 
that I felt arrive and expand and then diminish before a wave of light came 
 79. Garréta, Ciels liquides, 15. All subsequent references will be made in-text. Some might 
object to my translating idiome as language, but I agree with Derrida, who writes regarding 
this distinction: “I do not know where we can find internal and structural features in order to 
distinguish rigorously between a language, a dialect, and an idiom.” Derrida, Monolingualism 
of the Other, 8.
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to cover the root words and force me to interrupt the conversation entered 
into, the sentence begun.
I tried to trick people for a time: anticipating the dark blade, I returned 
to my interlocutor their speech, repeating their last words very quickly 
before they too were swallowed up, or else let fall on the page three drops of 
that sudden ink inundating my skull.]
Already, here, Garréta moves away from the idea of language as part of the 
human or as able to become part of the human body, and emphasizes lan-
guage’s alterity: with ink on a page, one can maintain a distinction between 
the paper and the ink that is indelibly on the paper, whereas food, once it is 
broken down by the digestive system and absorbed into the blood stream, can 
no longer be recognized as food as such, but has effectively become part of the 
body. Language and human are figured as different from each other, and as the 
novel progresses, this difference becomes more pronounced, and the two are 
granted, respectively, more autonomy from each other. Even just a few pages 
later, for example, Garréta describes the narrator’s inability to produce words 
(the next step in his aphasia, after first being unable to understand them), 
in quite Sarrautian terms: “En marchant, je toussai par deux fois, tâchant de 
racler au fond de ma gorge des lambeaux de langue” (30) [While walking, I 
coughed twice, trying to scrape away shreds of language from the depths of 
my throat]. Language isn’t simply something the body produces through the 
use of one’s vocal cords and mouth, but it has a physical, material presence 
and exists within the body as a foreign body, like one of Sarraute’s earlier figu-
rations of language’s autonomy.
When the narrator’s aphasia completely sets in, his parents hospitalize 
him. The medical team, in attempting to diagnose him, treats the narrator’s 
language-less, mute body as a text to be analyzed: they put electrodes on his 
skull and attach them to a machine that reads and records the signals his brain 
sends out; they treat his skull as a sheet of paper onto which they inscribe 
circles and arrows in red pencil—a medical code only they are able to read. 
The narrator rebelliously rubs off these inscriptions and resists being treated 
as if he were language. While hospitalized, the narrator has no freedom, as he 
is confined to a bed where he is constantly surveilled. But even as he loses the 
capacity to move freely, he gains a new sort of freedom: he’s no longer sub-
ject to the social and academic responsibilities he shouldered when he was a 
promising young student. This liberation from parental ambitions is concret-
ized when a mysterious artist named Céleste comes to visit him at the hospital 
and kidnaps him—we aren’t given any sense of her motivation or rationale or 
of how she knows about him. Céleste undoes the restraints that had been put 
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on the narrator to prevent him from erasing the marks the doctors made on 
him, dresses him, and takes him to her artist’s loft where she feeds him, sleeps 
with him, and works on a sculpture of an angel.
The nameless narrator is thus the mute witness to Céleste’s representation 
of a celestial creature whose purpose is to be a messenger—to carry a text, in 
other words—as the angel has been figured and understood in Christian the-
ology.80 In her studio, she has a body without language and a body that stands 
in for language. Céleste takes the angel, made of wood and cloth, and has the 
narrator accompany her to the Seine where she proceeds to try to hang the 
angel from a bridge—it’s unclear what sort of statement this is meant to convey 
to the Parisians and tourists who would see it—but she falls to her death when 
a gust of wind sweeps the angel, and her along with it, into the river’s waters.
Céleste’s death is a turning point in the novel: the narrator is completely 
alone in the world, cut off from society by his inability to speak and be spo-
ken to, identity-less and without any material resources. This first moment of 
complete alienation and solitude anticipates the post-nuclear holocaust world 
with which the novel begins, and reverses it: the novel begins with the nar-
rator who has language but no world to live in; this turning point places the 
narrator in the world but with no language with which to navigate it. In the 
second part of this framed narrative, the narrator follows the city workers 
who fish the angel out of the river and take it to a cemetery. He discovers an 
empty vault in the cemetery, which he makes his home—a foreshadowing of 
his post-apocalyptic existence in a lifeless world. He then learns to provide 
for himself, in a way. He collects flowers from graves, sells them to passersby, 
and exchanges what coins he receives for bread, depending on other people 
to count out the proper amount of money for him. He stumbles across some 
paper and proceeds to begin making rubbings of the tombstones that sur-
round him, able to procure and possess language in that way, and to “write” by 
reproducing text. Even if he cannot understand what he is copying, he under-
stands that it is language. After he starts collecting these instances of mortu-
ary language, regaining language in an impoverished way, he crosses paths 
with a man whom he recognizes as his doppelganger. He follows this other 
man who has his body and face but, unlike him, is endowed with language. 
He tails him from his workplace, the morgue, to a brothel, and then witnesses 
his double’s decapitation. The narrator takes advantage of his double’s death to 
take the dead man’s clothes and wallet and the identity that the papers inside 
the wallet promise him. Armed with the congruence of his own features, he 
starts working at the morgue, cleaning and cataloguing bodies and assisting 
 80. Angel derives from the Greek angelos via the Latin angelus, both meaning “messenger.”
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in autopsies, but possesses this other identity as incompletely as he possesses 
the language of his rubbings.
The narrator at this point, with his rubbings and job, discovers desire, in 
the form of a sunbather whose gender Garréta doesn’t reveal. The sunbather 
chooses to frequent the cemetery to sunbathe and the narrator falls in love 
with the beauty of this body, eventually working up the courage to approach 
them. He gives the beloved body a rubbing as a way of making contact and 
communicates through gestures, sounds, and laughter. Emboldened by the 
regularity of the interactions that follow, the narrator decides to declare his 
passion, but, on the chosen day, the sunbather does not show up as is their 
habit. Crushed by his love object’s absence, the narrator goes to work only to 
discover the sunbather’s body in the morgue on the coroner’s table.
This discovery is a world-shattering one for the narrator. Confronted with 
the sunbather’s lifeless body, the narrator recognizes the body that Céleste’s 
angel was modeled after: “Sur le billard d’acier froid, dans la lumière étale, 
gisait l’ange, son cadavre de chair, son modèle, sa statue” (143) [On the cold 
steel operating table, in the still light, lay the angel, its fleshly cadaver, its 
model, its statue]. Céleste’s angel, as a sculpture, had led the narrator to his 
cemetery home, and as a living body, had visited the narrator in it. The narra-
tor witnesses the angel’s autopsy in a state “sans vie ni voix” (144) [of lifeless-
ness, voicelessness], and identifies deeply with the dead body, feeling every cut 
made into the cadaver in his own body:
Je sens à mesure de la dissection de l’ange tous mes viscères, veines et artères 
ligaturées, ligaments sectionnés, un à un déroulés, décollés, séparés, extraits 
de leurs gangues membraneuses, pesés, leurs replis fouillés par le couteau, 
s’en aller de moi. (145)
[With the dissection of the angel, I feel leaving me all my viscera, ligated 
veins and arteries, cut ligaments, one by one uncoiled, detached, separated, 
extracted from their membranous envelopes, weighed, their folds excavated 
by the knife.]
It’s as if the angel’s body were his own, and this empathic projection of his 
senses onto the angel’s now insensate body can be seen as a visceral mani-
festation of the narrator’s desire for language—the angel exists to be a mes-
sage—and this desire for language is for an embodied language, as seen in the 
narrator’s falling in love with the angel’s body. In this scene, which is a sort of 
reciprocal vivisection, Garréta’s relationship to the angel parallels Wittig’s j/e’s 
passionate relationship to tu in Le Corps lesbien. But Garréta’s version sees no 
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resurrection. This mutual dismemberment, rather than leading to life, leads to 
as absolute a separation as possible from the angel—this language-body—and 
the narrator is deprived of the reintegration that Wittig narrates.
The angel’s death is a devastating one and when the narrator returns to his 
cemetery home, he discovers that his vault has been razed. The framed nar-
rative in regular type comes to an end with the narrator wandering around 
homeless, bereft of language, identity, and love—things we take to be founda-
tional to being human. He comes across a train station, and, while looking at 
the signs that indicate the trains’ destinations, all his language suddenly comes 
back to him when he’s able to recognize the name of the town he used to go 
to every summer, where his family has a country home. This is the seam that 
connects the two narratives, and in making the leap from this retrospective 
narrative to the present, post-apocalyptic one, Garréta suggests that the narra-
tor took that train to his family’s country home only to have the whole world 
go up in nuclear flames.
The frame narrative, which punctuates the framed one at irregular inter-
vals, is a much simpler one in terms of plot: nothing happens—it’s the narra-
tor’s monologue to himself in a grimmer version of Noah’s Ark where he waits 
out disaster, but, unlike Noah, has no company save himself. The narrator tries 
to pass the time by debating with himself whether it’s safe to venture outside 
the cellar. In his deliberation, he becomes convinced of someone else’s pres-
ence, some malicious entity who’s watching him, waiting for and wanting his 
death:
Il y a là dans ma nuit auprès de moi un autre qui, malgré la nuit, me voit et se 
joue de moi. [. . .] Il veille quand je dors et me souffle mes rêves. Dans la nuit je 
suis en son pouvoir. Autour de ma tête il resserre un étau. Il veut s’en emparer. 
Son souffle est sur moi. Il m’étouffe. Je me débats. (163)
[There, next to me, in the night, is another who, despite the darkness, sees me 
and dupes me. [. . .] He watches when I sleep and blows my dreams to me. In 
the night I am in his power. He tightens a vice around my head. He wants to 
seize it. His breath is on me. He suffocates me. I struggle.]
This other presence is a breath that blows out the narrator’s precious matches, 
his only light source after the last light bulb goes out—a breath that wants to 
remove the narrator’s breath and keep him in darkness (165).
It’s unclear who this maleficent other is. Rather than try to identify this 
other as a specific, singular other, I think it would be more productive to take 
this other as protean, able to assume multiple forms. The language of tighten-
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ing a vice around the narrator’s head and taking possession of it suggests that 
this other is none other than his doppelganger, here to get his head back as 
revenge for the narrator’s appropriation of his identity. Or, perhaps, it is the 
angel, turned malevolent. In the narrator’s past life, before his language was 
restored, the angel was a desirable figure, and a benevolent one. In this apoca-
lyptic time and space, this other presence reads like that of an angel of death 
who has come to take the narrator’s life, who desires his body (and particu-
larly the head, where the processes of speaking, reading, and interpreting take 
place) in a fatal inversion of the narrator’s desire for the other angel’s body.
In this terrible world with language but no one with whom to share it, 
the narrator resigns himself to his imminent death after leaving the cellar 
and discovering that the outside world holds no life or possibility of it. What 
follows, in the final pages of the novel, is the narrator’s inventory of all the 
objects that inhabit the cellar with him, which will be the objects of his last 
will and testament, the legacy he leaves behind. The novel ends mid-sentence, 
with the narrator’s breath suddenly cut off, when the other presence, this angel 
of death, takes over: “Il y a l’ovale émaillé d’un ci        ” (180) [There is the oval 
adorned with a ci        ].81 The book ends in the middle of a word. The abrupt-
ness with which the text ends is disturbing: we witness the text’s cutting off as 
the narrator witnessed his double’s decapitation. Garréta seems to be suggest-
ing that the reader is the narrator’s double, inhabiting his je, his I, the way the 
narrator inhabited his double’s identity. And just as he witnessed his double’s 
death, the reader is also present at his demise, which can be read as a meta-
phor for the text’s termination.82 Rather than allow the reader to have a qui-
escent end to the novel and to our reading experience, Garréta cuts language 
off violently and suddenly, the way Céleste and her angel fall, and the artist 
and her creation are removed from the narrator as Garréta and Ciels liquides 
are removed from us.
Ciels liquides features an extraordinarily complex plot that operates 
through the dynamic of doubling: the narrator and his double, the angel 
and its double, the narrator and the angel, the rubbing that is a double for 
the tombstone off which it is taken, the double narrative structure, and the 
reader as a double for the narrator. In the midst of all this doubling, the angel 
emerges as a crucial figure and is an allegory for the embodiment of lan-
guage. The angel’s appearance introduces the narrator to desire, a desire for 
language as much as for the sunbathing body—it’s only after “speaking” to the 
angel that the narrator feels compelled to confess his passion. It’s through an 
 81. Spaces were inserted to retain the visual impact of this ending. This sentence has no 
period.
 82. Perhaps the maleficent other is none other than the reader.
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approximation of language that inchoate desire is given a concrete form. The 
angel as a site of language is more desirable than the angel as body alone. The 
narrator, in desiring contact with the angel before he knows it is the angel, 
desires a body that provides him with the first instance of conversation in 
the novel in his aphasic state: “La conversation était engagée; il n’était que de 
la soutenir” (132) [The conversation had been started; it was only a question 
now of sustaining it]. The cruel irony of Garréta’s novel is that this conversa-
tion, with and in language, is unsustainable. What the narrator experiences as 
a moment of real engagement and intimate communication—“le ton devint 
très vite plus intime” (132) [the tone very quickly became more intimate]—
gives way to the angel’s death, which then gives way to the restoration of the 
narrator’s language.
It’s essential that the narrator’s interlocutor is the angel because the angel, 
as a messenger, is an entity whose sole function is to carry language. Even 
though the sunbather may not seem to be the angel insofar as the angel was 
a sculpture, the sunbather is the angel’s cadaver and its origin, its beginning 
and end. The narrator treats the sunbather as the angel, and so I do as well. 
The sequence of the angel’s death and the narrator’s subsequent restoration to 
language points to a zero-sum economy of language and desire that Garréta 
sets up: you can either have your angel (the body of language, the incarnated 
message-text) or your language (the ability to use language, to speak, read, 
and write). The narrator’s re-entry into language—the narrator’s becoming 
a writer—is thus built upon his mourning the loss of the angel. For him as 
for Garréta, to write is to always write after a passionate encounter—with the 
angel, in Ciels liquides, with the women-narratives, in Pas un jour. Garréta, 
unlike Sarraute and Wittig, never gets to have her language and eat it too.
At this juncture, I’d like to turn to an essay Garréta wrote on the invis-
ibility of French lesbian writing entitled “In Light of Invisibility,” which is 
instructive on two counts: first, it indicates how we might be able to read 
Ciels liquides and Pas un jour together, as coherent and interconnected parts 
of her corpus, despite how different each novel is in tone, construction, and 
plot. And second, it ends with a surprising and unanticipated invocation of 
the angel, which, when read as a gloss of Ciels liquides, serves to bring us back 
to language as an autonomous, corporeal entity, whose autonomy and corpo-
reality are at the heart of a poetics of unbecoming that spans the twentieth 
century into the twenty-first through Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta’s respective 
corps-à-corps with language.
This essay was published in 1996, six years after Ciels liquides, as part of 
the published proceedings of a conference that had taken place at the Yale 
French Department the previous year, Same Sex/Different Text?: Gay and Les-
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bian Writing in French. This issue of Yale French Studies takes up the question 
of whether homosexual writing exists, and if so, what constitutes it.83 Garréta 
thwarts the question and writes against the idea of a homosexual essence or 
gay subjectivity in literature, arguing that “the empirical self and the writing 
(or reading) self are not identical; fiction is the realm where identities, far 
from being reinforced, may be displaced.”84 As we saw in Chapter 3, Garréta 
is averse to the idea of the self as the site of subjecthood and identity. We 
can thus treat the distinction she makes here between the empirical self and 
the writing (or reading) self as follows: the empirical self corresponds to a 
subject endowed with an identity, whereas the writing/reading self denotes 
subjectivity as the site of experience but not identity—subjectivity without 
subjecthood. The displacement that she sees fiction as capable of effecting, to 
anti-identitarian effect, is enacted exemplarily in the splitting and doubling we 
find in Ciels liquides. The essay thus brings together both Ciels liquides and Pas 
un jour, speaking to the continuous, consistent rejection of the subject and of 
identity evident in Garréta’s work. Present in an early work like Ciels liquides 
are the seeds for what would become a very explicit critique of subjecthood 
and identity in Pas un jour.
The essay elucidates what I’ve outlined in this chapter as Garréta’s version 
of the passionate relationship with a living and embodied language through a 
rather surprising turn toward the angelic as it comes to a close:
The contemporary passion for unmooring all our categories from their 
metaphysical foundations seems to have given rise to a desperate and equally 
violent attempt at consolidating self-identifications: the text should resemble 
its author; readers should be able to recognize themselves in the text. Such 
mirrorings are fantasmatically invested with the power to anchor and insure 
self-identical subjects. [. . .]
I have often wondered at the insistent recurrence of a figure in queer 
fictions, from Proust to Genet to Marie-Claire Blais’s L’ange de la solitude, 
the figure of the angel. It is said that Sodom and Gomorrah were destroyed 
because their inhabitants did not recognize the angels, mistaking them 
for mere bodies. Bearers of light and disincarnate, luminous, and intangi-
ble, angels displace the body/light equation that commands visibility. The 
annunciation of the Word they perform precedes its incarnation. They are 
there to show that there is more to vision than not being blind and that the 
 83. Mahuzier et al., “Editors’ Preface.”
 84. Garréta, “In Light of Invisibility,” 212–13.
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passage from the transcendent realm of the word to the immanent realm of 
bodies requires more than a mirror.85
This passage provides a gloss for Garréta’s own Ciels liquides and its angel(s). 
She takes the biblical tale of Sodom and Gomorrah as a cautionary tale, a 
warning about the dangers of misrecognition, of not seeing the Word con-
tained in the angelic body, but also of another type of misrecognition, that of 
seeing self where it isn’t. The angel works to disrupt our usual sense of optics 
and identification. The angelic body, figured here, is light, whereas the human 
body isn’t light but merely reflects it. The reflected light enables us to see and 
apprehend the human body, to believe in its incarnation and identify it. The 
angelic body, on the other hand, is not apprehended through vision or reflec-
tion, but through annunciation—a linguistic act. (Hence the narrator’s inabil-
ity to ever establish physical contact with the angel’s body, save in death, when 
this body is no longer language’s, but simply a human body.) And in language, 
we cannot see ourselves—“the passage from the transcendent realm of the 
word to the immanent realm of bodies requires more than a mirror.” What we 
should see instead is language, and, I would add, the bodies of a transcendent 
language.
It makes sense that Garréta invokes the untouchable, intangible angel to 
speak of language, where Wittig invokes the touchable, tangible goddess. The 
angel is that which even in its presence is always absent or removed because of 
its provenance from the spiritual realm. The angel never stays for longer than 
it takes to speak its message—it embodies “le dévidage de la mémoire dans le 
cadre strict d’un moment déterminé” of Pas un jour. And it does not desire, it 
is only desired. The Wittigian goddess, on the other hand, is not constrained 
to a determined moment and desires the human in the space of a passionate 
present.
Garréta’s writing, which bears witness to her deep desire for language, 
reveals a language that can be found in (but not of) human bodies, as in Pas 
un jour, where human bodies are desirable in their capacity to give the writer 
an experience (however partial or limited) of language. By invoking the angel, 
Garréta posits language as autonomous and other, unable to be conflated with 
the human or taken as an extension of the human (the women-texts in Pas un 
jour aren’t to be taken for language’s real bodies). Her desire for language is 
a desire deflected—mediated through human corporeality and time—and it 
is particularly keen because it mourns the loss of a language that is cut off as 
soon as it’s experienced. Garréta punishes her narrator for mistaking the angel 
 85. Garréta, 213.
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as a body by cutting him off from the angel. She does not seem to be able to 
indulge the desire for language the way Sarraute and Wittig do.
Sarraute follows and patiently waits for language, accepting it in its inter-
mittence and capriciousness, and experiences what we might call a plenitude 
of subjectivity in those moments that language appears for her in its living- 
and embodied-ness. Wittig wrestles with language, embraces it and tears it 
apart and receives its caresses, experiencing in her contact with language what 
she calls dérangement. But Garréta appears to cut her own desire off short, in 
what seems to be an attempt to prevent it from having to enter into a present 
that will inevitably be lost, irretrievably turning into the past. The immanence 
of human bodies, time, and subjectivity cannot withstand the transcendent, 
angelic body of language, which is, which doesn’t reflect. The human always 
falls short of language. If Wittig presents a theology of the present with her 
exuberant goddesses and offers herself to a goddess, Garréta presents a theol-
ogy of anticipation and of mourning, of after. As with the women-texts of Pas 
un jour, the angel-body-text of Ciels liquides is experienced in its absence or 
loss, which can be read into Ciels liquides’s dedication, “To the Lost One.”
Garréta addresses a language that is lost because it was desired and expe-
rienced, and could not be held on to. This sense of loss and the destructive 
nature of desire goes all the way back to Sphinx, where one of the first bodies 
Garréta ever wrote into being—that of the dancer A***—is also taken away 
from the narrator once they’ve had the opportunity to realize their desire 
and the narrator has had the chance to experience A***’s body. It’s hardly a 
coincidence that A*** is rendered a vessel for language, in this case, African 
American language. In Garréta’s writing, one can never seem to hold on to 
what one desires, be it a human body, or language itself. The two are never far 
apart, caught up as they are in the same circuit of desire. And therein lies the 
conundrum: as a writer, she desires language, to touch it and work with it in 
the chantier littéraire in order to produce a text, but to do so is to lose it. Gar-
réta’s writing, then, is always in memoriam. But because language is absent for 
Garréta, it becomes present for us, and there is no reason that readers need 
to adhere to her melancholic, privative, ascetic theology. Indeed, as seen in 
Chapter 3, through the very act of reading her texts, we unbecome because we 
are encountering the body of the language Garréta uses in all its materiality 
and vitality.86 The text’s existence makes it possible for us to experience lan-
guage for ourselves, with as many types of relationship to language possible as 
there are subjectivities, each one a sign that we are alive with language.
 86. While my discussion of Pas un jour has concentrated on mining the content to elu-
cidate Garréta’s view of language, the novel, like Sphinx and La Décomposition, operates on a 
formal, material level through her use of the pronoun tu to make subjecthood uninhabitable. 
See my “Autofiction Infiltrated.”
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From Sarraute, where language is our guide, to Wittig, where language 
is the amante whom we are to love with a deadly, vital passion, to Garréta, 
where language is an angel who might take our breath away, each of these 
writers presents language as something vital with which we can be in a dizzy-
ing, dérangeant relationship, even if, in the case of Garréta, that relationship 
is always filtered through loss. But, as Alfred Tennyson famously wrote, “’Tis 
better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all.”87 It is better to 
have been consumed and transformed by love, opened by and to the other, 
than to remain imperviously, implacably oneself, a self contained and made 
by identity. It is better to unbecome someone than to become something. Our 
unbecoming as humans depends on the body of language: we have access to 
unbecoming language only insofar as we have access to it as a body, which, 
in its non-humanness, is able to make us become more than the fragmented 
categories of humanity that we have been told make up who we are. Perhaps 
we can see Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta’s works as a call to love and be loved 
by language: they all invite us to lose ourselves in a passionate corps-à-corps 
with language and unbecome, at least for a while.
 87. Alfred Tennyson, “In Memoriam A. H. H. OBIIT MDCCCXXXIII: 27.”
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Unbecoming Language
I ’ VE BR OUGHT TOG E THER the works of Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta as a 
collective corpus of writing against difference, against identity, and of writing 
for language, for an experience of language that enables us to unbecome. To 
use Sarrautian vocabulary, each of these writers works to strip language of the 
socially determined and deterministic meaning it is clothed in. They denude 
language, enabling readers to have a fresh experience of a living, vibrant lan-
guage not already domesticated by the dictates of the social order. In the nud-
ist colony of their literary production, Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta’s writing 
invites us to also strip ourselves bare of our identity clothes.
Sarraute does this through exploiting rapidly shifting pronouns and situ-
ating the action of her narrative inside the psyche, where she can bypass the 
identification and the interpellation of subjectivity as a subject—the corralling 
of persons into identity categories—that is an inevitable consequence of liv-
ing and participating in our current regime of sociality, or life as we know it.
Wittig takes on a less interiorized perspective than Sarraute and views her 
texts as Trojan horses, literary weapons to be deployed against the difference 
at the heart of forms of oppression like sexism and racism. Like Sarraute, Wit-
tig exploits pronouns to forcibly unseat the masculine subject from its posi-
tion of presumed universality and replace it with the feminine or neutral as a 
corrective to a false universalism.
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Garréta pushes her readers to remove their identity clothes by writing 
texts that cut off the usual processes of readerly identification with charac-
ters—narrating and narrated subjects—and turn against readers. Her texts 
make it impossible to slip inside as unobtrusive readers. In them, it’s uncom-
fortable to hold on to the idea of the reader as a subject endowed with iden-
tity: she imputes to the reader’s identity repugnant views or makes the reader 
the object of a hostile narrator’s abuse, for instance. She drives us to let go of 
our identity if we do not want to be interpellated in an alienating way by her 
narratives.
Examining Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta individually, there are many pos-
sibilities for what their legacies might be, what innovations and contributions 
they are or will be remembered for. We could point to Sarraute’s modern-
ist experiments in redefining what constitutes a novel by eliminating clearly 
delineated characters and plots, which have characterized and continue to 
characterize the form, and by pursuing a realism that bears little resemblance 
to the realist novels that came before. We could take her tropisms as a way of 
exploring hidden recesses of human psychology and previously unexplored 
realms of human relationality. We could admire Wittig’s feminist resolve to 
create a lesbian corpus that created a new language to wrest universality away 
from the masculine and destroy gender with the very language that creates 
it. We could marvel at her writing’s intertextuality and her uncanny ability to 
cannibalize the canon. We could laud the elaborate construction of Garréta’s 
works and the deployment of constraints that garnered her a place in the 
Oulipo. We could point to her ability to write with classical language about 
modern and contemporary things. We could see her as a bold voice in an oth-
erwise rather shallow field of queer French literature.
Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta are extraordinary writers in their own right. 
But in Unbecoming Language, the point has been to take them together. This is 
not to devalue their individual corpora or say that they cannot stand, or stand 
less firmly, on their own. Rather, it’s to show how, when their works are read 
together as a collective corpus of writing, an original poetics of unbecoming 
emerges that would otherwise remain submerged: Sarraute’s language makes 
Wittig’s possible, and Wittig’s language in turn opens up anti-identitarian pos-
sibilities for Garréta.
The foundation for this unbecoming poetics is the affective and corpo-
real relationship they have with language, itself an embodied and vital entity. 
Their embodied, sensuous encounter with language’s body forces a confron-
tation with the deadened and mortified language of a social and political 
order that has used language to build structures of inequality through the 
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construction of identity categories. In their writing, language is not merely 
embodied, it is unbecoming—it drives what I see as the political process 
of shedding the categories and the identities that we’ve been coerced into 
becoming.
I want to reprise Chapter 4 to insist on Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta’s 
affirmation of the non-humanness of language’s corporeality. Sarraute, Wittig, 
and Garréta do not equate language with the human, and despite what might 
seem like anthropomorphizing representations of language, its corporeality 
is always rendered other, imbued with a non-human dimension. In Sarraute, 
that non-human takes the form of the animal, vegetal, and microbial. In Wit-
tig, the non-human takes the form of a tu that, even as it is human, is more 
than that—goddess, animal, spore. As with Sarraute, the human is an unstable 
metaphor and it cannot be an exclusive point of reference. And in Garréta, 
the angel displaces language from being considered in human terms, and the 
human cannot adequately account for or stand in for language.
By maintaining the non-human corporeality of language, Sarraute, Wit-
tig, and Garréta create and hold open the space of difference between lan-
guage and the human. Their treatment of language as both corporeal and 
non-human challenges us to rethink both our relationship to language (to 
stop reifying and instrumentalizing it and make room for an affective and 
sensate relationship to and with it) and our conception of the human body. 
Unlike écriture féminine, where the (feminine) body is what is written, turned 
into language through the workings of the libido, with desire operating at an 
unconscious level, in this unbecoming poetics, desire is consciously directed 
toward an embodied language that responds to and receives that desire. Writ-
ing emerges as the product of that encounter. Each of these poetics preserves 
a form of difference, or has difference as a motor. In écriture féminine, the 
operative difference is that of sexual difference—it’s the feminine libido that 
is capable of transforming human corporeality into language. In the poetics of 
unbecoming, sexual difference—and any kind of intrahuman difference, as a 
difference created discursively by humans and reinforced socially—is rejected, 
and the difference that is foregrounded is instead the difference between 
human and language.
By shifting difference from the difference between various categories of 
humanity to this human-language difference, which is grounded in an experi-
ence of language as a living body, Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta’s writing takes 
pressure off the human body as a site of differentiation between humans by 
treating the human body as a body made truly universal in its relationship 
with and to language. Language does not distinguish between the catego-
ries of human as humans do. The human body, in its contact with language’s 
body, is stripped of the layers of identity clothes it wears. To be with lan-
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guage as Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta are with language in their writing, is 
to unbecome.
It’s difficult to process the idea of language having a body because of how 
easily we produce language—we open up our mouths, and there it is. We com-
mand our fingers to type or to grip a pen and move it around on paper, and 
there language is. Sarraute’s laborious approach to the tropism rightly signals 
the intense effort it takes to become conscious of language as an autonomous 
body, and to relate to it as such. Within the formalized context of literature, we 
pay increased attention to language, but even that is insufficient and we must 
assume a Sarrautian level of meticulous regard. The Russian formalists paid 
attention to language in order to render it strange as poetic language, but that 
attention to the materiality of language resulted not in a sense of language as 
embodied and living, but rather, as a vehicle for meaning.
Meticulous regard is not enough to reveal language’s living body. That 
body cannot be found in the greetings we exchange, the grocery lists we jot 
down hurriedly, those manifold and seemingly omnipresent instances of lan-
guage that only reinforce categories and identity and (intrahuman) difference. 
I would argue that just as biological life-forms have specific habitats—e.g., 
some fish can live in fresh water, and others only in salt water—language does 
as well. Language is able to be alive and embodied in a particular kind of habi-
tat, the literary one created and preserved by Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta, 
which we might describe as a habitat of innovation. They are all innovative 
writers writing against convention. It’s in that writing against the literary flow, 
that push to do something new with language, that language becomes acces-
sible as something autonomous and alive. The poetics of unbecoming, the 
becoming body of language that makes the human unbecome, occurs within 
a literary space of experimentation and innovation. But just because this space 
is rarefied—the conventional is conventional insofar as it dominates—doesn’t 
mean its ramifications for how we might rethink human embodiment are any 
less important.
Desiring and having a passionate encounter with a body that isn’t human 
opens up the radical possibility of not having embodiment, desire, and rela-
tion determined by a difference that leads immediately to hierarchy. In the 
difference between human and language, what kind of hierarchy could one 
establish? Hierarchies are only able to operate insofar as the two terms being 
compared are taken to have something in common, to share some common 
quality. Hierarchies of race and sex only hold insofar as the different races and 
sexes are recognized as human, despite the dehumanizing treatment those 
deemed inferior are subjected to. The poetics of unbecoming insists on a dif-
ference that cannot be recuperated for hierarchy, on subjectivity that relin-
quishes the subjecthood that falls into hierarchical modes of being.
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With Sarraute, her quest to find the tropism sets up language as an antiso-
cial body that draws the human subject out of its sharply delineated contours 
of self that sociality requires, and brings it into a living reality that is limit-
less, turning the subject into a universe without contours. For her, finding 
and coming into contact with this living language is an expansive, universal 
experience that breaks open the self and the world to introduce an infinite 
universe in their stead. Wittig takes this living language and sets it up as one 
half of a pair of amantes where the human-amante breaks open the language-
amante and vice versa so that the two can come together and be reintegrated 
as bodies liberated from the oppression of phallocentric culture and influ-
ence. The transformation that results from this new and regenerative way of 
experiencing language necessarily entails a new way of experiencing the body. 
For Wittig, making love to and with language, with a violence that enacts the 
death of old language, brings both human and language into a new life and 
reality. This dynamism embodies the utopian spirit that animates her literary 
works and is a product of her participation in the revolutionary movements 
of May ’68 and the MLF. Garréta’s experience of language lacks the exuberant 
togetherness and community that Wittig’s utopian writing expresses, and the 
violence that permeates her writing does not lead to a blissful afterlife for lan-
guage. Instead, Garréta’s writing shows two possibilities for language: either a 
language to be desired that remains intact in the potential of unrealized desire, 
or a language that’s been desired and encountered, made love to, known, and 
as a result, lost. But reading texts even as melancholic as Garréta’s still enables 
the reader to enter into the chantier littéraire and into a relationship with the 
language to be found therein.
These three writers present three different visions of language as a living, 
embodied entity: Sarraute’s language is alive, but vulnerable and constantly 
endangered—its life could be snuffed out at any moment—while Wittig and 
Garréta offer opposing versions of language’s afterlife. Wittig’s language is tri-
umphantly resurrected, its body impervious to violence and dismemberment; 
Garréta’s language has died, or, in its absence, might as well be dead, and 
there is no sense of an ineluctable return. But their corpora all reflect the rich 
anti-identitarian possibility of a literature that results from an encounter and 
a relationship with language’s body—in its fragility, immortality, or absence—
and the possibility for readers to encounter that body as well. They are differ-
ent modalities and temporalities of a poetics of unbecoming.
From Sarraute’s antisocial experience of language’s body to Wittig’s exu-
berant erotic textuality, to Garréta’s more pessimistic textual erotics, these 
writers give us entry into a language that is not just acted upon and manipu-
lated, but that acts upon the human, that guides, that moves unto death, unto 
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life, that leaves its imprint on human bodies. As readers, we are not voyeurs 
observing their relationships with language from a distance, obtaining gratifi-
cation through the indirectness of our involvement. Instead, we are interpel-
lated, hailed as being already caught up in the very same language that caught 
them up. Their corps-à-corps encounters with language could be called instead 
a corps-à-corps-à-corps, where they seize us and place us also in front of that 
vast panorama of language, which, like Garréta’s angel, can cut off our breath 
and make itself known, leaving its trace on our bodies with its own, erasing 
the marks that the social and political order has made on us. This cutting off 
of the breath is not a fatal one—the human does not die in the encounter with 
language, but unbecomes. Language, as a body, is unbecoming, and it is ours.
 U N B E CO M I N G L A N G UAG E •  239

241
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
“À quoi servez-vous?” La Nouvelle critique, no. 120 (November 1960): 85–88.
Abecassis, Jack I. “Montaigne in Brooklyn: Paul Auster’s Body Writing.” MLN 129, no. 4 (2014): 
1035–59.
Althusser, Louis. “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus (Notes Toward an Investigation).” 
In Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays, translated by Ben Brewster, 85–126. New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 2001.
Andrews, Chris. “Intertextuality and Murder: Anne F. Garréta’s La Décomposition and À la 
recherche du temps perdu.” Australian Journal of French Studies 54, no. 1 (April 1, 2017): 71–83.
Apter, Emily, Ed Atkins, Armen Avanessian, Bill Brown, Giuliana Bruno, Julia Bryan-Wilson, 
D. Graham Burnett, et al. “A Questionnaire on Materialisms.” October (January 1, 2016): 
3–110.
Armstrong, Nancy. How Novels Think: The Limits of British Individualism from 1719–1900. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2005.
Asso, Françoise. Nathalie Sarraute: Une écriture de l’effraction. Paris: Presses universitaires de 
France, 1995.
Auclerc, Benoît. “Le tropisme ou comment ne pas y croire dur comme fer.” Fabula-LhT, February 
1, 2012. http:// www .fabula .org/ lht/ 9/ auclerc .html.
———. “Wittig et Sarraute.” In Le Chantier littéraire, by Monique Wittig, 201–205. Lyon: Presses 
universitaires de Lyon; iXe, 2010.
Badiou, Alain. The Adventure of French Philosophy. Translated by Bruno Bosteels. London: Verso, 
2012.
Balibar, Étienne. “Is There a ‘Neo-Racism’?” In Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, by 
Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, 17–28. New York: Verso, 1991.
Balén, Julia. “The Straight Mind at Work at the Heart of Queer Theory: Excavating Wittig’s Radi-
cal Lesbian Materialism from Misappropriation.” Trivia: Voices of Feminism, no. 16 (Spring 
2014). http:// www .triviavoices .com/ the -straight -mind -at -work -at -the -heart -of -queer -theory 
.html.
Barad, Karen. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter 
and Meaning. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007.
Barthes, Roland. The Neutral: Lecture Course at the College de France (1977–1978). Translated by 
Rosalind Krauss and Denis Hollier. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.
———. The Pleasure of the Text. Translated by Richard Howard. New York: Hill and Wang, 1975.
———. The Rustle of Language. Translated by Richard Howard. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Gir-
oux, 1986.
Benmussa, Simone, and Nathalie Sarraute. Entretiens avec Nathalie Sarraute. Tournai: La Renais-
sance du livre, 1999.
Benveniste, Émile. Problèmes de linguistique générale. Vol. 1. 2 vols. Paris: Gallimard, 1966.
———. Problèmes de linguistique générale. Vol. 2. 2 vols. Paris: Gallimard, 1974.
———. Problems in General Linguistics. Translated by Mary Elizabeth Meek. Coral Gables, FL: 
University of Miami Press, 1971.
Berger, Anne-Emmanuelle. Le Grand théâtre du genre: identités, sexualités et féminise en “Améri-
que.” Paris: Belin, 2013.
Bersani, Leo. Homos. Reprint ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996.
———. “Is the Rectum a Grave?” October 43 (December 1, 1987): 197–222.
Bewes, Timothy. “Reading with the Grain: A New World in Literary Criticism.” Differences 21, 
no. 3 (2010): 1–33. 
Blanchot, Maurice. The Infinite Conversation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.
Bordo, Susan. Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body. Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1993.
Bouchardeau, Huguette. Nathalie Sarraute. Paris: Flammarion, 2003.
Bourque, Dominique. Ecrire l’inter-dit: La subversion formelle dans l’œuvre de Monique Wittig. 
Paris: Editions L’Harmattan, 2006.
———. “On dirait une révolution: L’originalité formelle de l’œuvre de Monique Wittig.” Tessera 30 
(June 1, 2001): 92–98.
———. “Shattering the Gender Walls: Monique Wittig’s Contribution to Literature.” In Literature 
and the Development of Feminist Theory, edited by Robin Truth Goodman, 114–27. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Braidotti, Rosi. “Thinking with an Accent: Françoise Collin, Les Cahiers Du Grif, and French 
Feminism.” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 39, no. 3 (March 1, 2014): 
597–626.
Brooks, Carellin. “The Body in the Text: All-Seeing ‘I’s.” In Every Inch a Woman: Phallic Posses-
sion, Femininity, and the Text, 61–88. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006.
Butler, Judith. “Critically Queer.” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 1, no. 1 (November 
1, 1993): 17–32.
———. Gender Trouble. New York: Routledge, 1990.
———. “Wittig’s Material Practice: Universalizing a Minority Point of View.” GLQ: A Journal of 
Lesbian and Gay Studies 13, no. 4 (2007): 519–33.
242 •  B I B L I O G R A P HY 
Canning, Kathleen. Gender History in Practice: Historical Perspectives on Bodies, Class, and Citi-
zenship. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006. 
Cairns, Lucille. “Queer Paradox/Paradoxical Queer.” Journal of Lesbian Studies 11, no. 1–2 (August 
1, 2007): 70–87.
Caserio, Robert L., Lee Edelman, Judith Halberstam, José Esteban Muñoz, and Tim Dean. “The 
Antisocial Thesis in Queer Theory.” PMLA 121, no. 3 (2006): 819–28.
Chambers, Samuel Allen. “The Politics of Literarity.” Theory & Event 8, no. 3 (October 4, 2005).
Chen, Mel. Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect. Durham, NC: Duke Uni-
versity Press, 2012.
Cixous, Hélène, Keith Cohen, and Paula Cohen. “The Laugh of the Medusa.” Signs 1, no. 4 (July 
1, 1976): 875–93.
Collectif, ed. “MLF: Le mythe des origines.” Prochoix, no. 46 (Winter 2008).
Coole, Diana, and Samantha Frost. New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2010.
Cope, Karin. “Plastic Actions: Linguistic Strategies and Le Corps Lesbien.” Hypatia 6, no. 3 
(1991): 74–96.
Costello, Katherine. “Inventing ‘French Feminism:’ A Critical History.” PhD diss., Duke Univer-
sity, 2016.
Cott, Nancy F. Root of Bitterness; Documents of the Social History of American Women. New York: 
Dutton, 1972.
Courson, Nathalie de. Nathalie Sarraute: La peau de maman. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2010.
Crowder, Diane. “Bio.” http:// www .moniquewittig .com/ bio/ bio .html. 
———. “From the Straight Mind to Queer Theory: Implications for Political Movement.” GLQ: A 
Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 13, no. 4 (2007): 489–99. 
Cusset, Francois. French Theory. Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze & Cie et les mutations de la vie intel-
lectuelle aux Etats-Unis. Paris: La Découverte, 2003.
Daroczi, Sandra. “Monique Wittig.” Accessed May 11, 2018. https:// modernlanguages .sas .ac .uk/ 
research -centres/ centre -study -contemporary -womens -writing/ languages/ french/ monique 
-wittig. 
Davis, James D. Beautiful War: Uncommon Violence, Praxis, and Aesthetics in the Novels of 
Monique Wittig. New York: Peter Lang, 2010.
Delphy, Christine. Classer, dominer: Qui sont les autres? Paris: La Fabrique, 2008.
———. “The Invention of French Feminism: An Essential Move.” Yale French Studies, no. 97 
(2000): 166–97.
Derrida, Jacques. De la grammatologie. Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1967.
———. Monolingualism of the Other, or, The Prosthesis of Origin. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1998.
———. Of Grammatology. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016.
———. Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
Descarries, Francine. “Language Is Not Neutral: The Construction of Knowledge in the Social 
Sciences and Humanities.” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 39, no. 3 (March 1, 
2014): 564–69.
Devarrieux, Claire. “’J’ai connu la guillotine.’” Libération, June 17, 1999. http:// www .liberation .fr/ 
livres/ 1999/ 06/ 17/ j -ai -connu -la -guillotine _276051.
 B I B L I O G R A P HY •  243
Disch, Lisa. “Christine Delphy’s Constructivist Materialism: An Overlooked ‘French Feminism.’” 
South Atlantic Quarterly 114, no. 4 (October 1, 2015): 827–49.
Duchen, Claire. Feminism in France: From May ’68 to Mitterand. London; New York: Routledge, 
2013.
Duffy, Jean. “Rereading “L’Opoponax” by Monique Wittig.” Revue critique de fixxion française 
contemporaine, no. 8 (May 24, 2014): 156–73.
Duggan, Lisa. “Queer Complacency without Empire.” Bully Bloggers (blog), September 22, 2015. 
https:// bullybloggers .wordpress .com/ 2015/ 09/ 22/ queer -complacency -without -empire/ .
Durand, Alain-Philippe. Un monde techno: nouveaux espaces électroniques dans le roman français 
des années 1980–1990. Berlin: Weidler, 2004.
Duras, Marguerite. “Une œuvre éclatante.” In L’Opoponax, 283–87. Paris: Minuit, 1983.
Écarnot, Catherine. L’Écriture de Monique Wittig: À la couleur de Sappho. Paris: L’Harmattan, 
2002. 
Edelman, Lee. No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2004.
Epps, Bradley S., and Jonathan Katz, eds. “Monique Wittig at the Crossroads of Criticism.” GLQ: 
A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 13, no. 4 (2007): v-454.
Eribon, Didier. Théories de la littérature: Systèmes du genre et verdicts sexuels. Paris: Presses uni-
versitaires de France, 2015. 
Fausto-Sterling, Anne. Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality. New 
York: Basic Books, 2000.
Feole, Eva. “Le déchaînement littéraire: ‘Sphinx’ d’Anne Garréta et ‘Le corps lesbien’ de Monique 
Wittig.” Revue critique de fixxion française contemporaine, no. 12 (April 27, 2016): 110–19.
Finas, Lucette. “Nathalie Sarraute: Mon théâtre continue mes romans.” La Quinzaine Littéraire, 
no. 232 (December 1978): 4–5.
Foucault, Michel. The Archaeology of Knowledge. New York: Pantheon Books, 1972.
———. The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage 
Books, 1990.
———. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. London: Routledge, 2002.
Fouque, Antoinette. “Femmes en mouvements: hier, aujourd’hui, demain.” Le Débat, no. 59 (Jan-
uary 1, 2011): 122–37.
Fouque, Antoinette, and Mouvement de libération des femmes. Génération MLF, 1968–2008. 
Paris: Des femmes, 2008.
Fourest, Caroline. “Le féminisme pour les nuls.” Le Monde, October 9, 2008, sec. Idées. http:// 
www .lemonde .fr/ idees/ article/ 2008/ 10/ 09/ le -feminisme -pour -les -nuls -par -caroline -fourest 
_1105039 _3232 .html.
Freed-Thall, Hannah. Spoiled Distinctions: Aesthetics and the Ordinary in French Modernism. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Garréta, Anne. Ciels liquides. Paris: Grasset, 1990.
———. “Fins de romans, XVII(e)–XVIII(e) siècles: Stylistique, rhétorique, poétique d’un lieu tex-
tuel.” PhD diss., New York University, 1988.
———. “In Light of Invisibility.” Yale French Studies, no. 90 (1996): 205–13.
———. La Décomposition. Paris: Grasset, 1999.
———. Not One Day. Translated by Emma Ramadan. Dallas, TX: Deep Vellum Publishing, 2017.
244 •  B I B L I O G R A P HY 
———. Pas un jour. Paris: Grasset, 2002.
———. Sphinx. Paris: Librairie générale française, 1986.
———. Sphinx. Translated by Emma Ramadan. Dallas, TX: Deep Vellum Publishing, 2015.
———. “Wittig, la langue-le-politique.” In Lire Monique Wittig aujourd’hui, edited by Benoït 
Auclerc and Yannick Chevalier. Lyon: Presses universitaires de Lyon, 2012.
Gazier, Michèle. “Nathalie Sarraute: Une aventurière intérieure.” Télérama, February 26, 2002. 
http:// remue .net/ spip .php ?article186.
Gerard, Sarah. “States of Desire: An Interview with Anne Garréta.” The Paris Review (blog), 
December 11, 2017. https:// www .theparisreview .org/ blog/ 2017/ 12/ 11/ states -of -desire -an 
-interview -with -anne -garreta/ .
Graves, Kristin. “Mapping La Belle créole.” PhD diss., Yale University, 2014.
Grosz, Elizabeth. Becoming Undone: Darwinian Reflections on Life, Politics, and Art. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2011.
Günther, Renate. “Le Chantier Littéraire (Review).” French Studies: A Quarterly Review 66, no. 2 
(2012): 274–75.
Haget, Henri. “On se tutoie? Faut voir . . .” L’Express, September 13, 2001. http:// www .lexpress .fr/ 
actualite/ societe/ on -se -tutoie -faut -voir _491511 .html.
Halberstam, Jack. “Straight Eye For the Queer Theorist—A Review of ‘Queer Theory Without 
Antinormativity.’” Bully Bloggers (blog), September 12, 2015. https:// bullybloggers .wordpress 
.com/ 2015/ 09/ 12/ straight -eye -for -the -queer -theorist -a -review -of -queer -theory -without 
-antinormativity -by -jack -halberstam/ .
———. The Queer Art of Failure. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011.
Halberstam, Judith. “Unbecoming: Queer Negativity/Radical Passivity.” In Sex, Gender and Time 
in Fiction and Culture, edited by Ben Davies and Jana Funke, 173–94. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011.
Halicks, Ruth Ann. “Interview with Nathalie Sarraute.” Artful Dodge, 1980. http:// artfuldodge 
.sites .wooster .edu/ content/ conversation -nathalie -sarraute.
Hemmings, Clare. Why Stories Matter: The Political Grammar of Feminist Theory. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2011.
Hermann, Claudine. “L’Écriture a-t-elle un sexe? Questions à des écrivains.” La Quinzaine Litté-
raire, no. 192 (August 1974): 27–30.
Hewitt, Leah Dianne. Autobiographical Tightropes: Simone de Beauvoir, Nathalie Sarraute, Mar-
guerite Duras, Monique Wittig, and Maryse Condé. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1990.
Higgins, Lynn. “Nouvelle Nouvelle Autobiographie: Monique Wittig’s ‘Le Corps Lesbien.’” Sub-
Stance 5, no. 14 (1976): 160–66.
hooks, bell. Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge, 2014.
Huffer, Lynne. Are the Lips a Grave?: A Queer Feminist on the Ethics of Sex. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2013.
———. “Foucault’s Fossils: Life Itself and the Return to Nature in Feminist Philosophy.” In 
Anthropocene Feminism, edited by Richard Grusin, 65–88. Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 2017.
———. Mad for Foucault: Rethinking the Foundations of Queer Theory. New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 2009.
Huppert, Isabelle. “Nathalie Sarraute.” Cahiers du cinéma, no. 477 (March 1994): 8–14.
 B I B L I O G R A P HY •  245
Irigaray, Luce. An Ethics of Sexual Difference. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993.
———. This Sex Which Is Not One. Translated by Catherine Porter and Carolyn Burke. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1985.
Jagose, Annamarie. “Feminism’s Queer Theory.” Feminism & Psychology 19, no. 2 (May 1, 2009): 
157–74.
———. “The Trouble with Antinormativity.” Differences 26, no. 1 (2015): 26–47.
Jameson, Fredric. Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1992.
Jardine, Alice, and Anne M. Menke, eds. Shifting Scenes: Interviews on Women, Writing, and Poli-
tics in Post-68 France. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.
Jefferson, Ann. Nathalie Sarraute, Fiction and Theory: Questions of Difference. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2000.
Kaplan, Alice. “On Language Memoir.” In Displacements: Cultural Identities in Question, edited 
by Angelika Bammer, 59–70. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.
Kelly, Joan. Women, History & Theory: The Essays of Joan Kelly. Women in Culture and Society. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
Khatibi, Abdelkebir. Maghreb pluriel. Paris: Denoël, 1983.
Killeen, Marie-Chantal. “Esquives, pièges et désaveux: Les ‘Anti-confessions’ de Nelly Arcan et 
d’Anne Garréta.” Études françaises 53, no. 2 (2017): 171–87.
Kim, Annabel. “Autofiction Infiltrated: Anne Garréta’s Pas un jour.” PMLA 133, no. 3 (2018): 
559–74.
Klapisch-Zuber, Christiane. Culture et pouvoir des femmes: essai d’historiographie. Paris: A. Colin, 
1986.
Kornbluh, Anna. “We Have Never Been Critical: Toward the Novel as Critique.” Novel 50, no.3 
(2017): 397–408.
Kosnick, Kristina. “Reading Contemporary Narratives as Revolutionaries: Radical Texuality and 
Queer Subjectivity in the Works of Monique Wittig, Anne F. Garréta, and Nina Bouraoui.” 
In Sexuality, Eroticism, and Gender in French and Francophone Literature, edited by Melanie 
Hackney and Aaron Emmitte, 1–16. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 
2011.
Kristeva, Julia. Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art. Edited by Leon 
Roudiez. Translated by Thomas Gora and Alice Jardine. Revised ed. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1980.
———. Revolution in Poetic Language. Translated by Margaret Waller. New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1984.
Lacan, Jacques. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis. Translated by Alan Sheridan. 
New York: Norton, 1977.
Lauretis, Teresa de. “Queer Theory: Lesbian and Gay Sexualities. An Introduction.” Differences 6, 
no. 2–3 (1991): iii–xviii.
“Le corps lesbien.” Les Éditions de Minuit. Accessed September 30, 2016. http:// www 
.leseditionsdeminuit .fr/ livre -Le _Corps _lesbien -1895–1 -1–0 -1 .html.
Lebovici, Élisabeth. “La bonne, la brute et la truande.” Romanic Review 107, no. 1–4 (January 
2016): 173–91.
Leduc, Violette. La folie en tête. Paris: Gallimard, 1970.
246 •  B I B L I O G R A P HY 
Lerner, Gerda. The Woman in American History. Specialized Studies in American History Series. 
Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1971.
Lindon, Mathieu. “L’assassin théoricien.” Libération, September 23, 1999. http:// next .liberation .fr/ 
livres/ 1999/ 09/ 23/ a -quoi -ca -sert -parmi -les -divers -usages -de -la -litterature -anne -f -garreta -et 
-alain -fleischer -en -propos _284965.
Livia, Anna. Pronoun Envy: Literary Uses of Linguistic Gender. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001. 
Lotringer, Sylvère, and Sande Cohen, eds. French Theory in America. New York: Routledge, 2001.
Love, Heather. Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History. Cambridge, MA; London: 
Harvard University Press, 2009.
Mahuzier, Brigitte, Karen McPherson, Charles A. Porter, and Ralph Sarkonak. “Editors’ Preface.” 
Yale French Studies, no. 90 (1996): 1–4.
Marlatt, Daphne. “Musings with Mothertongue.” Tessera 1 (January 1, 1984): 53–56.
Mathieu, Marie-Ève. “Des corps textuels.” Postures 1 (1997): 113–18.
Mauriac, Claude. L’Allitérature. Paris: Albin Michel, 1958.
McCarthy, Mary. “Everybody’s Childhood.” New Statesman, July 15, 1966.
Minogue, Valerie. Nathalie Sarraute and the War of the Words. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1984.
Moi, Toril. Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory. 2nd ed. London; New York: Rout-
ledge, 2002.
Moses, Claire Goldberg. “Made in America: ‘French Feminism’ in Academia.” Feminist Studies 
24, no. 2 (1998): 241–74.
O’Meara, Lucy. “Georges Perec and Anne Garréta: Oulipo, Constraint and Crime Fiction.” Not-
tingham French Studies 53, no. 1 (March 1, 2014): 35–48.
Perreau, Bruno. Queer Theory: The French Response. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2016.
Perrot, Michelle. “MLF: ‘Antoinette Fouque a un petit côté sectaire.’” Le Figaro, October 9, 2008, 
sec. Société.
———. Une histoire des femmes est-elle possible? Paris: Rivages, 1984.
Picq, Françoise. Libération des femmes: Les années-mouvement. Paris: Seuil, 1993.
———. “MLF: 1970, Année Zéro.” Libération, October 7, 2008. http:// www .liberation .fr/ societe/ 
2008/ 10/ 07/ mlf -1970 -annee -zero _112802.
Pivot, Bernard. “Pendant la campagne électorale lisez des romans.” Apostrophes, March 7, 1986. 
http:// www .ina .fr/ video/ CPB86005337.
Poel, Ieme Van Der, Sophie Bertho, and Ton Hoenselaars, eds. Traveling Theory: France and the 
United States. Madison, NJ; London: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2000.
Puar, Jasbir. Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times. Durham, NC: Duke Uni-
versity Press, 2007.
Rabaté, Dominique. Poétiques de la voix. Paris: José Corti, 1999.
Rabaudy, Martine de. “Nathalie Sarraute: L’exploratrice des mots.” L’Express, May 21, 1998.
Radicalesbians. The Woman-Identified Woman. Pittsburgh, PA: Know, Inc., 1970.
Rambures, Jean-Louis de. Comment travaillent les écrivains. Paris: Flammarion, 1978.
 B I B L I O G R A P HY •  247
Rancière, Jacques. The Flesh of Words: The Politics of Writing. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2004.
Rawson, C. J. “Cannibalism and Fiction: Part II: Love and Eating in Fielding, Mailer, Genet and 
Wittig.” Genre 11 (1978): 227–313.
Reber, Dierdra. Coming to Our Senses: Affect and an Order of Things for Global Culture. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2016.
Ross, Kristin. May ’68 and Its Afterlives. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.
Ruti, Mari. The Ethics of Opting Out: Queer Theory’s Defiant Subjects. New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 2017.
Rye, Gill. “Uncertain Readings and Meaningful Dialogues: Language and Sexual Identity in Anne 
Garréta’s ‘Sphinx’ and Tahar Ben Jelloun’s ‘L’Enfant de Sable’ and ‘La Nuit Sacrée.’” Neophilo-
logus 84, no. 4 (October 2000): 531–40.
Rykiel, Sonia. “Quand j’écris, je ne suis ni homme, ni femme, ni chien.” Les Nouvelles, no. 2917 
(February 9, 1984): 39–41.
Rykner, Arnaud. Nathalie Sarraute. Paris: Seuil, 1991.
Salles, Alain. “Grasset retrouve son rang dans les prix littéraires.” Le Monde, November 8, 2002. 
http:// www .lemonde .fr/ archives/ article/ 2002/ 11/ 08/ grasset -retrouve -son -rang -dans -les -prix 
-litteraires _297362 _1819218 .html ?xtmc = anne _garreta _pas _un _jour & xtcr = 12.
Sarraute, Nathalie. Between Life and Death. Translated by Maria Jolas. London: Calder, 1970.
———. Childhood. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013.
———. “disent les imbéciles.” Paris: Gallimard, 1978.
———. Lecture. Audio CD. Gallimard, 1998.
———. Œuvres complètes. Paris: Gallimard, 1996; 2011.
———. The Age of Suspicion. Translated by Maria Jolas. New York: George Braziller, 1963.
———. The Golden Fruits. Translated by Maria Jolas. New York: George Braziller, 1964.
———. Tropisms. Translated by Maria Jolas. New York: G. Braziller, 1963.
———. You Don’t Love Yourself. Translated by Barbara Wright. New York: George Braziller, 1990.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. Translated by Hazel E. Barnes. Reprint ed. New York: 
Washington Square Press, 1993.
Savigneau, Josyane. “Un genre énigmatique.” Le Monde.fr, April 4, 1986. http:// www .lemonde .fr/ 
archives/ article/ 1986/ 04/ 04/ un -genre -enigmatique _2917458 _1819218 .html.
Shaktini, Namascar. “Displacing the Phallic Subject: Wittig’s Lesbian Writing.” Signs 8, no. 1 
(1982): 29–44.
———. “Monique Wittig’s New Language.” Pacific Coast Philology 24, no. 1/2 (1989): 83–93.
———, ed. On Monique Wittig: Theoretical, Political, and Literary Essays. Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 2005.
Smith, Barbara, ed. “Combahee River Collective Statement.” In Home Girls: A Black Feminist 
Anthology. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983.
Sonnenfeld, Albert. Review of Review of The Opoponax, by Monique Wittig and Helen Weaver. 
NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction 2, no. 2 (1969): 185–86.
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty, and Donna Landry. The Spivak Reader: Selected Works of Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak. New York; London: Routledge, 1996.
248 •  B I B L I O G R A P HY 
Stryker, Susan. “My Words to Victor Frankenstein above the Village of Chamounix: Performing 
Transgender Rage.” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 1, no. 3 (1994): 237–54.
Suleiman, Susan, ed. The Female Body in Western Culture. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1986. 
Surkis, Judith. Sexing the Citizen: Morality and Masculinity in France, 1870–1920. Ithaca, NY: Cor-
nell University Press, 2006.
Weil, Kari. “French Feminism’s Écriture Féminine.” In The Cambridge Companion to Feminist Lit-
erary Theory, edited by Ellen Rooney, 153–71. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Weiss, Shusha, and Jason Guppy. “Nathalie Sarraute, The Art of Fiction No. 115.” Paris Review, no. 
114 (Spring 1990). http:// www .theparisreview .org/ interviews/ 2341/ the -art -of -fiction -no -115 
-nathalie -sarraute.
Wiegman, Robyn. Object Lessons. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012.
———. “Sex and Negativity; or, What Queer Theory Has for You.” Cultural Critique 95, no. 1 (July 
6, 2017): 219–43.
Wiegman, Robyn, and Elizabeth Wilson. “Introduction: Antinormativity’s Queer Conventions.” 
Differences 26, no. 1 (2015): 1–25.
Wilder, Gary. Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2014.
Willging, Jennifer. Telling Anxiety: Anxious Narration in the Work of Marguerite Duras, Annie 
Ernaux, Nathalie Sarraute, and Anne Hébert. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007.
Williams, Caroline. Contemporary French Philosophy: Modernity and the Persistence of the Sub-
ject. London: The Athlone Press, 2001.
Winter, Bronwyn. “(Mis)Representations: What French Feminism Isn’t.” Women’s Studies Interna-
tional Forum 20, no. 2 (March 1, 1997): 211–24.
Wittig, Monique. “Author’s Note.” In The Lesbian Body, translated by David Le Vay, 9–11. New 
York: William Morrow, 1975.
———. Brouillon pour un dictionnaire des amantes. 2nd ed. Paris: Grasset, 2011.
———. La Pensée straight. Paris: Éditions Amsterdam, 2013.
———. Le Chantier littéraire. Lyon: Presses universitaires de Lyon; iXe, 2010.
———. Le Corps lesbien. Paris: Minuit, 1973.
———. “Le Déambulatoire. Entretien Avec Nathalie Sarraute.” L’Esprit Créateur 36, no. 2 (1996): 
3–8.
———. Les Guérillères. New York: Viking Press, 1971.
———. L’Opoponax. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1983.
———. “One Is Not Born a Woman.” Feminist Issues 1, no. 2 (Winter 1981): 47–54.
———. “Some Remarks on The Lesbian Body.” In On Monique Wittig: Theoretical, Political, and 
Literary Essays, edited by Namascar Shaktini. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2005.
———. The Lesbian Body. Translated by David Le Vay. New York: William Morrow, 1975.
———. “The Literary Workshop: An Excerpt.” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 13, no. 4 
(October 1, 2007): 543–51.
———. The Opoponax. Translated by Helen Weaver. London: Peter Owen, 1966.
———. The Straight Mind. Boston: Beacon Press, 1992.
 B I B L I O G R A P HY •  249

251
I N D E X
A***, in Garréta’s Sphinx, 129, 134–37, 142, 
146, 232
aesthetics, 128, 213; in Garréta’s works, 16, 
143–44, 150–52, 213; of literature, 18, 101, 
114, 117, 128, 143, 151, 192; politics and, 18, 
41, 74–75, 101, 114, 144; Sarraute and, 40, 
49n27, 66; Wittig’s, 18, 85, 103, 125
agency, 18, 26, 45, 128, 192n43, 194; of lan-
guage, 172, 179, 182, 185, 188, 189
affect, affects, 4, 72, 169, 172
African Americans, in Garréta’s Sphinx, 129, 
135–42, 232. See also blackness, blacks
alienation, 61, 180, 205; in Garréta’s writings, 
22, 159, 225, 235
allegory, 49, 86, 141–42, 221, 228
alterity, 136, 137, 141, 165, 184, 187, 192, 224
Althusser, Louis, 25
Amazons, 195
anatomical text, in Wittig’s Le Corps lesbien, 
195–99, 197 fig. 2, 203, 203n60, 207, 210, 
211
angel, angels, 225, 230; in Garréta’s Ciels liq-
uides, 226–27, 228–29, 231–32, 233, 236, 
239
antecedents, in Garréta’s La Décomposition, 
148, 157
anthropocentrism, 102, 170, 171, 192, 192n44, 
193n45
anti-difference French feminism, 2, 3, 3n5, 32, 
33, 34, 165; Wittig and, 13, 45, 130n10
anti-identitarianism, 31, 32, 150, 230; in Gar-
réta’s La Décomposition, 150–51, 153–55; 
queer theory and, 22, 77, 127n6, 163; of 
Sarraute, 31, 41, 44–45, 64, 70, 77; of 
Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta, 8, 28, 29, 
37–38, 165. See also identity, identities
aphasia, in Garréta’s Ciels liquides, 222–24, 
229
Apostrophes (television program), Garréta 
on, 14–15
Armstrong, Nancy, 2, 131n11
ars poetica, 180; Wittig’s Le Chantier littéraire 
as, 12, 45, 83
art for art’s sake (Gautier), New Novel writ-
ers and, 9–10, 20
Asso, Françoise, 54n33, 58
Auclerc, Benoît, 44n15, 60–61n42
Auster, Paul, 171
autobiography and autofiction, 104n22, 151–
52, 152n40, 213, 214
avant-garde, 36, 40, 104. See also New Novel 
[Nouveau Roman] movement




Balzac, Honoré de, 8, 24, 37n2; novels of, 49, 
104, 105, 131n11
Barnes, Djuna, 91
Barthes, Roland, 3n5, 26, 42n12, 49, 85, 209; 
Fragments d’un discours amoureux, 87, 
220; influences Garréta, 16, 220, 220n74; 
Le Plaisir du texte, 168n10, 220
Baudelaire, Charles, 111
Beauvoir, Simone de, 39, 42, 80, 165, 165n1; 
Le Deuxième sexe, 24, 80
Beckett, Samuel, 36; as New Novelist, 10, 37 
fig. 1
being, Being, 41, 72, 76, 202
Benmussa, Simone, 69–70n53
Benveniste, Émile, 26, 70, 110–11, 111n31, 
147–48, 184n37
Bersani, Leo, 5n8, 30n66
Bibliothèque nationale de France, 126; Sar-
raute’s papers at, 11, 14n32, 59n39
bildungsroman, 104n22, 109; Wittig’s 
L’Opoponax as, 20, 86n11, 104, 109–10, 
133
biopower, 43–44, 44n14
blackness, blacks, 62, 138n22, 146; fetishiza-
tion of, 138–39, 140–41; in Garréta’s 
Sphinx, 129, 135–38, 140–42; language 
of, 137, 140, 141, 142. See also African 
Americans
Blais, Marie-Claire, 230
body, bodies, 134, 142, 169, 170–78, 194, 206, 
220, 224, 231; of America, 221, 221n77; 
explanation of, 169–70, 169n11; in Gar-
réta’s novels, 135, 213, 223, 225; language 
and, 175, 215–17, 222–23, 236; metaphor 
and, 169–70, 194n47; race and, 135–36; 
in Wittig’s Le Corps lesbien, 193–94, 
199–200, 201–2, 204. See also body of 
language; corporeality; corps-à-corps; 
female body
body of language, 168, 170, 175, 179–80, 192, 
193, 231–33, 238, 239; as non-human, 
222, 236; Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta’s 
encounters with, 173, 235–36; violation 




Brouillon pour un dictionnaire des amantes 
[Lesbian Peoples: Material for a Diction-
ary] (Wittig and Zeig, 1976), 76, 81n3, 
86n11, 114, 133; lesbianism of, 12, 19
Butler, Judith, 80, 84, 134, 134n19; Gender 
Trouble, 13n30, 80–81, 82n6, 163
Butor, Michel, 8, 10, 10n16
categorization, categories, 16n40 73, 119, 150; 
Garréta’s works and, 16, 125–28; identity 
and, 32, 65, 165; queer theory desta-
bilizes, 22, 163; Sarraute and, 1, 10, 37, 
38–41, 44, 46, 61n42, 64, 75, 76; undoing 
of, 131, 236; Wittig and, 92, 119. See also 
difference; identity, identities
Catherine Legrand, in Wittig’s L’Opoponax, 
104, 104n23, 110n29, 112, 113, 115
Céleste, in Garréta’s Ciels liquides, 224–26
chambre noire [darkroom], in Garréta’s La 
Décomposition, 154–55
Chantier littéraire, Le [Literary Worksite, 
The] (Wittig, 2010), 81n3, 84, 103, 110–15, 
117, 161, 191; corporeality in, 178–79; as 
doctoral thesis, 83, 86–87; footnotes 
in, 87–88; foundation and structure of, 
92, 93; importance of, 82, 83, 103; lan-
guage in, 153, 187–88, 193; on literature 
and subjectivity, 27, 45, 157; material-
ism in, 82n6, 101–3, 193; publication of, 
81, 83, 84–85; quotations from, 88–89, 
93, 94–95, 96, 97, 98, 99–100, 132–33, 
178–79, 197–98, 207, 209, 210, 211; Sar-
raute and, 12, 45, 83; translation of, 81n4, 
84–85; Trojan horse and, 85–90, 123, 210
charpente acoustique [acoustic structure/ske-
leton], in Garréta’s Pas un jour, 220, 221
Chatounowski, Pauline (Sarraute’s mother), 
8, 176
Chen, Mel, 6n11, 171–72
childhood, children, 105, 114, 176; narra-
tives of, 104, 104n22, 109, 115; in Wittig’s 
L’Opoponax, 105–6, 108
Ciels liquides [Liquid Skies] (Garréta, 1990), 
15, 21, 22, 127, angel in, 225, 226–27, 228–
29, 233; Celéste in, 224–26; dérangement 
in, 213; desire and passion in, 226, 228, 
229; Garréta’s Pas un jour and, 229–32; 
language in, 222–31; narrator in, 222–25, 
 I N D E x •  253
226, 227, 228, 229, 231–32; plot of, 224–
28; post-apocalyptic France in, 224–26, 
227; quotations from, 223–24, 226, 227, 
228, 229, 232; reader and, 228; violence 
and death in, 213, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229
Cixous, Hélène, 3, 3n4, 3n5, 25, 130n10, 165, 
166; écriture féminine and, 2, 168
class, classism, 1, 2, 24, 32, 59, 78n65, 136, 137, 
138n22, 141; bourgeoisie, 52, 59, 60n39, 
78n65, 117–18; women as, 13, 62
clichés, 51, 52, 55, 58–59, 59n38
Colette, Claudine à l’école, 104n22
Condé, Maryse, 39
conformism, 60n39, 61, 61n42, 63
consciousness, 7, 36, 71, 156–57, 168n10, 181; 
feminist raising of, 2, 19; identities and, 
72–73; Wittig on, 178, 179
Constant Journey, The [Voyage sans fin, Le] 
(play; Wittig, 1984), 12
constraint, constraints, 18, 126, 148n37, 213; 
Garréta and, 125, 128, 128n7, 214, 235; on 
language, 210, 211; Oulipo and, 15, 15n36, 
134, 151; on women, 23, 121
content of language, 94, 96, 98, 100–101, 108
corporeality, 171, 193; human, 201, 221, 231; in 
Garréta’s Pas un jour, 215–16, 217; of lan-
guage, 172–73, 177–78, 194, 194n47, 220, 
223, 229, 236; in Wittig’s works, 178–79, 
194–95
corps-à-corps, 172n19, 239; relationship to 
language as, 172–73, 229, 233; Wittig and, 
191, 205, 207; Wittig’s Le Corps lesbien 
and, 193, 205
Corps lesbien, Le [Lesbian Body, The] (Wittig, 
1973), 76–77, 81n3, 86n11, 103, 114, 115, 
208; anatomical text interruptions in, 
196–98, 196n53, 197 fig. 2, 203, 203n60, 
207, 210, 211; body in, 193–94, 199–200, 
201–2; corporeality of language in, 194–
95; description of, 193–94, 195; goddesses 
in, 194n46, 206, 210–11; lesbian politics 
of, 12, 19, 193, 195; pronouns in, 133, 195–
96, 200, 201, 202–3, 203–4, 204n62, 205, 
211n69, 212; quotations from, 195, 197 
fig. 2, 199–200, 202–3, 203n60, 204, 211; 
translation of, 195–96n51, 196n53; Trojan 
horses in, 212; violence in, 196, 199–200, 
202, 203, 226–27; Wittig on, 195
corpus, Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta’s works 
as collective, 235
Cott, Nancy, 19
Dans l’béton [In Concrete] (Garréta, 2017), 
15, 15n37
Dante, Divine Comedy, 86n11, 133, 191
death: in Garréta’s Ciels liquides, 225, 226, 
227, 229; in Garréta’s Sphinx, 142, 143; 
in Wittig’s Le Corps lesbien, 200, 201, 
202–3. See also murder
Décomposition, La [Decomposition] (Gar-
réta, 1999), 15, 21, 127, 129, 147; anti-
identitarianism in, 150–51, 153; murder 
in, 22, 148–49, 149n38, 150, 151, 152, 153, 
158, 159; narrator in, 148–49, 152–57, 159, 
160, 160n47, 161, 162; plot of, 148–49; 
pronouns in, 147, 148, 150, 155, 156–63, 
212–13; queerness of, 163–64; Proust and, 
139n24, 148n37, 148–49, 152–54, 158, 213; 
quotations from, 149, 150–51, 152–53, 155, 
156–57, 158–59, 160n47
deconstruction, deconstructionism, 3n5, 22, 
80, 77, 139, 180
De Gaulle, Charles, 12, 116
de Lauretis, Teresa, 29
Deleuze, Gilles, 3n5, 25, 25n56, 26, 27, 28
Delphy, Christine, 3, 3n5, 34, 80n2, 165
Denoël, publishes Sarraute’s Tropismes, 9, 
9n15, 46n23
dérangement, 212, 213–14, 232, 233
Derrida, Jacques, 3n5, 22n50, 26–28, 85, 221; 
deconstruction and, 25, 25n56; language 
and, 170, 223n79
Descartes, René, 25
desire, 168, 205, 214, 215, 220; écriture fémi-
nine and, 168, 236; in Garréta’s Ciels 
liquides, 226, 229; in Garréta’s Pas un 
jour, 214–16, 218, 221, 226, 231; Garréta’s 
works, 232; language and, 193, 213, 222, 
226, 229, 231–32; of reader, 135, 135n21. 
See also passion
destruction, 21n49, 201; in Garréta’s writings, 
21, 22–23; in Sarraute’s writings, 57, 73
Dickens, Charles, Dombey and Son, 131n11
difference, 18, 20, 25, 25n56, 29, 32, 33, 41, 45, 
74, 141, 142, 143, 168, 173; categorization 
and, 1, 10, 65; as constructed, 13, 142; 
cultural, 136, 137; fetishized, 129–30; in 
French feminism, 2–3, 24, 165, 166; Gar-
réta and, 127, 136–46; hollowing out, 34, 
254 •  I N D E x 
35, 46, 111, 140, 145; language and, 31, 130, 
132, 137, 142, 145; racial, 129, 130, 135–36, 
139, 140, 147, 234; rejection of, 42–43, 
146; social order and, 5, 32, 33; Sarraute, 
Wittig, and Garréta against, 1–2, 21, 23, 
77. See also categorization, categories; 
sexual difference
differences (journal), 29, 163
differentialist French feminism, 2–3, 19–20
discourse, 102, 103, 110, 120, 121, 121n46, 167, 
170, 209; Foucault on, 101, 130; language 
and, 130–31, 131n13, 145, 157, 165
doubling, doubleness, 131; in Garréta’s Ciels 
liquides, 228–29, 230; of language, 93, 
100
Duras, Marguerite, 38n4, 39, 82, 104, 114n36
écriture féminine, 3n4, 74, 78, 130n10, 166–68, 
194, 236; defined, 2, 166; poetics of, 3, 45
Edelman, Lee, 5n8, 30n66
Éditions de Minuit, 10, 10n16, 10n17; republi-
shes Sarraute’s Tropismes, 9, 46n23
Éditions iXe, publishes Wittig’s Le Chantier 
littéraire, 84
EHESS (École de Hautes Études en Sciences 
Sociales), Wittig’s doctoral work at, 83
Enfance [Childhood] (Sarraute, 1983), 29n65, 
46n21, 58n36, 75n60, 175, 191; quotation 
from, 176–77
English language, 140–41; gender in, 129n9, 
134
Enlightenment, 15, 16n40, 29
Entre la vie et la mort [Between Life and 
Death] (Sarraute, 1968), 179–92, 204; 
quotations from, 180, 182–83, 184–85, 
186–87, 188, 189, 190–91; reader and, 192
epic, 133
epistemology, epistemes, 7, 90, 171
Ère du soupçon, L’ [Age of Suspicion, The] 
(Sarraute, 1956), 9, 36n1, 180
Ernaux, Annie, 39
Eros mélancolique (Garréta and Roubaud, 
2009), 15
erotic, erotics, 221n77; textual, 220, 238
essentialism: biological, 136; strategic, 23n51, 
34, 136
experience, 4, 17, 88, 164; language and, 18, 
31, 40, 45, 55, 57, 65, 75, 206–7, 215; of 
selves as subjectivities without subject-
hood, 5, 7, 60, 71
experimentation with language, 4, 5, 237; 
Garréta’s, 133, 157. See also innovation, 
literary
female body, 2, 168, 194, 195, 220; in Garréta’s 
Pas un jour, 215, 216–17, 221; in Wittig’s 
Le Corps lesbien, 199–200
feminine, femininity, 70, 166, 234; degender-
ing, 113, 113n34; rejection of, 165, 208
feminism, feminist theory, 2, 7, 13n30, 42, 77, 
85, 102, 130, 165; anti-, 20n47; feminist 
movement and, 19–20, 21, 23, 23n51, 
80; feminist studies and, 82, 84; Gar-
réta and, 15, 15n38, 24, 138; queer theory 
and, 81, 130; wave model of, 23, 23n51, 
138, 138n22; white, 138, 139; Wittig 
and, 4, 12–19, 79–80, 165. See also anti-
difference French feminism; French 
Feminism
fiction, 5, 6, 16, 35, 165n1, 214n73, 230; auto-, 
151–52, 213n71; Garréta and, 139–40, 
149–50, 151–53, 157, 161, 162–63, 213–14, 
230; as possibility, 75, 230; pure, 152, 
152n40; reality vs., 153, 155, 161–62; Sar-
raute and, 27, 49, 118, 123; as theory, 27, 
28; Wittig and, 64, 86, 102, 118, 123, 193, 
208. See also genre, genres; literature; 
novel, novels
Flaubert, Gustave, 111; Madame Bovary, 143
footnotes, in Wittig’s Le Chantier littéraire, 
87–88
form of language, 90, 96, 97, 119; content 
and, 94, 98, 100–101, 108; new, 101, 103, 
111, 118, 174; in Wittig’s L’Opoponax, 
105–6, 114, 126
Foucault, Michel, 14n30, 16, 16n40, 22n50, 27, 
28, 44n14, 81, 85, 130, 142; assujettisse-
ment, assujetties, 5, 6; on discourse, 101, 
130; Histoire de la sexualité, 130, 146
Fouque, Antoinette, 19–20, 20n47, 80n2
France, 23, 36, 79, 104; culture in, 136–37; 
Paris, 8–9, 12, 129–30, 144, 225; politics 
in, 21–22, 126n2; race in, 24n53, 136, 
138n23; in World War II, 9, 10n17, 44, 
75n60, 79
French Feminism, 2–3, 3n4, 25–26, 130n10, 
166. See also anti-difference French 
feminism
 I N D E x •  255
French language, 16, 75, 158, 221n77; gender 
in, 54n32, 69, 131n13, 134, 141; in Sar-
raute’s Enfance, 175–77; translations 
from, 81n4, 84–85, 91, 106n25, 125n1, 
188n39, 195–96n51, 223n79
French literature, 2, 82, 104n22, 111; Garréta 
and, 4, 127, 235; queer in, 127, 235. See 
also literature
Fruits d’or, Les [The Golden Fruits] (Sarraute, 
1963), 46, 75, 180, 181; ellipses in, 66, 67; 
gender in, 65–69; pronouns in, 66–67, 
68, 69, 70; quotations from, 67–68
Gallimard, 10n17; Pléiade collection of, 8, 11, 
11n23, 37n1; Sarraute and, 9, 10, 24, 180
Garréta, Anne, 1, 4n6, 20, 22, 23, 29n65, 
123–24, 127–28n7; anti-difference poet-
ics of, 3, 77; author and, 129–30, 135n21; 
Barthes and, 16, 220, 220n74; difference 
denounced by, 129–30, 130n10, 138, 144; 
experimental literature of, 5–6; influ-
ences on, 16, 22; language and, 7n13, 
212–13, 231; literary sketch of, 14–17; as 
normalienne, 14, 129; Oulipo and, 2, 4, 
15, 125n1, 125–26, 133, 148n37, 213, 235; 
queerness of, 28, 127, 163–64; Sarraute, 
Wittig, and, 85–86, 128; as scholar, 14–15, 
26; Wittig influences, 2, 15n37, 16, 17, 18, 
20–21, 126, 128, 130, 132
Garréta, Anne, on: angels, 230–31; Butler, 
13–14n30; La Décomposition, 161; early 
modern literature, 16; Lacan 154, 154n42; 
novels, 149–50; reading, 4; self, 230; 
Sphinx, 132, 135; Wittig’s influence, 132; 
Wittig’s Le Chantier littéraire and, 83–84; 
Wittig’s universal, 16–17n43
Garréta, Anne, works of, 128n7, 139, 164, 232, 
234–39; anti-identitarian core of, 127, 
139, 143; Ciels liquides (1990), 15, 21, 22, 
127, 213, 222, 223–32; constraint in, 125, 
126, 128n7; Dans l’béton (2017), 15, 15n37; 
La Décomposition (1999), 15, 21, 22, 127, 
129, 147, 148–63, 164, 213, 232n86; against 
difference, 127, 130; “In Light of Invis-
ibility” (1996), 229–31; politics of, 126, 
127, 127–28n7, 128; queerness and, 22, 127, 
127–28n7, 163; Eros mélancolique (2009; 
with Roubaud), 15; Pas un jour (2001), 
15, 21, 127, 127n5, 128, 157n44, 213–23, 
229–32; Sphinx (1986), 14, 15n37, 18–22, 
29, 125n1, 127–29, 130–48, 150, 163, 213, 
222–32, 232n86
Gautier, Théophile, 9–10
gender, 2, 33n69, 42, 70, 92, 99; erased from 
Garréta’s Sphinx, 129, 134, 147, 149n38, 
150; in Garréta’s La Décomposition, 148–
49, 149n38; genre and, 20, 133; as iden-
tity category, 34, 40, 73; language and, 
76, 98–100, 119, 129n9, 132, 147, 235; pro-
nouns and, 107–8, 109–10, 112–13, 147; in 
Sarraute’s Les Fruits d’or, 65–69; studies 
of, 21, 21n50, 134; writing and, 37, 42
Genet, Jean, 230
Genette, Gérard, as Wittig’s thesis advisor, 83
genre, literary, 86, 104, 151, 180; gender and, 
20, 133
Germany, German language, 9, 41, 44, 75n60, 
79
GLQ, Wittig issue (2007), 14, 84–85
goddess, goddesses, 194n46, 206, 210–11, 
211n69, 231, 232
Grosz, Elizabeth, 6n11; Becoming Undone, 
6–7
Guérillères, Les [Guérillères, The] (Wittig, 
1969), 70, 75n61, 76, 81n3, 86n11, 103, 
114, 115, 194n46; lesbianism of, 12, 19, 80; 
pronouns in, 69, 70, 133; Wittig and, 99
Guillaumin, Colette, 3, 165
Günther, Renate, 84
Halberstam, Jack, 29n64, 30n66, 30–31
heterosexuality, 31, 111, 134, 135; normativiza-
tion of, 22, 127; regime of, 80, 201, 207
hierarchy, 167n8; as conceptual foundation 
for oppression, 2; difference and, 237; 
division and, 16; identity categories and, 
1; pronouns and, 158
history, historicity, 9, 17, 17n43, 18–24, 29, 
124, 144–45, 195; language and, 76, 90, 
131
homosexuality, homosexuals, 2, 22, 105, 130, 
195, 207, 219, 230; Proust and, 144, 145; 
sexual encounters of, 134, 135; in Wittig’s 
L’Opoponax, 104, 104n23
human, humans, 5, 102, 168, 170, 183, 227; 
humanity and, 1, 70, 80, 102, 133, 184, 
233; language and, 102–3, 128, 168, 170, 
171, 184, 184n37, 212, 224, 236; neutral-
256 •  I N D E x 
ity of, 41–42, 76; non-, 22, 33, 47, 102, 
169, 170, 172, 184n37, 223, 233, 236; post-, 
77, 102–3; subjectivity of, 25n54, 75, 76, 
102–3, 120, 147–48, 157. See also anthro-
pocentrism; body, bodies
Huppert, Isabelle, 77–78
identity, identities, 2, 5–7, 22, 25n56, 28n61, 
32, 34, 41, 60, 73, 75–78, 114, 130, 142–43, 
154, 163, 230; blurring of, 53–54; cat-
egorization of, 33, 43; clothes of, 73, 78, 
234, 235, 236; consciousness and, 72–73; 
destabilization and decomposition of, 
70, 150, 157, 163; difference and, 1, 25n56; 
in Garréta’s La Décomposition, 153–57; 
Garréta suspends and rejects, 15n37, 230; 
identitarianism and, 28n61, 61n42, 135; 
language and, 31, 165, 236; performa-
tive, 134, 163; politics of, 28n61, 127–28, 
154; pronouns and, 69, 161–63; queer, 25, 
127n6, 127n6; self-, 6, 28, 162–63, 230; 
Sarraute sheds, 24, 46, 234; unfixing of, 
50, 55; writing against, 21, 44–45
ideology, 17, 25, 90, 199, 209; language and, 
131, 198, 210
immanence, 5, 232; body and, 169, 231
indeterminacy, indeterminism, 29, 32, 49, 
66; Garréta and, 16, 133, 135, 143, 145, 147, 
160–61; in Sarraute and Wittig’s fiction, 
82, 112; in Sarraute and, 36–78; sexual, 
129, 129n9
innovation, literary, 101, 104–5; Garréta and, 
126, 213n71, 213–14; Sarraute and, 8, 
38n3, 40, 116–17; of Sarraute, Wittig, and 
Garréta, 235, 237; Wittig and, 20, 85, 96, 
103, 105; in Wittig’s Le Corps lesbien, 194, 
196–97; in Wittig’s L’Opoponax, 107–8, 
114, 114n36
interiority, 66, 73, 74, 118, 120, 122; je and, 
108, 110, 110n29, 112; Sarraute and, 65, 
73, 234
intimacy, 104n23, 159; language and, 121, 164, 
171, 189, 191, 229; of Wittig’s Le Chantier 
littéraire, 86, 87, 92; of Wittig’s footnotes, 
87–88
Irigaray, Luce, 3n4, 3n5, 81, 165–66, 167n5, 
168, 174n24; as differentialist French 
feminist, 3, 25, 130n10
irony, 150, 153, 207
Isis, 202, 203, 208, 211
Jardine, Alice, 39–40, 84
Jefferson, Ann, 44n15, 191
Jesus Christ, 170, 203
Jews: Sarraute as, 8, 10, 11, 31, 44–45, 74, 
75n60, 79; in World War II, 44–45, 
75n60, 79, 105
jouissance, 5, 5n8, 164, 167n5, 168n10




knowledge production, 1, 7, 44n14, 86, 143
Kristeva, Julia, 3n4, 3n5, 81, 165, 166, 167n5, 
168n9; as differentialist French feminist, 
3, 25, 130n10
Labé, Louise, 111
Lacan, Jacques, 3n5, 25, 25n56, 26, 27, 168n10; 
Garréta on, 154; Wittig on, 154n42
langage brut, le, Wittig on, 209–10, 212
language, 15, 25n56, 90, 112 126, 128, 134, 
147–48, 170, 194n46; agency of, 179, 185, 
194; autonomy of, 173, 199, 205, 224, 229; 
of blacks and African American, 137, 
140–42, 232; corporeality and, 171–72, 
177–78, 193–94, 194n47, 215–16, 223, 229, 
236; dead, 182, 184, 187, 189, 192; dif-
ference and, 32–33, 130, 132, 142, 145; 
discourse and, 130–31, 131n13, 145, 157, 
165; double nature of, 93, 100, 107–8, 
115; embodiment and, 173, 178, 193–94, 
209, 226, 228, 230, 232, 236–38; experi-
ence and, 18, 40, 43, 45, 55, 57; fiction 
and, 5–6, 7, 25, 105; Garréta and, 213, 
222–31, 223n79; gender and, 70, 75n61, 
98–100, 119, 132, 147, 199, 235; grammar 
and, 104, 106, 204; human and, 33, 102, 
123, 179, 184, 184n37, 212, 236; intermedi-
ate space of, 47, 50, 59, 60, 78; linguistic 
turn and, 6, 25, 25n54, 85, 170n13; loss 
of, 213, 231–32; love and desire and, 215, 
221, 222, 231–33; materiality of, 7, 7n13, 
92–93, 97–98, 101–3, 115, 120–23, 131, 
143n28, 150, 169, 171–72, 179, 182–83, 193, 
197–98, 205, 232, 237; mobility of, 181–82, 
189; neutrality and, 43, 199; normative, 
57–58; phallocentric, 70, 167; physicality 
of, 90, 92, 179; pornographic, 195, 198; 
potential of, 84, 131, 157, 174; powers of, 
 I N D E x •  257
10, 50, 53, 55, 102; raw, 97, 101, 120, 131, 
198, 209, 212; reality and, 77, 92n16, 93, 
100, 105, 115; Sarraute and, 180–93, 204, 
224; sensation and, 47, 51, 64–65, 71, 178; 
social contract and, 94–95, 110; subjec-
tivity and subjectivation and, 30–31, 43, 
110–11; tongue and, 176–77; tropismic, 
50, 60, 173–74, 189n40, 192; unbecoming, 
32, 34–35, 41, 233, 234, 239; of universal-
ism, 16–17; violence and, 201, 203–5; 
vitality of, 92, 95, 102, 120, 172–73, 183, 
187–88, 193, 205, 233; Wittig and, 14, 76, 
92, 132, 195, 204–5, 212. See also body of 
language; French language; literature; 
living language; pronouns; punctuation; 
relationship to language; tropisms
Leonardo Da Vinci, Vitruvian Man, 194
Leopardi, Giacomo, 111
Lerner, Gilda, 19
lesbianism, lesbians, 22, 105, 127, 133, 207; 
body of, 208, 212; feminists as, 20, 80; 
language and, 194n46, 205; literature 
of, 195, 235; as provisory concept, 114, 
114n37; Wittig and, 4, 12, 13, 14, 19, 21, 
21n49, 77, 81, 145, 193
Le Tellier, Hervé, 126n2
Lévi-Strauss, Claude, 26
libido, feminine, 166, 168, 236
Lindon, Jérôme, 37 fig. 1, 10n16
literary criticism, 9, 88, 89, 101, 166
literary worksite [le chantier littéraire], 81n4, 
89, 173, 232; innovation in, 64, 96, 114; 
inside view of, 87–88; le langage brut in, 
109–10; readers in, 193, 238; Sarraute’s, 
99; Trojan horses and, 94, 123, 164; Wit-
tig’s, 64, 82, 90–94, 96, 103, 114, 115, 120. 
See also Chantier littéraire, Le
literature, 2, 24, 35, 122, 143, 150, 152, 166, 181, 
230; absence of territory in, 16, 27; aes-
thetics of, 18, 143; committed [littérature 
engagée], 9, 20; early modern, 15–16, 
16n40, 27, 142; experimental, 5–6, 125, 
126; French, 2, 4, 10, 15, 18, 104, 111, 127, 
151, 235; gender in, 131, 131n11; identity 
and; innovation in, 8, 40, 85, 96, 116–17, 
237; language and, 90, 100–101, 237; phi-
losophy and, 99, 149–50; politics and, 2, 
18, 22, 40–41, 40n9, 84, 90–91, 100, 101, 
127–28; potential and possibilities of, 2, 
16, 22, 35, 74, 117, 118, 125, 143n28, 210, 
238; queer and lesbian, 127, 195; revolu-
tion and, 116–17; subject and subjectivity 
in, 4, 128; theory and, 27–28, 85; as Tro-
jan horse, 94–101; universality of, 16–17, 
92; Wittig and, 115–16, 120. See also fic-
tion; genre, literary; innovation, literary; 
novel, novels
living language, 45, 51, 58–60, 62, 78, 120, 
164, 172, 193, 230, 236; eludes mastery, 
182; encounter with, 238; metaphors for, 
183; in Sarraute’s Entre la vie et la mort, 
180, 181, 184, 187–88, 192, 193, 232; Sar-
raute, Wittig, and Garréta’s visions of, 
238–39; Wittig and, 143n28
love story, Garréta’s Sphinx as, 14, 15n37, 22, 
129, 133
Malherbe, François de, 111
Mallarmé, Stéphane, 167n5, 171
Manifeste des 121, Le, 79, 116
Marin, Robert, 9
Marlatt, Daphne, 170
Martereau (Sarraute, 1953), 9, 65
Marx, Karl, 26
Marxists, 12, 90, 124; journals of, 13, 116–17; 
Wittig as, 79–80
masculinity, 113n34, 195, 199, 205, 212; default 
universalization of, 147, 235
materiality, materialism, 7n13, 90, 101–3, 
169n12, 171–72; of anti-difference French 
Feminism, 3, 3n5, 13, 165; of language, 
7, 89, 92–93, 97–98, 120–21, 123, 131, 
143n28, 150, 182–83, 193, 197–98, 205, 232, 
237; new, 6n11, 6–7, 25n54, 85, 121n46, 




Mauriac, Claude, 37 fig. 1, 37n2
May 1968 student uprisings, 21, 116, 123; Wit-
tig and, 12, 79–80, 238
McCarthy, Mary, 114, 114n36
meaning, 6, 91, 98, 111, 209–10
medium, language as, 97, 100–101, 121, 150, 
171, 182, 187
Menke, Anne, 39–40
Mensonge, Le (Sarraute, 1966), 180
metaphors, 178, 179, 192, 194n47, 199, 208
Minogue, Valerie, 38n3, 45n18, 73n59
258 •  I N D E x 
Mitterand, François, 21
MLA (Modern Languages Association), Wit-
tig and, 13
MLF (Mouvement de Libération des Femmes 
[Women’s Liberation Movement]), 13, 
13n27, 19, 21–22, 116, 124; Psychépo and, 
19–20, 20n47; Wittig and, 2, 12–13, 13n27, 
19, 20, 80, 80n2, 238
modernism, 10, 124, 235; avant-garde and, 36, 
40, 80, 104
Mouvement de Libération des Femmes 
[Women’s Liberation Movement]. See 
MLF
multilingualism, in Sarraute’s Enfance, 175–
76, 177
murder, 143; in Garréta’s La Décomposition, 
22, 148–49, 149n38, 150–53, 158–59
narrative, 27, 49, 50, 66, 115, 156, 217; frames 
of, 222, 225, 227; Garréta’s, 215, 235
narrator, 214n73; in Garréta’s Ciels liquides, 
222–32; in Garréta’s, La Décomposition, 
148–49, 152–60, 160n47, 161–62; in Gar-
réta’s Pas un jour, 213–21; in Garréta’s 
Sphinx, 134–43, 147, 222
nationality, nationalism, 1, 43, 28n61, 136; 
biopower of nation state and, 43–44, 
44n14
negativity: in Garréta’s novels, 125, 162; queer, 
5n8, 27–28, 30, 30n66
neutrality, 42n12; Sarraute’s, 41–43, 45, 75–77, 
95; Wittig’s, 195, 234
New Novel [Nouveau Roman] movement, 
10n16, 37 fig. 1, 38n4, 114; gender and, 
38–39; Sarraute and, 2, 8–11, 36–40, 37 
fig. 1, 38n3, 46, 81, 124–25, 180; Wittig 
and, 12, 20, 80, 204–5
normativity, 22, 28n61, 29, 57, 59; Garréta 
and, 22–23; Sarraute and, 31, 46n21
novel, novels, 1–2, 26n59, 76, 131, 150, 180; 
conventions of, 65, 104, 235; Garréta on, 
149–50; realist, 4, 8, 20, 104, 231; reality 
and, 118–19, 152; within novels, 65, 65n49
Oedipal complex, 25n56, 153
OEuvres complètes (Sarraute, 1996), as 
Pléiade edition, 11, 11n23
Ollier, Claude, 10, 10n16, 37 fig. 1
ontology, 7, 102, 132, 171
Opoponax, L’ (Wittig, 1964), 15n37, 81n3, 
86n11, 99, 127, 194n46; as lesbian bil-
dungsroman, 20, 86n11, 104, 115; pro-
nouns in, 69, 107–10, 110n29, 111–14, 132; 
reviews of, 114, 114n36; Sarraute and, 17, 
104; subversive intertextuality of, 105–6, 
111–12; Trojan horses in, 107–8, 110, 113–
15; wins Prix Médicis, 80, 104; as Wittig’s 
debut novel, 12, 80, 103
Osiris, 202, 203, 208
Oulipo (Ouvroir de Littérature Potentielle 
[Workroom of Potential Literature]), 15, 
15n35, 15n36, 126, 126n2; Garréta and, 2, 
4, 15, 125n1, 125–26, 133, 148n37, 213, 235
Ouvrez (Sarraute, 1997), 45n18; as Sarraute’s 
last publication, 11, 37n1, 178n28
Oxford University, Sarraute at, 9
paradise, 123, 191
paragraphs, missing from Wittig’s 
L’Opoponax, 105
Paris-la-politique (Wittig, 1999), 12, 19
Pascal, Blaise, 205
passion, 221, 231, 237; deadly, 203, 233; in 
Garréta’s Ciels liquides, 226, 228, 229; for 
language, 92, 101, 172, 184, 185, 193, 207, 
213, 221, 229, 230–31, 233; between Sar-
raute and Wittig, 17, 82; in Wittig’s Le 
Corps lesbien, 193, 195–96, 203, 211, 226. 
See also desire
Pas un jour [Not One Day] (Garréta, 2001), 
21, 127n5, 157n44, 232, 232n86; body and 
language in, 214–22, 229, 231; description 
of, 213–14; desire in, 214–16, 218, 221, 
230; Garréta’s Ciels liquides and, 229–32; 
narrator in, 128, 213, 214, 216–21; as Prix 
Médicis winner, 15, 213; quotations from, 
128, 214, 215, 216–17, 218–19; violence in, 
213, 214
patriarchy, 19, 21n49, 40, 85, 110n29, 208, 
221n77; violence of, 167, 201, 203; Wittig 
resists, 44, 85
Pensée Straight, La (Wittig, 2001), 113n34, 
205–6, 207. See also Straight Mind, The
Perec, Georges, 15n36, 104, 104n22, 104–5, 
105n24
Perrot, Michelle, 19
phallocentrism, 130n10, 194, 195, 200, 238; 
language of, 205, 208; non-, 194n46, 198
 I N D E x •  259
Pinget, Robert, 10, 37 fig. 1
Pivot, Bernard, 15–16
Planétarium, Le [Planetarium, The] (Sar-
raute, 1959), 9, 10, 24, 65, 66, 78, 180
Plato, 26, 40n9
plot: absent in Sarraute’s fiction, 65–66, 75, 
235; in Garréta’s fiction, 149, 227, 228, 
229; as novelistic convention, 8, 9, 16, 
20, 39, 104; in Wittig’s fiction, 103, 194
poetics, 128, 168; of anti-difference, 3, 165–66, 
168; feminist, 2, 45, 165; of unbecoming, 
8, 18, 31, 32, 45, 166–73, 229, 235–37
politics, 34, 79, 126n2; identity, 28n61, 127–28, 
154; literature and, 2, 18, 22, 40n9, 40–41, 
43–46, 74, 90–91, 99–101, 114–16, 127–28; 
in Wittig’s works, 12, 19, 80, 116, 123, 129, 
193–95, 206–7
pornography, 195, 198; violence and, 196, 199
Portrait d’un inconnu [Portrait of a Man 
Unknown] (Sarraute, 1948), 65; Sartre 
and, 9, 38, 58–59, 59n38
posthumanism, 77, 102, 103, 171
postmodernism, 16, 16n42, 123, 213
poststructuralism, 22, 101, 102; French, 3n5, 
21–22n50, 25, 25n54, 29, 165
power, 90; bio-, 43–44, 44n14; of language, 
10, 50, 53, 55, 102
Prix Médicis: Garréta receives, 4, 12, 15; Wit-
tig’s L’Opoponax receives, 80, 104
Prometheus, 211
pronoun, pronouns, 33, 33n70, 69, 70, 74, 
76, 107, 120–21, 264; in Garréta’s La 
Décomposition, 148, 150, 155–63; in Gar-
réta’s Sphinx, 134, 146–47; Garréta’s use 
of, 128, 161, 212–13, 232n86; in Sarraute’s 
Les Fruits d’or, 66–68; in Sarraute’s Tu 
ne t’aimes pas, 71n55; tropisms and, 
48–52, 52n31, 53–57; in Wittig’s Le Corps 
lesbien, 133, 195–96, 200–204, 204n62, 
205, 211n69, 212; in Wittig’s Les Guéril-
lères, 69, 70, 133; in Wittig’s L’Opoponax, 
107–10, 110n29, 112–13, 132
proper names, in Garréta’s La Décomposi-
tion, 148
Proust, Marcel, 16, 91, 144, 145, 230; À la 
recherche du temps perdu, 144, 148–49; 
in Garréta’s La Décomposition, 139n24, 
148n37, 148–49, 152–54, 158, 213
psyche, 52, 181, 234
Psychépo (Psych et Po; Psychanalyse et Poli-
tique), 19–20, 20n47
psychoanalysis and psychology, 26, 29, 147, 
167, 168, 177n27, 235; Wittig on, 181n34, 
154, 154n42
punctuation, 104; ellipses in Sarraute’s Les 
Fruits d’or, 66, 67; slashes in Wittig’s Le 
Corps lesbien, 195–96n51, 204, 204n62, 
205
queer, queerness, 14n30, 15n38, 23, 29n65, 31, 
127; Garréta and, 1, 13–16, 28, 31, 82, 126–
28, 163, 212–13; literature and, 22, 230; 
negativity and, 28, 30, 30n66; studies of, 
13, 21, 21n50, 82, 84, 134
queer theory, 5n8, 22, 23, 29n64, 29–31, 81, 
85, 163, 163n50; Garréta and, 16, 24, 124; 
identity in, 25, 28, 28n61, 77, 130, 134
Queneau, Raymond, 15n36, 104n22, 104–5, 
105n24
Rabaté, Dominique, 47, 60
Rabaudy, Martine de, 192
race, racism, 1, 2, 77, 95, 133, 138n22, 234; in 
Garréta’s Sphinx, 129, 136–42, 146
Rancière, Jacques, 16, 40n9, 143, 143n28
Rawson, C. J., 196
reading, reader, 43n13, 49, 142, 161, 191; Gar-
réta’s fiction and, 4, 103, 143, 158–60, 228; 
dérangement and, 212, 214; desire and, 
135, 135n21, 221; labor and, 139–40, 141; 
sex and, 215–16; of Wittig’s L’Opoponax, 
113, 115; writer and, 100, 115, 120, 123, 
192n43
real, reality, 7, 49, 58, 85, 102, 103, 131, 167; 
fiction and, 152, 152n40, 153, 161–63; lan-
guage and, 77, 92n16, 93, 100–101, 105, 
115–16; new, 101, 108, 111, 115, 119, 120; 
Sarraute on, 118–19, 118n43; tropism and, 
46–47, 60, 173–75
récit d’enfance [narrative of childhood], 
104n23, 105n24; Wittig’s L’Opoponax as, 
104, 114
relationship to language, 5, 116, 121, 123, 
168n10, 174, 183, 192, 230, 232, 238; 
changing, 33–34; Garréta and, 214n73, 
222–23; in Sarraute’s Entre la vie et la 
mort, 180–89; Wittig on, 96, 98–99, 102–
3; in Wittig’s Le Corps lesbien, 206–7, 
260 •  I N D E x 
211–12; of writers, 180–81; in writings of 
Sarraute, Wittig, and Garréta, 172, 173, 
235–36, 238–39
resurrection, 208, 213, 227; in Wittig’s Le 
Corps lesbien, 202, 203
Robbe-Grillet, Alain, 8, 9, 10, 37 fig. 1, 46, 
46n21, 104
Rothenburg, Marcia, 13
Roubaud, Jacques, 15, 126n2
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 16, 104n22, 142n27
Russia, Russians, 237; language of, 41, 175–77; 
Sarraute and, 8, 10, 11, 24, 31, 41, 74, 176
Salles, Alain, 4n6
Sappho, 211
Sarraute, Nathalie, 1, 26, 29n65, 31, 43, 74, 79; 
biographical sketch of, 8–11; as canoni-
cal French writer, 4, 8, 11; categorization 
of, 10, 37, 38–41; childhood of, 176–77; 
collected papers of, 11, 14n32, 59n39; 
connections between Wittig, Garréta, 
and, 85–86, 129; country house of, 17, 
79; daughters of, 45, 45n17; death of, 
83; difference rejected by, 3, 42–43; 
experimental literature of, 5–6; historic-
ity of writings of, 23–24; interviews of, 
69–70n53, 77–78; identity rejected by, 
10–11, 45; indeterminacy and, 36–78; 
influences Wittig, 2, 17–18, 20, 44n15, 
82, 120, 123; language and, 7n13, 17, 185, 
224, 232, 233; as lecturer, 10; long career 
of, 36, 37n1; neutrality and, 41–43, 45, 
77; New Novel and, 2, 8, 10, 11, 36–40, 
37 fig. 1, 38n3, 81, 124, 125, 180; physical 
appearance of, 36, 37 fig. 1; politics and, 
43–46, 44n15, 116, 126; scholars of, 11n23, 
38n3, 40, 44, 44n15; singularity of, 37n2, 
38; Wittig and, 12, 14n32, 17, 71–72, 77, 
91; Wittig’s Le Chantier littéraire and, 
12, 17, 27, 45–46, 82–84, 88, 99–100; in 
World War II, 44–45, 75n60, 79; writing 
and, 17, 46
Sarraute, Nathalie, on: Barthes, 26; form and 
content, 98; gender in writing, 39; her 
singularity, 10; her work, 182n35; infinite 
selves, 7–8; innovation, 116–17; listening, 
178; Le Planétarium, 78; psychoanalysis, 
26; real, 118–19, 118n43; on sexual dif-
ference, 41–42; sous-conversation, 36, 
174; subjectivity, 6; tropisms, 36, 43n13, 
174, 235; on Wittig’s L’Opoponax, 104; on 
words, 51
Sarraute, Nathalie, works of, 199, 234–38: 
Enfance, 29n65, 46n21, 58n36, 75n60, 
175–77, 191; Entre la vie et la mort, 
179–92, 204; L’Ère du soupçon, 9, 36n1, 
180; Les Fruits d’or, 46, 65–70, 75, 180–81; 
“Le Langage dans l’art du roman” [“Lan-
guage in the Art of the Novel”], 51; 
Martereau, 9, 59, 65; Le Mensonge, 180; 
OEuvres complètes, 11, 11n23; Ouvrez, 11, 
37n1, 45n18, 178n28; politics of, 43–46, 
60–61n42, 118, 125; Le Planétarium, 
9, 10, 24, 59, 65, 66, 78, 180; Portrait 
d’un inconnu, 9, 38, 58–59, 59n38, 65; 
pronouns in, 66–68, 71n55, 163, 234; 
“Roman et réalité” [“The Novel and Rea-
lity”], 118–19, 174; Le Silence, 180; Tro-
pismes, 9, 9n15, 24, 46–65, 46n23; Tu ne 
t’aimes pas, 46, 70–76, 120; L’Usage de la 
parole, 58n36; Vous les entendez?, 59
Sarraute, Raymond, 9, 24, 44–45
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 9, 79n1, 116; Sarraute’s 
Portrait d’un inconnu and, 9, 38, 58–59, 
59n38
Saussure, Ferdinand de, 26, 27, 168, 220
Scève, Maurice, 111, 113
Sciences Po (Institut d’études politiques de 
Paris), Queer Week, 127, 127n4
Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky, 16, 163
self, 66, 98, 147; decomposure of, 28, 30; Gar-
réta and, 149, 230; rejection of, 11, 162; 
Sarraute and, 71–72; shattering of, 5, 5n8, 
30, 30n66
sensation: language and, 47, 178; tropism and, 
50, 51, 53, 64–65, 71, 175
sex, sexuality, 22, 31, 41, 133, 195, 199; as cat-
egory of oppression, 1, 2; in Garréta’s 
fiction, 134, 146, 215–19, 221; reading 
and, 215–16; sexism and, 12, 234. See also 
sexual difference
sexual difference, 2, 20n47, 39, 41, 25n56, 
42n12, 69, 75–78, 95, 111–12, 166–67, 234, 
236; in Garréta and, 129–30, 130n10, 134, 
139, 141–44
Shaktini, Namascar, 13, 194n46
signification, 131, 168, 168n10, 194, 221; body 
as site for, 170, 218
signified, 169, 220; Wittig on, 93–94, 96
 I N D E x •  261
signifier, signifiers, 25n56, 97, 220; body as, 
169, 194n46, 219; Wittig on, 93–94, 96, 
220
Silence, Le (radio play; Sarraute, 1964), 180
Simon, Claude: New Novel and, 8, 10, 37 fig. 
1, 112; Wittig and, 82, 104, 112–13
social contract, 98, 123, 207; language and, 
94–95, 110; Wittig on, 94–95, 121
social order, 1, 60, 69, 73, 75, 154, 239; catego-
rization and difference in, 5, 32–33, 146, 
234; language and, 78, 235–36; society 
and, 42, 43n13, 59, 105, 106, 146, 165; 
writers and, 180, 190
Sodom and Gomorrah, 230, 231
Sonnenfield, Albert, 114n36
Sorbonne, 9, 12
sous-conversation [sub-conversation], 36, 
47, 174
Sphinx (Garréta, 1986), 29, 127, 146, 232; A*** 
in, 129, 134–37, 142, 146, 232; characters 
in, 129, 129n9, 134; English translation 
of, 125n1, 127, 129, 134; Garréta on, 132, 
135; as Garréta first novel, 129, 132, 139; 
gender erased from, 14, 15n37, 22, 129, 
129n9, 134, 150; irony in, 140, 142; labori-
ous reading of, 139–40, 141; marketing 
of, 125n1, 127; narrator in, 134, 136–43, 
147, 222; pronouns in, 134, 146–47, 163, 
212–13; quotations from, 135, 136–37, 140, 
141, 146; race and racial difference in, 
135–41; racial clichés and stereotypes in, 
137–40, 142; sexual encounters in, 134–
35, 146; Trojan horses in, 138–39, 142–45, 
163; Wittig and, 18, 21, 129, 163
Spivak, Gayatri, 34
straight mind, 114; Wittig and, 1, 114n37, 119, 
144
Straight Mind, The (Wittig, 1992), 13, 21n49, 
81, 81n3, 82, 84, 91, 99, 114n37; on litera-
ture and subjectivity, 27, 90–91; politics 
and political theory of, 80, 83, 85, 90–91; 
quotations from, 131–32, 145; Sarraute in, 
17–18. See also Pensée straight, La
structuralism, 25, 101
subject, 7, 25, 77, 121, 147–48, 206; Garréta 
rejects, 128, 148, 149, 230; minority, 
205–6
subjecthood, 42n12, 59, 73, 168n10, 230; dis-
solving of, 28, 128; in Garréta’s fiction, 
127, 156–57, 161n49, 161–62, 232n86; sub-
jectivities without, 5, 7, 17, 26–27, 31–32, 
41, 74, 86, 128, 168, 230, 237; as unbe-
coming, 6, 17, 30
subjectivity, subjectivities, 5n8, 20, 25, 34, 
42n12, 68n51, 69–73, 77, 108, 121, 147–48, 
215, 232; contourless, 59, 60, 162, 175; 
difference and, 25–26, 74, 142; in Gar-
réta’s fiction, 148, 214; human, 1, 25n54, 
75–76, 102–3, 120; language and, 110–11; 
lesbian, 21, 21n49, 111, 205; masculine, 
69, 74; pronouns and, 69, 114, 161; split-
ting of, 109, 110; without subjecthood, 
5–7, 17, 26–27, 31–32, 41, 74, 86, 128, 168, 
230, 237; unbecoming, 7, 17, 30, 74, 122, 
128, 168, 168–69n10, 211; Wittig and, 14, 
108–10, 114; of writer, 186–87, 191
substance vivante [living substance] of tro-
pism, 173–74, 185, 190; living language 
and, 181–82
suffrage, women’s, 23, 24, 24n53
Symbolists, 171
syntax, in Wittig’s Le Corps lesbien, 198–99, 
204
Tcherniak, Ilya, 8, 176
text, texts, 90, 126, 221, 238; Barthes on, 26, 
168n10, 220; bodies into, 166, 224; les-
bian, 203, 205, 211, 225; reader and, 103, 
155–56, 171; violence against, 149, 213, 
214; women’s bodies as, 215, 217–18, 231, 
232; in Wittig’s Le Corps lesbien, 194–97, 
201; writers and, 89, 155–56, 171
Their Majesty the I, in Garréta’s La Décompo-
sition, 156–57
theory, 44n15: French, 3n5, 21–22n50, 25n54, 
25–28, 166; literature and, 27–28, 85
Trojan horses, 85–86, 94, 117, 122, 164, 193, 
234; in Garréta’s Sphinx, 138–39, 142, 
143–44, 145; literature as, 94–101; Wit-
tig and, 96, 131–32, 144n29, 144–45; in 
Wittig’s Le Chantier littéraire, 85–90, 
94–101, 123–24, 179, 210–12; in Wittig’s 
L’Opoponax, 103–4, 107, 110, 113–15
Tropismes (Sarraute; 1939, 1957), 46–65, 59, 
60, 67; quotations from, 47, 48, 49, 52, 
53, 55–56, 57; writing and publication of, 
9, 9n15, 24, 46, 46n23, 64
tropisms, 41, 46–47, 70, 74, 76, 120, 180–81, 
190; language and, 59n38, 181, 189n40, 
262 •  I N D E x 
192, 193; runaway, 61–64; Sarraute and, 
36–37, 43n13, 46–60, 82, 119, 174–75, 
181n34, 235, 237–38; substance vivante 
of, 173–74, 181, 185, 190; after Tropismes, 
64–75; sensation and, 50, 51, 71
Tu ne t’aimes pas (Sarraute, 1989), 70, 71, 75, 
120; extracts from, 72, 73; as late-career 
work, 46, 76
typography, in Wittig’s Le Corps lesbien, 196–
97, 197 fig. 2, 199
unbecoming, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 35, 43, 86, 128, 
168–69n10, 233; Halberstam on, 30–31, 
30n66; language of, 34–35, 41, 234, 239; 
as state of radical neutrality, 7, 17; as 
subjectivities without subjecthood, 6–7, 
17, 30, 74, 122; Sarraute, Wittig, and Gar-
réta’s connected writing of, 17–18, 168, 
237; in Wittig’s Le Corps lesbien, 211, 212. 
See also poetics: of unbecoming
uncertainty, 48, 49, 51; in Sarraute’s writing, 
54–55
United States, 21n50, 166, 171, 208; landscape 
of, 215, 220–21, 221n72; Wittig in, 12, 13, 
15, 81
universal, universalization, 1, 115, 17n43; 
of masculinity, 147, 234, 235; Wittig 
and, 144–45, 198, 205, 234; in Wittig’s 
L’Opoponax, 112–13, 115, 133
universalism, universality, 16–17, 29, 92, 114, 
120; false, 29n65, 109, 234; Garréta and, 
17n43, 29n65; lesbian writing and, 105, 
114–15, 235; of literary worksite, 95–96
universe without contours, 41–43, 75, 78, 
92, 238
Usage de la parole, L’ (Sarraute), 58n36
utopianism: in Garréta’s works, 21–22, 42n12; 
in Wittig’s works, 19, 193, 196, 238
vagina, vaginas, in Wittig’s Le Corps lesbien, 
198, 199, 200
Valerie Borge, in Wittig’s L’Opoponax, 
104n23, 113
violence, 91, 238; against language, 201, 
203–5, 213; in Garréta’s novels, 161, 213, 
228; in Wittig’s Le Corps lesbien, 196, 
199–203, 206, 211. See also murder
Virgil, 107, 111, 191
Virgile, non [Across the Acheron] (Wittig, 
1985), 12, 19, 81n3, 86n11, 103, 133
voice, voices: disembodied, 66, 74, 75, 201, 
216
Warner, Michael, 163
Wiegman, Robyn, 28, 29, 29n64, 73, 84
Wilson, Elizabeth, 29, 29n64
Wittig, Gille, 11n24, 13
Wittig, Monique, 1, 3n4, 4, 20–21, 27, 
60–61n42, 81, 82, 82n5, 85–86, 143n28, 
191; as activist, 14, 20, 79–80, 116, 238; as 
anti-difference writer, 3, 3n5, 130n10, 165; 
arrest of, 13, 80; Benveniste and, 147–48; 
biographical sketch of, 11–14, 19; death 
of, 13, 14, 83; experimental literature of, 
5–6; false universalism and, 29n65, 147; 
feminism and, 23, 82; Garréta and, 2, 
15n37, 16–18, 21, 126, 129; language and, 
7n13, 107, 119, 130–31, 143n28, 212, 232–33; 
lesbianism and, 12, 19, 21, 21n49, 28; 
as political writer, 44, 81–86, 126, 129; 
psychoanalysis and, 154, 154n42, 181n34; 
Sarraute and, 2, 14n32, 17–18, 20, 44n15, 
71–72, 74, 76, 77, 82, 83, 120, 123; Trojan 
horse and, 139, 144n29, 144–45, 234
Wittig, Monique, on: corps-à-corps, 207; Le 
Corps lesbien, 207, 210; difference, 167; 
gender, 70; lesbians, 13, 19, 21, 21n49; lit-
erary criticism, 89; metaphors, 178, 179; 
psychoanalysis, 154n42; relationship to 
language, 96, 98–99, 102–3; Sarraute’s 
language, 45, 60, 121; signified and sig-
nifier, 93–94, 96, 220; social contract, 
94–95, 121; Trojan horse, 96, 131–32, 
144–45; universality, 144–45; writing and 
language, 89, 122, 204, 209
Wittig, Monique, works of, 18, 20, 82n5, 125, 
234–38; Brouillon pour un dictionnaire 
des amantes, 12, 19, 76, 81n3, 86n11, 114, 
133; Le Chantier littéraire, 12, 27, 45, 81, 
81n4, 82–103, 110–17, 131, 153, 157, 161, 
178–79, 191, 193, 197–98, 207–10; “Com-
bat pour la libération des femmes,” 13; 
The Constant Journey, 12; Le Corps les-
bien, 12, 19, 76–77, 81n3, 86n11, 114–15, 
133, 193–212, 226–27; Les Guérillères, 12, 
19, 69, 70, 75n61, 76, 80, 81n3, 86n11, 
99, 114–15, 133; innovation in, 20, 85, 
86, 96, 101; “The Mark of Gender,” 70, 
 I N D E x •  263
98, 99, 113n34; L’Opoponax, 12, 15n37, 17, 
20, 69, 70, 81n3, 82, 86, 99, 103–16, 127, 
132; Paris-la-politique, 12, 19; La Pen-
sée straight, 13, 113n34, 205–7; “Some 
Remarks on The Lesbian Body,” 207; 
The Straight Mind, 13, 17–18, 21n49, 27, 
80–85, 81n3, 90–91, 99, 145; tonal shift 
in, 19–20, 77, 115; utopia in, 82, 127; vio-
lence in, 213, 238; Virgile, non, 12, 19, 
81n3, 86n11, 133
woman, women 13, 19, 29, 39, 133, 207–8; 
Garréta and, 160n47, 214–19, 222, 229; 
Sarraute as, 10, 11; suffrage and equal-
ity for, 23–24, 24n53, 201, 203; as texts, 
220–21, 231–32; as writers, 37–40
Woolf, Virginia, 4
World War II, 9n15, 10n17; Sarraute during, 
9, 44–45, 75n60
Wright, Barbara, 105
writer, writers, 28, 120 145, 161, 190–91, 212, 
214n73, 222, 232; dérangement of, 212–14; 
innovation by, 96, 116–17; language and, 
92, 172, 207; obligations of, 118, 184–85; 
in Sarraute’s Entre la vie et la mort, 180, 
184, 186–87, 190–91; Wittig’s instructions 
to, 97–98
writing, 44, 50, 204, 221, 229, 230, 231; gen-
dered, 37, 38; language and, 187–88; 
non-gendered, 39, 42; in Sarraute’s Entre 




Zeig, Sande, 12, 13, 76
Zola, Émile, 150

